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# SPACE AND TIME IN ANCIENT GREEK NARRATIVE

ALEX C. PURVES



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## **SPACE AND TIME IN ANCIENT GREEK NARRATIVE**

In this wide-ranging survey of ancient Greek narrative from archaic epic to classical prose, Alex C. Purves shows how stories unfold in space as well as in time. She traces a shift in authorial perspective, from a godlike overview to the more focused outlook of human beings caught up in a developing plot, inspired by advances in cartography, travel, and geometry. Her analysis of the temporal and spatial dimensions of ancient narrative leads to new interpretations of important texts by Homer, Herodotus, and Xenophon, among others, showing previously unnoticed connections between epic and prose. Drawing on the methods of classical philology, narrative theory, and cultural geography, Purves recovers a poetics of spatial representation that lies at the core of the Greeks' conception of their plots.

Alex C. Purves is assistant professor of classics at the University of California, Los Angeles.



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**ALEX C. PURVES**

University of California, Los Angeles



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*For Lionel and Orlando*





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## INTRODUCTION: THE PERFECT SURVEYOR

A Poet is as much to say as a maker. And our English name well conformes with the Greeke word: for of ποιῆν to make, they call a maker Poeta. . . .

Otherwise how was it possible that Homer being but a poore priuate man, and as some say, in his later age blind, should so exactly set foorth and describe, as if he had bene a most excellent Captaine or Generall, the order and array of battels, the conduct of whole armies, the sieges and assaults of cities and townes? Or as some . . . perfect Surueyour in Court, the order, sumptuousnesse and magnificence of royal bankets, feasts, weddings, and enteruewes?

George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie*

THE ARTE OF ENGLISH POESIE OPENS BY PRAISING HOMER AND HIS ability to “set forth and describe” the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, comparing it to the practical abilities of a general or a “perfect surveyor.”<sup>1</sup> Having commented on the etymology of the Classical word for poet, Puttenham goes on to describe poetry in terms that relate to the practice of making, marking, planning, and measuring out an object or place. The conceit of the poet as a perfect surveyor is a useful one with which to introduce the topic of this book, for it draws a parallel between narrative and place, asking us to imagine the poem as a kind of literary landscape that we might survey in our mind’s eye, as if it were a vista. My concern in this book will be to try to articulate the different forms that such a “view” of a plot might take.

I begin in this introduction by setting out some of the ways in which Homer encourages his audience to “see” his poem. In the chapters that follow, I argue that in the movement from Homeric epic to Classical prose it is possible to identify two sets of competing discourses informing the notion of a literary work’s shape, space, or view. The first

<sup>1</sup> Puttenham 1988, 1.1–2.

aspires to the fantastic (and, in human terms, impossible) way that the Muses are imagined to see in the *Iliad*. This viewpoint can be labeled protocartographic because of its affinities not only to early versions of *mappae mundi*, such as the Shield of Achilles, but also to the invention of cartography in the Greek world and, in particular, its uses in literature from the sixth and fifth centuries BCE.<sup>2</sup> The second discourse is more closely aligned with prose and the practice of investigating through walking. It takes the road as its dominant metaphor and sets forth a view of the plot that is sequential rather than simultaneous, requiring time to reach the end. I call this second way of seeing countercartographic, because it thematically and sometimes literally rejects the poetics of the map.<sup>3</sup>

Puttenham was not alone in his fascination with the “blind” Homer’s ability to open up a vista for us, to create a poetic landscape that is viewable in the mind’s eye.<sup>4</sup> In the fifth century, Metrodorus of Lampsacus famously saw the *Iliad* as a model of the cosmos, with the heroes standing in for its different spatial components.<sup>5</sup> Thus the chase of Hector by Achilles around the walls of Troy could be conceptualized, as if one were standing back and looking at the poem from a distance, as the circuit of the moon and sun around the earth. Later on, Crates understood the *Iliad* to have the form of a sphere. By this he meant not just that the sphere was a dominant motif in the narrative, but that it was intrinsic to the shape of the poem itself.<sup>6</sup>

Crates’ and Metrodorus’s interpretations of Homer may exist on the fringes of mainstream ancient literary criticism, yet they express the popular idea that a poem can be viewed in the mind’s eye as if it were a landscape or a picture of the whole. The sentiment is clearly articulated by Aristotle (*Poet.* 23.1459a30–4):

διὸ ὥσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μὴδὲ τὸν πόλεμον καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος

<sup>2</sup> On the Shield of Achilles as an early map, cf. Hardie 1985; Dilke 1985, 20, 55–6; Harley and Woodward 1987, 130–2.

<sup>3</sup> The concepts of the protocartographic and countercartographic viewpoints were suggested to me by Karen Bassi, and I have used them throughout the book as a means of organizing the difference between two competing ways of seeing in early Greek narrative.

<sup>4</sup> On the difference between things perceived with the mind’s eye and the bodily eye, see Bühler 1990, 137–57.

<sup>5</sup> The gods represented the “arrangement of the elements” (στοιχείων διακοσμήσεις) relating to the human body (such as the liver and spleen). DK 61A3. See further Califf 2003.

<sup>6</sup> See Porter 1992 for discussion and sources.



## INTRODUCTION

ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον· λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος  
ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι ὁ μῦθος, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον  
τῇ ποικιλίᾳ.

Just as we said before, Homer would appear to speak in a divine way (*thespesios*) compared to the rest, in that he did not attempt to make the war a whole, even though it had a beginning and an end. For the plot would otherwise have been too large and not easily seen at one time (*ouk eusynoptos*), or, if scaled down in length, too closely woven with detail (*poikilia*).

Later readers of the *Iliad* subscribed to a similar concept. As Goethe wrote to Schiller in the spring of 1798 (Von Sachsen 1893, bd. 13, 140):<sup>7</sup>

Your letter, as you wished, has found me amidst the *Iliad*, to which I always gladly return, as one always will, exactly as if one found oneself in a hot air balloon, held aloft over all earthly things and truly in the intervening space in which the gods travel to and fro. . . .

In 1775, Robert Wood wrote a treatise entitled *On the Original Genius of Homer*, in which he also compared his vantage point as a reader to that of the Homeric gods (135):

When I attempted to follow the steps of these poetical journies [of the gods], in my eye, from Mount Ida, and other elevated situations on the Aeolian and Ionian side of the Aegean sea; I could take in so many of them as to form a tolerable picture of the whole.

While Richard Jebb in “A Tour in the Troad” (1883) comments on Homer’s almost supernatural ability to conjure up an entire world before our eyes, by placing the poet in the role of a god looking down from a great height (520):<sup>8</sup>

And it is in taking a bird’s-eye view from a height, not in looking around one on the level, that the comprehensive truth of Homeric topography is most vividly grasped. Homer is as his own Zeus or his own Poseidon, not as one of the mortals warring on the lower ground.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Goethe’s description of “true poetry” in Trunz 1981: “Wie ein Luftballon hebt sie uns mit dem Ballast, der uns anhängt, in höhere Regionen, und läßt die verwirrten Irrgänge der Erde in Vogelperspektive vor uns entwickelt daliegen.” Schadewaldt 1959, 368.

<sup>8</sup> I thank James Porter for alerting me to the passages from Wood and Jebb here, as well as the Nietzsche passage that follows. See further Porter 2004.

These readers either implicitly or explicitly take their cue from the Olympians who appear to watch the Achaeans and Trojans simultaneously and from a single point of view at certain key moments in the *Iliad* (8.51–2, 11.80–3; 13.10–14):<sup>9</sup>

αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κορυφῇσι καθέζετο κύδει γαίων,  
εἰσορόων Τρώων τε πόλιν καὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν.

[Zeus] himself sat on the peak of the mountain, glorying in his  
splendor,  
looking down on the city of the Trojans and the ships of the  
Achaeans

ὁ δὲ νόσφι λιασθεὶς  
τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάνευθε καθέζετο κύδει γαίων,  
εἰσορόων Τρώων τε πόλιν καὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν  
χαλκοῦ τε στεροπῆν, ὀλλύντας τ' ὀλλυμένους τε.

[Zeus] having turned away  
sat apart from the other gods glorying in his splendor,  
looking down on the city of the Trojans and the ships of the  
Achaeans,  
the flashing of weapons, and men killing and being killed.

Οὐδ' ἀλαοσκοπιῆν εἶχε κρείων ἐνοσίχθων·  
καὶ γὰρ ὁ θαυμάζων ἦστο πτόλεμόν τε μάχην τε  
ὑποῦ ἐπ' ἀκροτάτης κορυφῆς Σάμου ὑληέσσης  
Θρηϊκίης· ἔνθεν γὰρ ἐφαίνετο πᾶσα μὲν Ἴδη,  
φαίνετο δὲ Πριάμοιο πόλις καὶ νῆες Ἀχαιῶν.

Neither did the mighty shaker of the earth keep blind watch  
for he sat marveling at the fighting and the battle,  
high up on the loftiest peak of woody Samos,  
in Thrace. From that point all of Ida was visible,  
and the city of Priam and the ships of the Achaeans were visible.

This is similar to Hesiod's account of how Zeus sees in the *Works and Days*: πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας ("The eye of Zeus sees all things and notices all things").<sup>10</sup>

Clearly, there is an element of fantasy at play here. Homer is not divine, yet these authors hint at the possibility that the poet is able to present the

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Scodel 2008, 123. At *Il.* 13.3–9 Zeus turns his eyes away from the battle to look toward distant lands; at *Il.* 15.4–12, he wakes up and immediately surveys the scene on the battlefield, taking in large- and small-scale events.

<sup>10</sup> Hes. *Op.* 267–9. Cf. M. L. West 1978, ad loc.; Sol. 13.17 states that Zeus oversees the end of all things (Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος).

## INTRODUCTION

topography of his plot synoptically because he has some kind of special access to the way that the immortals see. This is also the impression that Aristotle gives when discussing the *Iliad* in the *Poetics*, as we saw a few pages earlier, when he called Homer divine in speech (θεσπέσιος) for his ability to make the poem “easily seen at one time” (εὐσύνοπτος). One might note briefly that it is in fact quite difficult to form a clear mental picture of the scenes taking place on the Trojan plain in the poem.<sup>11</sup> Yet the idea that the *Iliad* really did present itself as a perfectly surveyable whole was pervasive enough for Nietzsche to refute it emphatically in his inaugural lecture on Homer and Classical Philology, delivered at the University of Basel in 1869 (Kennedy 1924: 164–5):

The design of an epic such as the *Iliad* is not an entire whole, not an organism; but a number of pieces strung together, a collection of reflections arranged in accordance with aesthetic rules. It is certainly the standard of an artist’s greatness to note what he can take in with a single glance (*zugleich mit einem Gesamtblick überschauen*) and set out in rhythmical form. The infinite profusion of images and incidents (*Bildern und Szenen*) in the Homeric epic must force us to admit that such a wide range of vision (*einen solchen Gesamtblick*) is next to impossible.

Nietzsche challenges the myth that the Homeric epic can somehow be seen in its entirety in a single glance, although he acknowledges the appeal of this concept. It might even be said that Homer, through passages such as the invocation to the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships, is looking back to the possibility of an epic narrative that he himself is not capable of. As Andersson has remarked: “we might assume that [the gods’] constant view from above would provide some focus on the battlefield. It never does” (1976, 23). Yet it is hard to resist the allure of the god’s-eye view in the *Iliad*. Because the poem repeatedly hints that others can view its “images and incidents” synoptically (the gods looking down from Ida, Samos, or Olympus; the Muses who inspire the poet; the Teichoskopia; Helen weaving her tapestry of the numerous battles between the Achaeans and the Trojans; the crafting of so many different scenes onto a single shield for Achilles), we are drawn into the illusion that, in our mind’s eye, we – and “Homer” – actually do see the poem in that way.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Andersson states that “unsurveyability is . . . an inherent feature of the epic” (1976, 21). For an alternative assessment of the *Iliad*’s clarity of space, see Lowe 2000, 112–13. Thornton 1984, 150–63, gives excellent detail on the topography of the plain. I discuss the bird’s-eye view in Homer in Ch. 1.

<sup>12</sup> As Nietzsche argued, the myth of “what Homer saw” is inextricably bound up with the myth of who “Homer” is. Unitarian readings are thus more susceptible to

This is a fascinating problem because it clarifies the relevance of topography and form to the unity of a poem at the same time as it suggests that a poem becomes thinkable, as a whole, by virtue of its being viewable.<sup>13</sup> As the examples from Puttenham, Wood, Jebb, and Aristotle indicate, the ideal of the perfectly shaped and viewable plot is expressed through an alliance of supernatural affinity and technical skill or craft.<sup>14</sup> The plot mirrors the viewpoint of the gods because the poet can be considered a “perfect surveyor” (Puttenham), at the same time as he can be commended for his sophistication in composing his story (Aristotle).

What Homer himself says about his own art in the invocation to the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships is that he has absolutely no (οὐδέ τι) access to all the things (πάντα) that the Muses see (*Il.* 2.484–6):

Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι –  
 ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαὶ ἐστέ, πάρεστέ τε, ἴστέ τε πάντα,  
 ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν –  
 οἳ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν.

Tell me now Muses, who have your homes on Olympus –  
 for you are goddesses, and are present, and know/have seen all things,  
 while we hear only fame but know/have seen nothing at all –  
 who were the leaders and the lords of the Achaeans.

This juxtaposition of microscopic and the macroscopic levels of detail (from *ti*, potentially the very smallest amount, to *panta*, the very largest) has a lot to do with how a particular scene or subject matter is visually

constructing the notion of a unitary and complete vision (poetic genius) coming from a single man. See further Notopoulos 1964, 57–9, who argues that the paratactic style of oral poetics “is an additive process and thus leads away from the organic concept of literature” embedded in Aristotle’s notion of the *eusynoptic* (58).

<sup>13</sup> The remarks of Owen (1947, 188) are instructive: “The poet’s method, just considered as a piece of literary engineering, may be described as the device of the single plane.” Owen’s plane overlaps with the Trojan plain (189: “we are thus enabled to see it all without straying from the battlefield”), leading to a point that is similar to Aristotle’s in the *Poetics*. See further Auerbach [1953] 2003, 3–23 on the notions of background and foreground in Homeric style, and Ch. 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Poietês* is first used for the figure of the poet at *Hdt.* 2.53 (P. Murray 1996, 8, note 21). Some scholars argue that craft has little or no relevance to the Homeric poet (Svenbro 1976, 193–212; Ford 1992, 31–9; Finkelberg 1998, 100–30). Others see it as an important component of the poet’s skill (M. L. West 1973, 179; P. Murray 1981, 98–9; Gentili 1988, 5–7, 236–7, note 4; Pratt 1993, 68, note 23; Nagy [1979] 1999, 296–300). What concerns me here is the clearly stated relationship between the epic *plot* and words to do with crafting or making (e.g., τεκταίνομαι, ἀρτύ[ν]ω, ὑφαίνω, τεύχω). Cf. *Il.* 3.212, 6.187, 357–8, 10.17–19; *Od.* 3.132, 152; 11.363–6, 368, 13.439, 14.131–2; 17.382–5, 24.197–8; Hes. fr. dub. 357 M–W.

framed. To be in control of one's literary landscape is also to be able to count up its elements and measure its distances and magnitudes. The finer the level of detail and complexity, the more *poikilos* (variegated) the view. This, in turn, slows down the time of the viewing and the tempo of the story line. If a narrator commits to this way of viewing, how then to fit the view of the whole into a limited frame? On the other hand, if one were to give an account of the whole, how would it be possible to do so except in the most general terms and without giving names and details? Homer acknowledges that it is possible for the Muses to see both the all and the detail at the same time, but he goes on in this passage to negate any possibility that *he* can narrate the *pléthus* (2.488), the great number of Achaeans who first came to Troy.

The terms of Homer's self-deprecation are suggestive. He proceeds to fashion a hypothetical part-mechanical, part-mathematical version of himself by multiplying and metallizing the ordinary aspects of his human body (*Il.* 2.488–90):

πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,  
οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν,  
φωνή δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη,  
εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο  
θυγατέρες, μνησαίαθ' ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον.

I could not tell nor name the multitude,  
not even if I had ten tongues and ten mouths,  
an unbreakable voice, and a heart of bronze inside me,  
unless the Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus,  
should bring to my mind how many men came under Troy.

Like the robotic girls in Hephaestus's workshop who are able to move untiringly and attend to the gods' every need (*Il.* 18.417–20), the poet uses metal to suggest perdurance but also a kind of supernatural artistry, where technical and magical skill converge in order to create a "heart of bronze."<sup>15</sup> The voice (*phônê*) is here described using the adjective "unbreakable" (*arrêktos*), which is used elsewhere in Homer only to refer to crafted objects – the gods' metal bonds, a rope (*peirar*), Aeolus's bronze wall, the Achaean wall – that need to be divinely made in order to be effective.<sup>16</sup> By attributing to himself a partly immortal, partly manufactured voice and heart, Homer attempts to bridge the gap between his

<sup>15</sup> Cf. the fashioning of Pandora (Hes. *Theog.* 571–84; *Op.* 60–82).

<sup>16</sup> *Il.* 13.37, 360; 14.56, 68; 15.20; *Od.* 8.275; 10.4. The Achaean wall, the only object described as *arrêktos* but *not* made by the gods, fails to live up to its adjective (*Il.* 14.56).

own limited knowledge base and the ability to recount the vast mass (*plêthus*) of the Achaeans.

There is more to be said about the confluence of the technical or practical arts and the supernatural in this key passage on Homeric *poësis*. By imaginatively multiplying his body by ten, Homer attempts to quantify the *plêthus* using a simple principle of arithmetic. If the number of Achaeans were divided into ten sets that could be narrated simultaneously, would they then fit within the poet's artistic range? Could the vast number of men who first sailed to Troy be ordered and recounted if reconfigured within mathematical proportions? We should not be too quick to dismiss Homer's multiplication by ten here as only hyperbolic numbering or the magical use of a formulaic number.<sup>17</sup> The number ten is often a formulaic rather than a quantitative number in Homer, but in Book 2 it weaves its own intratextual thread.<sup>18</sup>

First, the recollection of the prophecy involving the snake swallowing nine birds indicates, for the first time in the poem, that the Achaeans are fated to take Troy "in the tenth year" (they are now in the ninth, 2.329). Second, Agamemnon tells Nestor that *if there were only ten* Achaeans like him they would have captured Troy long ago (2.372–4). This concept of numbering the Achaeans by the power of ten (especially in reference to their ability to take Ilium) develops a theme that Agamemnon set in motion earlier in the book, when he attempted to count up all the Achaeans by ordering them into tens (2.123–30):

εἴ περ γάρ κ' ἐθέλοιμεν Ἀχαιοί τε Τρῶές τε,  
 ὄρκια πιστὰ ταμόντες, ἀριθμηθήμεναι ἄμφω,  
 Τρῶας μὲν λέξασθαι ἐφέστιοι ὅσοι ἔασιν,  
 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐς δεκάδας διακοσμηθεῖμεν Ἀχαιοί,  
 Τρώων δ' ἄνδρα ἕκαστοι ἐλοίμεθα οἶνοχοεῖν,  
 πολλάί κεν δεκάδες δευοῖατο οἶνοχόοιο.  
 τόσπον ἐγὼ φημι πλέας ἔμμεναι υἱᾶς Ἀχαιῶν  
 Τρώων, οἳ ναίουσι κατὰ πτόλιν.

<sup>17</sup> See Martin 1989, 224 on *Il.* 9.379–80. The number ten can impart the idea of impossibility (cf. *Il.* 8.418). On the notion of the formulaic or magical number, see Rubincam 2003, 449. Ford 1992, 79–82 discusses the impossibility of counting up to the amount that the Muses see with reference to Kant's mathematical sublime.

<sup>18</sup> The tenth day or year, incorporated into the model of "9 + 1" is a common epic device (e.g., *Il.* 1.54, 6.175, 9.479, 24.612; *Od.* 7.253, 9.83, 10.29, 12.447, 14.314; cf. M. L. West 1966, ad *Theog.* 636). Note that it occurs not only in the overall time frame of the *Iliad* but also in the days allotted for the burial of Hector (24.665, 785). In this light, it is interesting to observe that to reach the number ten (the tenth year, tenth day, etc.) is to reach the end.

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For if we both, Achaeans and Trojans, agreed  
to make faithful oaths and both have our numbers calculated –  
if as many Trojans as who live in the city were counted,  
and we Achaeans arranged ourselves into tens,  
then if we, each group of ten of us, chose a single man of the  
Trojans to pour our wine,  
still there would be many groups of ten left over without a wine  
steward.  
By that much I say the sons of the Achaeans outnumber  
the Trojans who inhabit the city.

Here, just as in Homer's invocation, dividing the number of Achaeans into tens is not enough to render them quantifiable. Their number is too large to be brought into an ordered proportion, as the similes comparing them to flies, leaves, and other uncountable things, as well as the resemblance of their number to sand or leaves elsewhere in Book 2, confirms.<sup>19</sup> In the end, although neither mathematics nor metal (nor even the two combined) adds up to a divine point of view ("Not even if I had ten tongues . . . and a heart of bronze"), they are still presented as the human poet's best resources at approximating one. The invocation to the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships makes clear that Homer is no immortal and will never see as the Muses do (2.486–7). Yet at the same time, it proposes solutions to Homer's poetic limitations through various technical and practical avenues.

Once Homer has dispensed with the idea of performing the *plêthus* by means of a quasi-mechanical superbody, he states that he will list instead the leaders and "all of the ships as well" (*Il.* 2.491–3):

εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο  
θυγατέρες, μνησαίᾱθ' ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον·  
ἄρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας.

Unless the Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus,  
should bring to my mind how many men came under Troy.  
But I will tell of the leaders of the ships and all of the ships as well.

He then recites the Catalogue of Ships, a brilliant feat of memorization and enumeration whose arrangement traces a geographical route through mainland Greece.<sup>20</sup> Scholars have argued that this route works

<sup>19</sup> *Il.* 2.87ff., esp. 455–83, 800.

<sup>20</sup> Giovannini 1969, 51–71; Kirk 1985, ad loc.

as a memory path that the poet is able to visualize and follow in the process of counting out the ships and their leaders in order (*katalegein*).<sup>21</sup>

This is as close as Homer comes to translating the vision of the Muses into words, and his ordered partitioning and framing of their perspective within the catalogue form successfully imparts an impression of both the detail and the whole. Indeed, although the Muses saw much more, and – in this case – many more men, than Homer can put into speech, the Catalogue of Ships is already a considerable length. In the *Odyssey*, Homer occasionally indicates how long an unabridged translation of the Muses' vision might take to narrate or what it might sound like. Thus Odysseus is said to recount *everything* about his journey to Penelope (*katalexai hapanta*, *Od.* 23.309), fulfilling one fantasy of epic storytelling in the supernaturally long and magical night created by Athena.<sup>22</sup> Alternatively, the Sirens claim that they know everything (*idmen . . . pant' hossa*) that happened at Troy and everything else (*idmen d' hossa*) that happens on the broad earth, and that the traveler might hear them sing it and still return home happy to his family. But the rotting corpses on their island suggest, by contrast, a nightmarish outcome for humans who succumb to the Muses' vision (*Od.* 12.39–54, 166–200).

The same overdetermined sense of “all” is to be found in Herodotus' description of cartography (*Hdt.* 5.49: *hapasês, pasa, pantês*) and his description of Xerxes' political yearnings to subsume all (*panta*) the world under his domain (7.8γ.1–2). In Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the sheer number (*plêthos polu*, 3.2.16) of the king's men approaching in battle provides an overwhelming visual impact on the narrator, while in his *Oeconomicus* the ability to record the place of each thing (*hekastos*) in infinite detail offers the reader an idealized version of the *oikos* in its entirety. In each of these cases, as we will explore in the following chapters, a delicate balancing act is in play between achieving comprehensiveness and unity, on the one hand, and imparting detail and variation, on the other.

<sup>21</sup> Minchin 2001, 84–7. On the catalogue as “ordered enumeration,” see Minton 1960, 1962, as a “full, exact account” Bakker 1997a, 56, note 5. See further Krischer 1971, 102–4; Edwards 1980; Ford 1992, 75–6.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Od.* 11.373, where Alcinoos calls the night of Odysseus' storytelling “endless,” and by contrast, *Od.* 4.240–3, where Helen tells Telemachus that she could not name all (*panta*) Odysseus' trials, just this one (*all' hoion tode*), or *Od.* 11.516–19, where Odysseus uses the same device in relating all the men killed by Neoptolemus to Achilles (*pantas . . . all' hoion ton . . .*). Cf. *Od.* 7.341–4, 11.328–31, 17.513–17; Worman 2002, 56–65.



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The terms of this balancing act are often negotiated at the point where the supernatural ideal of absolute and infinite (cartographic) vision meets, or almost meets, with the human attempt to count up to infinity or to measure and account for the world through man-made inventions or technologies. Thus, in the case of Herodotus, I argue that the Pythia's divine ability to count up all the grains of sand in the world and the measures (*metra*) of the sea (1.47.3) is countered by Herodotus's own use of *metra*, as in his empirical measurement of the Black Sea, for example (4.85.2–86.4).<sup>23</sup> Like the first combined map and prose treatise, called a *perimeton* (DK 12A1), Herodotus appears here to be adapting epic's programmatic meaning of *metra* to the new discourse of the prose author who sees not through the gods, but rather through his own scientific enquiry, or *historiê*.<sup>24</sup> It is no accident, I suggest, that the prose authors – in seeking to differentiate themselves from the epic perspective of the Muses – readjust the generic dimensions of *metra* to fit their own methodology.

Many of these authors' explorations into how measurement or arithmetic might provide a sense of surveyability of the whole originate from fields such as science, geometry, mathematics, or agriculture, and they often circle back to a key set of questions having to do with land and its relationship to literature. How is the literary plot like a territory or demarcated area? How does poetic form or style relate to a shape that has physical dimensions, or that can be mapped out on the ground? What is the relationship between visualizing a poem in the mind's eye and looking out over an imaginary landscape?<sup>25</sup>

In the *Iliad*, Homer uses various technical metaphors in order to give shape and a sense of space to his plot.<sup>26</sup> Some of these are well known: Helen's web uses the art of weaving to provide a spatial tableau of the *Iliad* (3.123–38); the manufacture of the Shield of Achilles uses metallurgy to set a picture of the cosmos within a single frame. Scholars have commented on the mimetic nature of both of these activities to the

<sup>23</sup> Hartog 1988, 342.

<sup>24</sup> Anaximander was said to have been the first to draw an outline (*perimeton*) of the earth and sea, as discussed in Ch. 3.

<sup>25</sup> The literary models of graph, diagram, and tree have recently been explored by Moretti 2005. On the relationship of literary models to maps, cf. Moretti 1998. On literature and spatial form, Frank 1945.

<sup>26</sup> It is relevant that Homer depicts the gods "fashioning" and "constructing" plots within the poems, using crafting vocabulary such as *teuchô* and *artuô* (Ford 1992, 37–9). Note also the "plan" of Zeus at *Il.* 1.5.

composition of the *Iliad* itself.<sup>27</sup> Other applications of technical skill to space within the poem appear on a smaller scale, such as in the simile when a farmer measures out the area of a field (*Il.* 12.421–2):

ἀλλ' ὥς τ' ἀμφ' οὔροισι δὺ' ἀνέρε δηριόασθον,  
μέτρ' ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες, ἐπιξύνω ἐν ἀρούρη

But as two men contend over boundary lines,  
with measuring ropes in their hands, in a common field

or when distances are marked in agricultural terms (*Il.* 10.351–3):<sup>28</sup>

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἀπέην ὅσσόν τ' ἐπὶ οὔρα πέλονται  
ἡμιόνων – αἱ γάρ τε βοῶν προφερέστεραί εἰσιν  
ἐλκόμεναι νειοῖο βαθείης πηκτὸν ἄροτρον –

But when he had gone on as far as the distance of  
ploughing mules – for they are better than oxen  
at dragging the well-worked plough through the depth of the  
field –

or by the conventions of athletics and competition (*Il.* 23.431–2):

ὅσσα δὲ δίσκου οὔρα κατωμαδίῳ πέλονται,  
ὅν τ' αἰζηὸς ἀφῆκεν ἀνὴρ πειρώμενος ἥβης,

As far as the distance of a discus thrown from the shoulder,  
which a lusty young man testing the strength of his youth releases

Each of these examples marks boundaries (*oura*) and negotiates distance, placing in the mind of the audience various set areas of space against which they can measure the dimensions of the *Iliad*.

When Puttenham calls Homer the “perfect surueyour,” he reminds us that the poet centers his plot on a limited area of land (the Trojan

<sup>27</sup> On Helen’s web, see Bergren 2008, 43–57, and the scholia ad *Il.* 3.126–7, where the poet is said to have modeled (ἀνέπλασεν) in the web a figure or archetype (ἀρχέτυπον) of his own poem (Erbse 1969; Bergren 2008, 48). Scheid and Svenbro’s rejection of the metaphor is unconvincing (1996, 116). On the shield, see Hardie 1985, esp. 15ff.; Hubbard 1992, with further bibliography; Taplin 1998, 107, writes of the shield that it is “as though Homer has allowed us temporarily to stand back from the poem and see it in its place – like a ‘detail’ from the reproduction of a painting – within a larger landscape, a landscape which is usually blotted from sight by the all-consuming narrative in the foreground.”

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Il.* 23.431; *Od.* 8.124. Aristarchus was impressed with Homer’s agricultural expertise in this simile (Hainsworth 1993, ad loc.).

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plain) that can be fully accounted for, and also that he repeatedly presents his audience with the illusion of absolute scopic authority.<sup>29</sup> Without this, the *Iliad* would have lost its celebrated unity and would not be as easily thinkable as a single, viewable whole. Yet the Muses, the perfect surveyors *par excellence* of the poem, present an ideal that is also a paradox, since for Homer to see as they see would result in the narrative breaking out of form and time. The impossible, infinite, and boundless nature of immortality can be co-opted for its synoptic possibilities by the poet only once it has been set in proportion through human mechanics and measurement.

The invocation of the Muses in *Iliad* 2 articulates the reader's desire for unity and the impulse to see narrative as a single and complete object, as if from the Muses' perspective.<sup>30</sup> This idea of the poem as an "object" that can be "seen" is complemented by the role of the god's-eye view in the plot of the poem. Both of these approaches bring us close to formalism, a way of reading that suggests that good literature has an ordered shape that can be abstracted and admired for its timeless qualities.<sup>31</sup> As a method of literary analysis, formalism has been criticized for stripping away all aspects of process and temporality, leaving an ideal and unchanging artifact.<sup>32</sup> This has often proven to be the case whether we think about form in verbal terms, through an examination of rhetoric and style, or in visual terms, as the spatial or geometric arrangement of the whole. Gallagher outlines the differences and similarities between these two notions (2000, 231):

Form as an arrangement or structure seems molar, an outline of the whole; form as style seems molecular, an enlargement of a detail. Form as structure comes into view only from a distance; form as style

<sup>29</sup> The word surveyor ("surueyour") encompasses several meanings, especially in this period. Puttenham might be invoking here the meaning of "an officer who superintended the preparation and serving of food" (Whigham and Rebhorn 2007, 94, note 14), which relates nicely to Agamemnon's imaginary role as a "surveyor" at a feast for all the Achaeans and Trojans. The more common use of the term in the sixteenth century denotes oversight of the lands and boundaries of an estate or the practical surveying of land (*OED* s.v. 1.d, 1.e, 3.a).

<sup>30</sup> Even though the view of the "whole" *Iliad*, all at once, would be too much for the reader to take in. See Ford for further discussion of this paradox (1992, 57–89).

<sup>31</sup> On the differing "shapes" of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, see Thalmann 1984, 1–77; on the "shapeliness" or *kosmos* of Homeric art, Walsh 1984, 3–21.

<sup>32</sup> The same criticism has been leveled against narratology, although – as with formalism – several scholars have been working with versions of narrative theory that do not depend on static models. See, e.g., G. Stewart 2008.

requires unusually close proximity. . . . Both versions of form may be said to arrest narrative flow, one by generalizing an enduring pattern toward which the moments contribute and the other by freezing a moment for analysis.

But, as several scholars, including Gallagher, have argued, the consideration of form and time need not be mutually exclusive. This is especially true when the mechanics of production are taken into account.<sup>33</sup> Both Helen's web and Hephaestus's shield in the *Iliad* are depicted in the process of being made, using the imperfect tense.<sup>34</sup> This emphasis on duration counteracts the synchronizing effect of studying a form, shape, or image out of the context of its production. The movement of time and its relationship to the shape of the narrative will be of central importance throughout this book, especially when we consider the image of narrative as an *animate* form that moves through time.

Alongside the formalist study of literature we should also mention the relevance to this study of Peter Brooks's work on the concept of the plot. Brooks describes how the English word "plot" expresses a spatial or topographical idea at the heart of narrative (1984, 12):

There may be a subterranean logic connecting [the] heterogeneous meanings [of the English word plot]. Common to the original sense of the word is the idea of boundedness, demarcation, the drawing of lines to mark off and order. This easily extends to the chart or diagram of the demarcated area, which in turn modulates to the outline of the literary work. We might think here of the geometrical expression, plotting points, or curves, on a graph by means of coordinates, as a way of locating something, perhaps oneself.

Here and elsewhere in his analysis, Brooks uncovers an allegiance between narrative structure and the ground.<sup>35</sup> We begin with geometry

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Turner 2006 (I owe this reference to James Porter), 16, who quotes De Man 1983, 31: "The idea of totality suggests closed forms that strive for ordered and consistent systems and have an almost irresistible tendency to transform themselves into objective structures. Yet, the temporal factor, so persistently forgotten, should remind us that the form is never anything but a process on the way to its completion."

<sup>34</sup> As noted by Bergren 2008, 46–7, for Helen's web and Giuliani 2003, 40–1, for Achilles' shield.

<sup>35</sup> Cornford 1957, 15–17 draws a parallel topographical meaning for the word *moira*. More recently, Turner has shown how the term plot or "plat" in the early modern period applied not only to geometrical ground plans and military strategy (from the French *complot*) but also to the three-dimensional structure of the "platform" of the stage (2006, 21–5). On the idea of the classical plot, see Lowe 2000, esp. 61–78. Brooks's interest in the stories that can emerge in and through space connects him to

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and measurement, and from there move on to the idea of a circumscribed area that converges with the way we classify and shape a literary plot. Brooks's discussion will be useful for the way in which it brings to light different versions of the measured area of land, ground plan, diagram, or scheme that shape the plots that we will consider in this book.<sup>36</sup>

Plot's spatial legacy is pervasive in ancient Greek thought, where songs might be conceived as pathways, *logoi* as routes, writing as the movement of oxen turning back and forth across a field with a plough (*boustrophedon*), narratives as pictures or landscapes, and plots even as living creatures that take up set areas of space. Aristotle conceptualizes both the sentence (*lexis* or *periodos*) and the plot (*muthos*) in terms of terrain, as if both occupied a measured or fixed area of ground. In his formulation, as we will discuss in the following chapters, it is as if the plot were a place that could be looked at, traveled across, or remembered as a landscape in the mind. The correspondence between plot and topography is expressed in the Greek world through spaces that range in structure and scale from the room to the cosmos, from the circuit of a racetrack to a march across Asia Minor. The ways in which characters in ancient Greek texts conceptualize and make sense of space provide us with insights into the structures of their narrative and enable us to see more clearly the workings and parameters of their plots.

The *Iliad* and its reception lay the foundations for the central questions that I ask of other texts in the book. I began this introduction by investigating a fundamental problem posed both by Homer and by later readers of his poem: how to "see" the *Iliad* as a single, synoptic whole, as the Muses do. I then went on to give an account of the way that we might understand the concept of literature having a "form" that is viewable in the mind's eye, especially in relation to the various practical and spatial metaphors that give it shape. In the last third of this introduction, it remains for me to explain how all of this fits into a diachronic scheme. In other words, how does the *Iliad* set the stage for the relationship between space and plot in the literature that follows it?

a well-established theme in literary criticism. See e.g., Bakhtin, who has shown how the "chronotope" of the road informs the course of the literary plot, or De Certeau for his tracking of the "narrative paths" that walkers make as they move from one part of the city to another (Bakhtin 1981; Brooks 1984; De Certeau 1984, 91–110).

<sup>36</sup> Brooks quotes the following definitions from the American Heritage Dictionary: "1. (a) A small piece of ground, generally used for a specific purpose. (b) A measured area of ground; lot. 2. A ground plan, as for a building; chart; diagram. 3. The series of events consisting of an outline of the action of a narrative or drama. 4. A secret plan to accomplish a hostile or illegal purpose; scheme" (1984, 11–12).

It needs to be said from the outset that I have been necessarily selective in the narratives I have chosen to focus on. The *Iliad*, as I have stated it here and as I will elaborate in Chapter 1, is important because it uses the Muses, Hephaestus's shield, and the contained spatial and temporal dimensions of its plot to suggest a poetics of total and synchronic visibility. In a sense, this ideal is no more than a mirror image of the concept of *kleos*, which promises everlasting visibility in exchange for death on the battlefield. If it is acknowledged that no tombstone commemorating the Homeric warrior can be everlasting and seen from all places, the implication is that epic poetry will substitute for that object. The eternally audible and repeatable song stands in for the idea of an eternally viewable *sêma*.<sup>37</sup> But there is a problem with this formulation, evident already by the time of the *Odyssey* (and not just because we learn there that Achilles made the wrong choice). What if the narrator becomes more self-reliant, and wishes to tell a story based on his own skill and experience, rather than through the Muses? The reduced role of the Muses in the *Odyssey* goes hand in hand with the sense of a world whose spatial horizons are out of sight, along with an attendant shift of the authorial eye from the peaks of Olympus and Ida to the traveler on the ground. This introduces a new spatial orientation to the epic form, based on the model of progressing along a path or journey rather than viewing a complete landscape in a single glance from above.

The importance of geography, travel, and human craft or skill (as exemplified by Odysseus and his *mêtis*) influences a turn away from the Muses' immortal perspective. The *Odyssey* bears the imprint of the growing interest in travel and inquiry in the ancient world, especially as it is fostered through human exploration and technology. It reflects the new spatial and cultural practices of its age through the theme of travel at the same time as it experiments with its own solutions to the problem posed in the invocation of the Muses in Book 2 of the *Iliad*.<sup>38</sup> By starting from just one man (*andra*, *Od.* 1.1) and using the motif of the journey as a thread upon which his encounters with many (*polla*, *Od.* 1.1, 3, 4) different people and events can be ordered into sequence, Homer reframes the *Iliad*'s problematic attempt to visualize a great number of men (*plêthus*) all at once. But as the numbers in the *Odyssey* contract, so does the poem's sense of space expand, calling into question the promise offered by the

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Hector on the imaginary *sêma* of his opponent (*Il.* 7.81–90) and Achilles' *sêma* (*Od.* 24.82).

<sup>38</sup> See e.g., Malkin 1998; Dougherty 2001.

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Shield of Achilles: can the entire world ever really be held, known, and seen, as it is there? The geographical motif introduced by the movement of a single traveler through space gives the epic poet a new avenue for testing the limits of the kind of encyclopedic or protocartographic knowledge that Hephaestus depicts.

The first two chapters elaborate the terms of epic's protocartographic perspective and the shift to a new way of visualizing literary space that occurs at the end of the *Odyssey*. Chapter 1 examines the fantasy of seeing the *Iliad* as the Muses do, primarily through the lens of Aristotle's description of the *eusynoptic* and Hephaestus's construction of the Shield of Achilles. Here, I also consider the symbol of the race as a means of trying to come to terms with the shape of the *Iliad*'s plot and its sense of looking toward an ending. For one of the major differences between the Muses' expansive vision, as articulated by Homer, and Aristotle's conceptualization of the perfectly unified and bordered *eusynoptic* plot is the notion of a scene that is limited in size and has a clearly articulated endpoint.

I structure Chapter 2 as an inverse of Chapter 1 by deliberately breaking out of the Aristotelean ideal of the unified epic form and reading beyond the end of the *Odyssey*. My investigation focuses on Tiresias's recounting of the very last journey in Odysseus's life, one that will take him to a place whose inhabitants have never heard of the sea.<sup>39</sup> I argue that the alien and unfamiliar world that Odysseus will walk into at the end of his life looks forward to both the end of epic's ideal and all-encompassing form and the future possibilities for the invention of prose.

The new prose genres that can be identified in the sequential model of the journey or path reflect a turn toward a countercartographic perspective.<sup>40</sup> This is not to suggest, however, that the protocartographic perspective vanishes in the conceptual gap between the *Odyssey* and the emergence of prose. Quite the opposite is true. In the third chapter, I explore the significant and as yet unnoticed impact that Anaximander's discovery of cartography had on the emerging written word in sixth-century Ionia. Here, I examine our two earliest-known prose practitioners, Anaximander and Pherecydes, both of whom were also labeled by the classical tradition as writers of the first book. What is interesting

<sup>39</sup> Arist. *Poet.* ch. 8 celebrates the unity of Homeric epic precisely because it does not follow the model of the hero's life from birth to death.

<sup>40</sup> Janni 1984 calls this "spazio odologico," as I discuss later in the book. Discussion of the prevalence of the path metaphor for the plot can be found in Chs. 2, 4, and 5.

about them both, in this context, is that they were also exploring the new science of cartography.

Anaximander, inspired by maps he presumably saw in Egypt and the Near East, is famed for having composed his own map and circulated it along with a book entitled the “Circuit of the Earth” (*Periódos Gês*). Pherecydes is also believed to have seen maps, but cartography makes its presence felt in his work in a metaphorical sense. He wrote a prose cosmogony whose longest remaining fragment describes how Zas (Zeus) embroiders the representation of the entire earth onto a cloak as a wedding present for his bride, and in doing so changes her name from *Chthoniê* to *Gê*. In both of these early writers, we find a preoccupation with depicting and describing the surface area of the earth.

I argue that Anaximander and, after him, Hecataeus used the map to replace the Muse’s perspective, in order to afford unity and a sense of viewability to the new, museless form of prose. But this practice, in turn, came to be rejected by prose writers in preference for the model of the journey or road. The road becomes important in certain prose writers (most notably Herodotus) as a means of conceptualizing the shape of a sentence, as if the reader were traveling along it from one word to the next. Moreover, since prose is not bound by the shape of the hexameter line it is more difficult to know where it is going and where it will end or “turn.” The author can work to correct this, by creating circular or “periodic” sentences and by keeping the *telos* firmly in sight, as Aristotle preferred. Or he could embrace the open-ended nature of prose’s form, allowing one clause to run on to the next like so many branches in a path.

As I explore in Chapter 4, Herodotus furnishes an excellent example of this kind of “running-on,” nonperiodic prose style (*lexis eiromenê*). Yet his project is also inextricably bound up with the history of cartography and cartographical approaches to narrative. The *Histories* describe a good deal of the world’s geography following on from the model of writing started by the mapmakers Anaximander and Hecataeus. This chapter is dedicated to an examination of both the cartographical and countercartographical impulses in Herodotus, therefore, showing how both inform his prose style and the shape of his work. Often these two impulses are in conflict with one another in the *Histories*, as I demonstrate through Herodotus’s presentation and rejection of Aristagoras’s map in Book 5. I argue that this map, which mirrors the ekphrastic description of the Shield of Achilles, is emblematic of an epic and Muse-dominated poetics that Herodotus professes to reject but is not able to dispense with completely.



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The last two chapters of the book take on two different texts of Xenophon: the *Anabasis* and the *Oeconomicus*. They represent the counter-cartographic and proto-cartographic points of view pushed to extremes (the *Anabasis* leads its reader through a narrative labyrinth where it is easy to become lost; the *Oeconomicus* poses the danger of a scene that is completely still). The *Anabasis*, a text that John Ma has described as “structured around the difficulty or impossibility of return” (2004, 333), relocates the epic *nostos* plot within a terrain that actively resists the attempts of its author to navigate, survey, and set his narrative in order. Its story takes place in a landscape into which characters disappear and out of which it is very difficult to see a path to the end. The *Oeconomicus*, on the other hand, sets forth an idealized version of home that, like a map, can be surveyed in an instant. The *Oeconomicus*’s precise organization and cataloguing of the household and its objects thereby successfully clears disorder and disorientation from the space of its plot.

For the *Anabasis*, I chart what happens when its author-protagonist becomes disoriented in the trek across Asia Minor, leading to a breakdown in systems of measuring, ordering, and narrating. The march of the Ten Thousand engages with certain Homeric problems posed earlier in the Introduction. In the size of their number, the Ten Thousand recall the *plêthus* of the *Iliad*’s invocation. The army that was there too numerous to recount, even when divided into ten, is now multiplied into an army of ten thousand, but here it is the vastness of the landscape that they move through rather than the number of the troops that cannot be satisfactorily narrated. In both cases, this emerges as a problem to do with counting, since it is primarily through his decreasing ability to give measurements of the army’s progress that Xenophon loses control over his narrative. As becomes increasingly clear in the course of Xenophon’s text, an ordered sense of counting is only possible in spaces with which the author is culturally familiar. The *Anabasis* runs into the same counter-cartographic inland space that first appeared in the *Odyssey* (ch. 2). In both cases, I argue that the sea provides cohesion and unity within the Greek literary landscape, especially given its connection to the Ocean that runs around the edges of the Shield of Achilles and the borders of maps.

In the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon presents a plot that is predicated on the idea that a certain area of space (one’s *oikos*) can be ordered, catalogued, and – no matter how much it is filled with detail or objects – supremely viewable. This space emerges as an idealized version of the plot that can be perfectly comprehended, at the same time as its domestic cartography

maintains idealized hierarchies of gender and class. Indeed, the architecture of the house is described in terms that validate the owner's economic and social stability. I argue that the spatial model that Ischomachus establishes for the storage of things sets up a human version of the Muse's cartographic way of seeing in miniature, inasmuch as Ischomachus's wife is trained to remember things by sorting them into compartments and catalogues in her mind. She does this by creating a cognitive map, an index of information out of which any object from a potentially infinite variety of things can be instantaneously retrieved.

This reading of space in the *Oeconomicus* also takes us back to a different part of the end of the *Odyssey*, revealing how a similar system is at play in the catalogue of trees that Odysseus relates to Laertes at the end of the poem in order to regain his rightful place within the family plot. In both texts, the vast scale of the space of the earth that this book begins by describing, as represented on Hephaestus's shield or the early Ionian map, is shrunk down to the size of a natural, manageable area: a simple plot of ground. Nevertheless, within these small spaces a complex system of information and memory can be stored, in a manner that reframes and reimagines Homer's recitation of the Catalogue of Ships.

The competing conceptualizations of space and time that can be broadly outlined in the difference between epic and history writing, or verse and prose, emerge in the course of this book as a series of divergences in the form of the literary work and its relationship to movement. Whereas epic starts from the protocartographic tendency to miniaturize, to create a synchronic impression, and to capture a "still" (moving) image, later countercartographic texts try to find ways of modifying or compensating for these effects by means of expanding into space, moving diachronically, and capturing a sense of dynamism rather than stillness.

The first and last chapters, which discuss the *Iliad* and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* respectively, trace an arc that details a movement from epic poem to prose dialogue, from a depiction of the cosmos to a depiction of the *oikos*. It is perhaps fitting that the protocartographic comes back into view with the Socratic dialogue, since its form signals a return to oral discourse within a written medium.<sup>41</sup> The question of narrative's oral or written properties is not the focus of this book, yet the analogies between writing, length, movement, and travel, on the one hand, and orality, succinctness, and immediacy, on the other, are related to the notions of

<sup>41</sup> On the oral nature of the Socratic dialogue and its relationship to prose, see Kurke 2006.

the protocartographic and countercartographic view of a literary work in ways that I will briefly outline.

The problem of the time that is required to complete a narrative is more acute in oral poetics, as Homer's example of needing ten mouths and tongues to recount the full catalogue suggests. What Thucydides referred to as the oral performer's desire to have an immediate effect on his audience (ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν, Thuc. 1.21) bears some resemblance to the idea of the poem that can be "seen" instantaneously, in a single glance. The paralyzing allure of this notion of the immediate, or *parachrēma*, is represented in its most extreme form by the Sirens, beings who epitomize the kind of still death that would accompany truly synoptic and "all-seeing" song.

The written text, on the other hand, was criticized for the opposite reason in antiquity and beyond. Plato refers to the *sungrapheus* as someone who turns his text over and sticks bits of it back together again over time (ἔνω κάτω στρέφων ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν, *Phdr.* 278d). Indeed, Socrates' famous description of the written text as a drifting, roaming animal in the *Phaedrus* (275e), and his criticism of Lysias's badly written speech as "thrown together indiscriminately" (264b), speaks to the aimless and less unified impression that the written text can, partly due to its length, sometimes present to view. My generalized pairing of epic poetry with the protocartographic and prose history with the countercartographic, therefore, is also related to the shapes, such as we can call them, of oral and written discourse.<sup>42</sup>

In its widest frame, this book charts how the cartographic impulse – as it begins with ekphrasis and the Muses in Homeric epic and transforms through the map and the fully visible interior of the Greek household – can be read as a defensive strategy against the insufficiency of human vision. At the same time, it expresses a fantasy about breaking beyond the ordinary bounds of form and time and escaping the condition of human mortality. Both the *Iliad* and the *Oeconomicus*, more than the other texts I examine here, deal with the fiction of a perfectly cartographic point of view, neither version of which is ever practically possible.

It should be pointed out that cartography is "fictional" in more ways than one. First, there is the issue of the map's illusory nature, its ability to lie and distort.<sup>43</sup> The idea that it might ever be possible to see as

<sup>42</sup> For further thoughts on the directions that this line of inquiry could head in, see Ong 2002, 136–52.

<sup>43</sup> See e.g., Harley 1988, 1989, 1998; Monmonier 1991; Jacob 2006.

the Muses see is the quintessential example of this kind of cartographic fiction. One of the facets of the distorting capacity of the map is its ability to engage seamlessly in fictions of power and to promote those fictions as if they were self-evident truths. The aesthetic perfection of the map and its ability to unify helps to promote this idea. It is no surprise, in this context, to find Aristotle claiming that the *eusynoptic* city (that can be seen in one glance, like a map) can be most easily defended, or Xenophon claiming that the ordered, cartographic qualities of Cyrus's orchard or Ischomachus's house reflect naturally on their military, economic, or gendered superiority. In the *Histories*, Herodotus might reject the map and Xerxes' cartographic ambition to rule the world, yet at the same time his own project as ethnographer, geographer, and historian maps out into written form its own set of power relations in the context of the western imaginary (for this reason, too, Xenophon's inability to map the space of the *Anabasis* destabilizes his voice in the text). To describe the world or to hold it in the hands puts the historian, cartographer, or the tyrant in the same category as the gods, and this – as Homer saw from the start in his attempt to make a supernatural version of himself as narrator – is a fictitious idea.

Another important aspect of the cartographic fiction, as I discuss it here, is the comparatively nebulous status of maps in the history of Greek thought. We know very little about early Greek mapmaking practices beyond the limited evidence that I survey in Chapter 3, and as far as we can tell maps were barely used for navigational or strategic purposes.<sup>44</sup> The Greek map is “fictional,” therefore, to the extent that its role in the shaping of literary plots works largely in the realm of metaphor.

This book is intended to further the discussion of the readings of space in Greek literature from a cartographical or countercartographical point of view, following on from what I identify as a fundamental crux in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as to how a poem can be conceptualized in the mind's eye. There could have been many other chapters in here on many other areas of archaic and classical Greek literature: Hesiod, Greek drama, archaic lyric, Thucydides, the Hippocratic corpus. In this book, I have chosen to trace a particular story that centers around the before and after

<sup>44</sup> See especially Janini 1984, 1998; Jacob 2006. For a survey of early Greek cartography: Heidel 1937; Thomson 1948; Van Paassen 1957; Johnston 1971; Peretti 1979; Bagrow 1985; Dilke 1985; Harley and Woodward 1987. On the different use of maps in the Roman period, Nicolet 1991.

## INTRODUCTION

of mapmaking and that divides into three thematic and chronological stages of Homer, early Greek geographical prose, and Xenophon.

I have written on Homer because the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* set the stage in important and different ways for our understanding of the kind of shape that a plot might take; geography, in order to examine the points of convergence between cartography, travel, and narrative; and Xenophon because of the exceptional and sustained attention he pays to space and its properties in both the *Anabasis* and the *Oeconomicus*. The chapters progress from Muse-inspired epic through the development of prose, the latter being an increasingly flexible form that hosts a variety of genres, even within the corpus of a single author (Xenophon). That progression should be read in conjunction, I argue, with the advent of certain advances in the practical and spatial arts (such as cartography, land measurement, memory techniques). In the context of the relationship between plot and place, those technologies can also be read as a response to the viewpoint of the Muses, those divine beings through whom Homer first presented the enduring poetic fiction that a literary work might be perfectly surveyed.

## ONE

# THE EUSYNOPTIC ILIAD: VISUALIZING SPACE AND MOVEMENT IN THE POEM

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO THINK OF THE LITERARY WORK AS A topography, or even as a landscape? How is literature a form that can be “surveyed” like a piece of land, according to both meanings of the verb? These questions pave the way toward an analysis of a recurring problem that threads through this book, that is, the attempt to see a place *as a whole*, from a perfectly positioned vantage point. In this chapter, I examine the correspondence between plot and place that occurs in the *Iliad*. I begin with an investigation of how and why Homer’s work was identified by Aristotle as having the quality of being “easily viewable,” and then move on to consider those images and places in the *Iliad* that suggest the idea of synoptic or protocartographic space.<sup>1</sup> It should be stated at the outset that Homer’s account of the Trojan War in the *Iliad* presents a conception of space that is quite different to the space of the *Odyssey*, a story that follows the meandering path of a single character through a vast and uncharted world. We will therefore save the *Odyssey*’s geography, and a discussion of how it corresponds to the form of its plot, for the next chapter.

## ARISTOTLE AND THE EUSYNOPTIC PLOT

The way in which Aristotle thought about plot, and, specifically, the way he thought about epic and tragic plots in the *Poetics*, was as a kind of mental image – an imaginary landscape. One clear example of how Aristotle understands the relationship between space and narrative form is in his description of the category of the “eusynoptic.” Through this

<sup>1</sup> I call this way of seeing “protocartographic,” because one of the ways that early prose writers experimented with the concept was through maps, as I explore in Ch. 3 and the Introduction (and my note 3 there).

term, he imagines the literary plot as an object or area that has spatial properties in a way that is highly suggestive for a reading of epic. In chapter 8 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle famously praises Homer for the limited range of his work, because the poet chose to construct his story line around a single action, rather than a long-running series of events, such as the entire Trojan War (8.1451a22–35). He then goes on to illustrate this principle by thinking about plot (*muthos*) as something that has physical dimensions and can therefore be “seen” (*Poet.* 23.1459a30–4):

διὸ ὥσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μὴδὲ τὸν πόλεμον καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἐπιχειρήσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον· λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι ὁ μῦθος, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ.

Just as we said before, Homer would appear to speak in a divine way (*thespesios*) compared to the rest, in that he did not attempt to make the war a whole, even though it had a beginning and an end. For the plot would otherwise have been too large and not easily seen at one time (*ouk eusynoptos*), or, if scaled down in length, too closely woven with detail (*poikilia*).

The important term here is *eusynoptos*, which translates less elegantly into English as “easily taken in by the eye in one view.” For a plot to be *eusynoptic*, according to Aristotle, it must be of a size that can be grasped in a sufficient instant, as if it covered a set area of ground in an open landscape. This *eusynoptic* perspective allows Homer “to speak in a divine way,” and yet it is worth noting how carefully Aristotle keeps the supernatural out of his explanation. His version of the *eusynoptic* firmly establishes the “perfect surveyor” as a human being, setting the terms of what can “be taken in with one view” within the context of ordinary human vision. Although the Muses might never be confounded by *poikilia* or events that stretch infinitely across time and space, Aristotle defines the *eusynoptic* according to his understanding of the science of human optics, by limiting the size and scope of the object that is being considered.

This is consistent with Aristotle’s use of the term in the *Politics*, where he argues that the ideal polis should be easily viewable not only in terms of the number (*plêthos*) of people who inhabit it but also in terms of the area of land (*chôra*) that it covers (*Pol.* 7.1326b22–4, 1327a1–4):<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the *plêthos* of *Il.* 2.488, discussed in the Introduction.

δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἡ μέγιστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολή πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος.

It is clear that this is the best limit of the population of a state, that is, the largest number possible for the purposes of life that can be taken in at a single view (*eusynoptos*).

ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον ἔφαμεν εἶναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν· τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν.

Furthermore, just as we said that the people needed to be of a number that can be viewed as a single whole (*eusynopton*), so too for the land. For the land that is easily surveyable (*eusynopton*) is easily protected (*eubothêtos*).

A literary plot could, then, be *eusynoptic* in the same way that a city or *chôra* could, as if it were envisioned by an observer standing at a distance. The area of land that can be easily defended and maintained finds its correlate in the plot that can be easily comprehended as a unit.

It is perhaps no accident that the “*eusynoptic*” *Iliad* is, according to Aristotle, an ideally sized literary plot that also covers a certain delimited area of ground, including a citadel (Ilium) that is in the process of being defended. In the *Iliad*, Zeus commands a *eusynoptic* view of the city of Troy and the ships of the Greeks (*Il.* 11.80–3). In both Aristotle and Homer, a commanding view is supposed to allow the surveyor to protect the space he watches over.

The *Iliad* is like the ideal city of the *Politics* in that it contains the right number of people and has a plot of the right magnitude so as to maintain its integrity as a whole. The size of the ideal city in the *Politics* and the number of its population has *limit* (ὅρος), just as Homer set parameters on the plot of the *Iliad* rather than let it run from the beginning to the end of the war. According to the same logic, the integrity of the *Iliad*'s plot is connected to the integrity of the city of Troy, whose walls remain unbreached through the course of the epic. Indeed, Aristotle states that Homer constructed a unified and *eusynoptic* narrative precisely because he did not include the destruction of the city of Troy in his poem.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Ford 1992, 70–1. Aristotle acknowledges that he is discussing the size of an “ideal or perfect state,” and that “we must presuppose many purely imaginary conditions, but nothing impossible” (*Pol.* 1325b35ff.).



If Aristotle's ideal plot (*muthos*) is like a perfectly viewable and guarded city, so it follows that his ideal sentence (*periodos*) is like a road or path that also has a *eusynoptic* quality (*Rh.* 3.9.1409a27–b1):

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν [“Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἡδ’ ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις”] (ταύτη γὰρ πρότερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται)· λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην ἡ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ’ αὐτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα <τὸ> λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὴς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσις ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη [τῆς λέξεώς] ἐστὶν ἡδε, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον.

The *lexis eiromenē* is an ancient style, [e.g., ‘This is an account of the inquiry of Herodotus the Thourian.’] (previously everyone used it, but now not many do). I mean by the *lexis eiromenē* that style that has no end (*telos*) in itself, and does not complete the event being narrated. It is displeasing because of its endlessness (*to apeiron*), for everyone likes to have the end (*telos*) in view. Otherwise they run out of breath and give up at the turning posts. But those who are able to look ahead to the end (*peras*) do not tire ahead of time. That is the *lexis eiromenē* (strung-along style), the *lexis katestrammenē* (compact style) is found in periodic sentences (*peri-hodoi*). By a periodic sentence, I mean the one that has a beginning (*archē*) and end (*teleutē*) in itself and an easily surveyed magnitude (*megethos eusynopton*).

To be clear, this passage refers to a different style of composition: the rhetorical sentence that is spoken aloud. Yet here too, the audience of the work is something like the surveyor of a scene. The passage from the *Poetics* imagined the reader of the *Iliad* standing back from the scene of the poem and viewing it as a prospect. In the example from the *Rhetoric*, the idea of narrative encompassing a physical terrain remains, except that this time we are in prose, with the reader conceptualized as a traveler who actually moves through the space of the sentence, following its shape as if he were making a tour or circuit along a road.<sup>4</sup> When the traveler or runner begins to tire, he is depicted as losing his breath

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Bakker: “In Aristotle’s account, the strung-on style of speaking is all that the periodic style is not: it is unpleasant because of its unboundedness. Without beginning, middle, and end, it does not provide the listener with a sense of being somewhere, of knowing where the discourse will lead and from which point it started” (1997a, 38, my emphasis).

(ἐκπνέω), just as the speaker would run out of breath when voicing an overly long sentence. The familiar ancient figure of the sentence as route or plot (*peri-hodos*) is underscored a little later in that same passage, where Aristotle talks about how the reader of a long sentence can be left behind (*Rh.* 3.9.1409b22–3):<sup>5</sup>

τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος·

Long clauses leave [the reader] behind, just like those who veer off on the outside of the turn

Just as the observer/reader of the *Iliad* can see everything clearly because the scene before him is neither too big nor too small, so the observer/reader of the ideal periodic sentence achieves a *eusynoptic* vision because he sees (καθορᾶν) the end clearly in sight.<sup>6</sup> In each case, Aristotle asks us to imagine a scene with a witness, at the same time as he invites us to view the literary composition through that witness's vantage point.

Aristotle's use of the term *eusynoptic* is now coming into clearer focus. In the *Politics*, the *eusynoptic* is modeled on the city that is impenetrable because it can be easily watched over. We have already discussed some points of overlap between the integrity of the city of Troy and the integrity of the epic of the *Iliad*. But tragedy plays its part here too. According to Aristarchus's reading of the arrangement of the Achaean ships in the *Iliad*, the area along the beach should be thought of as an easily viewable theatrical space.<sup>7</sup> This perhaps draws on and helps to explain the close correspondence between epic and tragedy set out by Aristotle in the *Poetics*.<sup>8</sup> The success of both epic and tragedy depends on plots that are – like well-defended cities or encampments – easily viewable as a whole, and the model that is most appropriate for trying to gain a sense of what it means to take in a literary work in one view is the theater, which arranges all of its seats in such a way that each spectator

<sup>5</sup> It is worth noting that the word for clause here, mentioned earlier in the passage, is *kólon* (limb), which also denotes the “leg” or lap of a race.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 24.1459b19–20: “one must be able to see the beginning and the end at the same time.”

<sup>7</sup> Much is made in the epic of protecting not only the walls of the city but also the shore encircled by Achaean ships, an area that Aristarchus described as θεατροειδὴς τόπος (a space shaped like a theater) in his commentary, and which he considered so important as to even describe in a separate treatise, *Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου*, complete with its own map (διάγραμμα). Schol. A. Ξ 31–6, M 258a, Λ 807a, O 449–51a (Erbse 1969–88); Porter 1992, 107–11.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 5.1449b18–20; 26.1461b26–1462b19.

is given a clear view of the plot. At the same time, it must be stressed that the *eusynoptic* view is theoretical rather than empirical, at least as far as Aristotle was concerned (and this makes it all the more applicable to epic). This is especially true given Aristotle's interest in "seeing" the plot of a tragedy through reading or in the mind's eye rather than in the theater itself.<sup>9</sup>

A little further on from the *lexis eiromenē* passage in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle returns to the *eusynoptic* in order to express how the range of a speech is determined, in part, by the perspective of the viewer and the magnitude of the crowd assembled before the speaker. Here, he returns to the question of optics by setting the perspective of the viewer and the size or scope of the speech in proportion to the size of the audience (*Rh.* 3.12.1414a8–14):

ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικεν τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ᾖ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρώτερον ἢ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περιέργα καὶ χεῖρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ <ἐν> ἐνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἔνεστι ῥητορικῆς· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκείον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ὄγῳ ἄπρεστιν, ὥστε καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις.

The style of oratory used in addressing the *dēmos* resembles scene painting (*skiagraphia*).<sup>10</sup> The greater the crowd, the further away is the point of view. On account of this, elaborate detail comes across poorly in both. The forensic style admits more detail. Still more is admitted into the style of oratory addressed to a single judge. For here the least amount of rhetoric is possible, and what is and is not pertaining to the matter is more clearly viewable as a whole (*eusynopton*), the struggle is absent, and accordingly, the judgment is clear.

When addressing large crowds, the orator must craft his speech as an artist would a painting of the scene set before him: both must limit the detail enough so as to fit their composition into a whole, and they do this by standing back from the scene and creating distance between themselves and their object. With a smaller audience, on the other hand, the artist or

<sup>9</sup> Arist. *Poet.* 13.1453b3–7; 26.1462a12–13. The sources are listed and discussed in Porter 1995, 118–22. See further Bassi 2005. At 256–7, Bassi discusses the pairing of Aristotle's injunction to the tragic poet to keep the plot "before his eyes" as he composes (*Poet.* 17.1455a22–6) and Demodocus's organization of his song in *Od.* 8.487–91.

<sup>10</sup> LSJ defines *skiagraphia* as "painting with the shadows, so as to produce an illusion of solidity at a distance, *scene-painting*." Pollitt 1974, 247–54; Keuls 1978, 59–87; Rouveret 1989, 13–63.

orator will draw nearer, bringing the composition into sharper focus.<sup>11</sup> Finally, the speech that is addressed to one judge is “close” enough to the addressee that it can be perfectly taken in by the eye and held in the mind at one time.<sup>12</sup>

## THE EUSYNOPTIC ANIMAL

Now that we have considered these different examples of what Aristotle meant by the term *eusynoptic* in a number of different contexts, we can return to the original notion of the *eusynoptic* epic plot that we first discussed in the *Poetics*. In each of his uses of the term, Aristotle connects what is *eusynoptic* with the concept of an ideal size or magnitude (*megethos*). But what is the ideal “size” of a *eusynoptic* epic plot? Is there some way in which we, as readers, should imagine ourselves as standing too “close” to or too “far away” from the plot of the *Odyssey* or *Iliad*? Aristotle appears to suggest precisely this idea when he outlines the ideal size (*megethos*) of a *eusynoptic* tragedy, a genre that serves as a double for epic throughout the *Poetics*.<sup>13</sup> In chapter 7, in one of the many references to the “proper magnitude” of an epic or tragic plot, he compares the *muthos* of a tragedy to the body of an animal (*zōon*) that is viewed by a human observer on the ground, as if he were looking at a figure in a landscape (*Poet.* 7.1450b34–1451a6):

ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ  
τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρ-  
χειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, διὸ  
οὔτε πᾶμικρον ἂν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῶον (συγχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία  
ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη) οὔτε παμμέγεθες (οὐ γὰρ  
ἅμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅλον

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Pl. Criti.* 107c–d.

<sup>12</sup> The judge in this passage highlights the importance of the witnessing figure that Aristotle posits for each of the scenes so far discussed. Cf. *Poet.* 17.1455a22–5: “At the time when he is constructing his plots, and engaged on the diction in which they are worked out, the poet should remember to put the actual scenes as far as possible before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will devise what is appropriate. . . .” On the importance of the witness figure in landscape painting, see Bordo 2002.

<sup>13</sup> The correspondence between the size of epic and tragic plots is traced in detail in the *Poetics*. See further Belfiore 2001. In the passage quoted (*Poet.* 7.1450b34–1451a6), Aristotle is discussing the tragic *muthos*, but he proceeds to illustrate his argument with the example of Homer’s epic plot. Throughout the *Poetics*, Aristotle attempts to apply the same principle of ideal size and viewability to tragedy and epic.

ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῶον· ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μήκος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι.

Since the beautiful, both animal and every matter (*pragma*) that is put together from certain things, ought not only to have these things in an ordered arrangement but also ought to have from the beginning a magnitude (*megethos*) that is not just arbitrary – for the beautiful consists in magnitude (*megethos*) and order (*taxis*), whence neither could a very small animal be something beautiful (for its contemplation is blurred by coming to be in an almost imperceptible amount of time) nor could a very great animal (for its contemplation occurs not at the same time, and the oneness and wholeness vanish from its contemplation for those contemplating it) such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stades, so that, just as in the case of bodies and of animals they must have a magnitude (*megethos*), and this must be easily seen in a single glance (*eusynopton*), so also in the case of stories they must have a length (*mêkos*), and this must be easily remembered (*eumnêmonēuton*).<sup>14</sup>

Aristotle describes plot here as an animal or being that embodies a set of physical dimensions. It has length (*mêkos*) and size (*megethos*). As a whole, this plot is then understood as something that can be envisioned, and that, since it covers an expanse of land, has a surface area. In fact, Aristotle emphasizes the topographical dimensions of the plot by attempting even to measure it out into a number of stades. If excessively small, the view of the plot will be passed over too quickly to be sustained by the eye. If too large, on the other hand, such as – in this example – a plot ten thousand stades (roughly sixty miles) long, the audience or narrator will not be able to gain an overview of the scene. The stade (*stadion*) itself is a unit of ideal magnitude because it is the length of the running track, watched from the sides by spectators from beginning to end.<sup>15</sup> What Aristotle said about the length of epic (“it must be possible for the beginning and end of the work to be taken in with one view,” *Poet.* 24.1459b19–20) is also true of the athletic running track. It must be long enough to generate the excitement and extension through time of a race, yet short enough to be apprehended in a single glance. We have already noted the dangers

<sup>14</sup> Translation Benardete and Davis 2002, 24–5.

<sup>15</sup> The Greeks must have therefore been familiar with “looking at” the stade. It was originally as far as a length that a plough would go, and the length of stadiums was approximately 400 cubits (600 feet), although the precise measurements differ.

of exceeding the track's length, or of going beyond the *terma*, in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* (3.9.1409b22–3).

Aristotle's use of the term *eusynoptic* is synonymous with the concept of an ideal plot inasmuch as it aims for organic unity, visual clarity, and an object that is of a size that can be taken in with one glance. He explains that unity and clarity do not come about simply from organizing a plot around a single life, such as the life of Odysseus. Too many details, even when ordered along the sequence of a biography, are superfluous and break down the notion of unity (*Poet.* 8.1451a16–29). Rather, as Aristotle explains elsewhere in the *Poetics*, it is the principle of *tade dia tade* (*propter hoc*) rather than *tade meta tade* (*post hoc*) that provides the logic for the *eusynoptic* totality (10.1452a18–21). The difference is one of temporality. In order for a plot to be surveyed as a complete entity, it must be capable of being comprehended in all its components at one time; “together with” (*syn*) or “through” (*dia*) itself, rather than stage “after” (*meta*) stage.<sup>16</sup>

## SEEING AND REMEMBERING THE ILIAD

Is Aristotle's concept of the *eusynoptic* just an abstract ideal, or does it have special relevance for the plot of the *Iliad*?<sup>17</sup> At first glance, it would appear to have special relevance for, like Aristotle's easily viewable animal-in-a-landscape, the *Iliad* is spatially limited to the landscape of the Trojan plain. Homer asks us to visualize this carefully delineated area, which runs from the Greek ships to the citadel of Troy, at certain key points in the narrative. In Book 3, for example, he uses Helen's weaving of the scene of the Trojan War as a prelude to her description of the war from the wall in the Teichoscopia. Both her tapestry and the view from the wall invite the reader to see plain and plot as a complete entity.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* ch. 23, esp. for the discussion of why a plot that is most pleasing because it is constructed around a single, whole, and complete action (like a single whole animal, ὥσπερ ζῷον ἐν ὅλῳ, 1459a20) is different from a historical plot: “thus in time that runs in sequence (ἐφεξῆς) sometimes one thing follows another (θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον), but from these things no single *telos* emerges” (1459a27–8). The *syn* in *eusynoptos* is cognate with the *syn* that prefixes many of the verbs Aristotle uses to suggest the idea of “grasping” or “comprehending” the plot and seeing it as a whole (e.g., *sylogizesthai*; *synorasthai* in 24.1459b19–20: “it must be possible to *see together* [συνωρασθαι, at the same time] the beginning and the end”).

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle's description of the *eusynoptic* animal applies to tragedy first and epic second, we should remember (see note 13).

<sup>18</sup> *Il.* 3.125–8 (see Introduction).

In both of these scenes, Homer encourages the *eusynoptic* idea by setting up certain ways of viewing that suggest that the plain could be taken in with one glance if it were possible to achieve the right vantage point.

The beings who do command the right vantage point in the *Iliad* are, of course, the gods. The most immediately synoptic perspective of Troy in the *Iliad* appears from above, where the divinities enjoy their position as spectators of the events. They watch the action on the battlefield from the heights of Olympus or from the hilltops of Pergamon, Samos, or Ida, and when they do so, Homer often describes them as sitting on high (ὕψιζυγος) or sitting aloft (καθήμενοι ἀστεροπητῇ), and “looking down at” (ἐκκατιδών), “looking onto” (εἰσοράω), or “marveling at” (θαυμάζω) the events below.<sup>19</sup> They are able to command an extensive visual range from such a position. At the beginning of Book 11, for example, Zeus sits apart (*Il.* 11.82–3):

εἰσορόων Τρώων τε πόλιν καὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν  
χαλκοῦ τε στεροπήν, ὀλλύντας τ’ ὀλλυμένους τε.

Looking down on the city of the Trojans and the ships of the  
Achaeans,  
the flashing of weapons, and men killing and being killed.

From this perspective, the ruler of the gods is able to keep his eye on the action on the plain, and control the events of the plot according to his own plan. As is true of several other sky gods from Indo-European traditions, Zeus’s supernatural ability to see everything, everywhere, is in part a result of the vantage point he commands by watching from such a great height.<sup>20</sup> But it is also a natural consequence of his immortality: the limitless nature of the gods’ lives is reflected in the limitless nature of their ability to see through time and space. Since they are beings for whom there is no *telos*, no temporal or spatial horizons, theoretically their vision should be unlimited.<sup>21</sup> This applies especially to the immortal

<sup>19</sup> *Il.* 4.4, 4.9, 4.166, 4.508, 7.21, 7.69, 7.443, 8.52, 11.82, 11.543, 13.10–11, 24.23; cf. Andersson 1976, 23. On the Homeric gods as “audience,” see Griffin 1978, and the Introduction.

<sup>20</sup> The divine association between wide-ranging observation and the gods’ location in the sky is strengthened by the fact that the gods do not see from underwater, nor are they themselves seen from there (cf. *Il.* 18.72ff., 400–5). Note also the etymological association between Hades and the “unseen” (*a-idēs*) regions (Ruijgh 1991, 575–6; Beekes 1998; Janda 2000, 114–16). Unlike the other gods, Zeus does not compromise his position as farseeing by ever coming down lower than the mountaintop of Ida.

<sup>21</sup> Vernant 1991; I discuss the question of the immortals’ relationship to time in the *Iliad* (with further bibliography), in Purves 2006b. Immortal omniscience is an ideal that

Muses, beings who inhabit Olympus yet who also exist everywhere (*Il.* 2.485), with a scopic range that collapses time and space and that it is difficult to pin down to a particular vantage point.<sup>22</sup>

Throughout the *Iliad*, human vision is complicated by the fantasy of what or how these immortals see. There is a tendency, as I discussed in the Introduction, for the audience of the poem to take their own visual cues from these divine superwitnesses. Homeric scholarship has also emphasized, however, that the *Iliad* is difficult to visualize as a single, coherent entity.<sup>23</sup> Not only do we run into problems connected with sequence and simultaneity when attempting to “see” the plot as if it were a picture, but we are also given very few examples of clear-sighted human vision within the poem. Despite scholars’ observations about the occasional panoramic standpoint of the Homeric narrator, we are rarely afforded a sustained bird’s-eye view.<sup>24</sup> The *Teichoscopia* reveals gaps in the visual ranges of both Helen and Priam, and on the field itself most of the action takes place at such close quarters that characters are rarely afforded a view at long distance.<sup>25</sup> We are faced with the paradox of Aristotle’s interpretation of a poem that adheres in form to the principles of what is *eusynoptic*, and that, even in the surface area of its plot, fills an area that could be of approximately the right size to be seen in one view, if one could attain the right vantage point. Yet within the poem

does not always play out in the practical lives of the gods. There are occasions in Homer when the eyesight of the immortals fails them: Ares and Aphrodite miss the invisible threads spun by Hephaestus; the gods cannot see through the cloud created by Zeus to hide his lovemaking; Zeus himself closes his eyes to the events on the battlefield when he sleeps after the *Dios Apatê*; Ares does not know that his son has died on the battlefield, etc. When they pay attention to looking, however, divinities are able to see perfectly, and that ability is set at variance with the limited prospect of human (and poetic) vision.

<sup>22</sup> On this special ability of the Muses to see universally, see Ford 1992, 57–89.

<sup>23</sup> Auerbach [1953] 2003 describes Homeric poetry as a number of pictures that do not connect up to make a composite scene, with background and foreground. Cf. Lessing 1984; Andersson 1976, 15–37.

<sup>24</sup> S. Richardson 1990, 119–23; De Jong and Nünlist 2004, 69.

<sup>25</sup> Although it at first appears that the godlike Helen’s position on the wall might afford her a viewing status that approximates to the Muses’, she nevertheless falls short of the omniscient narrator’s vantage point (*Il.* 3.234–44). See further Bassi (forthcoming); Edwards 1980, 102; Lynn-George 1988, 29–34. Helen fails to point out from the wall the one character she was supposed to be looking for, her former husband Menelaus. Priam is unable to watch the events about to take place below the wall, and his vision throughout – like Helen’s – is trapped in the past (3.166–90). On the coincidence between seeing from a “long view” and “longing” for the past, see Lynn-George 1988, 29–37.



itself, the account of the war takes place only frame by frame, moving from one point of view to the next.<sup>26</sup> The view from above can be disappointing in Homer because it never provides any real sense of focus on the battlefield.<sup>27</sup> We know only *that* the gods can see it all, not how or what they see. In what has become a classic example of the Homeric narrative paradox, the poet states that the Muses can “see” the work of the poem with perfect clarity across all space and time, at the same time as he regrets his own inability to tell us what that vision would look like (*Il.* 2.485–93).<sup>28</sup>

Yet it is also a truism that the very fact that Homer falls short of the Muses’ all-encompassing vision must be a good thing in terms of the feasibility of its narrative form.<sup>29</sup> In our reading of *Poetics* 7 earlier, we saw Aristotle state that one of the benefits of a *eusynoptic* plot is that it is also *eumnêmoneuton*, or easy to remember. Aristotle’s integration of size, optics, and mnemonics in this passage is important, for he relates the ability to remember a plot, or to hold it completely in the mind, to the practice of holding the image of a landscape in the mind’s eye in a single view. Although epic does not quite achieve the perfect magnitude of tragedy, its plot is just small enough to be taken in by the eye as a whole.<sup>30</sup> As Minchin (2001) has argued for Homer’s oral poetics, Aristotle implies that in order to recall the *Iliad* from memory (for the plot to be *eumnêmoneuton*), it must first meet the requirements of visualization (it must be *eusynopton*). The plot of the *Iliad* is in proportion because it is neither “too small” in its constituent parts nor “too large” as a whole to

<sup>26</sup> See De Jong 1987, 51; Bakker 1997a, 54–85, esp. 57ff.; Clay 2007; Tsagalis (forthcoming), on close-ups and the narrator’s ability to zoom in and out during battle scenes. Pace Lowe 2000, who believes the audience’s view of the *Iliad*’s space is unilinear and clean (112–13).

<sup>27</sup> Andersson 1976, 15–37.

<sup>28</sup> Ford 1992, 57–89; Bakker 1997a, 54–60. As Finkelberg puts it: “As the invocation to the Catalogue of Ships shows, the privileged realm of song begins where human witness ends” (1998, 75). The paradoxes inherent in these conclusions have been explored by Bassi: “calling upon [the Muses] implies both that seeing is a principal vehicle of human knowledge and that human sight is fallible” (forthcoming).

<sup>29</sup> White 1980, esp. 14–15. As White has said elsewhere, “every narrative, however seemingly ‘full,’ is constructed on the basis of a set of events that might have been included but were left out” (1987, 10).

<sup>30</sup> Cf. N. J. Richardson 1992, esp. 39, where he comments on Aristotle’s “underlying conflict . . . between his intense admiration for the Homeric poems, which prevents him from criticizing them as too long and complex or too ‘episodic,’ and his preference for a more compressed and more clearly unified structure.” See further Else 1957, 620, on Homer as “the precursor and in a sense inventor of drama.”

be recounted.<sup>31</sup> Aristotle's example suggests that what is read or heard in a narrative over time can be recollected as a space or picture in the mind's eye.<sup>32</sup>

In the prologue to the Catalogue of Ships, Homer explores the relationship between visualizing and remembering by contrasting his limited ability as a human being to the limitless capacity of the Muses (*Il.* 2.485–93).<sup>33</sup> The poet undermines the brilliance of his own mnemonic performance in the Catalogue by invoking the Muses at the same time as he laments his inability to perform their vision. By laying all responsibility for seeing on the eyes of the Muses, “for you are goddesses and are present and know/have seen all things” (*iste te panta*), while “we see nothing at all” (*oude ti idmen*), Homer relegates to himself the inferior capacities of hearing and speaking.<sup>34</sup> But, even then, he professes that he can hear only report or *kleos* (487), and that he can speak to a limited extent (489). Whether he could visualize it or not, for Homer to recite *all* (*panta*) that the Muses see is beyond the physical capabilities, even the lifespan, of the human body (490–1). The mechanics of the human voice, once it is caught up in the time-bound process of articulation, cannot help but draw the Muses' synchronic vision into the human temporality of lived experience. It is in this way, as Ford has argued, that the Catalogue most clearly differentiates itself from the Muses' instantaneous viewpoint, since the narrator has no choice but to count out a sequence of items over an extended period of time.<sup>35</sup> The tempo of the Catalogue is determined by the voice not the eye, as Homer makes clear in his reference to mouths, tongues, the sound of the voice (*phônê*), and to the beating of the heart (*êtor*) in preparing himself for his

<sup>31</sup> Bakker 1997a, 35–53, discusses the idea of a limited amount of information that can be visualized through consciousness at any one time. On memory as a picture, cf. Arist. *Mem.* 450a26–32, and Ch. 6.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle specifically mentions the visualization that can come about from reading (*anagnôskein*) the tragic plot (cf. note 9), but the ability to visualize is also, according to Minchin 2001, crucial to the technique of the epic poet.

<sup>33</sup> As quoted and discussed in the Introduction.

<sup>34</sup> Here, *iste* may be understood as “you have seen” or “you know” following the close association between seeing and knowing in Greek culture (see e.g., Clay 1983, 9–25). Even those passages in Homer where the character who “knows” has not himself “seen” (e.g., *Il.* 20.203–5; *Od.* 1.38; *Od.* 11.100ff. [cf. Leshner 1981]) usually reveal cases where human knowledge falls short of the greater capacity of being able either to see divinities or see like divinities. On the superiority of sight as a means of gaining access to knowledge and truth in the archaic world, see Clay 1983, 12–18; Hussey 1990.

<sup>35</sup> Ford 1992, 57–89, esp. 75.

exceptionally long and detailed account of the Achaean leaders and their ships.<sup>36</sup>

This is not to suggest, however, that Homer does not use visualizing techniques in order to help him memorize the long list of the leaders of the Achaeans. As Minchin has argued in her study of the uses of memory in Homer, cognitive mapping was an important tool for memorizing large quantities of information in sequence, particularly in oral cultures. In her reading of the Catalogue of Ships, she draws special attention to the poet's reliance on geography as the main organizing principle by which he structures his account (2001, 84–7). Each of the Achaean leaders is slotted into sequence in the Catalogue by a series of places on a route through Greece. The movement, in the poet's mind, from one place to another along a fixed geographical sequence that can be recalled easily from memory ensures that the Catalogue will also stay relatively fixed.<sup>37</sup> As the poet travels in his mind from one place to the next, he will then have to conjure up from memory – probably by techniques that are, again, based on visualizing – the name of the leader and the number of his ships.

Second, although it may only be through the Muses that it is possible to imagine what it might mean to be able to “see” the plot of the *Iliad* in all time frames, all places, and from all perspectives at once, the extension of past, present, and future into a single, cohesive whole could also be reflected in the technique of oral performance. Bakker has argued that the special epic discourse of the poet, as well as the performative context in which he brings his speech alive before an audience, contributes to a convergence of past and present in the storyteller's narrative. In his formulation, Homer's present includes the past in a way that is different from our own notions of a clear, spatial separation between tenses.<sup>38</sup> Through certain deictic markers, the poet is able to bring remote (past) events into the close, immediate presence of the audience. For the extent of an oral performance, then, the audience listening to the words of the poet is able to visualize the past and to experience it as “something close to actual perception” (1999, 58). In addition, French scholars have long made related claims about the role of tense and memory in archaic Greek

<sup>36</sup> By mentioning his *êtor*, I take Homer to be referring to the bodily tempo of his heart beating within his chest, as well as to the breath that emanates from there. Cf. *Il.* 22.450–1; M. Clarke 1999, 63–92.

<sup>37</sup> Minchin 2001, 86–7. On the difficulty of the recitation of such a long list from memory, see Minchin 2001, 73–99. See also my discussion in Ch. 5.

<sup>38</sup> Bakker 1997b. See also Bakker 1993, 1997a, 1999, 2001; Lada-Richards 2002, 70.

poetry, by positing that memorization was another form of visualizing, of “seeing” what is normally kept invisible, or of witnessing the long-past deeds of gods and heroes as if they were present.<sup>39</sup>

All of these arguments propose an interplay between epic discourse and visualization, thus resonating with Aristotle’s pairing of what is easy-to-see (*eusynopton*) and easy-to-remember (*eumnêmoneuton*). They suggest, moreover, that the epic narrator *is* able to remember and present a “view” of the Muses’ *eusynoptic* vision, but only by spooling it through the thread of language. In subsequent chapters, we will discuss how the linear, sequential quality of language calls into question Aristotle’s vision of a single, simultaneously viewable landscape and replaces it with the model of a route or path through space. But, in the case of the *Iliad*, is it possible to capture precisely those protocartographic or synoptic glimpses that Aristotle speaks of when visualizing the poem as a whole?

## THE ANIMATE LANDSCAPE

When Aristotle compares the ideal plot to an animal of just the right size to be seen in one glance, he frames his metaphor in a visual field. We cannot conceptualize looking at the animal unless we place ourselves in an imaginary landscape, from which we observe a creature that is an appropriate distance away. The *OED* defines landscape as “a view or prospect of natural inland scenery, such as can be *taken in at a glance* from one point of view” (2.a., emphasis mine). Considering that these are images that are ordered into a compositional frame only by the eye of the beholder, it is unsurprising that landscapes are closely connected to the idea of a picture.<sup>40</sup>

Contemporary discourse on landscape is a useful model with which to think through Aristotle’s ancient *zôon*, an animal that is also framed by a “single glance” and that gains its compositional structure from the position and viewpoint of the observer.<sup>41</sup> In addition, landscape theory

<sup>39</sup> Vernant [1983] 2006, 89–112; Detienne 1995, 42–3; cf. Thalmann 1984, 147ff. Ford 1992, 49–56, relates what he calls epic’s “vividness,” or “sense that the past is somehow present before us” to ancient theories of *enargeia*.

<sup>40</sup> The word “landscape” originally meant *only* a work of art, and, in the study of the iconography of landscape, the dividing line between picture and prospect becomes increasingly blurred. Cf. Casey 2002, 3–39.

<sup>41</sup> As Cosgrove 1985b, 46, has observed, landscape is a “way of seeing” rather than simply an object that is seen – it is determined as much by the perspective and position of the observer as it is by a pattern or formation on the ground. The way that we see when we look at landscapes is conditioned, it has been argued, by a variety of culturally and

can help us to understand the ways in which Aristotle's imaginary scene works iconographically, for the Greek word *zōon*, like the English word *landscape*, also has the alternate meaning of "picture."<sup>42</sup> *Zōgraphia* – a common word for scene-painting – is so-called because several paintings in early Greek art took animals as their subject.

Yet there is a potential contradiction in folding the two concepts of picture and animal together into Aristotle's *zōon*. Since most scholars agree that Aristotle is referring to an animal in chapter 7 of the *Poetics*, why draw out the idea of a picture from his simile at all? The most straightforward answer is that it would be a mistake to ignore the pictorial background that lies behind much of the discussions of texts and narratives in ancient Greek culture.<sup>43</sup> A suggestive precedent for how to understand the term *zōon* in this context can be found in Plato's *Timaeus*, where Critias uses the analogy of a picture (*graphê*) in his recollection of the story of the lost city of Atlantis.<sup>44</sup> He tells Socrates that he listened with such zeal to the story told to him as a child that, even now, it remains burned in his mind like an indelible picture (ἐγκαύματα ἀνεκλύπτου γραφῆς, *Tim.* 26b6–c3).

Critias is developing a theme that Socrates had introduced just a little earlier in the dialogue, when Socrates stated that he would like to bring his work to life, as if it were a living creature (*zōon*) in a picture (Pl. *Ti.* 19b4–c2):

προσέοικεν δὲ δὴ τινὶ μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις ζῶα καλὰ που θεασάμενος, εἴτε ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα εἴτε καὶ ζῶντα ἀληθινῶς ἥσυχίαν δὲ ἄγοντα, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καὶ τι τῶν τοῖς σώμασιν δοκούντων προσήκειν κατὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν ἀθλοῦντα· ταῦτόν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἣν διήλθομεν.

I have the same feeling concerning [our city] that someone might have if he were to look upon beautiful animals (*zōa*), whether that means

ideologically informed assumptions. See Cosgrove and Daniels 1988; Cosgrove 1985a, 1–38; Mitchell 2002, 5–34; Wylie 2007.

<sup>42</sup> *LSJ*, s.v. (I, II). Most commentators agree in translating *zōon* as "animal" here; it often occurs in plural form to mean "picture."

<sup>43</sup> Aristotle frequently compares a literary work to a sketch or drawing (*graphê*) in the *Poetics* (2.1448a5; 4.1148b16; 6.1450b1; 25.1460b8; 25.1460b32; 26.1462a18); Laird 1996, 76.

<sup>44</sup> See Brague 1985 and Ford 2002, 242–5, on the complementary dualisms of animal/picture and written work/painted work embodied in the words *zōon* and *graphê* in Plato. More recently, Morgan (forthcoming) has discussed the *Timaeus* passage with reference to the role of art, animation, and the Forms in Plato.

creatures fashioned *in a picture* (*graphê*) or animals that were actually alive (*zônta*), but at rest. A desire would come upon him to look upon these same animals moving (*kinoumena*) and exercising, in competition, some of the attributes that seemed to be evident in their bodies. This is exactly how I feel about the city that we discussed.

Part of the association between the painting and the plot that occurs in these passages stems from an ambivalence at the core of the term *graphê*, a word that does not in itself distinguish between the arts of drawing and writing.<sup>45</sup> But both Plato and Aristotle's choice of the word *zôon*, and Plato's use of the participle *zônta* ("living"), encourage us to think of these imaginary pieces as painted views that are also creatures; that *have the capacity*, in other words, *to come to life*. Not only is Plato's "animal" imagined in the form of a picture, but the animal/picture itself works as a symbol for the literary work that is also a "city" – both an area of land and the subject of a dialogue.<sup>46</sup> Note that the verb Socrates uses to describe the progress of their discussion (*dierchomai*) also denotes physical activity, as if the discussion itself were a creature moving through space.

By giving his animal spatial coordinates, or by framing it in a landscape, Aristotle, like Plato, tacitly acknowledges the possibility that his image of the plot might "move" (*kineô*). In fact, Aristotle describes Homeric poetry in exactly these terms in the *Rhetoric*, when he states that Homer made all things "moving and living" (*kinoumena gar kai zônta*).<sup>47</sup> On one end of the spectrum, then, we have the animal (*zôon*), the moving creature of a certain size; on the other, we have the living text (*graphê*), which also, like the animal, moves through time, from beginning to end. At the same time, the idea of the image or "picture" – that which is essentially held still before the eye and observed in one glance – is embedded within the meanings of the Greek words for *both* animal (*zôon*) and narrative (*graphê*). In Aristotle's formulation, the still picture is animated by its association with the two elements together, so that narrative can ultimately be thought of as a creature-picture; a visual field that the reader also experiences "moving" through time.

<sup>45</sup> *Graphê* means both written text and illustration. We will discuss this correspondence further when we come to examine the representation of space in prose in Ch. 4. Arist. *Poet.* 6.1450a39–b3 compares plot to an outline drawing and character to the color that may be added to it.

<sup>46</sup> The city is an ideal city that Socrates described in the previous night's conversation. Many scholars read this as shorthand for Plato's *Republic*.

<sup>47</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 3.11.1412a9, cited in A. S. Becker 1985, 49 (see his note 91 for further references to Homer's animation and *enargeia*).

That a plot could be envisioned not only as a landscape (whether picture or scene) but also as a landscape that *moves* is fundamental to its association with the concept of narrative as a form that “lives.” Both Aristotle and Plato’s symbol for the plot, the *zôon*, manages simultaneously to be still and to move through time. This double aspect is important, because it inadvertently poses a solution to the problem that Lessing raised in the eighteenth century.<sup>48</sup> The idea of a picture or animal “coming to life” will also, when the time comes, give us a model with which to think about ekphrasis and Hephaestus’s construction of the Shield of Achilles. Before that, however, I want to move from Aristotle to another reader of Homer, whose own visualization of the *Iliad* will help to bring these issues into clearer light.

### ZIELINSKI’S MOVING LANDSCAPE

In the opening pages of his seminal article on Homeric simultaneity (1901), the Polish Classicist Thaddeus Zielinski composes an imaginary landscape as a model for reading the *Iliad*. Through this model, he will go on to show how time works in the Homeric poems. The illustration is detailed, but I will pay attention to just the first part here. Zielinski begins by asking Homer’s reader to put himself in the shoes of a man (“ich”) standing and looking out at a country scene (409):

I see a landscape (*Landschaft*): in the foreground is a country road, then a wheatfield, and in the background a hill, with a windmill on top. I am overlooking all three planes (*alle drei Pläne*) completely equally. Of course, it did take time to study all the details: first the street, then the field, and finally the mill were at the center of my view; but because the whole landscape was still in the meantime, it could happen undisturbed. But now something occurs: the wind sets the windmill into motion. This “process” (*Vorgang*) captures my attention; that at the same time (*im selben Augenblick*) the same wind has also caused the wheatfield to wave and stirred up the dust of the country road, I did not notice in the meantime, since the more conspicuous action of the mill’s vanes completely captured my consciousness. My sight is suddenly transformed from a three-plane view to a one-plane view:

<sup>48</sup> A vast amount of scholarship has addressed the question of “ut pictura poesis,” or, more specifically, the ways in which the written text and the artistic scene correlate. From Lessing’s monumental *Laocoön* (1984), to Krieger [1967] 2003 to Mitchell 1994, a rich bibliography has emerged on the role of the visual within the medium of literature. See further Bartsch and Elsner 2007.

*the newly introduced dimension of time has displaced the spatial dimension of depth – but only for a minute. The movement of the windmill is too even to constantly hold my attention, and soon I see again on all three planes. (original emphasis)*

As for Aristotle, so for Zielinski. Both reflect on whether it is possible to “see” the *Iliad* as a landscape that can be taken in by the eye at a single glance, either *eusynoptically* or “on all three planes.”<sup>49</sup> In both, too, the concept of the landscape as a *picture* that is suggested by Aristotle’s use of *zōon*, and by Zielinski’s preparatory discussion on art history and his use of the word *Landschaft*, gradually transforms into the idea of landscape as a living entity that moves through time, whether through *zōon*’s primary meaning as “creature” or through the experience of the observer standing in a scene that is brought to life by the wind.<sup>50</sup> What we have here, with this idea of landscape, is a realization of Socrates’ desire in the *Timaeus* to bring his picture of the *Republic* to life. Like Plato and Aristotle in these examples, Zielinski sets narrative on visual terms, or, more accurately, he envisions a landscape that is altered with each new narrative event.<sup>51</sup>

For Aristotle, the scene’s potential to come to life is less important than the fact that the animal is a continuous organism from nose to tail: it represents the intrinsic whole that an ideal plot should imitate. For Zielinski, the sequential experience of reading narrative is recreated through the sequential animation of different parts of the whole. Yet, through Zielinski’s landscape, Aristotle’s description of the ideally sized animal or picture can now be understood more clearly; for both critics use the laws of optics to frame the *Iliad*’s story. They ask us to imagine the poem as something that is easily visible, as if we were looking out across a distance of the earth. Aristotle’s examples of the *eusynoptic* view of an object or scene relate to modern conceptions of landscape insofar

<sup>49</sup> Nietzsche discusses the same problem (see the Introduction). Zielinski’s three planes correspond to the ones used in military distance-judging and aiming: (*Nahziel, Mittelziel, Fernziel*). They are not spatial dimensions but rather three planes or slices through the visual field, each marking off a different distance from the observer. I thank David Blank for his help in clarifying the meaning of this passage.

<sup>50</sup> The German term *Landschaft* can also mean landscape [painting], although more rarely than in the English usage. Sauer 1967; Hirsch 1995, 9.

<sup>51</sup> Zielinski 1901, 410, states that, for regular events, it is only the beginning and the end that grabs the attention and draws the eye to the one dimensional plane. For the intervening period between the beginning and the end, the eye is at rest. Cf. Aristotle on the *Iliad* (*Poet.* 23.459a30–4), where he states that Homer narrated only one middle section of the war, neglecting to tell either the “beginning” or the “end” of the whole story.



as they both place an observer (“I”) on the edge of a scene and use his gaze to frame the visual field.<sup>52</sup>

There are moments when the *Iliad* also invites its reader to cognitively readjust his or her visual frame and use the image of a landscape in order to see more clearly into the text. The Homeric simile asks the reader of the poem temporarily to look away to a different scene, where the action that occurs will be, like Zielinski’s example of the wheatfield, at close enough range and straightforward enough in its sequence of events to be easily grasped by the mind’s eye.<sup>53</sup> In a subtle intertextual manoeuvre, Zielinski’s example of a contemporary pastoral landscape strays into Iliadic terrain through the intervention of the wind that brings his picture to life. He begins with a scene of stillness in which there is no wind at all (“in the foreground a country road, then a wheatfield, . . . a hill, . . . with a windmill on top . . . because the whole landscape was still . . . it could happen undisturbed”), as with the simile at *Iliad* 5.522–6:

ἀλλ’ ἔμενον νεφέλησιν ἑοικότες ἅς τε Κρονίων  
νηνεμῆς ἔστησεν ἐπ’ ἀκροπόλοισιν ὄρεσσιν  
ἀτρέμας, ὅφρ’ εὐδησι μένος βορέαο καὶ ἄλλων  
ζαχρειῶν ἀνέμων, οἳ τε νέφεα σκιάοντα  
πνοιῇσιν λιγυρῇσι διασκιδᾶσιν ἄντες·  
ὦς Δαναοὶ Τρῶας μένον ἔμπεδον οὐδὲ φέβοντο.

[The Achaeans] remained where they were, like clouds that the  
son of Kronos  
stops in the windless weather on the tops of mountains,  
still, for as long as the force of the north wind sleeps, and of the  
other  
blustering winds, which the dark clouds  
scatter, blowing with shrill blasts.  
So the Danaans stood unmoving against the Trojans and did not  
flee.

Zielinski then uses wind to animate his scene (“But now something occurs: the wind sets the windmill into motion”), just as Homer does

<sup>52</sup> Several geographers have emphasized that landscapes are characterized by their ability to fit perfectly within the range of the observer’s vision. Rose 1993 describes landscape as a “scene within the observer’s range of vision” (86); Jackson 1984, 3, as “a portion of land which the eye can comprehend at a glance.” It is a “composition and structuring of the world so it may be appropriated by a detached, individual spectator” (Cosgrove 1985b, 55).

<sup>53</sup> On the visual nature of similes, see Minchin 2001, 132–60; Bakker 2001. On the use of nature in the similes, and the access or “window” they provide to an outer world, Redfield [1975] 1994, 186–92.

in any number of similes. In the simile just quoted, the impending wind lets us know that we are on the brink of action, although the landscape remains still. In other similes, the wind breaks through the frame, scattering the still scene and rousing it to motion. For example, the very first time that the Greeks surge into action in the poem, they are compared to ears of wheat set in motion by the west wind. Homer then draws a parallel between the arrival of the wind in the simile and the disturbance that the Achaeans cause as their feet shake up the dust and raise it into the air. The ears of wheat that bend in the wind and the dust that swirls up in the road in Zielinski's imaginary scene ("that same wind has also stirred up the wheatfield into waves and swirled up the dust in the road") is reminiscent of a key Homeric simile (*Il.* 2.147–50):

ὥς δ' ὅτε κινήσῃ Ζέφυρος βαθὺ λήϊον ἔλθων,  
 λάβρος ἐπαιγίζων, ἐπὶ τ' ἡμίει ἀσταχύεσσιν,  
 ὥς τῶν πᾶσ' ἀγορὴ κινήθη· τοὶ δ' ἀλαλητῶ  
 νῆας ἔπ' ἐσσεύοντο, ποδῶν δ' ὑπένερχε κονίη  
 ἴστατ' ἀειρομένη·

Just as when the west wind approaches and sets in motion the  
 thick standing wheat,  
 rushing furiously upon the ears of wheat it bends them,  
 so the whole assembly was set in motion, and with a clamor  
 they rushed to the ships, and the dust under their feet  
 was lifted and rose up.

Zielinski's gust of wind, which starts up out of nowhere when the air had previously been still (as if a still life or a still landscape in a painting), is thus a resonant representation of the initiation of Homeric action.<sup>54</sup> In the Iliadic simile, the advent of the wind is in itself an isolated, irrelevant occurrence, but the event that the sudden rush of wind is compared to in Book 2 is highly significant: the onset of battle and thus the resurgence of action within the poem. Not only that, but the mustering of the troops in this book also recalls, through the Catalogue of Ships, a still more momentous onset of action: the Greeks sailing out from Aulis, an event

<sup>54</sup> At 5.499–500 and 13.334–6, Homer again uses the advent of a gust of wind to introduce the idea of sudden movement or disturbance into a scene, e.g., *Il.* 5.499–500: "As when the wind scatters the chaff along the holy threshing floors/ of men who are winnowing"; 13.334–6: "Just as when the storm gusts blow furiously under the shrill winds/ on a day when there is a great deal of dust on the roads,/ and they in a mass raise up a great cloud of dust." On wind in the Iliadic simile, see Scott 1974, 62–6, 190–205; Purves (forthcoming).

that coincided with the blowing of a wind that had been resolutely still before.<sup>55</sup>

The point here is not simply to show that Zielinski's writing reveals him to be a close reader of Homer. It is rather to show the significance of Zielinski's own extended "simile" when read within the context of his inquiry. His essay argues that Homer represented simultaneous time in a style that is relentlessly sequential.<sup>56</sup> As Zielinski attempts, through diagrams as well as the imaginary landscape discussed here, to envision the plot of the *Iliad* in spatial form, he resorts to the same techniques as the epic poet. Both present the *idea* of a landscape that can be seen in an *Augenblick*, or "taken in at a glance from one point of view" (*OED* 2.a). And just as Aristotle and Plato felt the need to introduce action into their landscapes in order for them to represent the temporal dimensions of the plot accurately, so do Homer and Zielinski use wind to bring their scenes to life and to illustrate moments of action in the poem. These wind-ruffled similes are synoptic in that they present landscapes that can be taken in at a glance from one point of view, but they are also notable for the way that they work as a model for the integration of description and action.<sup>57</sup> This is especially true when the movement in the similes scatters the visual field of the mind's eye and ensures that the plot-image keeps moving.

In order for Aristotle's image of the *eusynoptic* plot to help us in our understanding of Homeric space, therefore, it would appear that we need to identify landscapes in the *Iliad* that are not just synoptic but that are also embodied by a living creature or animated in some other way. We have seen the wind play this role in Homer's description of still, natural landscapes in his similes via our analysis of Zielinski's reading of the *Iliad*. In the next section, we will consider the animate potential of ekphrasis as it is represented in the Shield of Achilles, as an example of a picture that is brought to life through verbalization.

<sup>55</sup> I thank Sheila Murnaghan for these last observations. Two explanations for the delay at Aulis coincided: too much wind or an absence of wind. Homer does not mention which kind held the army from their expedition.

<sup>56</sup> On Zielinski and sequential versus simultaneous time, see Fränkel [1931] 1968a; S. E. Bassett [1938] 2003; Hellwig 1964; Krischer 1971; Whitman and Scodel 1981; Purves 2004; Scodel 2008. Belfiore 2001, 41–2, discusses Zielinski's theory in relation to Aristotle's claim in the *Poetics* that Homeric epic did represent events simultaneously. On the combined role of description and narration, see Genette 1976–7, 5–8.

<sup>57</sup> Clay 2007, 244 discusses Homer's use of the simile in the *Iliad* to shift position and perspective and argues that transitional similes "tend to view the action on the battlefield panoramically."

## THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES

No reading of *eusynoptic* – or as we will come to call it, cartographic – space in the *Iliad* would be complete without a discussion of the extended description of the Shield of Achilles at the end of Book 18. The spatial and simultaneous properties of this description have long been recognized, and since Crates the Shield has been read not only as a double for the universe (*mimêma tou kosmou*) but also as a spatial model for how to read the *Iliad* itself.<sup>58</sup> In this section, I want to consider how and whether the Shield of Achilles is surveyable as a *eusynoptic* whole, and how that idea of the *eusynoptic* has a bearing on our reading of the *Iliad*.

The workshop of Hephaestus that Thetis visits in Book 18 is a strange conflation of supernatural and technical worlds. Of particular interest is the artisan's ability to bring objects to life.<sup>59</sup> He is aided in his palace by homemade servants who, although manufactured from gold, nevertheless “moved . . . resembling living (*zôêsi*) girls” (*Il.* 18.417–18, cf. 19–20), and the scenes that he depicts on the Shield, although only representations, move through time and space as if they were animated by living creatures.<sup>60</sup> For example: at *Il.* 18.539, the men fighting on the Shield are so animated as to resemble living (*zôoi*) beings (ὧς τε ζῶοι βρωτοί), and two of the scenes depicted elsewhere are enlivened by the movement of animals (*Il.* 18.521–32, 573–86). This tendency of the ekphrastic picture to “come to life” (*zôein*) is not unique to Homer, of course. It is more pronounced still in the ps.-Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles*, where snakes are depicted with clashing teeth (164) and where the Lapiths and Centaurs are represented “running together as if they were alive (*zôoi*)” (189, cf. 194, 244).

In both cases, the movement of the live (*zô-*) or virtually live images depicted on Hephaestus's shields prefigures Aristotle's *zôon*, especially as it is mediated by Plato's painted and potentially moving animals.<sup>61</sup> This is true even if we understand Aristotle to have used the term *zôon* primarily in the context of organic unity, for the capacity of a description or still scene to move into action (and, vice versa, of the action to fit within a spatial frame) is a fundamental principle of narrative.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, some

<sup>58</sup> Hardie 1985, 15–16; Porter 1992.

<sup>59</sup> On the association between artist and magician, see Kris and Kurz 1979, 61–90.

<sup>60</sup> See further S. E. Bassett [1938] 2003, 95; Francis 2009.

<sup>61</sup> We should, however, bear in mind that in Aristotle the animal itself *is* the picture, whereas the Shield serves as a container or frame wherein pictures *in* or *on* it come to life.

<sup>62</sup> Genette 1976, 7.

might object that the term *zōon* was not used for both animal and picture as early as Homer and ps.-Hesiod, yet the overlapping of the two concepts does not reside in the meaning of the word alone. As the comparison to the Shield of Heracles makes clear, the animate picture is a common phenomenon within the tradition of ekphrastic description.<sup>63</sup>

How is Homer's ekphrasis of the Shield of Achilles animated by the "as-if living" creatures it depicts? As the eye of the observer is pulled further and further in, the space on the Shield transforms, separating itself off from the external world to such an extent that the scene "comes to life" within the minute context of its representation. Indeed, the kind of wonder (*thauma*) that the viewer experiences when beholding the Shield (*Il.* 18.496, 549; cf. [Sc.] 140, 224, 318, 218) may be understood to arrest her body in a form of momentary paralysis.<sup>64</sup> This "paralysis" is reenacted, on a narrative level, by the temporary pause within the action of the *Iliad*, as the movement of the narrative is arrested by the descriptive material of the ekphrasis.<sup>65</sup> The narrative impetus of the *Iliad* is forgotten in the cycle of adding detail upon detail within the circumscribed space of the Shield. Yet, as I have suggested, it is within this sphere of arrested movement that the picture itself begins to move.

In his famous essay on the ekphrastic principle, Krieger has shown how the English word "still" captures precisely this quality of ekphrasis, where the image manages to be both still in time (an artifact) and still through time (it lives on forever, and thus always moves through time).<sup>66</sup> The ekphrastic picture is animated through the process of being told, which is often synonymous with the activity of its being observed (and, here, constructed), stage by stage. As Mitchell has put it in a different context: "The poem stages for us the basic project of ekphrastic hope, the transformation of the dead, passive image into a living creature" (1994, 167). Although it is visually contained by elaborate borders, the "stillness" of the ekphrastic picture allows its plots to run on forever through time: to move and yet also to be still.

<sup>63</sup> Ekphrasis is conveniently described as the "verbal representation of a graphic representation" (Heffernan 1991, 299). Cf. A. S. Becker 1985, 9–22. See also Heffernan 1993; Laird 1996; Putnam 1998; Bartsch and Elsner 2007; Francis 2009.

<sup>64</sup> Greenblatt 1991, 20, following Spinoza.

<sup>65</sup> On ekphrasis as a narrative "pause," see especially D. P. Fowler 1991; Heffernan 1991. On the use of description rather than narration in the Shield passage, Giuliani 2003, 35–46.

<sup>66</sup> Krieger: "I have been openly dependent upon the pun on the word *still* and the fusion in it of the opposed meanings, never and always, as applied to motion" ([1967] 2003, 91). See further Bartsch and Elsner 2007, i–vi.

Taken together, the manifold details upon the surface of the work of art are woven into a single texture to create a whole landscape. Hephaestus's handicraft is able to replicate a visual panorama in a way that Homer's words (in the famous invocation in Book 2) could not, because it compresses it into the size of a physical space that can be taken in with one glance. In the hands of the master artisan Hephaestus, the entire world (greater in its dimensions than anything Aristotle could count out in stades) can be made to fit within the observer's field of vision. Achilles' Shield is protocartographic, for it presents a way of condensing and miniaturizing space that looks forward to representations of the world that are later found on maps, at the same time as it offers a kind of supernatural realization of Aristotle's ideal landscape.<sup>67</sup> The idea of a global overview is established by the description of the geographical and cosmic features, such as the sun, moon, heavens, stars, and River Ocean that are depicted on the innermost and outermost spaces of the Shield respectively, and that transform its space into an *imago mundi* (Il. 18.483–9, 607–8).<sup>68</sup> Here is the opening passage (Il. 18.478–89):

Ποίει δὲ πρῶτιστα σάκος μέγα τε στιβαρόν τε  
 πάντοσε δαιδάλλων, περὶ δ' ἄντυγα βάλλε φαεινὴν  
 τρίπλακα μαρμαρέην, ἐκ δ' ἄργυρεον τελαμῶνα.  
 πέντε δ' ἄρ' αὐτοῦ ἔσαν σάκεος πτύχες· αὐτὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ  
 ποίει δαίδαλα πολλὰ ἰδυίησι πρᾶπιδесσιν.  
 Ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ', ἐν δ' οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν,  
 ἡέλιόν τ' ἀκάμαντα σελήνην τε πλῆθουσιν,  
 ἐν δὲ τὰ τεύρεα πάντα, τὰ τ' οὐρανὸς ἑστεφάνωται,  
 Πληϊάδας θ' Ὑάδας τε τό τε σθένης Ὡρίωνος  
 Ἄρκτον θ', ἣν καὶ Ἄμαξαν ἐπὶ κλησὶν καλέουσιν,  
 ἣ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται καὶ τ' Ὡρίωνα δοκεύει,  
 οἷη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν ὤκεανοιο.

First of all he made a great, strong shield,  
 ornamenting it everywhere, and he encircled it with a shining rim  
 threefold and gleaming, and attached a silver strap.  
 There were five layers of the shield. On it  
 he made many intricacies trusting in his skill.

<sup>67</sup> Supernatural, because technically impossible. This is what modern scholars term a “notional” or purely imaginary ekphrasis (Francis 2009, 6).

<sup>68</sup> For the parallels between Shield and map, see my Ch. 3. Hardie 1985 discusses the various readings of the Shield in antiquity as an *imago mundi*. Il. 18.606–7 closes the description of the Shield with a *eusynoptic* view of the encircling river Ocean.

He crafted the earth on it, the heavens, and the sea,  
 the tireless sun and the full moon,  
 and all the constellations, which crown the heavens,  
 the Pylades and the Hyades and the strength of Orion,  
 and the Bear, which is also called the Wagon,  
 which turns in its place and watches Orion,  
 and which alone is never dipped in the waters of Ocean.

In chapter 7 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle suggested that the *eusynoptic* object has an ordered and commensurate magnitude (*megethos*) and length (*mêkos*), yet the Shield of Achilles seems to coexist in many different sizes at once. On the one hand it is fixed by the size of Achilles' body, but the images depicted upon it are so extensive that – in order to be seen by the human eye – they must be scaled down in a supernatural manner. In other words, the level of detail on the individual scenes of the ekphrasis calls for an object that is much larger than a shield. Thus, while Aristotle focuses on the way in which the *size* of an object can create the right visual effect, Homer's Shield succeeds in setting forth a viewable plot or landscape through the medium of *scale*.<sup>69</sup> While size and magnitude concern themselves with measurements that do not change ("an animal ten thousand stades long"), scale need not. Through the simple process of miniaturizing or expanding an image or object, scale can make any scene – even a scene of the entire cosmos – visible before the human eye. Yet the problem that Aristotle alludes to in the passage from the *Rhetoric* about the orator remains: shifts in scale call for a corresponding diminution or expansion of detail. If there is no key or fixed referent through which to set up a sense of scale, moreover, the actual size of the object becomes impossible to determine (and, in this case, literally impossible to design).

Although quintessentially *eusynoptic* in one way, therefore, the Shield also threatens to supersede the limits of Aristotle's definition of being "easily taken in with one view" precisely because it presents too much to contemplate at once. Despite the initial cosmic overview of the Shield, the eye is quickly drawn in to an assortment of different scenes, each with its own interior landscape.<sup>70</sup> As Marg noted some time ago, this leads the viewer to envision two different versions of the Shield. At the opening and closing of the description, the work of art is seen as a synoptic overview, and in between it is seen in separate parts, as a picture

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Clark 1999, 15–16, on the difference between size and scale.

<sup>70</sup> *Il.* 18.490–606. Cf. Hardie 1985, 11; Lynn-George 1988, 178.

that unfolds piece by piece (1957, 25). The various stages of the Shield's composition are reflected not only in the description of Hephaestus's progressive action as he constructs the arms,<sup>71</sup> but also in the description of the god at work when Thetis first arrives, where we see him in the process of making twenty as yet unfinished tripods (*Il.* 18.378–9).

The careful attention to detail with which these objects in Hephaestus's house are made and described prepares us for the visual display of the Shield of Achilles. For the description of the Shield's manufacture follows the time of the craftsman, as he adds one intricate detail to another. This is mirrored in Homer's use of the imperfect tense to describe the actions taking place on the Shield. In both cases, the unfinished or incomplete nature of the actions is emphasized.<sup>72</sup> Despite its considerable size, the Shield is a model of the world in miniature, whose boundaries are clearly defined by its form and whose scenes are admittedly selective. But the miniature and multiple aspects of all this detail can have a delirious effect, opening up the idea of infinite space and time.<sup>73</sup> Not only does the Shield represent the earth, heavens, sun, moon, and stars within its borders, but it also shows various human or everyday scenes of marriage, arbitration, war, agriculture, and dancing. As has often been remarked, the scenes on the Shield represent more action and cover a wider range than the plot of the *Iliad* itself.<sup>74</sup>

Unlike the River Oceanus flowing around the outer rim, the interior scenes on the Shield are described without markers indicating their position, without any obvious focal point, and without any sense of a fixed viewing order or hierarchy.<sup>75</sup> Each of these individual scenes is so intricate and self-multiplying that – as if entering into its own, isolated temporality – each one comes to life when the eye is trained upon it. The effect of this acute attention to detail in each of the scenes portrayed

<sup>71</sup> This is what saved Homer's description of a work of art, according to Lessing 1984, 95, but ruined Virgil's. Cf. A. S. Becker 1985, 9–22; Lynn-George 1988, 179–80.

<sup>72</sup> Lynn-George 1988, 181; Giuliani 2003, 40–1; Francis 2009, 9, and his note 24 for further bibliography.

<sup>73</sup> On the miniature, see S. Stewart 1993, 37–69. See also Lévi-Strauss 1966, 24, whose trenchant comments on the miniature and its relation to the work of art emphasize the aesthetic and otherworldly quality that comes with a reduction in scale.

<sup>74</sup> E.g., Mitchell 1994, 179–80.

<sup>75</sup> We are only told that the River Oceanus runs along the rim of the Shield. As for the rest, especially the scenes of human life, "the general impression of this group is of teeming abundance, and schematization does not really suggest itself" (Hardie 1985, 11).



on the Shield means that the spectator's range of vision is filled to an almost infinite degree.<sup>76</sup>

Often cited in the context of this kind of visual effect is Borges' short story "The Aleph," which explores what would happen if we could see the world in its entirety in all of its myriad detail.<sup>77</sup> After the narrator gains access to such a vision and laments the impossibility of translating what he sees into words, a poet named Daneri in the story attempts to do just that, by creating an extremely long and tedious work, entitled *The Earth*, in which he describes the world as a surveyor would, one square foot of land at a time. The poet fails because he falls into a black hole of description, which takes so long that it never leaves room for action.<sup>78</sup> At the same time, he fails because he composes a work that is not reduced in scale but that attempts to match text to world on a one-to-one ratio (Borges 1971, 7):

Daneri had in mind to set to verse the entire face of the planet, and, by 1941, had already displaced a number of acres of the State of Queensland, nearly a mile of the course run by the River Ob, a gasworks to the north of Veracruz.

Within the context of the short-story form, Borges' writer lampoons the poet for attempting to "set to verse the entire face of the planet." The idea of describing the world in its entirety stresses the limits of poetry and narrative, at the same time as it also winks at the ancient fiction that verse, *but not prose*, might grasp and transmit a synoptic or cartographic vision. Hephaestus's shield presents a similar *imago mundi* before the eyes of the reader. Yet Homer is able to create a cartographic effect whilst avoiding Daneri's mistake, for the Shield is selective in its choice of scenes. Its recasting of a cognitively infinite space into the strict limits of artistic representation, in miniature, also succeeds because of the presence of

<sup>76</sup> On the miniaturization of time, see the experiment cited in S. Stewart 1993, 66, showing that the rate at which humans experience time decreases according to the diminishing size of the object they are observing.

<sup>77</sup> "The Aleph" so beautifully captures the concept under discussion here that it is cited by scholars everywhere. See e.g., Marin 1984, 233–6; Soja 1989, 2–3; S. Stewart 1993, 52; Corner 1999, 221–5; Mitchell 2002, ix, and in connection with the Muses, Cavarero 2002, 58.

<sup>78</sup> Genette: "description, because it lingers over objects and beings considered in their simultaneity and because it envisages the actions themselves as scenes, seems to suspend the flow of time and to contribute to spreading out the narrative in space" (1976, 6).

*action* in each scene, which ensures that the eye is distracted and drawn in. Hephaestus's own activity as he moves toward the *telos* of completing the Shield, as well, guarantees the onward movement of time within the structure of the poem. Whenever he turns his attention to crafting a new area on the Shield (denoted by the preposition *en* "on") with various verbs for making, such as *poieô*, *tithêmi*, or *teuchô*, the potentially endless description of a particular scene is foreshortened.

Hephaestus tells us that after his fall from Olympus he spent nine years crafting intricate objects in Eurynome's cave, encircled by the limitless Ocean (18.401–2). This image of the craftsman at work on beautiful curved objects in his cave prefigures the description of the Shield. We might imagine Hephaestus in the cave as a prototype for a scene within the ekphrasis; in both cases a figure, surrounded by the ever-flowing Ocean, performs and reperforms a continuously revolving activity. Like the limitless (ἄσπεστος) Ocean that encircled Hephaestus in the cave, the Ocean that encircles the scenes on the Shield (18.607–8) symbolizes the infinite continuity within which the manufacture and description of objects are housed.

In addition to the Ocean, in the account of the planets that adorn the Shield, the sun is tireless (ἄκράντα, 18.484) and the Bear constantly turns in place (ἥ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται, 18.488).<sup>79</sup> It is appropriate that these symbols of continuity frame an ekphrastic piece, for the description of objects has the same tendency toward a circular, still form of description. The Shield, of course, is not only circular in form but also has several scenes depicting characters or objects organized in circles.<sup>80</sup> As the date of 1941 marking Daneri's composition of his poem shows, description of this sort has no real beginning and end. Instead, it reflects a kind of stillness that is connected to the deathlessness of immortality in the *Iliad*. There has been much speculation on how the Shield works as a *mise-en-abîme* for the poem at large, and how the predominantly peaceful and agricultural scenes represented on it both do and do not reflect upon the content of the *Iliad* and the rising anger of Achilles.<sup>81</sup> But if we take

<sup>79</sup> See further Lynn-George 1988, 176–7: "In its opening design, which spans earth, sky and sea, sun, moon and all the constellations, the Shield offers a divine comprehension of all at once" (177).

<sup>80</sup> *Il.* 18.488, 494, 504, 590ff.; Detienne and Vernant 1991, 279–326. On the circular shape of the *Iliad*, see Thalmann 1984, 76.

<sup>81</sup> Marg 1957, 20–37; Schadewaldt 1959, 361–7; O. Anderson 1976; A. S. Becker 1985, 4–5; Burkert 1985, 168; Hardie 1985; Stanley 1993, 3–38; Taplin 1998; Alden 2000, 52–3; Nagy 2003, 72–87.

the Shield as a whole, it represents something never before seen in the context of the *Iliad*, and that is a replica of the entire cosmos, including earth, stars, sun, and moon, that can not only move all at once but that can also be held, in one instant, in the divine, synoptic gaze.

The immortal nature of this viewpoint needs to be stressed, because the picture on the Shield is fantastic and idealized. In representing as much as it does, it breaks many of the rules that Aristotle celebrated in Homer's poetry. Specifically, Hephaestus's image subverts the Aristotelian ideal of proper "magnitude" and certainly does not conform to any kind of unity in terms of space and time. Between the hand of the immortal craftsman and the eye of the mortal spectator, Homer succeeds in expressing an infinite sense of time and space for objects and scenes to collect in.

When the Shield is brought down to earth by Thetis at the beginning of Book 19, however, our view of the miniaturized object changes considerably. Out of an Olympian context, the Shield is very hard to look at. It is notable for the amount of awe and fear it inspires in the mortals who behold it, as well as for the special reaction it produces in Achilles. Although Achilles rejoices in his view of the Shield, his men are unable to look upon the armor directly (*Il.* 19.13–18):

τὰ δ' ἀνέβραχε δαίδαλα πάντα.  
 Μυρμιδόνας δ' ἄρα πάντας ἔλε τρόμος, οὐδέ τις ἔτλη  
 ἄντην εἰσιδέειν, ἀλλ' ἔτρεσαν. αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς  
 ὥς εἶδ', ὥς μιν μάλλον ἔδυ χόλος, ἐν δέ οἱ ὄσσε  
 δεινὸν ὑπὸ βλεφάρων ὥς εἰ σέλας ἐξεφάνθεν·  
 τέρπετο δ' ἐν χείρεσσιν ἔχων θεοῦ ἀγλαὰ δῶρα.

All the intricacies (of the armor) rang out,  
 and trembling seized the Myrmidons, nor did any of them dare  
 to look straight at it, but they shrank in fear. Yet Achilles,  
 when he saw it, then his anger sank still further, and his eyes  
 flashed terribly under his brows as if a bright glare were shining out.  
 He delighted in the glorious gifts of the god, holding them in his  
 hands.

Scully has suggested that the Shield inspires this kind of terror in the Myrmidons (and in Hector, when Achilles approaches him outside the walls, *Il.* 22.134–7) because it presents an image that is so Olympian in its perspective that ordinary mortals can barely look at it (2003, 44). Achilles' delight in the Shield, on the other hand, speaks to his increasingly godlike status, as he rejects human concerns in his choice of death and *kleos aphthiton* over ordinary life and as his rage separates him from human

society. Only Achilles is able to hold the armor in his hands and view it with a godlike gaze that brings it into proportion as a synoptic whole. Scully observes that Achilles' new, godlike viewpoint, as it is represented by his ability to look upon the Shield and take pleasure in it, offers him a form of transcendence. That transcendence is literally enacted in that, when he first puts on the arms, a bright light shines out from the hero, and he is lifted from the ground as if on wings (19.386: τῷ δ' εὔτε πτερὰ γίγνεται, ἄειρε δὲ ποιμένον λαῶν).<sup>82</sup> As Achilles' feet symbolically leave the ground, he grasps, however briefly, what it means to see from an immortal point of view.

In observing and wearing Hephaestus's special armor, Achilles gains access to a way of viewing that had, up till now, been the exclusive privilege of the immortals. Rather than seeing from a path on the ground, or from a man-made structure like the top of a wall, Achilles is – whether in reality or through metaphor – elevated on immortal wings that briefly offer him an aerial perspective.<sup>83</sup> This suggests the possibility of seeing the world in miniature, in an overview from above. Achilles, alone among mortals, can look upon and understand the Shield, and when he does so he can see it all at once, and instantly recognizes that it is the work of a god (*Il.* 19.21–2).<sup>84</sup> The Shield is an important visual symbol in the *Iliad* because it alone brings us close to seeing as we might imagine that the Olympians see, that is, from a godlike and elevated perspective, and as the Muses see – over a potentially infinite array of space and time.

When the Shield is first revealed to human view, we are told that “all its intricacies rang out,” driving the Myrmidons into a panic. This overwhelming effect comes in part, I suggest, from the combination of the words for “all” (*panta*) and “detail” (*daidala*). Such a combination is too much for an ordinary human being to take in with one view. In this case, interestingly, the effect can only be heard – taking us back to Homer's words about the vision of the Muses in Book 2 (“we hear only rumor, and see nothing”) and the impossibility of narrating the *plêthos* there. Aristotle also understood the difficulties involved in fitting detail (*poikilia*) and the whole (*to holon*) into a single visual frame, as we

<sup>82</sup> Scully 2003, 39. Wings have traditionally been associated with Daedalus (Morris 1992, 15–16), who as a magical craftsman can stand as a double for the divine Hephaestus (*Il.* 18.592).

<sup>83</sup> This depends on whether we take *eute* as introducing a simile or not (cf. *Il.* 3.10).

<sup>84</sup> This separates Achilles not only from his fellow Achaeans but also from his literary descendant, Aeneas, who famously fails to understand the scenes depicted on his shield at *Aeneid* 8 (Putnam 1998, 6).

saw in the quotation from the *Poetics* at the beginning of the chapter (23.1459a30–4).

If the Shield offers us a glimpse of the way in which the immortals see, Achilles is among a select few mortals in the *Iliad* who comes close to assimilating their point of view.<sup>85</sup> For similar reasons, Aristotle refers to Homer's *eusynoptic* conception of plot as a "divine way of speaking" (*thespesios*, *Poet.* 23.1459a30).<sup>86</sup> In the end, however, Aristotle understands that we see as the Myrmidons see, and his account of the *eusynoptic* can be read as an attempt to reframe the Homeric text within the context of a landscape that is humanly viewable as a whole. The Shield gives us a Homeric way of thinking about the convergence of description and action, which accords with Aristotle's *eusynoptic* plot (*muthos*), as well as his *eusynoptic* animal (*zôon*) and *eusynoptic* area of land (*chôra*). It represents the fullest realization of the cartographic vision as far as it can be expressed in Homer, as an idealized way of seeing that is bound up with immortal and fantastic notions of time and space. All of the ideal objects and plots discussed by Aristotle, on the other hand, are alike in being of a magnitude that can easily be taken in by the *human* eye.

## ACTION IN THE ILIAD: A LOOK AT RUNNING

Only once in the *Poetics* does Aristotle invite us to "look at" an event occurring within the plot of the *Iliad*, and this occurs during the chase of Hector around the walls of Troy (*Poet.* 24.1460a11–17; cf. 25.1460b26; *Il.* 22.137–223). Aristotle mentions the episode in order to explain that the element of the marvelous (*thaumaston*) can be admitted to epic where it cannot in tragedy. Although he has little interest in analyzing the race, his choice of scene is apt. Scholars have noted that the running of Hector and Achilles around the walls of Troy is watched by several different parties within the poem. As Redfield observes:

The death of Hector is a scene played before several audiences. The Trojans watch from the wall. The Greek army watches, kept back by Achilles lest they spoil the scene (XXII.206–7). The gods watch from above, like spectators at the games (XII.162–6). ([1975] 1994, 158–9)

<sup>85</sup> Calchas is another obvious example, who, like Hesiod's Muses, sees the things of the past, present, and future (*Il.* 1.70).

<sup>86</sup> There is a long tradition among Homeric scholars of comparing the Shield to the poet's perspective. See Hubbard 1992, 17, with further references; A. S. Becker 1990, 152–3; Alden 2000, 53.

Furthermore, in their study of the “bird’s-eye view” in Homer, De Jong and Nünlist have isolated this scene as a particularly synoptic moment.<sup>87</sup> The viewpoint of the gods is revealed, importantly, at the end of a simile comparing the running of Hector and Achilles to the movement of horses in a chariot race (*Il.* 22.162–6):

ὥς δ’ ὅτ’ ἀεθλοφόροι περὶ τέρματα μώνυχες ἵπποι  
 ῥίμφα μάλα τρωχῶσι· τὸ δὲ μέγα κείται ἀεθλον,  
 ἢ τρίπος ἢ γυνή, ἀνδρὸς κατατεθνηῶτος·  
 ὥς τῶ τρις Πριάμοιο πόλιν περιδινηθήτην  
 καρπαλίμοισι πόδεσσι· θεοὶ δ’ ἔς πάντες ὀρῶντο·

Just as when prize-winning single-footed horses around the  
 turning posts  
 run ever so quickly, when a great prize has been set aside,  
 either a tripod or a woman, when a man has died.  
 So the two men whirled three times around the city of Priam  
 on their swift feet. And all the gods looked down on them.

As in Aristotle’s own examples concerning stades and turning posts that we considered earlier (*Poet.* 7.1450b3–1451a6; *Rh.* 3.9.1409a27–b1, 1409b22–3), the running track creates a good medium for thinking through the concept of a *eusynoptic* space. In this example, the running men are compared to horses in a race, the *telos* of which is highlighted by the description of the prizes awaiting the competitors. In the very first line of the simile, the horses run round the *termata* (turning posts) as they double back to complete the race. The word occurs just before the bucolic diresis, marking a pause and readjustment in the rhythm of the line that renews its momentum enough to swing us into the following hexameter. These “turns” in the course of the race or verse function as breaking points but not endings. Elsewhere in Greek literature, *termata* often represent boundary or endpoints, but in the *Iliad* they only signify boundaries that have been reached and then pulled back from, marking the middle rather than the end of a journey.<sup>88</sup> Even when we

<sup>87</sup> *Il.* 22.136–66; De Jong and Nünlist 2004, 70. For further discussion of a global overview of the *Iliad*’s action, cf. Clay 2007.

<sup>88</sup> Contrast my discussion of the Homeric words *peirar* and *peirata* in Ch. 2 and Bergren 1975. *Tërma* [s.] and *termata* [pl.] occur seven times in the *Iliad*, always in reference to turning posts in a chariot race (22.162; 23.309, 333, 358, 462, 466, 757). *Tërmata* occurs once in the *Odyssey*, referring to the line marking where Odysseus’s discus has landed in the games on Scheria (8.193). In the archaic poets and beyond, it can refer to both the turning point in a race and to a definitive terminus, such as the end of one’s life. See further Purves (forthcoming).

imagine – as we are asked to do twice in this simile – racing toward a goal (*aethlon*, 162–3), the *Iliad* still invites us to think not in terms of finite trajectories but in terms of circles or lines that loop back upon themselves. This is worth accentuating given the context of the scene that is being watched: a race that whirls three times around the walls of Troy and yet ends at the terminus of death.

A little later, Achilles' chasing of Hector around the walls of Troy is likened to a dream in which the distance between two runners stays the same and the running goes on forever (22.199–201):

ὥς δ' ἐν ὀνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν·  
οὔτ' ἄρ' ὁ τὸν δύναται ὑποφύγειν οὔθ' ὁ διώκειν·  
ὥς ὁ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάρψαι ποσίν, οὐδ' ὅς ἀλύξαι.

Just as in a dream one is not able to catch the one fleeing  
neither is the one able to escape nor the other to catch up with him.  
So the one could not reach the other with his feet, and the  
other could not escape.

In such a context, the speed of the racers becomes irrelevant, for the two never change their place in relation to one another. The runners, like the scene, are stuck in time. The movement of one cancels out the movement of the other, an effect that is also played out in the structure of the lines through the doubling and redoubling of negatives. As with the ekphrastic scene, the synoptic view of the two warriors circling the walls of Troy, especially when it is telescoped out into the vision of figures whirling around in a circle, is marked by the idea of stillness and the deferment of an endpoint.

In his description of the Shield of Achilles, Homer compares a similar kind of stillness-in-action (the running to nowhere of dancing boys) to the “running” of a potter's wheel (*Il.* 18.599–601):<sup>89</sup>

οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν θρέξασκον ἐπισταμένοισι πόδεσσι  
ῥεῖα μάλ', ὥς ὅτε τις τροχὸν ἄρμενον ἐν παλάμῃσιν  
ἑζόμενος κεραμεὺς πειρήσεται, αἶ κε θέησιν·

At times they would run (θρέξασκον) on their skilled feet  
very nimbly, as when a potter takes the wheel (τροχόν),  
and crouching down he makes a trial of it, to see if it will run  
(θέησιν) in his hands.

<sup>89</sup> The word for the potter's wheel (*trochos*) comes from *trechō*, to run. The verb is used here of the running of dancers, and a different running verb, *theō*, is used for the movement of the wheel.

The round and round of the potter's wheel suggests timelessness and the postponement of the *telos*, just as the running of Achilles and Hector (βίμφα μάλα τρωχῶσι, 22.163) in a series of circles around the walls of Troy takes on the timeless and aimless quality of a dream. Indeed, the simile's proleptic allusion to the chariot race in the funeral games for Patroclus (since they are like horses running "at the games for a dead man," 22.164) contributes a certain circularity to the poem, inasmuch as its imagery and action are caught in a loop of repetition. Viewed in terms of the timeline of the plot, however, the simile specifically looks forward to two future events (the death of Hector and the funeral of Patroclus) that both depend on a causal chain of events. For neither could take place without the race coming to an end in exactly the way it does. Seen this way, the "endless" race of Hector and Achilles foreshadows the *telos* of the poem, not just by alluding to the funeral games for Patroclus but also to those for Hector, whose burial brings the epic to its end. The chase around the walls, therefore, at the same time as it works through the imagery of circularity and resistance of an endpoint, also marks a key moment of action in the "line" of the plot.

The significance of these two opposite ways of "seeing" or reading the race around the walls of Troy may relate to the different way that gods and humans see within the spatial frame of the poem. The immortals watch synoptically from high above, perhaps experiencing the race – as they experience their own lives – as an endlessly ongoing event. From their point of view, the race can only be resolved by bringing out the scales and the intervention of Athena. From the less-elevated perspective of the human viewers on the wall, however, the running of Achilles and Hector would only be seen piecemeal, each time they passed under the spot at which the Trojans were located. The end of the race and the end of Hector's life fall under their purview, reinforcing the point that humans more ordinarily see narrative in terms of progressive points along a line.

In Book 23, during the chariot race to which the simile of *Iliad* 22.162–6 alludes, our attention is once again drawn to the concept of the *termata* or turning point. The word occurs six times in this section of the poem and is the primary object around which Nestor's advice to Antilochus hinges, leading to some complication in the final ordering of positions in the race.<sup>90</sup> To further complicate matters, after the horses

<sup>90</sup> Cf. note 88. Achilles points out the halfway turning point (*termata*) to the competitors as they line up at the starting posts, even though it is far off (*télothen*) on the plain (*Il.* 23.358–9). He also sets Phoenix up as the *skopos* or overseer of the race, who – like the bard – might "remember and tell it accurately" (360–1).



have rounded the turning post, a disagreement ensues among the spectators as to who is in the lead. One spectator who has gained an elevated vantage point correctly identifies the leader, but his vision is contested by another observer of the race (23.450–90). This suggests that the distance to the *termata* is potentially but not necessarily viewable, falling just within the reasonable limits of what can be taken in by the human eye in a single sweep of the landscape.

The viewable spaces marked out by these two kinds of running (the race around the walls and the chariot race), therefore, are also suggestive areas within the poem that might serve as doubles for how the plot of the *Iliad* can be “looked at.” On the one hand, they denote very specific endings – the death of Hector, the funeral rites of Patroclus, the ending of the *Iliad* – but on the other, they problematize the concept of seeing the end even as it occurs. Readings of *Iliad* 24 as a reversal of *Iliad* 1 contribute toward the argument that the poem’s entire plot can be mapped on the model of running toward the *termata* and back.<sup>91</sup> The circular and *eusynoptic* nature of the two races brackets the poem within a world where the death of Achilles can be deferred, affording a pleasing unity to the epic and an easily graspable sense of a whole.<sup>92</sup> To go further along the sequence of the events in the Trojan War would be to undo the unity of the epic, just as it would also be to undo the idea of a contained and surveyable landscape.

As we discussed earlier in the chapter, Aristotle’s analysis of the strung-along sentence in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* compares it to running a race whose turning post is not clearly visible up ahead, causing the reader/runner to tire and lose his way (3.9.1409a27–b1). There is something exhausting, in other words, in following narratives whose starting and endpoints are not completely surveyable within a single visual frame. In this context, we might also note that going further along the sequence of events in the Trojan War would mean collapsing the unity of the *Iliad*’s landscape in a very real sense, through the destruction of the citadel’s walls.

<sup>91</sup> E.g., Macleod: “One could imagine an epic like the *Iliad* which ended with the sack of Troy or the death of Achilles. Both events are foretold in the work as we have it, and in Book 22 the narrative for a while even seems to be moving towards them” (1982, 27–8) On the whole concept of moving toward the end in the *Iliad*, see Lynn-George 1988, 209–29 and *passim*; Murnaghan 1997.

<sup>92</sup> Aristotle is quick to applaud Homer for not narrating the Trojan War from beginning to end, but choosing to stop with the funeral of Patroclus and the ransoming of Hector’s body (*Poet.* ch. 8).

## LOOKING BEYOND THE END: ONE MORE MOVING ANIMAL

Beyond the *Iliad's* ending lies the destruction of the citadel of *Ilium* and the end of the Trojan War – events that Aristotle credited Homer for leaving out of his epic in order to create an organic and unified plot (*Poet.* 18.1456a16, 23.1459a30–4). Throughout this chapter, we have paid special attention to the *eusynoptic* qualities of the *Iliad* in conjunction with the *eusynoptic* properties of the plot-as-creature that Aristotle describes in chapter 7. Elsewhere in Aristotle's work, there are other indications that we should think of a plot as being somehow embodied – as if it were a creature that lives and move through time (*Poet.* 23.1459a17–21):<sup>93</sup>

Περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθόπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις συνιστάναι δραματικούς καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχουσιν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἵν' ὥσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὅλῳ ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν . . .

In the case of narration and imitation in meter, plots need to be constructed just as they are in tragedies, that is around one complete action with a beginning and a middle and an end, so that, just like a single unified creature (*zōon*), they might create the proper pleasure . . .

In reading the *Iliad* through the lens of Aristotle's *eusynoptic* ideal, we have found that the way a landscape can be observed has varied between the idea of a still picture and an animated scene, whether that means a moving animal or a series of images that “come to life” within a formerly static environment. The *eusynoptic* is paired with the concept of animation as a means of suggesting a formula by which the reader, once she has translated the sequential experience of reading or listening to a narrative into something still (a picture), can then reintroduce or relive that sequentiality by having the picture come to life.<sup>94</sup>

Aristotle's *zōon* also looks back to the ideally arranged animal described by Plato in the *Phaedrus* (Pl., *Phdr.* 264c2–6):

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Arist. *Part. an.* 645b15–17.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Lessing 1984 on the “transforming [of] what is coexistent in his subject into what is consecutive and thereby making the living picture of an action out of the tedious painting of an object.” Lessing argues that this takes place through Hephaestus's crafting of the scene. I argue that it is intrinsically linked to the principle of animation in this and other scenes.

... δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄμουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα.

... Every speech should be arranged like a living creature (*zōon*), possessing a body of its own, so that it is neither headless nor without feet, but has both a middle and extremities that are designed so as to be fitting to each other and to the whole.

As Porter has argued, Aristotle's *zōon* recalls Plato's ideal of unity and wholeness not in and for itself but insofar as it is easily surveyable and appears complete to the person looking at it (forthcoming). But what about that other well-known creature in the *Phaedrus*? (Pl., *Phdr.* 275d–e):

δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοιον ζωγραφίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι... ὅταν δὲ ἅπας γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος...

Writing (*graphē*), *Phaedrus*, has the following strange feature – one that in truth is similar to painting (*zōgraphia*). For the offspring of the latter stand as though they were alive (*hōs zōnta*), but if anyone asks them anything, they remain very solemnly silent. Speeches too have the same quality... once it has been written down, each speech roams about everywhere...

On first reading, this passage would not seem to have much in common with Aristotle's analysis of Homer or the shape of the *Iliad*. This is especially true, since Socrates is drawing a distinction between oral and written speech. Here, the written word is dumb, being unable to answer or speak for itself when queried, and it “roams” or “rolls” about aimlessly. A spoken discourse, on the other hand, is ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον (“animate and breathing,” *Phdr.* 276a). This is a distinction that we cannot attribute to Aristotle's interpretation of Homer and tragedy, even though the two are oral mediums, because Aristotle is as interested in the visual images that these plots represent when they are read (*anagignōskein*) as when they are performed.<sup>95</sup>

Nevertheless, it is interesting that Socrates draws a distinction between animals that are truly alive and animals that are artifacts, fashioned out of

<sup>95</sup> Arist. *Poet.* 13.1453b3–7; 26.1462a11–13, and the passages cited in Porter 1995, 118–23; Bassi 2005. For further discussion on the relation between the structure of a text and the body of an animal, see Ford 2002, 240–9.

materials to take on the moving properties of living creatures. We might think here again of Hephaestus's self-wheeling cauldrons and robotic maidens.<sup>96</sup> But Plato's silent, rolling animals are also eerily reminiscent of the Trojan horse – that crafted, lifelike animal that rolled on wheels and remained famously silent when addressed by Helen.<sup>97</sup> Although our best literary description of the horse does not occur until Book 2 of Vergil's *Aeneid*,<sup>98</sup> we have indications of both its size and moving parts. Servius, for example, states that the horse was 120 feet long and 30 feet wide, and that its tail and knees could move (ad *Aen.* 2.150).

In his summary of the *Little Iliad*, Proclus describes how the Trojan horse was specifically built to be too large to fit through the city gates, so that part of Ilium's walls would have to be knocked down in order to wheel the animal inside.<sup>99</sup> Like Aristotle's animal ten thousand stades long, the enormous animal is too big for the visual frame of the *Iliad*, breaking down its *eusynoptic* properties as it breaks down the walls of the ideally *eusynoptic* and impenetrable city-state. With the transgression of the Trojan horse through the walls of Troy, in other words, the literary landscape of the *Iliad* could no longer be *eusynoptic*, in all the forms of the word that we have discussed: neither easily defended, nor seen in one view, nor cohering as a plot that can be easily understood or remembered.<sup>100</sup>

The Trojan horse *does* fit within Homer's epic range when looked at from the distance of the *Odyssey* – it can, in other words, fit synoptically into the shape of a plot. Yet, in the context of the *Iliad*, there is a difference between the moving, crafted creatures on Hephaestus's shield or in his workshop, and the crafted, moving creature of the Trojan horse. The former, supernatural kind of creature helps to suggest the illusory nature

<sup>96</sup> As also of Daedalus's moving statues at Pl. *Meno* 97d–e.

<sup>97</sup> Odysseus silences the Trojan horse when he claps his hands over the mouths of the Achaeans inside it (*Od.* 4.74–89). The earliest representation of the Trojan horse in art, a Boeotian fibula from c. 700 BCE, depicts it on wheels (Sparkes 1971, 55).

<sup>98</sup> In the *Odyssey*, Demodocus called it a “great wooden horse” (*Od.* 8.512). Virgil, focalizing the horse from the Trojans' perspective, was more explicit about its grotesque and monstrous nature, describing it as *instar montis* (*Aen.* 2.15), *moles equi* (2.32), *machina* (2.46), *moles immanis equi* (2.150), *immensa moles* (2.185), and *monstrum* (2.245). See further Austin 1959; Garcia 2007, 313–17.

<sup>99</sup> Procl. *Chres. suppleta ex Apollod. Epit.* 5.6–16. Cf. Verg. *Aen.* 2.187.

<sup>100</sup> It makes perfect sense, therefore, that Aristotle criticizes the *Little Iliad*, the poem in the epic cycle that describes the manufacture of the horse, calling it far inferior to the *Iliad* (Arist. *Poet.* 3.1459a37–b18). On Aristotle's understanding of unity in Greek poetics, see Heath 1989, 38–55.

of a fully visible view of the whole from an immortal vantage point; the manmade creature is both less fantastic and more destructive, working as a kind of antitype of the *eusynoptic*, or a reminder of the limits of what is humanly possible. The Trojan horse, Odysseus's secret scheme, pushes the terms and definitions of the ideal plot beyond the limits of the *Iliad*.<sup>101</sup>

We started this chapter by considering some of the ways in which the *Iliad* presented a *eusynoptic* vision of its plot, as suggested first by Aristotle and his various applications of the term, and then by the text of the *Iliad*, which experiments with seeing the poem as a landscape, or seeing the poem from above, in ways that are similar to Aristotle's examples. In the *Iliad*, we considered how both the immortal point of view and the epic figure of ekphrasis present a global, synoptic overview, a fantastic illusion of the whole. We also considered how these points of view work in narrative terms, because, as Aristotle hinted by putting an animal in his landscape, they admit movement and animation within the visual frame. At its extreme, however, the immortal point of view is limitless and difficult for humans to grasp, whether those humans are characters within the poem, the epic poet who recites from memory, or the audience who listens and attempts to see the plot in their mind. Thus Aristotle insists on his *eusynoptic* landscape or object being of a size that cannot exceed the capacity of the human eye, and also, by extension, the limits of human memory. He understands that an audience will tire if the *telos* of a plot is kept continually out of sight, and that seeing human actions from too far away or on too grand a scale makes them lose narrative coherence. Aristotle's reading of Homer from this standpoint enables him to reconfigure the divine way of seeing that is suggested by the invocation to the Muses and the description of the Shield. His emphasis on a human version of the *eusynoptic* sets the terms for a successful narrative form, since the limits that he places on the plot contrast with the endless properties of immortal space and time.

Aristotle's view of a living creature "of a certain magnitude" stands as a symbol not only for the plot of the *Iliad* but also for an ideal way of seeing that the epic lays claim to but never fully reveals. Through his

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Brooks 1984, 11–12, and the four definitions of plot listed there from the *American Heritage Dictionary* ("4. A secret plan to accomplish a hostile or illegal purpose; scheme," as discussed in the Introduction). We will consider the different shape of the *Odyssey's* plot in the following chapter.

*zôon*, Aristotle plays with the idea that a plot (even a plot that moves through time) might be understood to represent an area of ground that can be seen. At the same time, he knows that to see from this human perspective places certain necessary limits on the work. Specifically, it calls for a view of space that is to size, not scaled down through the fantastic technologies of immortal vision or supernatural technology.<sup>102</sup> In Chapter 3, we will consider how the Greeks attempted to achieve this supernatural, synoptic effect through their experimentation with cartography and its uses in and alongside the written word. Before that, however, we will turn to a different presentation of space to be found in the *Odyssey*.

<sup>102</sup> Belfiore: “According to Aristotle, then, ‘beauty consists in magnitude,’ not absolutely, but relative to the perception of ephemeral beings” (2001, 44).

## TWO

# PATHS AND MEASURES: EPIC SPACE AND THE ODYSSEY

IN THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER, WE CONSIDERED HOW THE *ILIAD* PUT forward the notion of a synoptic or cartographic view of space, and how, as a result, the Homeric plot might be visualized in the mind's eye as a kind of landscape. Following Aristotle, we noted that this kind of view of the plot is characteristic of Homer's poetry. In the Introduction and in Chapter 1, I tried to get to the heart of what this *eusynoptic* ideal really meant for epic storytelling through a reading of the panoptic points of view suggested in the *Iliad* by the invocation to the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships, the gods' view from Olympus, the Shield of Achilles, and the Trojan plain. Toward the end of the first chapter, I also explored the notion of the *telos* or endpoint in Homer's work, trying to see how it fit within the shape of a plot that is "protocartographic" or can be viewed as a whole from above.<sup>1</sup> There, we saw that the line of the running track provided a useful medium for conceptualizing the size of the *eusynoptic* plot and for giving the reader a model with which to look toward the end.

It will not be my concern in this chapter to describe the protocartographic aspects of the *Odyssey*. The poem adheres to those basic properties that Aristotle laid out for it, but my interest will instead be focused on the small ways in which the *Odyssey* resists being categorized as a closed and unified system, especially at the very end of the poem. I will suggest that that resistance is prescient of a shift in genre and style that occurs with the beginnings of prose, a form that – although its early life is closely tied to mapmaking – sets forth a more countercartographic view of space.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For an explanation of my use of the terms protocartographic and countercartographic, see the Introduction and note 3 there.

<sup>2</sup> See Chs. 3 and 4.

While the *Iliad* is marked by references to the Muses and the powerful and sublime vision of the world designed by Hephaestus on the Shield of Achilles, the *Odyssey* only invokes the Muse once (*Od.* 1.1), and can be characterized not by a divine view of the world but by the human exploration of its protagonist through it. The varied and expansive geography of the *Odyssey* invites us to consider the landscape of the poem in a different way, hinting at new forms for the epic and new ways of looking within it.

The core of this chapter considers one small episode from the *Odyssey* that tells of the hero's journey into an alien landscape located far from the sea. I analyze this episode in order to suggest ways in which the *Odyssey* calls into question epic's synoptic viewpoint. The inland journey raises the issue of unseen places; alien geographies that exist beyond epic's global scope. Homer's authorial viewpoint also shifts with the *Odyssey*, predominantly because of the increased importance of the human narrator. With this shift we move toward the sequential model of following a path or route through space. Here, I introduce the idea (developed more fully in Chapter 4) that such a viewpoint anticipates the countercartographic way of seeing that can be found in the writing of Herodotus.

## THE TRAVELING NARRATOR

One of the ways in which the poet of the *Iliad* was able to successfully present a protocartographic view of his plot was by claiming he saw nothing at all (*oude ti*), whilst simultaneously summoning inspiration from the Muses who saw everything (*panta*). Both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* begin with an invocation to the Muse, but each takes that beginning in a different direction. As has long been noted, the emphasis on the Muses is much more pronounced in the *Iliad*, while the *Odyssey* chooses to focus on the human figure of the inspired singer (*aoidos*), as he is represented by Phemius and Demodocus, as well as by Odysseus himself in Books 9–12.<sup>3</sup> One of the consequences of this difference is that the narrative viewpoint

<sup>3</sup> Invocations to the Muses in the *Iliad*: *Il.* 1.1–7; 2.484–7, 761–2; 11.218–20; 14.508–10; 16.112–13. Cf. Minton 1960, 1962; Clay 1983, 9–25; Thalmann 1984, 126–9; De Jong 1987, 41–99; Pucci 1987, 228–35; Ford 1992, 23, 78–9; Segal 1994, 113–41; Finkelberg 1998, 48–79; Minchin 2001, 161–80; Biles 2003. It may be significant that the figures who most closely approximate the Muses in the *Odyssey* are the Sirens, who speak in Iliadic language of exclusively Iliadic material (Pucci 1998, 1–9, cf. Ford 1992, 83), and who are presented as destructive figures in contrast to the positive portrayal of the poem's other major "Iliadic" narrator, Demodocus.



moves from an aerial to a grounded position. The epic Muses see, in a generic fashion, from above. But they also appear to exist everywhere, at all places and all times. They epitomize what Nagel (1986), following Leibnitz, has termed the “view from nowhere,” or perhaps better, the view from everywhere.<sup>4</sup> The position of the narrator on the ground in the *Odyssey* necessarily gives the poet’s voice a more limited perspective.

The wanderings of Odysseus lead the poem along a route where divine inspiration is woven into the human fabric and experience of the poem. We are told in the *Odyssey* not so much that the Muse “sees everything,” but rather that she has taught her servant, Demodocus, certain “paths” (*oimai*) of song (8.481, cf. 488). In the same section of the poem, Odysseus surmises that Demodocus might have direct experience of the events he sings of due to having been there at the time (“you yourself must have been present [παρεών] or heard about it from someone else who was”).<sup>5</sup> Demodocus’s role as a witness to the events of history in Book 8 foreshadows the first-person narrative of Odysseus in Books 9–12, where everything he tells the Phaeacians comes not through the eye of the Muse, nor through divine inspiration, but from his own experience as a traveler.<sup>6</sup>

The appearance of various narrators within the *Odyssey* and the bodily hardships that the poet-figure Odysseus suffers contextualize the role of the narrating voice within the physical space of the poem. For three important books, the authorial eye is localized within the many-turning, much-suffering body of Odysseus, and it is the movement of this body through space that animates and energizes the thread of the poem as a whole. In the *Iliad*, the body of the human being needs to escape its own boundaries in order to grasp a fully synoptic viewpoint. Thus in Chapter 1, we saw how Achilles is symbolically lifted toward an immortal vantage point when he observes the shield. In the Introduction, we also considered Homer’s prologue to the Catalogue of Ships, where he complains that he could not narrate all that the Muses see, even if he had a body possessing ten tongues and ten mouths.<sup>7</sup> “God’s-eye” views of space occur in the *Odyssey*, but mortals in the poem do not strive toward

<sup>4</sup> The Muses inhabit Mount Olympus, yet *pareste* at *Il.* 2.485 suggests a vision that collapses time and space and which is difficult to pin down to a normal vantage point.

<sup>5</sup> In the prologue to the *Iliad*’s Catalogue of Ships, the story was quite different. There, the narrator claimed he heard and saw nothing of value, while the Muses saw everything (*Il.* 2.485; *Od.* 8.491).

<sup>6</sup> For further discussion and bibliography on this topic, see Dougherty 2001, 70–3; Biles 2003; Bassi (forthcoming).

<sup>7</sup> *Il.* 19.386; 2.490, as discussed in the Introduction.

the kind of *eusynoptic* vision of a plot that we find in the invocation to the Muses in Book 2 or on the Shield of Achilles. Instead, the impulse that we noted in the *Iliad* to draw the *eusynoptic* image into movement (through animation) is now explicitly rendered, in the *Odyssey*, through the motif of the traveling narrator.<sup>8</sup>

Since the events of *Odyssey* 9–12 rely on human memory and experience, they must then share a different relationship to truth and narrative to those corroborated by or told through the Muses.<sup>9</sup> This kind of authorial vantage point looks forward to the kind mediated by the traveling body of the early Greek historian, not least because the visual meaning embedded in the practice of *historiê* has much in common with the *Odyssey*'s focus on the grounded, eyewitnessing narrator. Both combine the acquisition of knowledge through vision and direct experience with the practice of traveling as a means of tracing a literary route.<sup>10</sup> Intricately connected to the privileging of visual knowledge is the choice of the narrative path as a way of helping the reader travel from one part of the plot to the other.

Although the *Odyssey* is situated within the world of epic, the way in which it asks its audience to envision the path of its narrative, therefore, anticipates the advent of historiography as a genre. This is a topic to be discussed later in the book, but it will be worthwhile touching here on how the *Odyssey* spans the interval between epic and prose, especially in terms of the spatial metaphors it uses to envision its plot. It has long been recognized that the *Odyssey* is a significant forerunner of the kind of Ionian historiography taken up and practiced by Herodotus, and that the narratives of Demodocus and Odysseus exert an influence on the first-person account of the traveling eyewitness Herodotus.<sup>11</sup> Even

<sup>8</sup> A good example of the convergence of the “god’s-eye” and travel-based viewpoints is found in the flight of Hermes from Olympus to Ogygia at the beginning of *Od.* 5.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Alcinous’s comment to Odysseus at *Od.* 11.363–9. Several scholars have also noted the punning relationship between the Greek words for wanderer (*alêtês*) and truth (*alêthês*). *Od.* 14.118–27; Segal 1994, 179–83; Montiglio 2005, 92–6, 253.

<sup>10</sup> It is significant that the word *historiê* (visual inquiry) shares the same root (\**vid*) as the epic word for seeing and knowing (*idein*), which is used in the *Iliad* to describe the ways by which the Muses gain their knowledge, but by which humans, significantly, do not (*Il.* 2. 486–7).

<sup>11</sup> Much work has been done on the Homeric qualities of Herodotus, who is called “most Homeric” (*homerikôtatos*) by Longinus ([Long.], *Subl.* 13.3). Cf. Huber 1965; Strasburger 1972, 1057–97; Erbse 1992, 122–32; Hornblower 1994, 65–7; Calame 1995, 86–91; Marincola 1997, 6ff.; Boedeker 2000, 103–6; Marincola 2006, 2007; Baragwanath 2008, 35–54. On *oimê*, see Hom. *Od.* 8.74, 22.347–8; Pind. *Ol.* 9.47; *Pyth.* 2.96; *Hymn. Hom. Merc.* 451; On the motif of the road in Herodotus, cf. 1.5.3:

more than the poet-figures of Demodocus and Odysseus, though, it is Telemachus – the inquirer who sets out on a journey through “real” geography in order to gain knowledge about his father – who plays a mediating role between the *Odyssey* and the *Histories*. Already within the epic tradition, therefore, the motif of the journey or route offers up a dynamic model for the shape of a geographical plot. Alongside the correspondence between the Herodotean *logôn hodos* (road of words) and the Homeric *oimai* (paths of song), there is also the oft-noted connection between *Odyssey* 1.1–4 and *Histories* 1.5.3, as I discuss later in the book.<sup>12</sup>

Yet it must be stressed that the *Odyssey* does not forgo the Muses’ vision completely, nor does it exactly replicate the kind of authorial practice and viewpoint that we find in Herodotus. In the poem, the principle of gaining knowledge through the human enterprise of travel is muted by the fact that Telemachus does not learn very much on his trip to find news of his father (and most of what he does learn is derived indirectly from the voice of the divine seer Proteus), while Odysseus’s journey is a constant source of distress to him and a diversion from his primary goal of returning to Ithaca.<sup>13</sup> Odysseus makes it home only with a great deal of divine aid, by following carefully the directions spelled out to him by Circe and Tiresias. Despite the prominent role of Odysseus as the grounded narrator, therefore, the poem does not *dispense* with epic’s synoptic or protocartographic system of envisioning space. It is rather that we can identify in the *Odyssey* a move toward an opposite way of seeing (what I am calling here the countercartographic), because it presents a vision that, like the path that it follows, is both sequential and limited in its horizons.

The *Odyssey* accentuates the concept of the path in order to articulate a different way of thinking about, and looking at, the space of its plot. By diminishing the role of the Muses in the story, Homer asks us to consider what a plot might look like from a human perspective. Thus, although the poem conforms to the visual regime of epic by suggesting,

“I will proceed (προβήσομαι) further along my argument”; 1.95.1: “I can show the three other roads of narrative (λόγων ὁδοὺς) concerning Cyrus”; and 1.117.2; 2.20.1. Further discussion can be found in Lanata 1963, 11–12; Lang 1984, 1–5; Dewald 1987, 149; Ford 1992, 41–8; Nagy [1979] 1999, 18 (§1.4., note 3); Bakker 1997a, 60–2; and my Ch. 4, note 11. Nagy 1990a, 233, also compares the process of narration to the process of traveling along a road and provides parallels from epinician poetry and the *Odyssey*.

<sup>12</sup> On correspondences between *Od.* 1.1–4 and *Hdt.* 1.5.3, see Hartog 1988, 343; Montiglio 2005, 127; Marincola 2007, 13–14.

<sup>13</sup> On the distress that Odysseus’s journey causes him, but that Herodotus’s journey does not, see Montiglio 2005, 126–8; Marincola 2007, 20–8.

through Odysseus's detailed but successful *nostos*, a protocartographic view of space, its method of visualizing the plot as if from the perspective of a traveler on the ground acknowledges the difficulty of rendering any area of space completely accessible to view. This is nowhere truer than in Homer's foretelling of Odysseus's journey into a completely new and unseen form of space.

## THE LONG WALK INLAND

The last journey that Odysseus is fated to take in his life pushes the narrative model of the path (and the view from the path) to its limits. Its route is so unusual that it does not even take place within the boundaries of the poem. It exists only in the realm of prophecy, as spoken first by Tiresias in the Underworld (11.121–31), and later repeated by Odysseus to Penelope back on Ithaca (23.267–77).

Leaving Ithaca one last time, Odysseus is told that he will walk inland with an oar on his shoulder until he meets a wayfarer from a race of men who “do not know of the sea.”<sup>14</sup> When this stranger mistakes Odysseus's oar for a winnowing-shovel, he is to plant it in the earth, sacrifice to Poseidon, and finally return home.<sup>15</sup> As Tiresias makes clear, Odysseus will fully complete his travels only after having encountered this inland space, and only then will he be free to return permanently to Ithaca, there awaiting a “gentle death.” Here is the passage in full as Odysseus narrates it to Penelope (23.266–84):

οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς

χαίρω, ἐπεὶ μάλα πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστε' ἄνωγεν  
 ἐλθεῖν, ἐν χεῖρεσσιν ἔχοντ' εὐήρες ἔρετμόν,  
 εἰς ὃ κε τοὺς ἀφίκωμαι οἳ οὐ ἴσασι θάλασσαν  
 ἄνερες, οὐδέ θ' ἄλεσσι μεμιγμένον εἶδαρ ἔδουσιν·  
 οὐδ' ἄρα τοι ἴσασι νέας φοινικοπαρήους,  
 οὐδ' εὐήρε' ἔρετμά, τά τε πτερὰ νηυσὶ πέλονται.  
 σῆμα δέ μοι τόδ' εἶπεν ἄριφραδές, οὐδέ σε κεύσω.  
 ὁππότε κεν δῆ μοι ξυμβλήμενος ἄλλος ὁδίτης  
 φήῃ ἀθηρηλοιγὸν ἔχειν ἀνὰ φαιδίμῳ ὦμῳ,  
 καὶ τότε μ' ἐν γαίῃ πήξαντ' ἐκέλευσεν ἔρετμόν,  
 ἔρξανθ' ἱερὰ καλὰ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι,  
 ἄρνηϊόν ταῦρόν τε συῶν τ' ἐπιβήτηρα κάπρον,

<sup>14</sup> *Od.* 11.122–3; 23.269–70. Hansen 1990 identifies the story as a popular folktale motif.

<sup>15</sup> A winnowing-shovel is an agricultural tool used for separating the wheat from the chaff. See J. E. Harrison 1904, esp. 246; Carrière 1992, 34; Olson 1997.

οἴκαδ' ἀποστείχειν, ἔρδειν θ' ἱεράς ἐκατόμβας  
 ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσι,  
 πᾶσι μάλ' ἐξείης· θάνατος δέ μοι ἐξ ἁλὸς αὐτῷ  
 ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος ἐλεύσεται, ὅς κέ με πέφνη  
 γήρα ὑπο λιπαρῷ ἄρημένον· ἀμφὶ δὲ λαοὶ  
 ὄλβιοι ἔσσονται· τὰ δέ μοι φάτο πάντα τελεῖσθαι.

Nor am I

happy, since [Tiresias] bid me to go to many cities of men,  
 holding in my hands a well-fitted oar,  
 until I should come upon a people who do not know of  
 the sea,  
 who do not eat food that has been mixed with salt,  
 and who know nothing of purple-cheeked ships,  
 or of well-fitted oars, which are the wings of ships.<sup>16</sup>  
 But he told this clear sign to me that I will not hide from you.  
 Whenever some other traveler coming across me in the road  
 should say that I carry a winnowing-shovel upon my gleaming  
 shoulder,  
 then he told me to fix the well-fitted oar in the earth,  
 and to carry out auspicious sacrifices to lord Poseidon  
 a ram and a bull and a boar who mounts sows,  
 then to return home, and to accomplish holy hecatombs  
 to the immortal gods who hold Olympus,  
 all of them in order. Death will come to me from the sea,  
 a very gentle one, which will kill me  
 worn down by sleek old age. And my people around me  
 will be prosperous. All this he told me would happen.

The most obvious aspect that makes this final landscape of the *Odyssey* so different from the other spaces in the poem is the absence of salt and sea. For Odysseus to become truly lost, he must leave the sea behind, entering a region where he will come close to relinquishing his identity in the context of Homeric poetics. As his projected story crosses the *telos* of the poem's end, in other words, it also shifts from the space of the sea to a new site, that of the landlocked interior. The disappearance of the sea has certain important ramifications for the poem as a whole, for it destabilizes the parameters of the epic world as we know it.

At first glance the sea might seem, especially in an epic context, to be only a baneful entity, and thus its absence from the poem might be

<sup>16</sup> For the comparison of oars with wings, see Stanford 1948 ad 11.125; M. L. West 1978 ad *Op.* 629.

thought to be of no great significance. The sea causes drowning, the worst kind of death, and is responsible for the loss of the last of Odysseus's crew, as well as a number of Achaean heroes returning from Troy. To die at sea, a fate far worse than dying on land, suggests oblivion (*Od.* 5.306–12). Yet the sea is also an important circulator of Homeric storylines and its paths of song run lightly across the surface of the water. News travels swiftly by ship, and it would be difficult to imagine how any kind of ancient Greek plot could work without the passage at some point in time of characters across the sea. In more specific terms, if there exists a group of people who have never heard of the sea or who do not know what an oar is used for, then there also exists a group of people who know nothing of Homeric epic, nothing of a man called Achilles, or indeed any of the heroes Homer recounted in the Catalogue of Ships. It is, of course, impossible to narrate the story of the Trojan War without the mention of ships.<sup>17</sup> The disturbing implication of Tiresias's prophecy, in other words, is that – although Odysseus's *kleos* may well “reach to the heavens” (9.20) – there are places beyond epic's range which his fame does not touch.<sup>18</sup>

Why would Homer choose to look out at such an alien landscape from the confines of a poem that takes so much of its meaning and context from the sea? Or, more bluntly, why does the *Odyssey* ask us to consider what would happen if the sea were to disappear from epic's conceptual horizon, beyond the vanishing point of both its own ending and the poem's transmission? To travel inland in such a way is to travel “off the map” of archaic poetics, along a path that is no longer defined by well-established topographical or generic contours. The standard interpretation of this journey is as a rite of reparation to Poseidon, which in turn motivates the movement of the god's worship inland.<sup>19</sup> But I argue that the journey can be read quite differently. Even if Odysseus brings Poseidon with him, his expedition away from the sea takes us beyond epic territory, thereby registering a movement toward a new literary landscape.<sup>20</sup>

Whether in poetic, cultural, or economic terms, it is hard to overstate how important the sea was to Homer's audience.<sup>21</sup> We know that the

<sup>17</sup> Cf. my discussion of the opening of Herodotus's *Histories*, Ch. 4.

<sup>18</sup> For further discussion of this phrase, see Segal 1983, 29, and note 22.

<sup>19</sup> This has been the interpretation favored by several scholars, stretching as far back as Eustathius (1675, 32–4). Cf. J. E. Harrison 1904; Dornseiff 1937; Hansen 1990, 249; Hartog 2001, 35; Carrière 1992. Benardete 1997, 93–4, has a slightly different take, as does Peradotto 1990.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Falkner 1989, who argues that the inland journey represents for Odysseus a “final farewell to the heroic age and the passage to a peaceable kingdom” (53).

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed reading of Homeric poetics and sea travel, see Dougherty 2001.

Greeks tended to settle and travel within close proximity of the coast, and that early *periploi* and sailing expeditions constructed their accounts in the form of a point-to-point itinerary along the shoreline.<sup>22</sup> Colonizers, too, approached new sites from the perspective of the shore, and rarely ventured far inland from coastal areas.<sup>23</sup> As historians have long recognized, and as is evident from the *Odyssey*, it was necessary for sailors to keep the border between land and sea in sight for practical reasons of food and water supply. It would be difficult for the Greeks to imagine a world in which the sea was not a defining characteristic of their identity and experience. Even in the realm of the imaginary, the mythical river Ocean – whence all rivers and the sea originate – represents the furthermost edges of the Greeks' world.<sup>24</sup> Its depiction on the outermost rim of the Shield of Achilles supports this, as does the fact that Homer locates the Underworld just beyond Ocean's borders. In ancient cartography, as we will observe in the following chapter, the Ocean denotes the outermost edge of the map, providing a framework within which the earth as a whole might be conceived.<sup>25</sup> Going *beyond* the sea is thus a truly destabilizing and unsettling idea.

Since both the familiar border of the sea and the fantastic edge of the mythical river Ocean were important devices by which the Greeks gave shape to their world, the venturing into a landscape without sea or salt speaks to the fading away of the traditional Greek view of the earth's geography. When Odysseus takes up an oar on his shoulder and walks inland until he meets a people who have never tasted salt; when he turns his back, that is, on the familiar site of the sea, then, and only then, will he truly lose his way in both world and poem. This movement toward an alternative version of space in the poem has repercussions for the structure of epic narrative, denoting not just a shift to a radically new and alien topography but also a shift in genre between the ends of epic and the beginnings of prose.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Thuc. 1.7; Hdt. 4.42–4; Romm 1992, 9–34; Gisinger 1937; Dilke 1985, 130–3; Hartog 2001, 88–9.

<sup>23</sup> Malkin 1998, 1–31.

<sup>24</sup> *Il.* 21.195–7; cf. Hes. *Theog.* 787ff.

<sup>25</sup> Romm 1992, 32–44; Hartog 2001, esp. 23–4. The shields of Heracles and Achilles are both encircled by deep layers of metal, representing the river Ocean. For the ancient technique of drawing maps with a compass or lathe, see Kahn 1985, 83–4. See also Hdt. 4.36 (and my discussion in Chs. 3 and 4); Pl. *Criti.* 113d. Note also the term *perimetron* (or outline) used by Diogenes Laertius to describe Anaximander's map at DK 12A1.

## LOOKING TOWARD THE END

Odysseus first learns of his final journey with the oar, as we have said, from Tiresias in the Underworld. His own repetition of Tiresias's account, in Book 23, reminds us that, even now that Odysseus has reached Ithaca, killed the suitors, and been reunited with Penelope, his journey home is not really over.<sup>26</sup> This is in keeping with certain other resistances to closure that occur at the end of the poem. As the suitors' families and Odysseus's household are about to meet in battle in the last lines of Book 24, Homer tells us that "everyone would have died and not returned home" (literally: been made *nostoi*-less) (καί νύ κε δὴ πάντας ἔλεσαν καὶ ἔθηκάν ἀνόστους, *Od.* 24.528), if not for the sudden intervention of Athena. The sentiment momentarily derails the poem's celebration of the completion of Odysseus's homecoming. In fact, the whole of Book 24 appeared so problematic that Homer's ancient editors argued that the true ending of the poem occurs at *Od.* 23.296, just as Penelope and Odysseus retire to bed (and just after the oar story is retold). They marked this point, presumably, because of a wish to place a limit on a narrative that increasingly moves toward the idea of an ending, only to turn away from it. In their commentaries, some refer to line 296 as being the true "limit" (*peras*) of the epic.<sup>27</sup> We do not have to agree with their conclusions to recognize that the Alexandrians raise an important point in their quest to find a suitable ending for the narrative as it moves toward closure. Once the hero has reached his treasured and immobile bed, the very counterpart of the moving ship, surely we are to deduce that he has also reached the end of his *nostos*.<sup>28</sup>

It is interesting to note that the *Odyssey* works as hard to uproot this idea as it does to establish it. We have already discussed the shadow ending, or *peras*, of the epic that is posited by the scholia at *Od.* 23.296. Next to consider is the horizon (*peratê*) upon which Athena holds back the night, in order that Odysseus might have time to tell his story to

<sup>26</sup> On Penelope's role in creating fissures in the *Odyssey* even as it moves toward closure, see Tsagalis 2007, 63–90.

<sup>27</sup> For discussion on how Hellenistic scholarship and especially Aristarchus suggested that the *Odyssey* originally ended at *Od.* 23.296, see in particular Bury 1922; Kay 1957; Rossi 1968; Wender 1978, 12–15. On teleology in the *Odyssey*, see Buchan 2004, 1–14; on closure and aftermath, Roberts 1997. Martin 1993 argues that it is "clear that the poem itself speaks of the end of a tradition" (240).

<sup>28</sup> The bed is a counterpart to the ship in the sense that it has never been cut from its base (the key activity in the making of a ship, e.g., *Eur. Med.* 1–6). I discuss the relationship between ships and trees more extensively in the second half of the final chapter.



Penelope right through to the end. Yet the very first thing that Odysseus tells his wife is that they have not yet reached the endpoint or boundary (*peirata*) of their trials (23.239–50):

ὥς ἄρα τῇ ἀσπαστὸς ἔην πόσις εἰσοροώσῃ,  
 δειρῆς δ' οὐ πῶ πάμπαν ἀφίετο πῆχες λευκῶ.  
 καὶ νῦ κ' ὀδυρομένοισι φάνη ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἥως,  
 εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ἄλλ' ἐνόησε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη.  
 νύκτα μὲν ἐν περάτῃ δολιχὴν σχέθεν, Ἥω δ' αὔτε  
 ῥύσατ' ἐπ' ὤκεαν ὦ χρυσόθρονον, οὐδ' ἔα ἵππους  
 ζεύγνυσθ' ὠκύποδας, φάος ἀνθρώποισι φέροντας,  
 Λάμπον καὶ Φαέθονθ', οἳ τ' Ἥω πῶλοι ἀγούσι.  
 καὶ τότε ἄρ' ἦν ἄλοχον προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς·  
 ὦ γύναι, οὐ γάρ πῶ πάντων ἐπὶ πείρατ' ἀέθλων  
 ἦλθομεν, ἀλλ' ἔτ' ὀπισθεν ἀμέτρητος πόνος ἔσται,  
 πολλὸς καὶ χαλεπός, τὸν ἐμὲ χρή πάντα τελέσσαι.

So welcome was her husband to Penelope looking upon him,  
 and she would not yet at all release her white arms from his  
 neck.

Then rosy-fingered Dawn would have lit upon their weeping,  
 if the gray-eyed goddess Athena had not thought otherwise  
 and lengthened the night by holding it back upon the horizon  
 (περάτῃ).

She kept golden-throned Dawn back at the Ocean, nor would  
 she let her  
 yoke her swift-footed horses, bringing light to men,  
 Lampos and Phaethon, the foals who carry Dawn.  
 Then resourceful Odysseus spoke to his wife, saying:  
 Wife, we have not yet reached the boundary (πεῖρατᾶ) of all  
our trials,  
 but, still, a labor that will be unmeasured,  
 manifold, and difficult, remains for me to complete.

The close correspondence in meaning and sound between *peratê* (horizon) and *peirata* (boundaries) in this passage invites us to consider how the *Odyssey* is both anticipating and deferring the idea of an ending.<sup>29</sup> Athena's actions allow the couple to withdraw into a sequestered space in which time is brought to a standstill and where Penelope could happily

<sup>29</sup> On ἐν περάτῃ at *Od.* 243, see Stanford 1948, ad loc. Note also this passage's proximity to the Alexandrians' ideal endpoint (in their words, *peras*) for the epic (*Od.* 23.296). On the word *peirar* in Homer, see Bergren 1975, and, on the play between *peirar* (limit) and *peira* (trial) in the *Odyssey*, Bergren 2008, 228.

have kept her arms around her husband's neck forever, as if she would never, or "not yet at all" (οὐ πω πάμπαν), let go (240). Her attempt to hold her husband within the timeless space of her embrace mirrors the actions of Athena, who stretches the perimeters of time by holding back the dawn. But Odysseus's words just a few lines later (248–50) upset that equilibrium, for his confession that they have "not yet" (οὐ γάρ πω πάντων . . . ἄέθλων) reached the boundary of all their trials subverts his wife's fantasy and the promise of everlasting reunion for the two.<sup>30</sup>

We first hear of the oar prophecy when Odysseus visits the Underworld, a region located at the edges (*peirata*) of the river Ocean (11.13–16). There, and in Odysseus's relaying of the narrative to Penelope back on Ithaca (23.300–43, esp. 322–5), the story of the journey is told within a timeless zone untouched by the sun, and within which the edges of the night supernaturally extend to encompass the length of its telling. The horizon (*peratê*) upon which Athena holds back the night overlaps with the boundaries (*peirata*) of Odysseus's trials, just as, in turn, the edges (*peirata*) of the earth where the Cimmerians live are, like Penelope and Odysseus's endless night, untouched by the sun.<sup>31</sup>

In much the same way as these various endpoints are connected through the motif of night and sunless space, so too are they joined by their narrative contexts in each of the two books in which they appear. As Odysseus narrates both his past and future journeys to Alcinoüs in Book 11, the Phaeacian king claims that the night "seems almost endless" (11.373). Similarly, for Penelope in Book 23, the night extends to encompass Odysseus's retelling of his wanderings ("She delighted in listening, and sleep did not fall upon her lids until he had narrated everything [καταλέξει ἅπαντα]," 23.308–9).

In the same passage, Odysseus describes his journey with the oar as an infinite, or "unmeasured" toil (23.249: *ametrêtos ponos*). As if in mirror image to the circuitous journey from Troy, the precise location of whose ending was never held in doubt, Odysseus's movement away from Ithaca will take him to an unknown site at an immeasurable distance from home, even if he were to proceed there in an unbroken line. This experience of heading, somewhat blindly, toward an invisible *telos* is one we are already familiar with from our discussion in Chapter 1 of Aristotle's description of the early prose sentence, the *lexis eiromenê* (*Rh.* 3.9.1409a30–4):<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Russo, Fernandez-Galiano, and Heubeck 1992, ad loc. on the unusual position of "οὐ γάρ πω" at the beginning of a speech.

<sup>31</sup> *Od.* 11.15–16, 372–4.

<sup>32</sup> The Greek text is quoted in my discussion of this passage in Ch. 1.

By “free-running” style I mean the one which has no end (*telos*) in itself, and does not complete the event being narrated. It is displeasing because of its endlessness (*to apeiron*), for everyone likes to have the end (*telos*) in view. Otherwise, they run out of breath and give up at the turning posts. But those who are able to look ahead to the end (*peras*) do not tire ahead of time.

Here, too, as Odysseus moves away from the certainties of an epic world-view, the poem loses sight of its own endpoint; the *telos* or, as both Aristarchus and Aristotle put it, *peras*, of his plot.

### MEASURES OF SONG

Hidden within the *ametrêtos ponos* of *Od.* 23.249 may be a further clue as to not only the distance but also the narratability of the landscape that Odysseus will ultimately enter. For the journey itself, since it never takes place in the poem, is not “measured out” into the metrics of Homeric verse, nor is its “distance” ever marked through the successive flow of narrative. In terms of the spatialized reading of plot that I have elaborated in the Introduction and previous chapter,<sup>33</sup> the inland space where Odysseus will plant the oar exists as an alternative narrative site beyond the boundaries of epic’s poetic range. I have referred to Aristotle’s description of the sentence as a kind of promenade in order to highlight the fact that the Greeks could understand their plots as topographical constructs along which the narrative moves as if a traveler along a road. In the *Odyssey*, a connection can be drawn between the use of the road as a metaliterary figure and the inland route that Odysseus will eventually take. On that road, he will meet a *hoditês* or wayfarer, who – in his misrecognition of the oar – will speak a completely different language to the customary discourse of epic. I am suggesting, therefore, that Odysseus’s final journey may also be read generically, as a path that will take him far beyond the boundaries of epic geography and poetics.

In the ancient language of literary criticism, *metra* applies to both the verses of a poem and the meter in which they are composed. In association with these two definitions, it also refers to the poet’s own knowledge, or *sophia*, in a particular field.<sup>34</sup> On two different occasions in the *Odyssey*, for example, Proteus and Tiresias instruct characters within the poem on

<sup>33</sup> See Brooks 1984, 11–12, and my discussion in Ch. 1.

<sup>34</sup> M. L. West 1978, ad 648.

the “path and measures of their route” (ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου).<sup>35</sup> As its connection to the verb *metreô* (used to describe Odysseus’s traversal of space at 3.179) suggests, *metra* here might equally refer to the physical distance, as in “units of measure,” of the journey home, as well as to the metrical units of the prophet’s speech or to his particular knowledge concerning the theme of the hero’s return. Proteus and Tiresias thereby replicate the role of the Homeric poet in their ability to spell out the terms of the hero’s *nostos*, both in words and in measures, as the two different meanings of the word *metra* are brought into relation with one another.

My second example of this phenomenon comes from a well-known passage in Hesiod. Scholars have argued that the “Nautilia” section of the *Works and Days* skillfully combines the divergent meanings for *metra* that I outlined earlier, resulting in a connection between the act of sailing and the art of poetry. At *Works and Days* 648–9, Hesiod promises to tell his brother of the measures of the sea (δείξω δὴ τοι μέτρα . . . θαλάσσης), but then claims not to have the skill to do so (οὔτέ τι ναυτιλίας σεσοφισμένος οὔτέ τι νηῶν) (“I am not well-versed in sea matters nor in ships”). As Nagy first noted, in these lines Hesiod appears to be drawing an association between the *sophia* that is attributed to sailing and the concept of Homeric poetics, both of which he, as a non-Homeric poet, is programmatically rejecting.<sup>36</sup> That is, in the context of Hesiod’s land-rooted poem, the *metra* of *metra thalassês* may be translated as both distance measures and song measures, because for an agrarian poet like Hesiod to “measure the seas” means not only to wander into the terrain of Homeric poetry, but also to begin to sing according to its “rules.”<sup>37</sup>

Certainly, as Rosen (1990) argues, the reference in the Nautilia to Hesiod’s one brief journey by sea, from Euboea to Aulis, and the prize he won there for his singing, suggests that Hesiod is drawing a connection here between sailing and song-making, particularly Homeric song (given the reference to Aulis). Hesiod’s “inexperience” in sailing might then be interpreted as the farmer-poet’s own generic difference from the “heroic” (because seabound) poetics of Homer. Dougherty has recently

<sup>35</sup> 4.389 = 10.539; cf. Peradotto 1990, 87.

<sup>36</sup> Nagy 1982, 65–6; Steiner (2005) discusses the use of *sesophismenos* here and in the poetic program of Ibycus (*PMG* 282, 23).

<sup>37</sup> At the end of the Nautilia, at *Op.* 694, Hesiod urges his brother to μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι, “observe these measures/rules (*metra*),” or “observe good measure (in all things),” (M. L. West 1978, ad loc). M. Griffith 1983, 61, remarks on *metron*’s temporal significance in the Nautilia. Note especially the temporal markers that surround it here (καίριος, 694; ώραῖος, 695 [cf. 630, 642]).

pushed this connection between Homeric poetry and sailing further, by underscoring the similarities between shipbuilding and poetic composition, and by highlighting the programmatic role of extensive sea travel in the *Iliad*'s Catalogue of Ships.<sup>38</sup>

If the prominent role of ships and seafaring in Homer implies a connection between Homeric poetics and the sea, as these scholars have argued, then the association between the "measures" (metrics, rules) of song and the "measures" (routes, distances traveled) of the sea in Hesiod's *Nautilia* combine to achieve a rich metapoetic resonance. According to this reading of Hesiod, to speak of the domain (or *metra*) of Homeric poetics is also, in the same breath, to talk of the *metra* of the sea.<sup>39</sup> When Odysseus states that he will eventually embark upon an "unmeasured" journey at *Od.* 23.249, therefore, and, furthermore, when he proceeds to describe the people toward whom he will travel as those who know nothing of sea, salt, ships, or oars, we are reminded of Hesiod's own placement of himself in a similar position at *Works and Days* 649. That is, in both cases, we might suggest that the movement of a central character within the poem away from the sea entails a complementary movement away from the *metra*, or laws, of Homeric poetics. Although Hesiod obviously composes the *Works and Days* in hexameters, his programmatic rejection of *metra thalassês* indicates a turning away from Homer in terms of topic and genre.<sup>40</sup>

The shared vocabulary of poetic and nautical measurement ensures that Odysseus's marine wanderings will always find expression in song, no matter how far he travels. But the distance between Ithaca and Odysseus's final destination with the oar lies beyond the range of epic discourse. It is described as unmeasured, or *ametrêtos*, because it leaves behind the domain of the sea and thus, following my argument, the realm of Homeric *metra*. The uncharted interior landscape of the *Odyssey* is presented as an "unmeasured" linguistic space partly because it is never narrated (that is, "measured out" into verse), and partly because it involves entering a territory whose inhabitants speak a language that

<sup>38</sup> Dougherty 2001, 13, 21–5. She suggests that a ship's planks, which in some cases were stitched or fitted together with pegs, might evoke the same technical vocabulary as the crafting of poetry.

<sup>39</sup> See Romm 1992, 176–83 on further connections between Homeric poetry and the Ocean, especially as they were developed in later literary traditions.

<sup>40</sup> There has been some debate as to whether *metron* can refer specifically to meter as early as Hesiod (Ford 2002, 18, and notes 40–1), but it is generally accepted that it does refer to the poet's "domain," or as M. L. West puts it, his "rules and formulae" (1978, ad 648).

is completely different from Homer's. The renaming of the oar as a "winnowing-shovel" might then be interpreted as a process of translation between two alternative poetic territories or fields; those marked by contact with the sea (Homeric epic) and those that have little or no contact with it at all.

The oar's new label as "winnowing-shovel" (23.275) serves to illustrate a new cultural or poetic zone, where the *metra*, or rules, of Homeric poetics (that an oar is an oar, known poetically as the "wing" of a ship [23.272]) no longer apply. Furthermore, if *metra* is understood in terms of translation, or semantic range, then Odysseus's task is to cross the boundaries of Homeric vocabulary, until he reaches a place where, as oar transforms into winnowing-shovel, a single object can take on two mutually exclusive meanings.<sup>41</sup> Odysseus, in other words, is instructed to get as lost in language as in space.

## SÊMA

After planting the oar in the ground, Odysseus is told to return to Ithaca and await a gentle death that will come either "from the sea" or "away from the sea" (23.281: ἐξ ἁλός). The ambivalent terminology is significant, given the context in which it occurs. For it is no surprise to find that a journey that turns on the verbal ambiguity between "oar" and "winnowing-shovel" should result in a prophecy about death that can also be understood in two ways. Are we to understand that Odysseus's death will come "from the sea" (by way of a stingray or poisonous conch, for example, as it does in one myth) or "far from the sea"? The exact meaning of ἐξ ἁλός at *Od.* 23.281 has been debated at least since Aristarchus, and still remains undecided in current scholarship.<sup>42</sup> But, as Nagy (1990b, 214) and others have observed, its meaning is best left unresolved if we are to appreciate fully its role in the narrative.<sup>43</sup> Since neither of the deaths is narrated, after all, both are equally possible. The two endings of the *Odyssey* that the reader is faced with in Book 23, one of which describes Odysseus's return to Ithaca and the other of which

<sup>41</sup> Benardete 1997, 93–4, 165.

<sup>42</sup> See Eustathius, *Comm. Od.* 1676, 43–59 (= ἀπὸ θαλάσσης); Dornseiff 1937, 354: "from the sea"; Dindorf 1962, I, 6; Stanford 1948, ad loc.: "away from the sea"; Hansen 1990, 246: "away from the sea"; Carrière 1992, 38–42, cf. 21: the ambiguity is a necessary imitation of the oracle's obscurity; Hartog 2001, 35: deliberately ambiguous.

<sup>43</sup> Peradotto (1985, 439 and 1990, 67) describes the prophecy as opening up a "grid of possibilities."

tells of his journey far away from the sea, is structurally reflected in the two alternative locations that can be conjectured for his death.<sup>44</sup> In both cases, the difference between the two kinds of ending is determined by whether they take place either near or far from the border of the sea.

It becomes possible, in this way, to understand the sea as more than just a topographical marker, for it also functions as a poetic site through which the language of Homeric epic is determined. In the context of the sea, Homer's oar takes on its own significance, whether through metaphor (the "wings" of a ship) or through symbolism (as the marker of Elpenor's grave on the shore of Aeaea, a *sēma* to which I will return). As one of the seven occurrences of the word *sēma* to appear in Book 23, the oar also shares in a coded language that only the epic narrator may reveal, as part of the system of "hidden signs" that the *Odyssey* uses to seal the hero's identity.<sup>45</sup> While one could argue that the *sēma* Tiresias tells to Odysseus refers not just to the physical object of the oar, but rather to the entire encounter with the stranger or, more specifically, the stranger's alien term *athêrêloigos* (winnowing-shovel), it is in keeping with the Homeric system of *sēmata* clustered around the end of the poem (such as the scar and bed) to read the oar as the material sign from which the rest of Tiresias's message unfolds.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> I do not mean to suggest that Odysseus will plant the oar in the same place as the place indicated by ἐξ ὁλός (away from the sea), only that, in both examples, a structural similarity is established along the poles of "from (or on the border of) the sea" and "far from the sea."

<sup>45</sup> *Od.* 23.73–4 (scar), 110 ("hidden signs" by which Penelope and Odysseus will recognize each other), 188, 202 (bed), 206 (sure signs of Odysseus's identity), 225 (bed), 273 (oar). Teiresias states that the naming of the object on Odysseus's shoulder will function as a *sēma* (23.273), and as such it fits within the triad of physical objects or marks (scar, bed, oar) that occur in Book 23, which – as signs – play an important role within the scheme of Homeric poetics. See further Zeitlin 1996, 19–52; J. M. Foley 1997, 75–81; Bergren 2008, 228–33. Nagy 1990b, 202–22, demonstrates that Teiresias's revelation of the *sēma* to Odysseus shares the same language as *Il.* 23.326, where Nestor indicates to his son the *sēma* at which to turn in the race. In both of these cases, the *sēmata* are marked by their position in the landscape, signaling the point at which the actor is instructed to turn back toward his starting point. On the *sēma* "as a sign or token of something else," see Zeitlin 1996, 22; as a "metonymic sign-language," see J. M. Foley 1997. See also Lynn-George's valuable discussion of the Iliadic *sēma* (1988, 252–76).

<sup>46</sup> On the importance of the "signifying object" in Homer, see Zeitlin 1996, 19–20. Note that Nestor uses the same phrase "I will tell you a clear sign . . ." in describing the physical *sēma* of the turning post/grave to Antilochus (Nagy 1990b, 210). Homer associates the oar, too, with *sēma*'s secondary meaning as grave marker in the description of Elpenor's burial mound, as discussed later in the chapter.

To carry across, manually, the “sign” of the oar from one place to another is also to complicate and dismantle, figuratively, the Homeric notion of metaphor. In chapter 21 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle classifies metaphor as “the “carrying-over” of a name that belongs to something else” (μεταφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ).<sup>47</sup> Here, instead of carrying a name from one object to another, Odysseus understands that he must physically carry an object from one naming context to another, thereby undoing the work of Homeric metaphor that is already attached to the sign of the oar (τὰ τε πτερὰ νηυσὶ πέλονται, “oars, which are the wings of ships”).<sup>48</sup> His act is *like* a metaphor, because it involves the rhetorical movement of language across space from one context to another,<sup>49</sup> but the terms of the translation are ultimately reversed, leading to a kind of anti-metaphor, since metaphors only work if they can “[function] in two referential fields at once.”<sup>50</sup> For the Inlanders, the object on Odysseus’s shoulder means one thing only; it is stripped of the symbolic value that it exhibited in Homer’s world.<sup>51</sup>

In his study of literary space and form, Franco Moretti has argued that metaphors cluster around spatial borders, and are infrequent once the border has been passed (1998, 45–7). In this case, too, once the linguistic sign, or *sêma*, of the oar has left the border of the sea behind, Homeric language loses its rhetorical and referential force. Despite the extraordinary range of his storytelling in Books 9–12, here Odysseus is unable to carry Homeric poetics with him, either as narrator or as epic hero. It is especially telling that Odysseus, the master of punning and doublespeak, should finally travel to a world where objects have defiantly singular meanings.

We might counter by claiming that when Odysseus removes the oar from its rightful context, he comes close to reinventing it as a metaphor (from wing to winnowing-shovel), and in doing so, to rewriting the symbolic language of Homer’s world.<sup>52</sup> But the oar is also a marker of

<sup>47</sup> Arist. *Poet.* 21.1457b 7. Cf. *Rh.* 3.10–11, esp. 3.11.1412a14–16.

<sup>48</sup> 23.272 = 11.126. On the oar’s metaphorization as “wing,” see Peradotto 1990, 158.

<sup>49</sup> That metaphor might be conceived of as a spatial construct is not unusual in the ancient world, where rhetoric (such as sentence structure or the art of memory) was often plotted on a topographical plane. For later examples, cf. Puttenham’s definition of metaphor as “the figure of transport” (1988, 189), and De Certeau 1984, 99ff., 115.

<sup>50</sup> Ricoeur 1978, 299.

<sup>51</sup> Nagy 1990a, 232.

<sup>52</sup> Peradotto 1990, 158, likens the stranger to a poet, for he “recategoriz[es] the world through metaphor.” The “secret” unfamiliar language of the oar is also connected to the role of the magical token in folklore, which undoes a spell when it is correctly



the failure of Homeric poetics to reach quite that far. Just as the meaning of Odysseus's bed is "fixed" by its immobility and becomes invalid the moment it is moved, so too does the oar change its semantic value when it is moved from one place to another.<sup>53</sup> These two *sēmata*, then, the bed and oar of Book 23, both complement and undo one another: the bed creates narrative resolution and closure because, as a *sēma*, it remains fixed in place, while the oar throws not only the ending of the poem but also its whole system of meaning into question, because it moves ever further away from its original context of the sea.<sup>54</sup>

Several scholars have observed the connection between the concept of the *sēma*, which, especially as a tomb, preserves the hero's *kleos*, and epic poetry.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps the best known example of this phenomenon is the gravestone, or *sēma*, that Hector envisions for his opponent in Book 7 of the *Iliad*, which will extend his *kleos* far into the future and is placed, significantly, overlooking the sea (*Il.* 7.86; cf. *Od.* 24.82). The *sēma* that marks the turning point in the horse race during the funeral games for Patroclus is similarly hypothesized to be the grave marker of someone who died long ago.<sup>56</sup> In the *Odyssey*, the parallel has also been drawn between Elpenor's tomb, or *sēma*, marked by an oar on the edge of the sea in Book 11, and Odysseus's planting of the inland oar as a grave marker of sorts of his own eventual death. Elpenor requests that the oar be planted "on the edge of the sea" (ἐπὶ θινὶ θαλάσσης, 11.75), so that "men who come hereafter will learn of me" (11.76), but it will more likely function, like the wooden *sēma* of *Iliad* 23, as an anonymous symbol.<sup>57</sup> Odysseus's planting of the *sēma* of the oar marks an identity that will presumably also remain anonymous (the text gives us no indication to think otherwise).<sup>58</sup>

identified with its true secret name. Dornseiff 1937, 353, adduces that the use of such an unusual word has all the properties of a spell. On the rarity of the term ἄθηρηλοιγός, cf. Hansen 1990, 254, and Olson 1997. Dougherty 2001, 172–4, 220, note 37 sees the randomness of the "sign" about where to plant the oar as comparable to random signs given to colonizers by the Delphic oracle.

<sup>53</sup> J. M. Foley 1997, 79.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Zeitlin 1996, 42: "The *sēma* that is *empedon* (i.e., the bed rooted in the earth) emerges as a *sēma empedon* (a valid sign)."

<sup>55</sup> Redfield [1975] 1994, 34; Murnaghan 1987, 150–1; Lynn-George 1988, 252–76; Nagy 1990b, 215–20; Vernant 1991, 69; Ford 1992, 131–7. For an ancient discussion of *sēma* as both tomb and sign, see Pl. *Cra.* 400c1–4.

<sup>56</sup> *Il.* 23.326–33, esp. 326, 331. See also my discussion of this turning point in Ch. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Eustathius (1304.20) compares *Il.* 23.331 with *Od.* 11.77, as noted by N. J. Richardson 1993, 211. The fact that Elpenor's oar will be anonymous is perhaps – following his less than heroic death – also to be read as a parody of epic convention.

<sup>58</sup> On the importance of naming in the *Odyssey*, see esp. Peradotto 1990, 94–119, 143–70.

The oar, which stands as a double for Elpenor's grave and – as a *sêma* or tomb – proleptically marks the death of Odysseus, also works as a kind of anti-*sêma*, therefore, in that it remains anonymous. In this way, it is related to Odysseus's actual death, at the hands of Telegonus, in the version recorded in Proclus's summary of the *Telegony*. There, Odysseus dies through misrecognition (κατ' ἄγνοιας) at the hands of a son who did not know him.

## LOOKING BEYOND THE END OF THE POEM

The inland zone that Odysseus will eventually enter with his oar is a place where the protagonist will lose not only his way but also the signs and language by which to navigate.<sup>59</sup> In contrast to the other signs at the end of the *Odyssey*, the inland planting of the oar signifies the point at which the *sêma* becomes unrecognizable and loses all connection with its meaning in the context of Homeric poetics. This translates, finally, into Odysseus's loss of his own name, as he becomes truly *outis*: a “nobody” whose *sêma* exists nowhere, that is, both unnamed and unplaced.<sup>60</sup> His anonymous status is compounded by the fact that he can no longer engage in doublespeak. In a world where puns no longer carry any currency, he will become *outis* without the *mêtis*, a man whose fame will dissipate when he is no longer the one speaking and setting the terms of the discourse.<sup>61</sup> This is a first for Odysseus, for even in his passage through the fantastic and alien spaces of Books 9–12, he never loses control over the province of language. Polyphemus and the Phaeacians are both seduced by Odysseus's artful handling of the disclosure of his

<sup>59</sup> See here Wigley's comments (1996, 49–50) on F. Jameson's famous description of being lost in the Bonaventura Hotel (1984): “The critic is lost in the face of a new form of space, where being lost is understood as an inability to describe ‘the thing itself.’” This is where my reading departs most strongly from the standard interpretation of the inland journey, which is that the oar colonizes the inland space by increasing the boundaries of Poseidon's realm. See e.g., Hartog 2001, 35 (my argument is, in fact, more in sympathy with Hartog's 1988 reading of Scythian space as “aporia”).

<sup>60</sup> Benardete 1997, 94.

<sup>61</sup> On the Cyclopes' island, Odysseus wins: Polyphemus suffers through Odysseus's *outis/mêtis* joke, and Odysseus himself cannot bear to leave without attaching his name to such cleverness. Indeed, his name is already known to Polyphemus. None of these kinds of circumstances surround the story of Odysseus's encounter with the Inlanders.

name, while on Circe's island and in the Underworld, Odysseus uses the moly and the blood in order to garner control over who speaks and when.

We might say, then, that Odysseus's skillful use of language acts as a map upon which the *Odyssey* plots its course, ensuring that its hero never becomes absolutely lost, but rather that those places and peoples whom he meets along his way bend themselves to his will or lose themselves under the force of his linguistic or semantic byways. Although he may have had to rely on physical strength or divine aid in order to escape from other situations, Odysseus's journey in Books 9–12 of the *Odyssey* takes him through a world that is either linguistically familiar, or over which he is able to exert linguistic control. Finally, and most importantly, throughout the poem, Odysseus sails the waters of his own epic genre, through seas where the story of the Trojan War was well known (Scheria, the Sirens' island), or where his name had already been spoken in prophecy (the island of the Cyclopes and Aeaea).<sup>62</sup>

The logical consequence of Tiresias's prophecy is that there exists somewhere upon the earth a group of people who, although they are human and "eaters of bread," have never heard of the Trojan War or a hero who fought in it called Odysseus. In this way, the *Odyssey* questions whether epic's protocartographic ideal is ever really possible. The Inlanders must be eaters of bread if they mistake the oar for an agricultural tool, and, since – as we mentioned earlier – it is impossible to narrate the story of the Trojan War without the mention of ships, they must also be a people who are ignorant of Homeric verse.<sup>63</sup> The oar that Odysseus eventually plants thereby marks a "lost" or invisible space in terms of epic narrative's ability to map the entire earth with its *kleos*. The *sêma* of the oar conveys its message across the domains of both sea and sky (as "the wings of ships"), since, in both regions, its meaning is fixed by a Homeric context. As soon as it moves into a new form of inland space, however, it leaves both the language and the reception of the *Odyssey* behind.

The story of the oar thereby offers a counternarrative to the *Odyssey*'s representation of uncharted space in Books 9–12.<sup>64</sup> Here, as if in mirror image, the journey inland presents an alternative understanding of what it means to be lost in Greek culture; that is, not only to lose one's

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Pucci 1998, 1–9.

<sup>63</sup> Carrière 1992, 34 on the Inlanders as eaters of bread.

<sup>64</sup> Note Alcinoüs's classification of the places to which Odysseus travels in Books 9–12 as "unseen" at *Od.* 11.366.

geographic bearings, but also the referents of language, semantics, and even epic, the foremost Greek genre. The translation of the oar from one *sēma*, or interpretation, to another, is mapped in spatial terms as the movement from a global, protocartographic view of the world (where oar = airborne wing), to a local, terrestrial, and countercartographic one (where oar = winnowing-shovel fixed in the ground).

When Odysseus walks inland, beyond the end of the poem and into a new form of space, he leaves the old devices and measuring systems of epic behind. This leads to a disorientation of the plot that is connected to the loss of the poem's overall cohesive vision. The final, untold story of the *Odyssey* stands as a point of dislocation in the hero's *nostos*, which, instead of reaching a fixed endpoint or finishing line, simply recedes toward a geographic and semantic vanishing point upon a fluid horizon.<sup>65</sup> The fact that the *Odyssey* looks forward to an ending in a location that is indeterminate and unplaced speaks, I suggest, to a corresponding indeterminacy concerning the place of this poem in general and the role of the epic tradition once its heroes have either died (cf. 24.1–202) or safely returned home.<sup>66</sup> In one sense, the meditation on endpoints at the close of the poem only serves to thematize the possibility of a story's (endless) expansion within the context of an oral performance, which the audience of an epic poem will experience in a way that readers of texts – who can count pages – will not. Furthermore, even after it has been “fixed” in writing, the ending of the *Odyssey* remained insecure, as we have seen with Aristarchus's deletion of 23.297 through to the end of the poem, and with the competing cyclic epics, such as the *Telegony* that sought to continue Odysseus's story. As Richard Martin (1993) has argued in a different way for the beginning of the poem, the ending of the *Odyssey* anticipates a time, and a place, that exists beyond the range of its own transmission.

But what makes the *Odyssey* different to the *Iliad* in its foreshadowing of action that will take place beyond the end of the poem? And why should it be significant that the *Odyssey* alludes to the future journeys of Odysseus that were, after all, told elsewhere in Greek literature, such as in the cyclic *Telegony*? Both questions converge on the issue of the idealized notion of unity in the Homeric plot.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. my discussion in Ch. 1 of the use of the funeral games and the finishing line of the chariot race in *Il.* 23 to bring that poem to a close.

<sup>66</sup> Martin 1993, 240.

Aristotle rightly claimed that the deferral of Achilles' death in the *Iliad* led to a more *eusynoptic* sense of the whole, yet, as has often been noted, several allusions to his upcoming death are made in the poem.<sup>67</sup> It is worth considering, in the first place, how the projected deaths of Achilles and Odysseus are strikingly unlike. The tragic death that the *Iliad* looks forward to guarantees Achilles' heroism, for his young and beautiful fall in battle will remain fixed for all time in heroic song.<sup>68</sup> The *Odyssey* acknowledges precisely this fact by recounting the death of Achilles in Book 24. But Odysseus's anticipated death is lost in a flurry of unstable meanings. Even though we know that it will happen "gently" and on Ithaca, the way in which it is foretold means that it remains ambiguous and misplaced.

The strands of Odysseus's death that do turn up in the *Telegony* and later traditions, moreover, serve to reinforce the destabilizing role of Odysseus's final journey in the context of Homeric epic.<sup>69</sup> For the unity and *eusynoptic* impression that Aristotle claimed set Homer apart from the composers of the cyclic epics is precisely what is called into question here. The final journey questions the watery edges of the poem's world and threatens to capsize the ordered sense of the whole for which Homer's poetry was celebrated.

It is important to emphasize, too, that in this new inland territory it is Odysseus who remains the stranger, and the only epic material that he carries with him – the oar – symbolically erases his own identity as its meaning is changed. This suggests that Tiresias's instructions do not necessarily serve as a kind of prescription for colonization, as Dougherty has argued, for colonizers bring their identities with them (2001, 172–4).<sup>70</sup> For similar reasons, Tiresias's instructions do not prophesy, as is usually stipulated, an extension of Poseidon's realm (and therefore of Homeric subject matter) into new, inland regions.<sup>71</sup> There is no indication that the planted oar remains anything more than a winnowing-shovel to the

<sup>67</sup> *Il.* 16.709, 18.96, 19.417, 22.359, 24.85.

<sup>68</sup> Vernant 1991, 50–74.

<sup>69</sup> Carrière 1992, 35–8; Hansen 1990, 263–8; Tsagalis 2007, 68–90.

<sup>70</sup> Space so far from the sea is too alien to be associated with home in the early Greek imagination. Thus, although colonization may well signal a symbolic movement from "sea to land," the consequences of a Greek moving so far inland must also be taken into account.

<sup>71</sup> Odysseus is given detailed instructions on how to carry out the sacrifices to Poseidon and the other immortal gods (11.130ff.; 23.277ff.), and it is the only task that he must perform before returning to Ithaca. Hartog 2001, 35.

Inlanders, nor that they will understand the significance of Poseidon's name any more than they will Odysseus's. The sacrifices are a personal act of reconciliation between Odysseus and Poseidon, and in this sense they provide closure for his long seabound narrative. But if Poseidon is introduced as a new divinity within this inland space, he must also be "translated" into a god of a new domain, and thus lose his identity in the context of Homeric poetics. In other words, the incorporation of Poseidon into this new landscape is not a case of simply extending the borders of epic territory so that the Inlanders will no longer be unfamiliar with the sea. The poem makes no attempt to resolve the essentially alien nature of the inland space, nor is Odysseus said to teach the Inlanders what an oar actually is. Instead, we can imagine the planted oar functioning in a similar way to the wooden *sēma* of Book 23 of the *Iliad*; as an unidentified and anonymous object fixed in the ground. That sign serves as a turning point (*termata; nussa*) in the race, pointing the charioteer back to where he started. So too for Odysseus, the oar stands as a kind of *terma*, for it is only at this point that he is allowed to turn back toward home.<sup>72</sup>

If the radically new landscape that marks Odysseus's future lies beyond the reach of Homer's customary routes and paths of song, what then of the future of epic as a genre? We have already mentioned that the Nautilia section of Hesiod's *Works and Days* stakes out new poetic territory that is deliberately distanced from Homeric epic and the sea. There, Hesiod tells his brother to remove his oar from the sea ("hang your well-made steering oar above the fireplace," πηδάλιον δ' εὐεργές ὑπὲρ καπνοῦ κρεμάσασθαι, *Op.* 629, cf. 45) and to enjoy a period without sailing. The *Works and Days* focuses on staying in one place at one time, drawing its poetic force from the ground, and the goods that the ground can produce when it is systematically cultivated and returned to again and again.

Indeed, some scholars have argued that the changed function of the oar represents a movement from heroic to agricultural poetics.<sup>73</sup> In keeping with the turn away from the sea signaled by Hesiod's Nautilia, the end of the *Odyssey* suggests new ways of thinking about space and, more specifically, the implications of that space as rooted and grounded. A different literary sensibility emerges from the idea of a terrain that can be dug and planted. The *Odyssey* had already prepared for this development

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Nagy 1990b, 209ff, and my discussion in Ch. 1.

<sup>73</sup> Falkner 1989; Dougherty 2001, 172–4.

in its recurrent classification of the human and nonmonstrous as “eaters of bread” in the course of Odysseus’s journey home. We learn only in the final books that the foundations for this agricultural poetics were laid deep in the poem’s past, when Odysseus carved his bedroom from the olive tree and when Laertes planted the trees in the orchard for his son. The remembering of these two events at the poem’s end serves to reinforce the idea not only of Odysseus’s return to the land, but also a turn away from seabound, Homeric epic.<sup>74</sup>

I do not mean to suggest that the genre of heroic or seabound epic actually came to an end after the *Odyssey* (of course it did not), rather that the prophecy concerning the oar meditates on the *idea* of the end of epic. It also opens up a path for the movement into new modes of expression. The prophecy hints at the destabilization of an epic (protocartographic) worldview, but it does not spell out its destruction in terms of the history of the genre. It does indicate, however, that epic will move into new regions that will play themselves out in different languages, genres, and geographies.

## EPILOGUE: THE PHAEACIANS

If the journey inland with the oar functions as one kind of epilogue to the story of the *Odyssey*, then it must be balanced by reference to another one, which tells of the Phaeacians left stopped in time in the middle of the poem as a landlocked race without access to the sea. In Book 13, in a sequence that could be compared with the oar’s transformation into a fixed and earthbound tool, the swift, self-guiding ship of the Phaeacians is magically turned into stone and “rooted” (ἑρρίζωσεν, *Od.* 13.163) in the bed of the sea. No sooner have these events transpired than Alcinous remembers the prophecy that his people would one day be covered over by a vast mountain, and his story comes to an abrupt halt in the middle of a line (13.177, 185–8). Such mid-hexameter shifts of locale are extremely rare in Homer.<sup>75</sup> Even stranger, though, is the poet’s subsequent silence upon the topic of the Phaeacians. We never return to Scheria, nor are we again given any notion of its inhabitants’ existence. In narrative time, the Phaeacians are left suspended at the moment of their transformation: a fragment of both verse and geography for the remainder of the *Odyssey*.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Murnaghan 2006.

<sup>75</sup> Peradotto 1990, 81.

Their story, whose end exists outside the borders of the poem, can be read as a counterpart to Odysseus's final journey with the oar.

Before we can address this sudden transformation of the Phaeacians from "long-oared" peoples (δολιχήρετμοι, 8.191) to a group that is rooted like Elpenor's oar and fixed beneath a mountain, it will be necessary to retrace our steps to an earlier point in the chapter. I want to return to Penelope, whom we last considered in the pose of having her arms around Odysseus's neck, just before she learns of the prophecy. At that moment, Homer compared her happiness at Odysseus's return to the feelings of sailors who have survived a shipwreck (23.233–9):

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀσπάσιος γῆ νηχομένοισι φανήη,  
 ὦν τε Ποσειδάων εὐεργέα νῆ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ  
 ῥαίσῃ, ἐπειγομένην ἀνέμῳ καὶ κύματι πηγῶ·  
 παῦροι δ' ἐξέφυγον πολίης ἄλως ἥπειρόνδε  
 νηχόμενοι, πολλή δὲ περὶ χροὶ τέτροφεν ἄλμη,  
 ἀσπάσιοι δ' ἐπέβαν γαίης, κακότητα φυγόντες·  
 ὥς ἄρα τῇ ἀσπαστὸς ἔην πόσις εἰσοροώσῃ

Just as welcome as the land appears to ones swimming,  
 whose well-made boat in the sea Poseidon has  
 wrecked, oppressed by the blow of wind and wave,  
 and a few of them having escaped the gray sea to land  
 swimming, coated with brine on their skin,  
 gladly reach land, having escaped hardship,  
 so welcome was her husband to her looking upon him.

What does it mean that Odysseus's revelation of his upcoming venture into a world without salt is prefaced with a simile comparing Penelope to a small group of shipwrecked sailors who have escaped from the sea, and for whom land is a welcome sight? First, it takes us further back in the poem, for the sailors in this simile who emerge from the sea coated in brine are much like the salt-crusted Odysseus after he escaped shipwreck off the island of Scheria (5.453–9). For Odysseus then, the sight of land appeared as welcome (ἀσπάσιος . . . φανήη) as the sight of a man returning to life is to his family (5.394–9):

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀσπάσιος βίोटος παίδεσσι φανήη  
 πατρός, ὃς ἐν νούσῳ κείται κρατέρ' ἄλγεα πάσχων,  
 δηρὸν τηκόμενος, στυγερός δέ οἱ ἔχραε δαίμων,  
 ἀσπάσιον δ' ἄρα τὸν γε θεοὶ κακότητος ἔλυσαν,  
 ὥς Ὀδυσῆ' ἀσπαστὸν εἰσατο γαῖα καὶ ὕλη,  
 νῆχε δ' ἐπειγόμενος ποσὶν ἠπείρου ἐπιβῆναι.



And just as welcome as the appearance of a father's life is to  
 his children,  
 a father who lies in sickness suffering harsh pains,  
 wasting away over a long period, whom the hateful spirit  
 of death has grazed,  
 but then the gods release him, glad, from his sickness,  
 so welcome did the land and woods now appear to Odysseus,  
 as he swam, eager to set his feet on the land.

Scholars have noted the connection between these two passages and their relevance to the story of the *Odyssey* as a whole.<sup>76</sup> In the simile from Book 5, the sight of land is as welcome to the shipwrecked sailor Odysseus as the sight of a man coming back from the dead is to the immediate family of his sons. In the simile from Book 23, the sight of the man Odysseus returning, figuratively, from the dead is as welcome to the immediate family of his wife as the sight of land is to shipwrecked sailors. The parallel is marked by subtle variations in the roles of the family members and the number of sailors, and by the switch in the role of Odysseus in the similes. In one, he is happy to see the land; in the other, he is like the land, the sight of which brings happiness. In one, Odysseus's salvation from shipwreck is compared to the reentry of a family member to the world of the living; in the other, Penelope's discovery that her husband has reentered the world of the living makes her as happy as if *she* had been saved from shipwreck.

The Odysseus whom Penelope embraces in Book 23 is like a man returned from the dead for at least three reasons. First, to follow the connections introduced by the paired similes, Odysseus virtually dies in the storm at the end of Book 5 before reaching the shore. Second, Penelope intimates at several points in the poem that she has given up hope of his still being alive.<sup>77</sup> Finally, when Odysseus arrives on Ithaca, he does so only after being transported across the sea in a deathlike stupor.<sup>78</sup> It is important to remember that during the actual shipwreck in Book 5, which the simile in Book 23 recalls, Odysseus bemoaned a certain kind of "dismal death" that comes from the sea, where the body disappears without *kleos* or funeral rites (5.306–12). The connection between the two similes thereby takes on an added resonance, for death in shipwreck

<sup>76</sup> Segal 1962, 43; Podlecki 1971, 88–90; Moulton 1977, 128; Friedrich 1981, 133–7; H. Foley 1987; Zeitlin 1996, 51.

<sup>77</sup> See e.g., *Od.* 23.71–2.

<sup>78</sup> The journey takes place in a sleep that, of all kinds of sleep, comes closest to death, 13.80. Cf. Segal 1962; Cook 1992.

comes closest to the kind of death and oblivion that the inland journey hints at for the transmission of the *Odyssey*.

In addition, if both of these passages associate the arrival of Odysseus home or back from the dead with a traumatic, salt-clad emergence from the sea, then they also call out to be read in the context of Odysseus's eventual death that comes, according to Tiresias's prophecy, *ex halos* – either “far from the sea” or “from the sea.” In the simile in Book 5, Odysseus looking at land is explicitly compared to the “children” (παίδεσσι) who gratefully look upon the return of their father to life. But he is also very much like the father in the simile, especially since this is a man who has “suffered many pains” (κρατέρ’ ἄλγεα πάσχω) for “a long time” (δηρόν).<sup>79</sup> An obvious difference between Odysseus and the family unit he is compared to in the simile in Book 5 is that Odysseus, like his forefathers, has only one son, as Homer makes pointed reference to in Book 16 (117–21).

On the other hand, the simile in Book 5 works in a different way if we choose to read it as a signpost pointing beyond the *Odyssey*, to the alternative tradition where Odysseus fathers more children on his journey home.<sup>80</sup> This brings us back to Tiresias's prophecy of his death. Odysseus's son by Circe, Telegonus, was reputed to have killed his father accidentally, either when he himself was emerging from the sea or with a spear poisoned on the tip with a stingray or conch.<sup>81</sup> The fact that this death comes about from a misrecognition between father and son serves to complicate the terms of the two similes and their relation to the saltless inland space still further.

This duet of similes is so carefully choreographed that traces of its effect can be found in other sections of the *Odyssey* as well. The conceit of the sight of the returning father being welcome to his children (again, *paidessi*) recurs in Agamemnon's speech to Odysseus in the Underworld

<sup>79</sup> The simile is more complicated still, since at first it draws a connection between how welcome the land and woods are to Odysseus (*aspasion* . . . *Odusseî*) and how welcome the life of the father is to the children (*biotou* . . . *paidessi*); but then it goes on to talk about how happy (*aspasion*) the father is as well, since the gods have released him from evil. As the simile progresses, therefore, it muddles the terms of whom Odysseus is being compared with – apparently both the sons *and* the father.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Davies 1989, 84–91, on Odysseus's multiple sons in later traditions (particularly the *Telegony*).

<sup>81</sup> Apollod. *Epit.* 7.34–7; Scholia on *Od.* 11.134; Eustathius 1676, 43–59; Oppian *Halieutica* 2.497ff.; cf. Davies 1989, 90; Carrière 1992, 20–1. Tsagalis 2007, 68–90, traces an alternative means of death by the sting of a turtledove.

(11.405–34). From the very first, Agamemnon qualifies that his *nostos* did not end in shipwreck (406); instead the poem plays with the idea that Agamemnon, rather than Odysseus, could be the man in the simile of Book 5, by having the leader of the Achaeans claim: “I would have returned home welcome to my children (ἄσπράσιος παίδεσσιν) and my slaves” (11.430–2). The difference this time falls with the wife (432–4), whose emotions about her husband’s return were quite different to Penelope’s in the context in which the simile in Book 23 is applied and compared to the one in Book 5. As so often in the poem, the *nostos* of Agamemnon serves as a foil to that of Odysseus, and this passage, which draws together characters and elements from the similes of Books 5 and 23 at once, is no exception. Agamemnon is at one and the same time a father welcome to his children and, through a reversal of the simile of Book 23, a husband unwelcome to his wife.

The second point I wish to consider in this pair of similes is the significance of the broken boat. The ship smashed by Poseidon in the simile of Book 23 is *euergês*, well-made, and Homer is at pains to tell us how much care and skill Odysseus puts into the building of the raft that is similarly destroyed by Poseidon in the storm off Scheria (5.234–60). We have already noted that Dougherty has applied a metapoetic reading to this construction, arguing that the skilled epic shipbuilder employed the same technique and practice as the epic poet.<sup>82</sup> But if the ship or raft can be read as a symbol of poetic technique, what then of its repeated destruction in this series of similes and episodes?<sup>83</sup> The theme of shipwreck sustains the possibility that the Homeric hero could die without *kleos*, and that the poem itself could break apart and be washed away in the wasteland of the sea. From the beginning of the *Odyssey*, shipwreck makes itself felt as a dangerous if oblique presence that threatens to obliterate the story’s participants (1.6–9).<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> The association between epic song and craft is contested, as I note in the Introduction.

<sup>83</sup> Dougherty 2001 sees the shipwrecks on either end of the Scheria narrative as necessary for the progress of Odysseus’s story. See her work, *passim*, and 82: “The loss of Odysseus’ raft, with all its metapoetic associations, is thus compensated within the narrative by the actual stories that he tells (on Scheria).” She argues that the fact that the metapoetic vessel can break apart is a positive sign of epic poetry’s flexibility and mutability as an oral form (82). I want to suggest that the opposite is also true: the theme of shipwreck can be seen as a marker of epic’s fragile and transitional state.

<sup>84</sup> Notice the subtle function of *pauroi* at *Od.* 23.236. In the simile in which Penelope is compared, and which, in turn, associates her with Odysseus, only a few of the sailors

In Book 13, when Poseidon roots the Phaeacian ship in the sea with the slam of his hand, it is in part because of his own anger at Scheria's ability to offer safe passage and to avoid shipwreck, as Alcinous observes (13.172–7):

ὦ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ με παλαίφατα θέσφαθ' ἱκάνει  
πατρὸς ἐμοῦ, ὃς φάσκε Ποσειδάων' ἀγάσσεσθαι  
ἡμῖν, οὐνεκα πομποὶ ἀπήμονές εἰμεν ἀπάντων.  
φῆ ποτὲ Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν περικαλλέα νῆα  
ἐκ πομπῆς ἀνιοῦσαν ἐν ἡεροιδείῳ πόντῳ  
ῥαϊσέμεναι, μέγα δ' ἦμιν ὄρος πόλει ἀμφικαλύψειν.

“Alas, the ancient prophecy has come to pass  
of my father, who said that Poseidon would bear a grudge against  
us, because we are, with impunity, the escorts of all men.  
He said that one day he would wreck a beautiful ship of Phaeacian  
men, returning from a convoy on the misty sea,  
and a great mountain would cover over our city.”

When the vessel is finally destroyed (the verb used is ῥαίω, as in the simile in Book 23), the guarantee of safe passage disappears along with the Phaeacians' special relationship with the sea.<sup>85</sup> As the land of Scheria is assimilated to the ship that has become a rock, so the island that started off as a place that Odysseus can only reach by shipwreck ends disconnected from the sea and hidden beneath a mountain.

Penelope's simile in Book 23 thus emerges as a complex indicator of the number of different directions that the epic looks to, even in its penultimate book. On the one hand, it diverts us back toward the retelling of Odysseus's story that occurs following his shipwreck on Scheria, delaying the *peras* of the poem. On the other, it suggests the final, welcome arrival on solid land, which overlaps with the welcome return of the man who has been given up for dead by his family. This arrival is abruptly juxtaposed, in a mid-hexameter shift, with the “shipwreck” off Scheria of the vessel that transported him (13.185–8):

ὥς οἱ μὲν ῥ' εὔχοντο Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι  
δήμου Φαιήκων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες,  
ἑσταότες περὶ βωμόν. ὁ δ' ἔγρετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς  
εὖδων ἐν γαίῃ πατρώῃ, οὐδέ μιν ἔγνω

survive the shipwreck. Odysseus, as *Od.* 1.6–9 reminds us, is also the lone survivor of the shipwreck that destroys the last of his crew in Book 12.

<sup>85</sup> *Od.* 23.235. Odysseus refers to his shipwreck off the coast of Scheria using the same verb at 6.326, and indirectly at 5.221. Cf. 8.569 (= 13.177).

So they prayed to lord Poseidon,  
 the leaders of the deme of the Phaeacians and the commanders,  
 standing around the altar. But now noble Odysseus woke up,  
 who had been asleep in his fatherland, although he did not  
 know it.

It is also worth noting that Odysseus suffers the same experiences upon not recognizing Ithaca as he did when awakening on dry land after the shipwreck in Book 6 (6.119ff.; 13.197ff.).

How, then, do these two shipwrecks inform the simile in Book 23 that marks Odysseus's final arrival home, which in turn leads to the revelation of Tiresias's prophecy? The prevalence of the imagery of shipwreck implies that, in Book 23, Odysseus has finally reached dry land: his endless wandering upon the sea is over. Dry land might be represented by the trees (ὄλη, 5.398) Odysseus spies from his broken raft off Scheria; by the comparison of his washed-up body to an ember buried beneath the leaves that preserves the spark of fire on the edge of the tilled land (5.488–90); by the olive-bed of Book 23; or even by Laertes' orchard, the final marker that Odysseus has arrived "home."<sup>86</sup> In each of these examples, there is a movement toward, and often an effort to preserve, wood that is dry, as if Odysseus's eventual arrival at the immobile bed is an attempt to trace in reverse, or even undo, the post-Golden Age development from tree to moving ship.<sup>87</sup> In keeping with such a reversal, the prophecy about the oar suggests that wood can become drier still, to the extent that it might lose all trace of its connection with ships and salt water altogether. This takes us into a landscape that exists on another plane altogether to the *Odyssey* and its world.

The end of Odysseus's journey, mediated as it is through the imagery of a broken Homeric ship, pushes the *telos* of the poem into increasingly alien territory, even as it promises that, eventually, Odysseus will circle back toward home. The human figure who emerges, caked in brine, from the sea, will walk for such a long time that all traces of salt will eventually disappear from his story. When that happens, we are faced, paradoxically,

<sup>86</sup> Redfield [1975] 1994, 189ff., has discussed the geographical importance of the term *agrou ep' eschatiês* (*Od.* 5.489) as marking the border between lowland and grazing land; here, it reinforces the idea of moving further away from the sea. On the counting of trees in Laertes' orchard as the sign that Odysseus has at last returned, cf. Pucci 1996; Henderson 1997; my Ch. 6.

<sup>87</sup> We are reminded here of Hesiod's injunction to "hang the steering-oar above the smoke" in order to dry out the wood and prevent it from rotting (and to avoid sailing upon the sea) (*Op.* 629, cf. 45).

with a possibility for the poem that is analogous to shipwreck, for the erasure of identity and the loss of *kleos* and orientation that takes place inland works as its own kind of shipwreck within the context of the epic. Like the complete obliteration of Scheria, the sign of the oar functions as a landlocked shipwreck that – precisely because it is located so far from the sea – hints at the destabilization of Homeric epic and the space that it occupies.

### THREE

## THE WORLD IN THE HAND: ANAXIMANDER, PHERECYDES, AND THE INVENTION OF CARTOGRAPHY

IN THE FIRST TWO CHAPTERS, WE CONSIDERED TWO CONTRASTING conceptions of the world in Homer, both of which anticipate conceptions of space that are related to the presentations found in cartography. In the *Iliad*, it was the cartographic fiction of an ideal space that can be taken in with one glance or even held in one hand. In the *Odyssey*, it was the possibility of a world that always extended beyond our cognitive horizons, and that could never be fully known or mapped. With this chapter, we move from poetry to prose in order to uncover the spatial and visual dimensions at play in those narratives that no longer took the Muse as their point of inspiration or focus. The story of the emergence of prose is intriguing, because its origins in the early sixth century are concurrent with the development of the first Greek map. In the history of Greek literature and space, therefore, prose and cartography are related; they are born in the same place to the same author, and – as some would have it – even at the same time.<sup>1</sup> Although there are a number of good reasons to be skeptical of prose and cartography's perfectly synchronized births, this chapter argues that it is not entirely coincidental that cartography makes its appearance at a time when narrative is starting to articulate a voice, and a vantage point, that is no longer dependent on the Muse.<sup>2</sup>

The question at stake here is how prose used the scientific properties of the map to create its own distinct identity, as a genre spoken in the voice of a human narrator without the fantastical aid or inspiration of the Muses. On the one hand, I want to consider the map as an instrument that

<sup>1</sup> Numerous sources credit the Presocratic philosopher Anaximander as the first Greek to compose a prose treatise and the first to draw a map of the world: DK 12A1, 6, 7.

<sup>2</sup> I am not suggesting that prose follows on from cartography in a developmental or causal fashion, rather that the two reflect the same cultural and conceptual changes at a significant moment in the development of Greek narrative.

reflected contemporary geographic and scientific inquiry. On the other, I want to think about how the map works as a metaphor, given that cartography offers up a new model for the organization and perception of space that follows on from models we have already considered in Homeric epic. In both contexts, the cartographic paradox – that the map can depict the entire earth while at the same time being of a size that is small enough to be held in the hands of its reader – presents problems for its author. We will trace the various manifestations of that problem in this and the following chapter.

Since it is often argued that maps provide the human observer with an aerial way of looking at the world that resembles a god's-eye view,<sup>3</sup> cartography's emergence at the same time as prose invites us to consider the extent to which the map substituted for or replaced the Muse's perspective. In addition, the compilation of cartography and prose into a single "book" (if Anaximander's doxographers are to be believed) suggests that the art of prose narrative was, at least at its origins, inherently bound up with the art of pictorial representation.<sup>4</sup> In Chapter 1, we examined the ways in which the pictorial aspect of the Shield of Achilles worked, through ekphrasis, to afford a synoptic or protocartographic view of the whole. Now, at the beginnings of Ionian prose-writing, we can detect that same pictorial aspect reappearing in the form of a map.<sup>5</sup> It is perhaps no accident that with the departure of the Muses and the fantasy of a sublime, immortal way of seeing, a revolutionary graphic form of representing the world enters the literary record, especially since cartography's presentation of a synoptic point of view conceptually reconfigures the Muse's supernatural gaze.

The questions that arise from the convergence of prose and cartography continue the themes of the previous chapters by critically engaging with the role of place and topography in the formation of a literary work, and investigating the ways in which literary systems or "plots" are shaped by their own geographies. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that what we know about the beginnings of these two traditions can only be sketched in the barest of outlines. Despite the pronouncements of later

<sup>3</sup> Cf. De Certeau 1984, 92–3.

<sup>4</sup> For cartography as an art form, see Rees 1980; Woodward 1987. It is not known whether the map served as an actual illustration of geographical texts (cf. Peretti 1979, 21, note 18).

<sup>5</sup> On the influence of epic poetry on early scientific discourse, see Most 1999. On the development of prose from oral poetry, Nagy 1990a, 17–51. For a different reading of prose's early history and its relationship to catalogue poetry, Bertelli 2001.



Greeks on the subject, Anaximander did not actually “invent” cartography. Instead, he introduced maps into the Greek-speaking world, probably after having seen non-Greek examples in the Near East.<sup>6</sup> We should apply the same caution to his reputation as the inventor of prose. What we do know is that Anaximander, unlike his predecessor Thales, set down his scientific theories in a book made up of papyrus rolls, but – although he certainly wrote at the beginning of the prose tradition – we cannot say whether he was actually the first *person* in the Greek world to compose a prose narrative. It is reasonable to claim, however, that Anaximander was the spearhead of a joint tradition – prose and cartography – that went on to experience very different levels of prominence in the ancient world. While prose quickly developed its own rich history, cartography had a very limited and minor use in the early stages of Greek culture.<sup>7</sup>

Yet I want to suggest that cartography had an important and previously unrecognized influence on prose, especially in relation to its spatial properties. In the transition from poetry to prose, the geometry of meter (where the measured lengths of syllables make up the whole) is displaced onto the geometry of the earth. Anaximander, the fabled importer of the *gnōmon*, transfers the idea of a “metron” (a unit of measurement) from language to space.<sup>8</sup> This results in a prose that – as Kahn has demonstrated in his study of the associations between early prose writing and geometry – shares a practical association with architecture and city planning (1983, 112–13). As prose is aligned with the external units of measurement by which cities are designed and distances between places are recorded, the geometries of language and space merge into the same sphere and begin to reflect upon and shape one another.<sup>9</sup>

I do not want to imply that this leap from poetry to prose was too easily made, nor to create a narrative in which the translations from one generic form to another (muse to map; metrical verse to measured earth)

<sup>6</sup> On early non-Greek mapmaking practices, see Dilke 1985, 11–23. On the history of Greek cartography, Harley and Woodward 1987, 130–47.

<sup>7</sup> For the strongest claim that maps were insignificant to early Greek thought, see Janni 1984. On the history of early Greek cartography, Heidel 1937; Lukerman 1961; Johnston 1971, 32–4; Janni 1984; Dilke 1985, 21–38; Homet 1985; Jacob 1985; Harley and Woodward 1987, 130–40; Jacob 1988; Jacob 1991; Nicolet 1991; Seaford 2004, 198–9; Jacob 2006; Munn 2006, 178–220.

<sup>8</sup> DK 12A1, 2. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983, 103) define the *gnōmon* as “a set-square or any vertical rod whose shadow indicates the sun’s direction and height.”

<sup>9</sup> This will be particularly true for Xenophon, as I explore in Chs. 5 and 6. On the use of geometry in world mapping, and political town planning, see Lèveque and Vidal-Naquet 1996, 81–97.

are facile or simplistic. It must be reiterated that cartography showed up as little more than a tangent in the history of Presocratic science. Nevertheless, I *do* want to suggest that this tangent occurred for a reason, and that it was instrumental in carrying over questions about space that were already at play in Homer. When prose first comes into being, a small but significant story about space is told, crucially, *by means of maps*. In this chapter, we will trace the two earliest strands of that story, by treating in parallel the work of two figures who stand at the very beginning of the prose tradition, and who even compete between themselves for the status of the “inventor of prose”: Anaximander of Miletus and Pherecydes of Syros.<sup>10</sup> Since Pherecydes’ work bridges the conceptual gap between Homer’s Shield of Achilles and Anaximander’s early experiments with cartography, it is to his *Theogony* that we will turn first.

## DEPICTING THE EARTH: PHERECYDES’ THEOGONY

Pherecydes of Syros was a mid-sixth-century mythographer who wrote a history of the cosmos, variously entitled the *Theogony*, the *Mixing of the Gods*, and the *Seven Nooks*.<sup>11</sup> Although most of his book does not survive, two columns have been recovered from what is surmised to be the middle of the work.<sup>12</sup> The largest of these fragments describes the wedding of Zas (Zeus) and Chthoniê, from which the earth, Gê, is created. This wedding has been associated with the very first marriage (*hieros gamos*) between Zeus and Hera, at which the world – in many accounts of its beginnings – is understood to have taken its original form.<sup>13</sup> As the first wedding, it establishes the practice and customs of the human marriage ceremony as well.

Pherecydes’ book starts with the three preexisting deities (Zas, Chthoniê, and Chronos) and develops into a story about the creation of new gods (including a serpent, Orphioneos, whom Chronos will

<sup>10</sup> On the debate about the first prose writer, see Jacoby 1947; M. L. West 1971, 5–7; Kahn 1985, 240; Bertelli 2001, 78, note 27. Cf. Schibli 1990 frs. 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12 for testimonia attributing the first prose narrative to Pherecydes.

<sup>11</sup> I agree with the majority of scholars in assuming that Pherecydes of Syros (a mythographer) is a different person to Pherecydes the Athenian (a historian). See further Jacoby 1947; Toye 1997; R. L. Fowler 1999.

<sup>12</sup> The line number “600” has been preserved. See M. L. West 1963, 157–72; Kirk et al. 1983, 50–71; Schibli 1990.

<sup>13</sup> M. L. West 1963, 165; Schibli 1990, 61–2.

defeat in his establishment of cosmic order) and the formation of the world. The first line of the book states that Zas, Chthoniê, and Chronos had always existed (*êsan aei*) but that *Chthoniê's name was changed to Gê* when Zas bestowed the earth upon her as a gift (Schibli 14):<sup>14</sup>

σώζεται δὲ τοῦ Συρίου τό τε βιβλίον ὃ συνέγραψεν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ‘Ζᾶς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἦσαν ἀεὶ καὶ Χθονίη· Χθονίη δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζᾶς γῆν γέρας διδοῖ’.

The book that the one from Syros wrote has been preserved. Here is the beginning of it: “Zas and Chronos and Chthoniê always were. But Chthoniê was named Gê, when Zas gave her the earth (*gê*) as a gift.”

Zas, the ruler of the gods, marries Chthoniê, and in doing so transforms her from “Chthoniê” to “Gê.” In Pherecydes’ formulation, two different layers or aspects of the earth (we will sort out the differences later) once corresponded to two separate divine beings who were then, by the action of Zas, joined into one.

Pherecydes starts from the premise that the earth can be described in two ways. In the beginning, it is simply chthonic, coming from the Greek word *chthonios*, which has traditionally been understood to mean “in, under, or beneath the earth.”<sup>15</sup> But it takes on a new name after marriage to Zas. Chthoniê then becomes Gê, the word for land, or the substance that covers the surface of the earth, either as a whole (including land and sea) or in contrast to the heavens or ocean.<sup>16</sup> The chthonic quality of the earth is traditionally understood to be hidden, connected with what is located either underground or in the underworld, while *gê* encompasses that which lies on the surface of the earth, and which would be spread out for view, especially at long range. The connection between *gê* and individual lands, whether “foreign” or “home,” already evident in Homer, also forges an association between *gê* and the study of geographic regions.

The process of Chthoniê’s transformation further helps to separate the difference between the two aspects of the earth that we have been considering, for Zas creates land (Gê) by weaving an immense, variegated robe for Chthoniê. The description of the marriage in which Zas

<sup>14</sup> On Zas’s gift of a cloak, see Scheid and Svenbro 1996, 62–6.

<sup>15</sup> *LSJ* s.v. χθόνιος.

<sup>16</sup> *LSJ* s.v. γῆ. Cf. the use of the three different English words *earth*, *world*, and *globe* (Cosgrove 2001, 5–8).

presents the cloak to his new bride survives in two fragmentary columns (Schibli 68):

Col. I

[αὐ-  
τω ποιεῦσιν τὰ οἰ]κία  
πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα·  
ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐξετέ-  
λεσαν πάντα καὶ χρή-  
ματα καὶ θεράποντας  
καὶ θεραπαίνας καὶ  
τᾶλλα ὅσα δεῖ πάντα.  
ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα ἐτοῖ-  
μα γίγνεται, τὸν γά-  
μον ποιεῦσιν. κἄπει-  
δὴ τρίτῃ ἡμέρῃ γί-  
γνεται τῷ γάμῳ, τό-  
τε Ζῆς ποιεῖ φᾶρος μέ-  
γα τε καὶ καλόν, καὶ  
ἐν αὐτῷ[ι] προῖκ[ι]λλει Γῆν  
καὶ Ὑγην[ον] καὶ τὰ ὤ-  
γηνοῦ [δῶματα. . .

Col. II                    [βουλόμενος  
γὰρ σεο τῶν γάμου]ς  
εἶναι, τούτῳ σε τιμ[έ]ω.  
σὺ δέ μοι χαῖρε καὶ σὺ[ν-  
]ισθι. ταῦτά φασιν ἀν[α-  
καλυπττήρια πρῶτον  
γενέσθαι, ἐκ τούτου δι[ὲ]  
ὃ νόμος ἐγένε[το] καὶ  
θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώ[π]οι-  
σιν. ἡ δέ μιν ἀμείβε-  
ται δεξαμένην εὐ τὸ  
φᾶρος . . .

Col. I They make him many and large halls, and when they have accomplished everything – that is, when the goods and the attendants and serving-maids and as many other things as were necessary have been made ready – they perform the wedding. On the third day of the wedding, Zas fashions a vast and beautiful robe, and on it he depicts Earth (Gē) and Ocean and the dwelling places of Ocean . . .

Col. II “... Wishing marriage with you I honour you with this (robe). Welcome me, and form a union with me.” It is said

that this was the first *anakalupteria*.<sup>17</sup> From this event, the custom (of the *anakalupteria*) originated among gods and men. And she accepted the robe and answered him . . .

When Chthoniê (the chthonic base matter, or interior of the earth) puts on the robe, she transforms into “Gê” because her surface is now covered with land and ocean. In clothing herself and removing her veil, Chthoniê/Gê becomes an object to be looked at, moving from matter to representation. The robe is described as “vast and beautiful” (*mega te kai kalon*), and the verb *poikillô* that is used to denote Zas’s embroidering of its surface is the same as that used of Hephaestus to describe his crafting of the shield (*Il.* 18.590). It is also the same root as the adjective *poikilos* that Aristotle used to describe the *eusynoptic* plot in chapter 23 of the *Poetics* (1459a34). As Schibli observes, *poikillô*’s connection to words such as *poikilmos* (variegation) and *poikilos* (wrought in various colors) also evokes descriptions of the star-studded ceiling of the heavens.<sup>18</sup>

Schibli argues that the Ocean (Ôgênos) and the mysterious “halls of Ocean” that Zas embroidered on the robe must have been located around its border (1990, 54). If he is right, then two conclusions can be drawn from the design of the cloak handed from Zas to Chthoniê. First, as an area of land, Gê’s mantle resembles the “flowery robe” that Persephone was weaving in the Orphic Rhapsodies at the moment when she was abducted by Hades.<sup>19</sup> Persephone’s robe, as M. L. West (1983, 11) observes, has a certain cosmic significance. Her weaving of the flowers into its fabric suggests that it should be imagined as the soil of the earth, upon whose surface flowers and crops emerge with the cycling of the seasons. The emergence of the plants on the surface of the cloth is reminiscent of a simultaneous movement in creation myths detailing the progression from an unformed clod of earth to a fully articulated, manufactured cosmos.<sup>20</sup> In both cases, the base matter of the earth is transformed into a plot; an object or area to be looked at.

<sup>17</sup> On the *anakaluptêria*, the ritual of unveiling the bride, see Llewellyn-Jones 2003, 227–30.

<sup>18</sup> Schibli 1990, 53, note 6; *Od.* 14.107, 17.292. On the word *poikilothronos*, also related to dress, see Scheid and Svenbro 1996, 53–82. I discuss *poikilos* again in Ch. 4, in connection with Aristagoras’s map.

<sup>19</sup> M. L. West 1983, 10–11; Lee 2004, 257. Dilke 1985, 12, discusses a Mesopotamian map depicted on the robe of a statue (c. 2100 BCE). We might compare the robe Andromache is weaving when she hears of Hector’s death (*Il.* 22.441), especially if *throna* there means flowers.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Loraux 2002, 1.

Chthoniê's robe also bears an obvious resemblance to another decorated item that is worn upon the body: the great cosmic shields of epic poetry. For Hephaestus, like Zas, also depicted the earth, land, sea, and all the stars, as well as the river Ocean running on a border around the rim of his artwork. In his commentary on this fragment, Clement of Alexandria observes that Chthoniê's robe, fashioned by a divine artist as a replica of the world, has much in common with the crafting of the Shield of Achilles (DK 7B2):

αὐθὶς τε Ὀμήρου ἐπὶ τῆς ἡφαιστοτεύκτου ἀσπίδος εἰπόντος· ἔν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ', ἐν δ' οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν· ἐν δ' ἐτίθει ποταμοῖο μέγα σθένος ὤκεανοιο.' (Σ 483, 607)

Homer said the same thing about the shield fashioned by Hephaestus: "He fashioned the earth on it, the heavens, and the sea. And he set on it the great strength of the river Ocean." (*Il.* 18. 483, 607)

Like the shield, Chthoniê's robe can be held in the hands of its protagonists, and is readily able to be taken in at a glance. By means of the designs depicted on both objects, the concept of the earth *as a whole* can be captured and framed in the imagination. The sixth-century *Shield of Heracles* expresses the same idea: Hephaestus creates in the shield an object that bridges the gap between the worlds of gods and men, at the same time as it frames the entire earth within its borders ([*Sc.*] 314–15).<sup>21</sup> In each of these cases, just as in the case of Hephaestus's manufacture of Pandora, base materials or elements from the earth are transformed into something that is made whole and visible through design, manufacture, and ornament, and that is presented as an object to be admired.<sup>22</sup> Finally, all three of these objects represent maps inasmuch as they spread out before the gaze of the observer a view of the earth, heavens, and ocean on a roughly flat surface area.<sup>23</sup>

Yet Pherecydes achieves this effect in his *Theogony* by playing with scale in a somewhat complicated way. For although we think of the robe as a miniature replica of the world when we see it in our mind's eye,

<sup>21</sup> Hephaestus and Zas can be compared as creators of the earth who also work from its base material. Cf. Hephaestus's creation of Pandora, the first woman, out of earth in Hes. *Theog.* (571) and *Op.* (61, 70); Loraux 2002.

<sup>22</sup> Note that Hesiod's Pandora, like the Homeric and ps.-Hesiodic shields, is a "wonder to see" (*thauma idesthai*, *Theog.* 581) and possesses qualities that are "like [those of] living creatures" (*zôioisin eokota phônêssin*, *Theog.* 584).

<sup>23</sup> Constellations may have been important features of those maps that dealt with navigation. Cf. Dilke 1985, 20, with reference to the Shield of Achilles. The Shield may be somewhat concave, but it is close enough in shape to the flatness of a map.

in order for it to cover the body of Chthoniê point for point, it must have been depicted on a 1:1 scale. In other words, the robe is not a miniaturized representation of the world, as the shield is, but the world itself: its bestowal upon Chthoniê is what creates Earth (Gê), after all.<sup>24</sup> Her robe is designed to match the earth's dimensions exactly.

In his very short prose piece, "Museum: On Exactitude in Science," Borges plays upon the relationship between map and mimesis in his description of an empire that is covered "point for point" by a map that corresponds to it exactly in size.<sup>25</sup> He explores how cartography, as it reaches toward the illusion of not only accurate but *complete* representation, is revealed as a double of the empire itself: a medium whose surface becomes indistinguishable from the territory over which it is laid. With the eradication of differentiation (in scale, but also, if only temporarily, in the textures of the earth and its "covering" of paper or cloth), the makers of Borges' map achieve the same effect as Zas does when he clothes the entire earth in a new and decorated surface. Pherecydes may not be implying anything quite so literal as the idea of an actual map that is the same size as the earth. But there is a similar element of the paradoxical in his description of a robe that is both a *representation* of the earth (a world in miniature, made by Zas, just as Hephaestus made his shield) and yet also covers the earth in its entirety.<sup>26</sup> The robe scales down the earth, transforming it into a miniature replica that can be held in the hands of Zas and his new bride. Yet, at the same time, because the robe (*gê*) covers the chthonic matter of the earth, point to point, there is explicitly no principle of scaling down taking place at all – the *mega te kai kalon* cloth that Zas weaves must be as large as the earth itself.

As with the description of the shield in the *Iliad*, the description of the robe fluctuates between human and divine points of view. To "see" the narrative according to the divine view of the world, the earth must become miniature – a small gift, or synecdoche of its larger self – exchanged between gods within a world set to their dimensions. Pherecydes' *Theogony* directs us to read the cloak as something that "fits" within the proportions of two environments, because the text moves

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Schibli 1990, 56, note 12: "Ge, invested with the robe, *is* the earth" (italics in original).

<sup>25</sup> Borges 1998, 325. Cf. Marin 1984, 233–7; Corner 1999; Jacob 2006, 14, 321–2.

<sup>26</sup> On the important role of miniaturization in creating art, see Lévi-Strauss 1966, 22–30. On the relationship between maps and textiles, Jacob 2006, 50 and 18 (where he discusses the origin of the Latin word *mappa*, meaning tablecloth: "The term is thus concerned with a material form, a textile, in other words, a medium or a surface.").

between the cosmic landscape of the elemental “nooks” that make up the primordial world and the human landscape of palaces and the setting out of furniture in preparation for a wedding. But the hand with which Zas offers the cloak perhaps best exposes the paradox between these two environments. The robe/earth becomes miniature as soon as Zas and Chthoniê are able to hold it in their hands, yet this is also the exact moment when their hands are no longer in proportion with their world. Pherecydes’ robe tricks us in our reading, for – like the description of Hephaestus’s shield – it represents a world that can only be fully grasped when set within an immortal context and made miniature according to an immortal sense of scale. What is most difficult to comprehend about Zas’s map-world (and to a lesser extent Hephaestus’s cosmos-shield) is that its creator exists both inside and outside the frame of this world. He has to be simultaneously big enough to hold the world in his hand and small enough to fit inside it. This can be understood as a cartographic paradox, since it illustrates the same problem that a map reader is faced with when holding a map of the earth in his hands.<sup>27</sup>

Like ancient maps of the earth, Pherecydes’ Gê represents the entire cosmos, including the constellations. The associations between her clothed body and the mapped earth are worth pursuing a little further, for it is only through the practice of cartography that the earth can be spread out as a visible and fully coherent system before the eye. In other words, the map displaces the invisible quality of place and space, by giving it contours and form and by turning it into an object that can be looked at as a discrete unit.<sup>28</sup> In a similar way, before Chthoniê is clothed, her body cannot be visualized, yet afterward her earthly dimensions take on the form of a topography and body that can be seen. This also explains why Gê can only be unveiled, and thus formally looked at, after she has been dressed.

Zas’s bestowal of the robe upon Chthoniê as a gift mirrors, on a visual level, Pherecydes’ attempt to describe the space of the earth in words in his *Theogony*, with Zas taking on the role of master craftsman, mapmaker, and author. For Zas’s arrangement of the space of the earth into a single, synoptic whole reflects on the narrative endeavor of Pherecydes to make a comprehensive “plot” of the cosmos in his writing. Pherecydes’ fragment shows that, in order to move between the two viewpoints of mortals and

<sup>27</sup> On the topos of the size of the divine creator’s or sovereign’s hands in relation to maps, see Jacob 2006, 322–5, 337–8.

<sup>28</sup> On the “invisibility” of place and space, see Geertz 1996.



immortals in Greek narrative, there must always be a readjustment, so that a supernatural view of space and time can be made to fit into the limited dimensions of human vision. In the marriage of Zas and Chthoniê, it is almost possible to see from both of these viewpoints at once; that is, from the supernatural plane of the gods and from the human “translation” of that plane – the perspective of the sixth-century mapmaker.

M. L. West has twice suggested that Pherecydes may have written his *Theogony* with a map of the world before him, perhaps like the Babylonian world map of the early fifth century, now in the British Museum.<sup>29</sup> Like the text that accompanies that map, Pherecydes’ narrative deals with a monster-god who is destroyed by Chronos/Marduk and settled in the sea, and West believes that Pherecydes’ curious reference to the “homes” (δῶματα) of Ocean may result from the fact that “he has in view a map on which they are prominently marked.” He has also noted the spatial arrangement of Pherecydes’ narrative, as if the author had divided his cosmos into parts that he is describing in turn (Schibli fr. 83 reads “and next below that division . . .”). Likewise, Pherecydes’ description of the soul’s journey between lives is markedly topographical, with one fragment (Schibli fr. 88) recording “nooks, pits, caves, doors, and gates” (M. L. West 1971, 24–5). These tantalizing fragments of Pherecydes’ text suggest that the poem attempted to articulate a topography and spatial system for the newly emerging cosmos.

In the course of a single fragment, therefore, Zas’s robe unfolds into both real and representational space as it alternates between the surface of the earth and the surface of a map. The difference between the surface (*gê*) and base matter (*chthoniê*) of the earth is in one sense visual. The earth, once it has been taken in by the eye, transforms into *gê* and becomes whole. This corresponds, as I suggested earlier, to the distinction whereby *chthôn* comes increasingly to denote the hidden or nether regions of the earth, while *gê* comes to be understood as its surface, its particular regions, or the earth as an embodied whole. While *chthôn* has matter, *gê* has form, and it is this sense of form or representation that lends it the quality of “place.”<sup>30</sup> It is more likely that *gê* will demarcate a particular area of

<sup>29</sup> M. L. West 1971, 19, 49–50; 1997, 146 and note 193. Unger 1937, 2, includes a reconstructed drawing of the world map, with the seven islands of the river Ocean marked. See further Nemet-Nejat 1982; Horowitz 1988.

<sup>30</sup> For definitions of place, see Tuan 1977, 1978; Parkes and Thrift 1980; Merrifield 1993; Hirsch 1995; Casey 1997; Sack 1997, 60–87; K. Clarke 1999, 17–18; Said 2000; Agnew and Smith 2002, 1–18; Curry 2005. Place is usually so categorized because it is experienced or contextualized in a way that is significant to an individual or group.

ground and that *chthôn* will denote the amorphous quality of the earth or the underground – in the latter case, the regions of the earth that cannot be pictured readily in the mind’s eye.

### ANAXIMANDER’S EARTH

It is this sense of *gê* that emerges most strongly in the descriptions of the earth that we are told Anaximander of Miletus produced in his early experiments in cartography in the second half of the sixth century BCE. The doxographical evidence records that Anaximander “was the first to draw (πρῶτος ἔγραψεν) an outline of the land and sea, but he also constructed a world-sphere” (DK 12A1). The space of the map is a *gês kai thalassês perimetron*, a circuit of the land and sea, while that of the entire cosmos is a *sphaira*, a globe that, we imagine, offered a model of the cosmos as a whole, or that even encased the cosmos. Anaximander understood the earth, *gê*, to be a floating entity located in the middle of the cosmic structure.<sup>31</sup> Flat in shape, like a cylindrical drum three times as wide as it was deep, it is the even, topmost surface of this space that must have constituted the *gê* Anaximander represented on his map. This is the surface upon which we walk.<sup>32</sup> For Anaximander as for Pherecydes, *gê* adheres to the principle of place – it is the area that one inhabits, that is specified by certain regions or borders, and that is familiar or at least connected to the human world. In the language of the Presocratics, *gê* moves away from its previous chthonic associations and toward the understanding of the mappable surface of the earth as *oikoumenê*, or inhabited region.<sup>33</sup>

The *Suda* tells us that Anaximander wrote several prose works, including *On Nature*, *The Circuit of the Earth*, *On the Fixed Stars*, and *The Celestial Globe* (DK 12A2). Whether we accept that Anaximander did

The mutual dependency between places and bodies has been discussed by scholars (Casey 1996; Nast and Pile 1998; Gillies 2001). In terms of our argument, then, it is perfectly fitting that earth’s transition to becoming a place should be mediated through the body; as Chthoniê gets dressed, the contours of her body are determined, and it is this process of embodiment that allies her with the idea of place. Cf. Carson 1990, 161–3.

<sup>31</sup> DK 12A11. Cf. DK 12A26. On Anaximander’s interest in the cosmos, see Guthrie 1995; Couprie 2001; Graham 2006, 1–26.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Couprie, Hahn, and Naddaf 2003, 194.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. DK 12A6, where the world of Anaximander’s map is referred to as *oikoumenê*, and – for the word’s political associations in this context – Munn 2006, 188–96.

write a *Periodos Gês*,<sup>34</sup> as the *Suda* informs us, or whether we interpret the map as an accompaniment to a more meteorological vision of the world as described in the *Peri Physeôs*,<sup>35</sup> it is possible, in both cases, to see the map and prose narrative as two mutually reciprocating halves of a single, complete “text.” All of the ancient testimonia on Anaximander’s activity indiscriminately apply a form of *graphein* to both of his innovations, because the word applies to both drawing and writing (DK 12A2, 6, 7). Moreover, since Anaximander’s map is said to be depicted on a *pinax*, or writing tablet, the overlap between map and prose is accentuated by the fact that both are inscribed upon the same material surface. We do not know much about what Anaximander’s map might have looked like, but it appears to have followed the same basic shape as Homer’s Shield of Achilles.<sup>36</sup> We have already noted that the Shield, a circular object showing different areas of land surrounded by the river Ocean, is analogous in many ways to early Greek maps of the world.<sup>37</sup> Dilke has posited that the Shield’s design may be due to the fact that Homer

<sup>34</sup> As Romm 1992, 26, points out, the phrase *περίοδος γῆς* marks a departure from the poetic tradition because it does not fit within the hexameter (contrast epic’s *πείρατα γαίης*). Note also the similarity here in subject matter and phrasing between the description of Anaximander’s map (*γῆς . . . περίμετρον*) and book (*γῆς περίοδον*).

<sup>35</sup> While it is widely accepted that Anaximander did construct the first Greek map of the world, and while some scholars, such as Romm (1992, 26–7, and note 51), have ascribed a *Periodos Gês* to him, opinion is divided on whether Anaximander wrote a geographical treatise, with much of the argument hinging on a passage from Eratosthenes (Strabo I.1.1 C 1), which (although the Greek is ambiguous) credits Anaximander with the first map and Hecataeus with the first *Periodos Gês*. In 1921, Heidel argued that the *Peri Physeôs* was written as a companion piece to the map, calling it “the first Greek geographical treatise.” Although his theory – that *peri physeôs* referred to geography rather than astronomy and meteorology – has been rejected by several scholars (Jacoby *FGrH*; Jacob 1988, 281, note 24), Van Paassen 1957, 58–61, has persuasively demonstrated that “Anaximander’s map . . . cannot possibly have been a mere drawing without a commentary” (58) and that “Anaximander must have used his treatise *On Nature* as a basis for his map of the world” (59). As Van Paassen, Kahn 1985, 81–4, and Jacob 1988, 277–81, have recognised, the distinction between cosmography, geometry, and cartography was not absolute during this period. Not only does Anaximander’s map fit neatly onto the top surface of his cylindrical model of the world (as described probably in the *Peri Physeôs*), but its circular, symmetrical design, divided into the two halves of Asia and Europe by a diametrically flowing river (Kahn op. cit.) should be indication enough that Anaximander’s cartography is intricately connected to, and illustrative of, the subject matter of his prose.

<sup>36</sup> For recent conjectures, see the chapters by Naddaf and Hahn in Couprie et al. 2003.

<sup>37</sup> Dilke 1985, 20; Harley and Woodward 1987, 130–2.

had seen a rudimentary map.<sup>38</sup> Strabo, who claimed that Homer was the “first geographer” may also have been thinking of cartography when he associated the epic poet with Anaximander and Hecataeus, both of mapmaking fame.<sup>39</sup>

Hecataeus, like Anaximander, also wrote a *Periodos Gēs*, some of which survives in fragments. Like Anaximander, he also appears to have illustrated his text with a map, a representation of the earth that was so accurate that it became a source of wonder (DK 12A6):<sup>40</sup>

Ἀναξίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀκουστής Θαλέω πρῶτος ἐτόλμησε τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν πίνακι γράψαι· μεθ’ ὃν Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀνὴρ πολυπλανὴς διηκρίβωσεν, ὥστε θαυμασθῆναι τὸ πρᾶγμα.

Anaximander the Milesian, pupil of Thales, first dared to depict (*grapsai*) the inhabited world on a tablet. After him, Hecataeus the Milesian, a much-traveled man, corrected it with the result that it became an object to be marvelled at.

The wondrous or magical aspect of the map (θαυμασθῆναι τὸ πρᾶγμα) comes from the idea that it might include, like the shields, more than it is humanly possible to see. It is difficult to reach a conclusion about what either Anaximander or Hecataeus’s maps must have looked like, especially as no material remains of Ionian cartography survive from the classical or archaic period. As a comparandum, the Babylonian world map depicts the cosmos as a circle bisected by the Euphrates and surrounded by seven star points and an encircling “Bitter Ocean.” It denotes places, especially mountains, and is inscribed with text describing the different regions in general terms.<sup>41</sup> Our lack of information about early Greek maps is compounded by the fact that the fragments of Hecataeus’s two works, the *Genealogies* and the *Periodos Gēs*, are hard to tell apart.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Dilke sees in the mixed perspective of the Shield something analogous to the maplike Minoan frescoes found at Thera (1985, 55–6). Cf. Morris 1989, esp. on the connections of these frescoes to themes found in early Greek epic.

<sup>39</sup> DK 12A6: “Eratosthenes says that the first two after Homer were Anaximander, the friend and fellow citizen of Thales, and Hecataeus the Milesian.”

<sup>40</sup> Although cf. Dilke 1985, 24, who believes that this might mean that Hecataeus criticized Anaximander’s map in his *Periodos Ges*, rather than redrew it. See also Zimmermann 1997/8; Bertelli 2001; Prontera 2001; Jacob 2006, 130–1.

<sup>41</sup> Thomson 1948, 38–9; M. L. West 1971, 50; Dilke 1985, 12; Kahn 1985, 84; Horowitz 1988; Smith 1996. Small maps have also been found on fourth-century Greek coins (Johnston 1971).

<sup>42</sup> Clarke 1999, 61.

As K. Clarke (1999, 61) observes, a fragment putatively belonging to one work might just as easily belong to another.

In the *Histories*, Herodotus ridicules the “many men” who have made maps of the earth by dividing it into two regions of equal size (Hdt. 4.36.2):

γελῶ δὲ ὁρῶν γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη καὶ οὐδένα νόον ἔχόντως ἐξηγησάμενον. οἱ ὤκεανόν τε ῥέοντα γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν, ἑοῦσαν κυκλωτερέα ὥς ἀπὸ τόρνου, καὶ τὴν Ἀσίην τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ποιεύντων ἴσην.

I laugh when I look at the many men who have drawn maps of the earth, not one of whom has described it with any sense. They draw the river Ocean flowing around a circular earth, as if drawn with a compass, and they make Asia equal in size to Europe.

Many scholars see Hecataeus as one of the targets of Herodotus’s criticism here, especially since Hecataeus’s map is believed to have been schematic and symmetrical.<sup>43</sup> Our sources indicate that he divided the world into two continents, Asia and Europe, with Delphi at the center and bounded by the Caspian Sea in the east and the Pillars of Heracles in the west.<sup>44</sup> Although Hecataeus identifies various places and their relative proximity in his fragments, it was his written text, not his map, that would more likely have served as a guide for the arrangement and orientation of places along the coast in his *Periodos Gēs*.<sup>45</sup>

The marking of continents upon the map, and especially the highlighting of the visual relationship of those continents to one another, emphasizes that the Ionian world map attempts to offer a panoptic, global view of the earth; one that is so holistic that it becomes overly schematic, in Herodotus’s view. Homer, as we saw in Chapter 1, arranged the space on the shield as a series of overlapping “scenes” within the framework of the constellations and encircling Ocean, and the further away from these topographical markers the eye is drawn, the harder it is to detect any kind

<sup>43</sup> Jacoby 1912, cols. 2702–7; Lloyd 1976, ii, *passim*; Munn 2006, 178–220; Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, ad loc. On whether Hecataeus divided the earth into two or three continents, see Zimmermann 1997/8. For a later criticism of the circular map, cf. Arist. *Mete.* 2.5.326b13–30; Van Paassen 1957, 63–4. Scholars have cautioned against taking Hdt. 4.36.2 at face value (Heidel 1937, 11–12; Prontera 2001), but his account of the map, even if exaggerated, still appears to be correct in its basic principles.

<sup>44</sup> Alonso-Núñez 2003. On the difficulties of this bipartite division, especially in relation to the placement of Libya (i.e., Africa), see Zimmermann 1997/8.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. K. Clarke 1999, 60; Thomas 2000, 76–8.

of order of symmetry within the organization of space. The Ionian map, on the other hand, is controlled by the mark of the compass needle at its most central point, ensuring that the space that radiates from its center is coherent and ordered to a mathematical degree.<sup>46</sup>

In Herodotus's eyes, however, this is precisely the problem with the map – because the proportions are so exact, the earth is reduced to an abstract model, with no real connection to the land that Herodotus walks on, and which he will go on to describe, in his *Histories*, from a different point of view. Herodotus states that maps should be based not on mythological and outmoded principles, such as the encirclement of the earth by the river Ocean, but on empirical observation.<sup>47</sup> His description of the Ionian map is illuminating to the extent that it offers a synoptic display of the earth that is, in his opinion, too reliant on mathematical instruments and proportions.<sup>48</sup>

As the compass and the counting out of measures replaces the body as the primary point of reference, the map loses its human perspective and its basis in experienced or “lived-in” reality, and thereby also loses its connection to place.<sup>49</sup> As we will see in the following chapter, much of Herodotus's claim to authority in the *Histories* is based on the autopsy of different regions and the locating of different peoples within a geographically and ethnographically determined sense of place. Yet the measuring device of the human eye is substituted, in the Ionian mapmaking tradition, by a compass. For Herodotus, this renders the map a static and abstract document, whose representation of the earth ends up having little correspondence with the ground beneath the cartographer's feet.

## ARISTOPHANES' MAP AND THE JUMP OF A FLEA

To talk of maps, distance, and feet in a fifth-century context is to end up, sooner or later, in a discussion of Aristophanes' *Clouds*. We have noted how Anaximander and Pherecydes' maps both problematize the body's role in negotiating the adjustment in scale that takes place between seeing the world from a superhuman, synoptic perspective and seeing it

<sup>46</sup> Dilke 1985, 21: “The Ionian philosophers and their successors were interested in theoretical rather than practical cartography . . . their study led a number of them to map the heavens as much as the earth”; cf. Kahn 1985, 81–4.

<sup>47</sup> Hdt. 4.42. Cf. Romm 1992, 32–41.

<sup>48</sup> For a reconstruction, see Dilke 1985, 56. See further Jacob 1985, 27: “La carte sent trop le compass,” and 26–30.

<sup>49</sup> This applies equally to Gê's body, which creates a structure for Pherecydes' “map,” as it does to the role of the body in perceiving landscape, as discussed in Ch. 1.

from the ground. Almost a century later, Aristophanes addresses the question of viewing through a cartographic perspective in his parody of Socrates in the *Clouds*. In the last part of this chapter, we will examine Aristophanes' concoction of three experiments conducted in the name of natural philosophy and science, a discipline that grew out of the early inquiries of Anaximander and that became increasingly anchored in the prose tradition.<sup>50</sup> Each of the experiments is humorous, and two are deliberately bizarre. They are the attempt to read a map, the attempt to measure the foot of a flea, and the suspension of Socrates in a basket so that he might view the heavens in midair. We will consider how Socrates' position in the basket and his measurement of the flea's foot thematize some of the difficulties of map reading in the late fifth century. The confusion that ensues from the failed map-reading attempt in the *Clouds* highlights the differentiation in scale and adjustment that is called for when moving between different perspectives.

A short time after the simple Athenian Strepsiades has entered Socrates' "Thinkesterion," a student produces a map from a variety of other scientific paraphernalia to show him (Ar., *Nub.* 206–17, Dover):

- Μα. αὕτη δέ σοι γῆς περίοδος πάσης. ὁρᾷς;  
αἶδε μὲν Ἀθῆναι.
- Στ. τί σὺ λέγεις; οὐ πείθομαι,  
ἐπεὶ δικαστὰς οὐχ ὁρῶ καθημένους.
- Μα. ὥς τοῦτ' ἀληθῶς Ἀττικὸν τὸ χωρίον.
- Στ. καὶ ποῦ Κικυννῆς εἰσίν, οὐμοὶ δημόται;
- Μα. ἐνταῦθ' ἔνεισιν. ἡ δέ γ' Εὐβοί', ὥς ὁρᾷς,  
ἡδὶ παρατέταται μακρὰ πόρρω πάνυ.
- Στ. οἶδ'. ὑπὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν παρετάθη καὶ Περικλέους.  
ἀλλ' ἡ Λακεδαίμων ποῦ 'στίν;
- Μα. ὅπου 'στίν; αὐτή.
- Στ. ὥς ἐγγὺς ἡμῶν. τοῦτο μεταφροντίζετε,  
ταύτην ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἀπαγαγεῖν πόρρω πάνυ.
- Μα. ἀλλ' οὐχ οἶόν τε.
- Στ. νῆ Δί', οἰμώξεσθ' ἄρα.

- Student. This is a map of the world. Do you see? Here's Athens.
- Streps. What are you saying? I don't believe you, since I don't see any jurors sitting at their benches.
- Student. No really, this land is Attica.
- Streps. Well then, where are my fellow demesmen from Cicyna?

<sup>50</sup> Most 1999, 359.

- Student. They're here. And this is Eubeia, as you can see. This area, laid out a long way across the mainland.
- Streps. That's for sure, since we laid it out with Pericles. But where's Sparta?
- Student. Where is it? Right here.
- Streps. But it's so close to us. You'd better rethink that one, and move it further away.
- Student. But that's not possible.
- Streps. You'll be sorry if you don't!

The exchange between Strepsiades and the student illustrates the difference between someone who is able to read a map and someone who is not.<sup>51</sup> One of the most important differences between the two figures is that they are looking at the map at different scales. Although they both observe the same representational space, there is a disjunction between what each of them sees (as the repetition of the verb *horaô* in the dialogue makes clear). Where the student "sees" Attica from a distance, Strepsiades cannot process the idea of not seeing at close range, misunderstanding why he cannot "look into" the map and see the jurors sitting at their benches. Similarly, because of the map's reduction in scale, Strepsiades believes that Sparta is "too close" to Athens. As one character looks at the earth from a distance and one at close up (that is, as one attempts to "zoom in" while the other attempts to "zoom out"), Aristophanes' map accentuates some of the same problems we have encountered in our readings of *Iliad* 18 and Pherecydes' *Theogony*.

Perhaps Strepsiades imagines that by looking into the map he might be able to see on all scales at once, just as Homer imagines immortals might see when they look "into" the Shield of Achilles. If the Shield may be understood as a precursor of the map, why should Strepsiades not see jurors sitting at their benches, in much the same way as, within the framework of Homer's Ocean and constellations, the observers of the Shield can see the actions of the judges who deliberate the appropriate

<sup>51</sup> For an extended reading of this passage, see Jacob 1985, 34–9. The joke would only work if the Athenian audience was relatively map literate, at least more so than Strepsiades. Cf. Plut. *Nic.* 12.1.2, who states that just before the invasion of Sicily the average Athenian could sketch the outlines of the region and locate it in relation to North Africa and Carthage. Yet, Thuc 6.1.1 claims that the Athenians had scant knowledge of the size or population of Sicily. Dilke 1985, 25–6. Note also that Dilke 1985, 26, has suggested that Strepsiades is attempting to read the map as an "allotment plan" with which, as a farmer from the country, he might be familiar. See further Ael. *VH* 3.28; Harley and Woodward 1987, 138–9; Jacob 1988; Munn 2006, 218, note 144 for comparable Aristophanic passages.



retribution for murder (*Il.* 18.497–508)? By the same token, the proximity of Sparta to Athens appears to give Strepsiades the idea that these two places might move toward or overlap with one another, and his call to “move [Sparta] further away” suggest that he reads the scenes on the map as if they were fluid and potentially mobile. The joke behind these requests, of course, lies in the fact that a map is a fixed document (as exemplified by the student’s “That’s not possible!” in response to Strepsiades’ request to move Sparta). Perhaps it is for this reason that Strepsiades quickly tires of the map. Aristophanes cleverly uses the buffoonish Strepsiades to unmask the wondrous nature of cartography.<sup>52</sup> Without poetry’s magical ability to bring the picture to life through ekphrasis, the scientific attempt to reproduce a god’s-eye view is easily exposed.<sup>53</sup>

Strepsiades’ misreading of the map is set in context by the student’s prior description of Socrates’ attempt to measure the jump of a flea. As the student tells Strepsiades, Socrates was challenged to measure how many of its own feet a flea could jump. By melting wax and setting it around the flea’s feet to create little boots that could then be removed, Socrates created a measuring unit set to the scale of the body of a flea (*Nub.* 143–54):

[Μα.] λέξω, νομίσαι δὲ ταῦτα χρή μυστήρια.  
 ἀνῆρετ’ ἄρτι Χαιρεφῶντα Σωκράτης  
 ψύλλαν ὅπόσους ἄλλοιτο τοὺς αὐτῆς πόδας.  
 δακοῦσα γὰρ τοῦ Χαιρεφῶντος τὴν ὀφρῦν  
 ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τὴν Σωκράτους ἀφήλατο.

[Στ.] πῶς δῆτα διεμέτρησε;

[Μα.] δεξιώτατα.  
 κηρὸν διατήξας, εἴτα τὴν ψύλλαν λαβὼν  
 ἐνέβαψεν εἰς τὸν κηρὸν αὐτῆς τῷ πόδε,  
 κῶστα ψυχεῖσιν περιέφυσαν Περσικαί.  
 ταύτας ὑπολύσας ἀνεμέτρει τὸ χωρίον.

[Στ.] ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τῆς λεπτότητος τῶν φρενῶν.

Stud. I will tell you, but you must treat these things as secret.  
 Just the other day Socrates asked Chaerophon  
 how many of its own feet a flea could jump.  
 For a flea had just bitten Chaerophon on the eyebrow  
 and then jumped onto Socrates’ head.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Agathemerus’s description of Hecataeus’s map as a “wonder,” quoted earlier in the chapter.

<sup>53</sup> See Ch. 1 for my discussion of the power of ekphrasis.

Strep. How did he measure it?

Stud. Most cleverly.

First he melted wax, then he took the flea  
and dipped its feet into it,  
then when it cooled little Persian boots had formed.  
Slipping these off, Socrates measured the space.

Strep. Lord Zeus, the fineness of his thoughts!

The insect's original jump, from Chaerophon's eyebrow to Socrates' head, renders the human body massive in proportion to a flea's foot. The miniaturization of space that comes about with Socrates' experiment, as well as the obsessive attention to micromasurement (note the *leptotês*, or fineness, of Socrates' thoughts – 154), takes to absurd leaps the Presocratic and sophistic inquiry into how to measure space. Just as the quality of the space between Socrates and Chaerophon expands when judged according to the length of a flea's foot, so the space on the map takes on a new quality when viewed not from the perspective of how far the eye must travel in crossing from one part of the map to another, but rather from the perspective of how diminutive the length of an actual human foot becomes when set against the scale of the map. The discontinuity between map and body size realized by the flea's jump replays and reverses the same observations that were brought to life by the use of the gods' bodies in Pherecydes and Homer.

Both of these incidents build up to the eventual appearance of Socrates suspended in a basket and promoting, in a typically Aristophanic fashion, the benefits of an aerial point of view (*Nub.* 231–4):

εἰ δ' ὦν χαμαὶ τᾶνω κάτωθεν ἐσκόπουν,  
οὐκ ἂν ποθ' ἠϋρον· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἢ γῆ βίᾳ  
ἔλκει πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἱκμάδα τῆς φροντίδος.  
πάσχει δὲ ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ τὰ κάρδαμα.

If I had been seeking out things up here from down there on  
the ground,

I would never have made a discovery. For the earth by force  
draws the moisture of thought toward itself.

It happens in the same way with watercress.

The suspension of Socrates on the theatrical crane puts him in the standard position of a god in the Greek theater, at the same time as it ridicules his attempts to see more from an elevated plane. Socrates and his basket interrupt the examination of the map, causing Strepsiades to redirect his gaze upward from the aerial view of the earth presented by

the map, to observe a creature who looks down upon *him* in a somewhat similar way (217–18, 223). In fact, Strepsiades imagines that Socrates is so high as to even “look down” (ὑπερφρόνεις, 226) on the gods.

These examples involving the basket, flea, and map can be read in response to the fundamental scientific questions of how to grasp a view of the whole without divine intervention, or how to make miniature or scaled-down models of nature or natural events. Each of the passages we have considered in this chapter investigates a problem that is set in motion by the desire to visualize more than is humanly possible, whether that means viewing a portion of the earth on a large, global canvas or viewing it through a microscopic lens. On the Aristophanic stage, the attempt to be comprehensive, to compute either a grandiosely panoramic or an overly refined view of the world, exposes – albeit to an absurd degree – the limitations of the early scientist’s attempts to represent the earth as something that can be held in the hand and observed in a single glance. In the next chapter, we will examine an attempt to manipulate scale, measurement, and vision by means of a map in Herodotus’s *Histories*, a work that is from the same period as the *Clouds*, but that takes much more seriously the attempt to make the world legible – even visible – in prose.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Scholars disagree on the dating of the *Histories*. One long-standing theory (based on the presumed parody of Hdt. 1.1–4 in Ar. *Ach.*) is that it was completed by 425 BCE.

## FOUR

# MAP AND NARRATIVE: HERODOTUS'S HISTORIES

MODERN TRANSLATIONS OF HERODOTUS'S HISTORIES ARE RARELY published without at least one map appended to help orient the reader within the extensive geography through which Herodotus travels.<sup>1</sup> Yet, as we saw in the preceding chapter, cartography in the classical period was not necessarily associated with the concept of orientation, but rather with a schematic overview of the general shape of the earth and its inhabited regions. The map was not a document that could easily be read, or from which specific information about routes or distances could easily be gleaned, especially by the untrained eye. Part of the reason for its eccentricity arose from the absence of an adequate technology for mapping on an extended scale, resulting in a document of limited practical use. As the descriptions of geography in prose grew more sophisticated, cartography remained relatively obscure. This is particularly evident by the time of Herodotus, who, unlike Hecataeus, chose not to “publish” (*ekdounai*) his prose histories alongside a drawn map of the world.<sup>2</sup>

In Chapter 3, I stressed that the map played a crucial role in the emergence of the prose tradition, helping to shape the way that stories about space were told in the afterworld of epic. I suggested that the newly emerging medium of prose combined with the development of cartography to create a world picture that substituted the technological advances of the map for the supernatural vision of the Muses. If cartography's

<sup>1</sup> Strassler 2007 includes 127 maps.

<sup>2</sup> Hdt. 4.36. On Hecataeus, see my discussion in Ch. 3. The *Histories'* beginning as an orally performed narrative goes some way to explaining the lack of an accompanying map. On the question of Herodotean publication and oral performance, see Nagy 1987; Thomas 1992, 101–27; Johnson 1994; Rösler 2002. On the map as a “published” document: DK 12A6; Jacob 1988, 281.

practical use as a map of the earth was limited, its creative use as a model for narrative form was not. Like the landscape idea that we examined in Chapter 1, cartography provides the reader with an image through which to envision the literary plot. In both cases, the idealized way of looking that is associated with landscape and cartography gives new expression to the unattainable, divine point of view of the Homeric Muses.

In this chapter, I continue to trace the development of geography in prose by progressing chronologically onward from Anaximander and Hecataeus to the so-called father of history, Herodotus.<sup>3</sup> In his *Histories*, Herodotus pointedly attempts to dissociate his own work from cartography, preferring to rely on the exclusively verbal medium of words to describe the space of the earth and presenting a narrative that looks out to an ever-receding and elusive horizon.<sup>4</sup> In a few passages, he refers directly to cartography, but only in order to minimize its role in his own geographic discourse. Here, we will reexamine his derision of mapmakers (Hdt. 4.36.2) and reassess the role played by cartography in his narrative. The small section of the *Histories* that will provide the core of this chapter focuses on a scene in which the Milesian Aristagoras takes a map of the world to the Spartans, hoping to persuade them to march against Persia (5.49–51).

Aristagoras's strategy pointedly fails, creating an opportunity for Herodotus to undermine the use of cartography as a device for representing space. Yet, as we will see, the map remains an important visual force in Herodotus, as a spatial template that sets geography and history within a narrative frame and as a counterpart to the linear thread of language. Although Herodotus may appear to reject the map in his writing, its singular ability to represent the entire world in a discrete and all-encompassing form is nonetheless inherently bound up with the narrative project of the *Histories*.

I interlace two paradigmatic examples from Book 1 with the incident in Book 5 to help us think more about how maps encourage their readers to envision space. These are two well-known encounters

<sup>3</sup> The chronological progression from Anaximander to Hecataeus is best summed up by DK 12A6 (quoted in Ch. 3), and from Hecataeus to Herodotus in the latter's critique of cartography (Hdt. 4.36), which most scholars read as an allusion to Hecataeus (see for further references in Herodotus, S. West 1991).

<sup>4</sup> The bibliography on the history of prose is substantial. For different influences on Herodotus, see Jacoby 1909; Kahn 1983; O. Murray 1987; Humphreys 1996; Thomas 2000. On the development of geographical writing as a genre, see Romm 1992; K. Clarke 1999; and on prose: Goldhill 2002.

between characters in Herodotus that also “fail.” The first is between Candaules and Gyges (1.8–12), in which the Lydian king reveals his wife’s body to his bodyguard, Gyges, and subsequently loses both throne and queen to him; and the second is between Croesus and Solon (1.30–3), in which Croesus displays his lavish treasure-house to the traveling Athenian in an attempt to have himself called the most fortunate man Solon knows. These two episodes dwell on visual appeals and dangers that are similar to those put forward by cartography.

### THE “PEDESTRIAN HOMER”: EPIC PRECEDENTS

Before we can fully understand Herodotus’s treatment of cartography, we need to explore the geographical and spatial metaphors that shape his text. The wide-ranging and comprehensive nature of Herodotus’s narrative is well known, as is the meandering nature of his work.<sup>5</sup> I want to start this inquiry, therefore, by asking some fairly basic questions. In what ways can the language of Herodotus’s prose be termed a geography? How did it open up new ways of representing place and space? How does it change our view of the plot, or our idea of a literary landscape, to see from the grounded, Museless position of the traveling historian? What special connection, if any, can be drawn between Herodotus’s role as an *histôr* (one who views, observes, inquires), his use of prose-writing, and the activity of walking?

We have already established that Herodotus aims to work without his predecessors’ models of map (Hecataeus) or Muse (Homer). To a certain extent, therefore, he is presented with the freedom to discover a new, independent perspective in space from which to tell his story.<sup>6</sup> But prose’s “freedom” in this regard could of course be overstated, since many of the spatial motifs used by Herodotus have their roots in early epic.<sup>7</sup> Two of the motifs that are of particular interest in understanding Herodotus’s

<sup>5</sup> Bakker 2006, 92: “Herodotus sought to capture the experience of the entire known world in one long, complex and continuous *logos*.” The difference in spatial arrangement that comes with the difference between oral and written speech will not be my primary focus, but I will address this aspect as it pertains to genre.

<sup>6</sup> On the role of the independent narrator in ancient historiography, see Connor 1984, 3–19; Wheeldon 1989, 45; Marincola 1997, 3–11. On the extent to which the epic narrator may be termed independent, see De Jong 1987, 45–53.

<sup>7</sup> On the transition from poetry to prose, see Krischer 1965; Lang 1984, 37–51; Nagy 1987, 1990a 17–51, 215ff.; Herington 1991; Bakker 2002; Boedeker 2002, 2003, with further bibliography; Marincola 2006, 2007.

drawing of a world picture are *historiê* (the practice of acquiring knowledge through vision and direct experience), and the practice of *walking* or *traveling* as a means of tracing a literary route.

Since there has been so much discussion in the scholarship on the role of *historiê* and visual enquiry in Herodotus, I will not elaborate on this topic beyond a few observations concerning its applicability to epic ways of seeing.<sup>8</sup> It is significant that the word *historiê* (visual inquiry) shares the same root (\**vid*) as the epic word for seeing and knowing (*idein*), which is used in the *Iliad* to describe the ways by which the Muses gain their knowledge but by which humans, specifically, do not (*Il.* 2.486–7):

For you are goddesses and are present (*pareste*) and know/have seen (*iste*) all things,  
while we hear only fame (*kleos*) but know/have seen (*idmen*) nothing at all.

Only certain divine or divinely inspired characters are able to see in this way in epic, while ordinary human beings, blind to such a vision of the world and its events, are forced to depend on hearsay.<sup>9</sup> Herodotus, however, states from the beginning that he will rely on his own visual inquiry in setting out his *Histories*, and makes various references to either the superiority of acquiring knowledge through one's eyes rather than one's ears (1.7.2), or, alternatively, to the combined practice of listening and seeing as a means of gaining knowledge (2.99.1; cf. 7.139.1, 7.152.3). In making these claims, Herodotus draws on epic as a model of gaining knowledge for his plot, at the same time as he upgrades his own role as author to that of the primary observer and discriminator.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Darbo-Peschanski 1987; Nagy 1990a, esp. 250ff.; Connor 1993; K. Clarke 1999; Thomas 2000; Bakker 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Those special divine or divinely inspired beings are Homer, perhaps, after invoking the Muses in Book 2 (the *Iliad* is not clear on how much Homer himself ever "sees"); Calchas, the Achaean prophet who "knew (had seen) the things that are, will be, and were before" (*Il.* 1.70); the *Odyssey's* Sirens, who "have seen as many things as have happened on the much nourishing earth" (12.191); Eidothea, the daughter of Proteus, who helps Menelaus gain access to knowledge about both his route home and past and future events (*Od.* 4.365–425); Demodocus, who tells the story of the Trojan War so accurately that Odysseus supposes that he might have been there and seen it himself (*Od.* 8.491); and Hesiod's Muses, who both "see" (*Theog.* 27, 28) and are able, like Calchas, to recite "the things that are, will be, and were before" (*Theog.* 38).

<sup>10</sup> Hesiod paves the way for this model in the proem to the *Theogony*, by combining his own vision of the Muses with their bestowal upon him of the ability to see/sing epic material.

Intricately connected to Herodotus's privileging of visual knowledge is his choice of the narrative path as a means of helping his reader travel from one part of his plot to the next. In a more sustained and complex way than Homer and his references to the paths of song in the *Odyssey*, Herodotus writes about his narrative as a path of words (*logôn hodos*).<sup>11</sup> The written form of prose bore an association with walking because of the indeterminate number of "feet" in a line that could go on at will in whichever direction the narrator wished, without adhering to the conventions of meter and verse.<sup>12</sup> This formal aspect of prose's structure is reaffirmed through the prose historian's method of gathering information through travel. Herodotus does not stand still to make his observations but moves from place to place, and the flow and direction of his narrative is often marked by the linear thread of a pedestrian walking through space.<sup>13</sup> As Boedeker has discussed, an inscription from Halicarnassus labeling Herodotus as "the prose (πεζόν) Homer of historiography" uses the adjective *pezon* (prose; on foot) to connect Herodotus's practice as a historian with the act of walking.<sup>14</sup> It has frequently been observed that the narrative of the *Histories*, which proceeds (*probainô*) through a number of cities, and which stops and decides which "roads" to go down at various points on its journey, depends greatly on the model of traveling along a path or route. Indeed, as Cartledge and Greenwood point out, Herodotus's preferred adjective for denoting what is true is *atrekes*, or "on track."<sup>15</sup>

In addition to the correspondence between the Herodotean *hodos* and the Homeric *oimê* (path [of song]), there is also the oft-noted connection between *Odyssey* 1.1–3:

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, . . .  
πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,

Tell me of the man of many ways, Muse, . . .  
who saw the cities and knew the minds of many men

<sup>11</sup> See my discussion in Ch. 2, note 11. On the literary motif of the road, see O. Becker 1937 (101–38 on Herodotus); Slater 1969, s.v. ὁδός 2b; Thornton 1984, 33–45, 148–9; Dewald 1987, 149; Nagy 1990a, 233; Ford 1992, 40–8; Bakker 1997a, 60–62; Payen 1997, 334–42 (on Herodotus); in the nineteenth-century novel, Moretti 1998, 48–64; Montiglio 2000, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> That the ancient Greeks understood the verse line to be made up of "feet" is suggested in many sources. Cf. Ar. *Au.* 1378, where the adjective *κυλλός* puns on the lame nature of both Cinesias's verse (cf. Ruijgh 1960) and gait (Sommerstein 1987, ad loc.).

<sup>13</sup> Lang 1984, 4.

<sup>14</sup> Boedeker 2002, with further citations and bibliography; cf. Boedeker 2003.

<sup>15</sup> Cartledge and Greenwood 2002, 361–2.



and *Histories* 1.5.3:

προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὁμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα  
ἄσ τε αὐθρόπων ἐπεξιῶν

I [Herodotus] will travel on to the next part of my argument, investigating small and large cities alike.

The geographical subject matter of both the *Odyssey* and the *Histories* aligns with the metaphor of the narrative as path. It is clear, in both cases, that the practice of moving in sequence from one place to the next allows the narrator to include a large range of people and places within his work over time.

## NARRATIVE PATHS AND PROSE GEOGRAPHIES

The field of Herodotean prose is based on a conceit of its author wandering at will through a landscape framed only by the physical range of his eye and the movement of his feet across the ground. Aristotle's description of this kind of prose style as a terrain, which the reader imaginatively traverses along the course of a sentence, further encourages us to think of the *Histories* in terms of a "geography."<sup>16</sup> Even at the level of syntax, the prose sentence is grounded in space and place as much as it is determined by the successive movement of its action from beginning to end (Arist. *Rh.* 3.9.1409a27–b1):

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν [“Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἡ δ’ ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις”] (ταύτη γὰρ πρότερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται)· λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην ἡ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ’ αὐτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα <τὸ> λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὴς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρασ οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη [τῆς λέξεως] ἐστὶν ἡδε, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον.

The *lexis eiromenē* is an ancient style, [e.g., ‘This is an account of the inquiry of Herodotus the Thourian.’] (previously everyone used it, but now not many do). I mean by the *lexis eiromenē* that style which has no end (*telos*) in itself, and does not complete the event being narrated. It is displeasing because of its endlessness (*to apeiron*), for everyone likes

<sup>16</sup> See especially Payen 1997, who analyzes “l’espace du récit” in Herodotus and “la cartographie de son œuvre” (47–8, and *passim*).

to have the end (*telos*) in view. Otherwise they run out of breath and give up at the turning posts. But those who are able to look ahead to the end (*peras*) do not tire ahead of time. That is the *lexis eiromenê* (strung-along style), the *lexis katestrammenê* (compact style) is found in periodic sentences (*peri-hodoi*). By a periodic sentence, I mean the one that has a beginning (*archê*) and end (*teleutê*) in itself and an easily surveyed magnitude (*megethos eusynopton*).

The first time that we looked at this passage it was to consider Aristotle's description of the *megethos eusynopton*, or easily surveyed magnitude (Ch. 1). This time, I want to focus on a different set of linguistic markers, having to do with the idea of running along a path, finding oneself short of breath in the course of a sentence, and giving up before the end. Aristotle contrasts the *lexis eiromenê* with the *eusynoptic* clarity of the periodic sentence that has a "beginning and end in itself," for, as he proceeds to explain, a sentence will leave its reader behind if it goes on for too long (*Rh.* 3.9.1409b22–4):

τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἔξωτέρῳ ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρατος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας . . .

The long sentences leave the reader behind, just as those who veer off on the outside of the turn leave behind those who are walking with them . . .

It is worth noting how many geographical terms Aristotle includes in his analysis of syntax, transforming the text into a kind of boundless landscape through which the reader wanders helplessly if he is not given sufficient guidance.<sup>17</sup> In Book 4, Herodotus's description of Scythia as a land without obvious markers captures precisely the sense of endlessness that Aristotle claims he experiences when reading the kind of sentences that can be found in the *Histories*. It is uncanny how Darius's experience trying to capture the Scythians mirrors that of Aristotle's hypothetical reader in trying to follow a strung-along sentence. For Darius, as if an early Aristotle finding himself lost in Herodotus, calls for an "end to

<sup>17</sup> Dewald 1987, 149, writes: "Because the material [of the *Histories*] itself is so diverse and the transitions between one segment and the next so patent, we must look to the author, Herodotus himself, to guide us along the *logôn hodos*, the 'route of the *logoi*.' We are certainly not allowed the illusion that it exists independent of his efforts, or that we can traverse it by ourselves unaided." Cf. Lang 1984, 1; Payen 1997, 334–42; R. L. Fowler 2006, 32.

the wandering” (4.126.7) and an “end to the running” (4.126.8). Like the reader of the Herodotean *lexis eiromenê*, the Persian king is unable to determine any borders or endpoints to his journey through Scythia.<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, Aristotle claims that the Herodotean style of sentence is unsatisfying because the reader cannot look forward and see the end (31–3). This statement echoes the advice of the *Histories*’ first wise adviser, Solon, who famously tells Croesus that, rather than just looking at what is before him, in the present, he should “look to the end” in order to determine the happiness of a man’s life (σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρημάτων τὴν τελευτὴν κῆ ἀποβήσεται, “it is necessary to look to the end of everything in order to determine how it will work out” 1.32.9).<sup>19</sup>

Solon’s statement speaks to the importance of movement through time (running, reading, or living) in the structure of any narrative, by means of a paradigm that explicitly rejects the ideal of the synoptic view that can be taken in with a single glance. In response to the instantaneous image of wealth that Croesus reveals to him as a display of his treasures, Solon substitutes a counted-out model that allows him to look forward and backward in time (1.32.2–4). His speech offers a positive take on the sequentiality of the *lexis eiromenê*, by overlaying the ideal “periodic” sentence, which the reader can imaginatively traverse without stumbling or tiring whilst always holding its end clearly in sight, with the Solonian model of looking ahead toward an end that it may not be possible to see, but that it *is* possible to count out through a series of carefully measured and calculated days.

It is this counting out of time that marks the difference between Aristotle’s ideal “periodic” sentence, which the reader can see *eusynoptically* in a single instant, and the Solonian model for reading the events of history. Aristotle’s word for period comes from the ancient word (*periodos*) for a specific kind of journey, but it is also the word used by later writers to describe Anaximander’s and Hecataeus’s maps. Like a cartographer, Aristotle wants to unbundle the sequential aspects of his ideal sentence and allow it to stand still as a perfectly realized landscape. Herodotus’s Solon, on the other hand, rejects the static concept of a visual display in favor of an elaborate series of calculations based on the number of days that a man will pass through in his life. As we will come to see increasingly in this chapter, Solon’s model for understanding plot as a linear structure that

<sup>18</sup> 4.17.2, 18.3, 20; Hartog 1988; Purves 2006a.

<sup>19</sup> On Solon’s injunction to look to the end, see Konstan 1987; Shapiro 1996; Ker 2000; Marincola 2005.

moves through time is strongly determinative of Herodotus's rejection of the still and simultaneous impression of place presented by the map.<sup>20</sup>

Herodotus is explicit from the beginning of his *Histories* that places do not stand still (1.5.4). His descriptions of space and geography always have the idea of movement working through them. Like a traveler with a meandering and circuitous itinerary, Herodotus expands his narrative in several different geographical directions, often looping back on himself to catch up with previously abandoned tracks or using places as synapses to connect different parts of his narrative.<sup>21</sup> His style differs explicitly from the style of cartographic, simultaneous presentation. In the following section, I will comment on some of the spatial analogies between content and form that occur in different parts of his work, showing how the model of the narrative route or path intersects with our discussion in previous chapters of the role that place plays in the composition of a plot. It is here that we will see Herodotus attempt to articulate the differences between his own writing, the concept of travel and geographical description, and the idea of a map. I will do this by examining a number of his descriptive sections in sequence, starting with the opening of the work.

### *The Prologue*

At the beginning of the *Histories*, Herodotus uses the geographical model of the *periplus* as an imaginary route on which to plot the various coordinates of the stories told about the start of the hostilities between the Greeks and the Persians. The opening description of these arguments traces the movement of a series of ships from place to place (1.1–1.5). We begin with the Phoenicians – famed explorers, sailors, and writers of *periploi* – and follow their movement from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, then along the coast to Argos, where they trade Assyrian and Egyptian goods, abduct the girl Io, and sail on to Egypt. Next, the narrative follows the routes of a number of other ships through different parts

<sup>20</sup> Dewald 1997 notes the parallel between Herodotus's practice as a narrator, where the end is out of sight because it is still occurring in the events of contemporary history, and his own injunctions to "look to the end." Cf. Greenwood 2006, 42–56, on Thucydides.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Dewald 1987, 165: "Praeterition allows [Herodotus] to point to alternate routes in the *logôn hodos* (1.95.1b, 1.214.5); cross-referencing allows him to indicate where the narrative course we are on might have doubled around and so come close to touching something passed much earlier on our journey" (5.36); Payen 1997; Montiglio 2005, 145.

of Asia and Europe, as the Cretans sail to Tyre and abduct Europa, the Greeks sail to Colchis and abduct Medea, and the Trojans sail to Sparta and abduct Helen. In using this geographical model to open his *Histories*, Herodotus connects a series of chronological events as much by a spatial as a temporal set of coordinates.

Although each abduction is linked by a causal chain, sparking a series of retaliations that drive the plot forward, each also successively fills in the blank spaces on the map of Herodotus's world. As the events of history are traced over the geography of Asia and Europe, it becomes possible to locate the plot's crisis points topographically. They are often found at the edge of the sea, between the prow of the foreign ship and the girl who comes from the land for trade or some other purpose (e.g., 1.1.4). It is just as easy, in other words, to mark each abduction with an "x" on an imaginary map of Herodotus's geography as it is to mark it with an "x" on the timeline of his history.<sup>22</sup> As the narrative moves from one spatial coordinate to another, the temporal succession of events leading up to the Trojan War is ordered into chronological sequence through the spatial analogy of a ship's itinerary.

At first, it appears that Herodotus is opening his *Histories* with a *periplus* motif only in order to reject it as a model for his own work. This is the way that the *Persians* tell the story of the beginning of the conflict between the Greeks and themselves, whereas Herodotus himself will start his history with the explicitly temporal marker of the actions of a single man. He changes the terms of the "beginning" of his work from a series of places connected by the motif of sailing to Croesus, the single man who started the injustices (1.5.3), and whose story will be traced through genealogical succession. In an emphatic contrast to the *periplus* model (1.5.3), Herodotus explains that he will use the generation of fathers and sons as an ordering device for his narrative, so that the story of the Persian expansion across space is also one of genealogical succession. At the same time, the ancestors from whom Croesus's story unfolds are plotted as a kind of geography through which Herodotus travels on his journey through the "small and large cities of mankind" (1.5.3). It does not matter which way you read the "history" in the *Histories*, in other words; it will always retain its primary association with place, especially in relation to the shape of its structure.

<sup>22</sup> Some scholars have argued that we make a mistake reading history as a chronology instead of as a "map" or spatial system (Soja 1989, 1; Nicolet 1991, 8; K. Clarke 1999).

*The Description of Asia*

In Chapter 3, we considered Herodotus's rejection of the Hecataean world map. The account occurs just before he offers his own description of Asia "in a few words" (4.36.2):<sup>23</sup>

I laugh when I look at the many men who have drawn (γράφαντας) maps of the earth, not one of whom has described it with any sense. They draw (γράφουσι) the river Ocean flowing around a circular earth, as if drawn with a compass, and they make Asia equal in size to Europe. For I will show in a few (words) the size of both of them and what shape each (continent) is in regards to its outline (ἐξ γραφῆν).

The juxtaposition between the two types of representation evoked by the term *graphein* that Herodotus uses three times in this passage – twice to deride the activity of his predecessors, and once to suggest his own, preferable version *en oligoisi* (in a few words) – is illuminating. By changing the terms of *graphein* from drawing to writing, Herodotus's prose subtly coopts the language of cartography, as it simultaneously distances itself from the art of drawing and design. Instead of portraying the world through the map, a visual double that might exist independently, like Hecataeus's map, alongside the text, Herodotus folds the *graphein* of cartography into the *graphein* of language in an attempt to embed its visual element within an exclusively verbal account.<sup>24</sup> It is notable that the verb he uses to introduce his project, δηλώω (show) employs a visual metaphor.

Herodotus not only redraws the map by changing the shape and size of the two continents, as Hecataeus had done before him, but he also, specifically, rewrites it. His own version of the shape of the world, following directly on from the laughing statement about his predecessors, incorporates the forward movement of the explorer across an expansive terrain within the structure of a series of long, paratactic sentences (e.g., 4.37.1, cf. Asheri et al. 2007, ad loc.):

Πέρσαι οἰκέουσι κατήκοντες ἐπὶ τὴν νοτίην θάλασσαν τὴν Ἐρυθρὴν καλεομένην· τούτων δ' ὑπεροικέουσι πρὸς βορέην ἄνεμον Μῆδοι,

<sup>23</sup> The Greek text is quoted in Ch. 3.

<sup>24</sup> See further Boedeker 2000, 107, on Herodotus's "precise verbal allusions" to the opening of Hecataeus's *Genealogies* ("I write (γράφω) as it appears to me to be true: for the *logoi* of the Greeks seem to me to be many (πολλοί) and laughable (γελοῖοι)," (FGrH I.1a). See further Rösler 2002, 88–9; Pelling 2007, 195–201.

Μήδων δὲ Σάσπειρες, Σασπείρων δὲ Κόλχοι κατήκοντες ἐπὶ τὴν βορήνην θάλασσαν, ἐς τὴν Φᾶσις ποταμὸς ἐκδιδοῖ.

The Persians inhabit territory extending to the southern sea (the Red Sea); above them live the Medes toward the north wind, north of the Medes, the Saspies, and north of the Saspies, the Colchians, who extend as far as the northern sea (the Black Sea), into which the Phasis river empties.

This syntactical terracing of clauses moves in geographical sequence, and each clause is connected to the next by the frequent repetition of the places themselves (Μῆδοι, Μήδων δὲ Σάσπειρες, Σασπείρων) and by spatial prepositions. In the 336 words that Herodotus uses to describe the peoples of western Asia (4.37–41), he uses spatial prepositions fifty-two times, and the cardinal markers north, south, east, and west ten times. Over the course of ten sentences, therefore, he constructs a rough average of one spatial or orientational marker for every five words in his text.<sup>25</sup> This makes for a prose style that is extremely paratactic, running from place to place on a circuitous itinerary that matches the geographical expansion it describes.<sup>26</sup> In fact, Herodotus's fourfold use of the verb *teinō* (to stretch or extend) to mark the expansion of one region into another when describing the continent of Asia might also be applied to the shape of his own extended sentences (4.38.1–39.1). These descriptions of the regions of western Asia are ultimately hard to follow, however, and Herodotus soon abandons his paratactic geographical course for a brief overview of the dimensions of the continents (41), followed by a more successful account that is based on narratives of exploration, primarily Scylax's tour of the Indian Ocean and the Persian and Phoenician circumnavigations of India.<sup>27</sup>

### *The Description of Egypt*

The original design of Herodotus's rewriting of the map is first outlined in Book 2, where, in addition to his critique of previous representations of the world (such as the Ionian tripartite division and theories about

<sup>25</sup> Out of a total of 336 words in the passage, the instances are ἀπό (13); ἐπὶ (2); πρὸς (10); ἐς (10); ἐκ (2); ἐνθεῦτεν (1); παρὰ (2); μέχρι (4); ἐν (3); διὰ (1); κατύπερθε (1); ἐνθεν (2).

<sup>26</sup> On Herodotus's paratactic style, see Fränkel [1955] 1968b, 62–7; Immerwahr 1966, 46–78; Lang 1984; Dewald 1987; Hartog 1988, 350–5; Bakker 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Romm 1992, 35.

the sources of the Nile, 2.15–21), he gives precise measurements of the length and breadth of Egypt, including the distances between places, in either stades or traveling time, and the topography en route. In marked contrast to the bold circumference drawn by the mapmaker's compass, Herodotus allows the parameters of his descriptions to blur into obscurity and emptiness, as if his paragraphs mirrored the effect of looking toward a distant horizon. In his account of the Nile's course, for example, Herodotus's language becomes increasingly vague the further it travels (Hdt. 2.31):

Μέχρι μὲν νυν τεσσέρων μηνῶν πλόου καὶ ὁδοῦ γινώσκεται ὁ Νεῖλος πάρεξ τοῦ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ρεύματος· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ συμβαλλομένων μῆνες εὐρίσκονται ἀναισιμούμενοι ἐξ Ἐλεφαντίνης πορευομένων ἐς τοὺς αὐτομόλους τούτους· ῥέει δὲ ἀπὸ ἐσπέρης τε καὶ [ἡλίου] δυσμέων. τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε οὐδεὶς ἔχει σαφέως φράσαι·

Beyond Egypt, the flow of the Nile is known as far as a four-month journey by boat and road.<sup>28</sup> So many months, added together, are found to be spent on the journey from Elephantine to the deserters whom I mentioned previously. Then it flows from the west and the setting of the sun. But from there nobody can say clearly where it goes.

As with the uncertainty that defines the edges of the Scythian desert, where Herodotus's sentences often peter out with an inconclusive "as far as we know . . ." (4.17.2, 18.2, 20.2), or the view to the north of Scythia, which is obscured by a "snow of feathers" (4.7.3), Herodotus's prose never achieves the map's ideal effect of total and simultaneous visibility through space.<sup>29</sup> By the time we, with Aristotle, imaginatively "run" our way to the end of his geographic descriptions, in other words, there may quite literally be nothing there to see. Herodotus certainly does not shy away from inscribing the limits of human vision into his landscapes. Yet his pedestrian technique affords him a number of advantages as a narrator, because language, unlike illustration, is equipped to describe evolution through time. In terms unavailable to the cartographer, Herodotus is able to describe Egypt as a topography in motion, with a landmass that continually rises and expands, borders that stretch unseen for miles beneath the water, mountains that are littered with the seashells left over from their time beneath the sea, and black earth that carries the traces of a former life amidst the silt and swamps of Ethiopia (2.5–13).

<sup>28</sup> As described in Hdt. 2.29–30.

<sup>29</sup> Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 84–101.



*The Description of Scythia*

The insubstantiality of cartography's claim to represent the earth accurately comes into sharpest definition with the shift into Scythian terrain in Book 4 of the *Histories*.<sup>30</sup> In describing Scythia, Herodotus does two interesting things at once. First, as Hartog (1988) was the first to observe, he makes the region quintessentially "unmappable," due to its nomadic inhabitants, its lack of architectural definition, and its resistance to the principles of geometry. But at the same time, Herodotus undermines this portrait of Scythia by including in his description of its topography various uncanny resemblances to the surface area and structure of a map.<sup>31</sup> On the one hand, this is a region that lacks not only edges but also any kind of center, and thus makes something of a mockery of any attempt to draw place with a mapmaker's compass. As I outlined earlier when comparing the Scythian landscape to Aristotle's description of the *lexis eiromenê*, it is also the terrain *par excellence* for losing one's sense of direction and place.

Yet, remarkably, the flat, open landscape of Scythia creates a landscape that is almost exclusively horizontal, leading to the fantastic prospect of an extensive range of visibility across space. Apart from the walls of the Cimmerians and the tomb of the king at the edges (4.12, 71), there is no architecture to speak of in this nomad territory. The kind of flat (*pedias*), extensive visibility across space that this engenders lends itself to comparisons with looking at the level surface of a map.

The stories that Herodotus tells about the two Scythians, Anacharsis and Scyles, who attempt to hide themselves from that extensive visual range, reinforces the point. Anacharsis unsuccessfully attempts to escape from view within his country's only wooded area, performing secret rites at night (4.76), but he is still seen by the Scythians. Scyles takes refuge within the walls of a Greek city, hidden – or so he thinks – from the eyes of his countrymen. In fact, he ends up exposed in full view, trapped beneath the gaze of those watching from above in much the same way as objects on the ground are flattened by the cartographer's perspective (4.78). In the end, neither of these Scythians is able to escape from their nation's penetrating gaze, which appears to be as all-encompassing and horizontal as a mapmaker's.

<sup>30</sup> For modern accounts of cartography's unreliability, see Monmonier 1991; Harley 1998.

<sup>31</sup> On the unmappable quality of Scythia, see Hartog 1988; on being lost, Wigley 1996; on Darius lost in Scythia, Purves 2006a.

Scythia's curious role as a two-dimensional landscape is further emphasized by the exposure and proximity of land to sky that we find in Herodotus's account of the region. It is almost as if the sky were too close to the earth, or as if the two environments lay flat on top of one another in an uninterrupted continuum. The Scythians' story of their own foundation, which begins with the falling of gold objects from the sky to earth, and which leads to a complex set of prohibitions about sleeping in the open air (4.5–7), evokes the same flat environment as a map. The interpretation of the signs sent by the Scythians to Darius also elicits a starkly horizontal topography. Unable to escape up into the sky (like a bird), underground (like mice), or underwater (like frogs), the Persians are trapped by their exposed position on the surface of the Scythian land (4.132.3). Herodotus works the idea of a map into Scythian topography only to underline the absurdity of finding oneself utterly visible and exposed on the surface of a landscape that it is, at the same time, impossible to navigate. It is precisely the pockets of *invisibility* that Herodotus perceives in connection with this landscape, especially given the Scythians' ability to disappear (4.14, 95, 124.2), which suggest that the map's all-encompassing perspective is not only incomplete but also illusory.

### ARISTAGORAS'S MAP

So far we have examined a series of sketches of the ways in which Herodotus describes different regions of the world through language. In these examples, we have seen Herodotus reject the literary Muse/map model of many of his predecessors at the same time as he incorporates several motifs from both epic poetry and Ionian prose. I now want to build on those observations by turning to the story that Herodotus tells about the map that Aristagoras brings to Sparta in order to persuade Cleomenes to join the Ionian revolt and march on Susa (5.49–51). Aristagoras tries to use the map as a kind of rhetorical tool, by which he might provide a spoken picture (something like an ekphrasis) of the route from Ionia to Susa. As Aristagoras puts his account of the map into words, he highlights the wealth of the lands along the chosen route, while at the same time eliding the distance and arduousness of the journey. Cleomenes at first seems impressed by the map, but after considering Aristagoras's proposal for a short while, he is amazed to discover that the journey from Greece to Asia would take three months. This discovery leads to the swift dismissal

of Aristagoras and his map. But why exactly does Aristagoras's experiment with cartography fail?<sup>32</sup>

### *Map and Ekphrasis*

Aristagoras arrives holding in his hand a bronze tablet (*pinax*) on which was inscribed the circuit of the whole earth (γῆς ἀπάσης περίοδος), the entire sea (θάλασσά τε πᾶσα), and all the rivers (καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες, 5.49.1). It was probably circular, as maps appear to have been at that time, imitating the perceived shape of the Ocean-encircled earth.<sup>33</sup> Given that Aristagoras brings the map from Ionia, the center of the mapmaking world, and given Sparta's reputation for backwardness in technological matters, the expectation is that Cleomenes will not have seen one before.<sup>34</sup> In the beginning, then, it exists as little more than a symbol of the world Cleomenes might take possession of if he attacks the Persians. By physically presenting the king with an image of the world in a single, composite form, Aristagoras minimizes the distance between the two continents, simultaneously underplaying the length of the trek from Ionia to Susa and overplaying the tangibility of the miniature earth that Cleomenes might hold in his hands (5.49.4–6; cf. Jacob 2006, 322–35):

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοῖσι τὴν ἡπεριον ἐκείνην νεμομένοισι ὅσα οὐδὲ τοῖσι συνάπασι ἄλλοισι, ἀπὸ χρυσοῦ ἀρξαμένοισι, ἄργυρος καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ ἐσθῆς ποικίλη καὶ ὑποζύγια τε καὶ ἀνδράποδα· τὰ θυμῷ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἂν ἔχοιτε. κατοίκηνται δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐχόμενοι ὥς ἐγὼ φράσω, Ἰώνων μὲν τῶνδε οἶδε Λυδοί, οἰκέοντές τε χώρην ἀγαθὴν καὶ πολυαργυρώτατοι ἐόντες. δεικνὺς δὲ ἔλεγε ταῦτα ἐς τῆς γῆς τὴν περίοδον, τὴν ἐφέρετο ἐν τῷ πίνακι ἐντετυμημένην. Λυδῶν δέ, ἔφη λέγων ὁ Ἀρισταγόρης, οἶδε ἔχονται Φρύγες οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἡῶ, πολυπροβατώτατοί τε ἐόντες πάντων τῶν ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ πολυκαρπώτατοι.

“There are many good things available for the men who possess this land, such things as are not available to all other men, starting with gold, silver, bronze, embroidered clothing and oxen and slaves. You, if

<sup>32</sup> Only later does Herodotus tell us that the map was in fact successful in persuading the Athenians to join Aristagoras (5.97); Pelling 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Hdt. 4.36; Heidel 1937; Dilke 1985, 24; Kahn 1985, 83. On the *pinax*, see Regenbogen 1950; Pritchett 1956, 250–3, and note 256 (with further references).

<sup>34</sup> For the effect of Miletus's trade connections on the development of scientific thought in the sixth and fifth centuries, see Seaford 2004, 198ff.

you desire these things, might possess them. Now, I will show you how the countries are situated in relation to each other. These here are the Lydians, next to the Ionians, and they inhabit good land and are exceedingly wealthy.” He said these things pointing to a map of the world, which he had brought with him inscribed onto a pinax. “Here next to the Lydians,” said Aristagoras, “are the Phrygians, who live toward the east, and they are the wealthiest in livestock and in crops of all the men I know.”

Aristagoras goes on to describe the string of wealthy and desirable regions that run in succession from Ionia to Susa. As he describes the journey, and as he begins to trace the route across the tablet, the territory of Asia transforms into a dazzling and extraordinary landscape. The emphasis on wealth in his description (gold, silver, bronze, colored cloth, beasts of burden, slaves, good land, great stores of silver, rich flocks and fruits of the earth, five-hundred-talent tributes, treasure-houses, and even Zeus’s riches) suggests a terrain that merges with the surface upon which it is inscribed, as if the imagery of gold and fertile plains were reflecting off the shining bronze exterior of the tablet. Aristagoras’s juxtaposition of precious metals and crops also evokes a famous moment from Homer’s description of the Shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.548–9):

ἦ δὲ μελαίνετ’ ὄπισθεν, ἀρηρομένη δὲ ἐώκει,  
χρυσείη περ ἑοῦσα· τὸ δὴ περὶ θαῦμα τέτυκτο.

the field darkened behind them, and looked like the ploughed  
earth,  
even though it was made of gold. Great was the marvel that  
had been crafted.

Homer’s skill here lies in his ability to combine two different visual registers – the material of the Shield and the color of the earth – simultaneously.<sup>35</sup> The wonder of the craftsmanship, which opens up a space wherein the viewer can see on two planes at once, turns on the art of illusion, miraculously enabling the images depicted upon the Shield to move into the realm of the fantastic. Indeed, the pictures crafted by Hephaestus are *so* accurate that they even come to life on the surface of the Shield, allowing the visual object to escape into its own register of time. This is why I earlier compared Aristagoras’s spoken description of the map to an ekphrasis. Aristagoras’s map and Homer’s Shield are both

<sup>35</sup> A. S. Becker 1985, 9–22.

graphic representations that we are supposed to imagine as being rerepresented verbally. In both, too, the second level of (verbal) representation supersedes the physical limits of the object itself.<sup>36</sup>

Aristagoras's account is ekphrastic, then, inasmuch as it fails to maintain the boundaries between representation and reality in his attempts to seamlessly open up the bronze tablet into a picture of the world. He tries to facilitate that transition between the two visual registers (the one that exists on the surface of the picture, and the other that can only be seen through the "window" of narration) by stressing how *easy* the movement across the map is, and by emphasizing the contiguity of the different countries, so that they emerge as "an unbroken stream of riches from the coast to Susa."<sup>37</sup>

The emphasis on wealth in Aristagoras's narrative creates a link between the inner and outer pictures through the dazzling effect of the bronze upon which the map is engraved. On both the Shield of Heracles and the Shield of Achilles, the different metals on the shield are juxtaposed with the internal reality of the ekphrastic narrative. Whether it is the row of vines "fashioned from gold" (*Il.* 18.561; [*Sc.*] 296–7) or that Ares and Athena are both embossed in gold *and* clothed in golden armor (*Il.* 18.516–17), the splendor of Hephaestus's working materials are repeatedly invoked to reinforce the brilliance of the internal scene.<sup>38</sup> In a similar way, the imagery of silver and gold that Aristagoras draws upon in his own image-making mirrors the language of epic ekphrasis, even if nothing in the scene is afforded the opportunity, finally, to come to life.

In fact, the problem that Homer and Hesiod solved to a certain extent by having their pictures "come to life" is the same problem that betrays Aristagoras, because it remains unsolved: the illusion of his map breaks apart as soon as time enters the picture. Aristagoras's account of his map attempts to miniaturize time along with space, as if crossing from one side of the tablet to another were as easy and inconsequential as the jump of a flea.<sup>39</sup> Ekphrastic space plays with the fantastic proposition that time can be experienced along a simultaneous plane rather than in succession,

<sup>36</sup> Payen 1997, 97–8.

<sup>37</sup> Murnaghan 2001, 69. Aristagoras uses the word *easy* (*eupete-es/-ds*) three times in his description (5.49.3, 49.4, 49.8). He is trying to mobilize the "ekphrastic lie," as Bartsch and Elsner (2007, i–vi) describe it.

<sup>38</sup> *Il.* 18.507; 534; 548–9; 574; 577; 597–8; [*Sc.*] 183; 188; 192; 199; 203; 204; 208; 212; 220; 222; 224–5; 225–6; 231; 271; 295; 299; 312–13.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. my discussion in Ch. 3.

as if different temporalities could be made simultaneously visible on a single surface from scene to scene in the present moment of viewing them.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, this manner of comprehending time appears to be similar to the way that the prophets and divine Muses of epic see.<sup>41</sup> The map's wondrous ability to make the entire earth visible within the blink of an eye suggests a correspondingly synchronic image of the world, where distance across space loses all temporal value. Aristagoras attempts to manipulate precisely this aspect of his map by contracting the external time of a three-month journey to Susa into the brief period that it takes for his finger to trace the route across the tablet.

Instead of allowing the picture to exist as a self-contained whole, Herodotus interrupts the map's synoptic, ekphrastic narrative with the intrusion of the external time of his *Histories*. After looking at the map, Cleomenes tells Aristagoras that he will give him an answer the day after tomorrow. His act of removing himself from the tablet for an interval of two days undoes both cartography and ekphrasis's spellbinding ability to stop narrative time.<sup>42</sup> When he meets with Aristagoras again, the Spartan king successfully intrudes upon the map's temporality by asking how many days the journey to Susa would take. Aristagoras's reply – that it will take three months – is radically at odds with the map's presentation of time through space, and thereby negates the optical illusion that Aristagoras had tried to engineer. It swiftly undoes the illusion of the 1:1 scale that his combination of image and narrative had suggested. As Herodotus's own straightforward account of the distance goes on to prove, Cleomenes' outraged reaction to such a lengthy journey corresponds, in broader terms, to the failure of cartography and ekphrasis as models for encompassing and depicting the world.

Herodotus complicates the terms of the "ekphrasis" of the map in two significant ways. First, the concept of a linear journey from point A to point B does not fit easily within an ekphrastic frame. Because ekphrasis presents time as circular or simultaneous, its image always remains on a continuum between A and B, a continuum that never "arrives" and that has no specific event. The opening description of the Shield of Achilles

<sup>40</sup> A feat that Zielinski, in his reading of time in Homer, argued was physically impossible for the human eye to perform (1901, as I discussed in Ch. 1).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Hes. *Theog.* 32, 38; *Il.* 1.170, 2.486, and my note 9.

<sup>42</sup> There has been much scholarly treatment of ekphrasis' ability to stop narrative time. See e.g., A. S. Becker 1985; D. P. Fowler 1991; Putnam 1998, 2. Heffernan 1991, 301, qualifies the notion of "atemporal eternity" by stressing the ekphrasis' insistent "embryonically narrative impulse."

offers a good example of this phenomenon: the Shield shows, simultaneously, a tireless sun, a waxing moon, and the Bear turning about in a fixed place, always looking at Orion, who never reaches down as far as the river Ocean (*Il.* 18.484–9). Each of the constellations moves in place, without reaching an endpoint. The scenes of action on the Shield, such as the lions’ ambush of the ox (*Il.* 18.573–81), are simply short narrative loops that play repeatedly whenever the eye is directed toward them. Even where there is a version of the Aristotelian *telos*, it does not mark the arrival at the end of a path or story. The ploughmen who drive their ploughs to the end of the field (τέλσον ἄρουρης) pause there to drink, but then are iteratively compelled to start up on the cycle of ploughing the strips of field again (στρέψασκον ἄν’ ὄγμους).<sup>43</sup> Thus, although it is possible for an ekphrasis to depict movement, and for its scene to come to life through the process of miniaturization and animation, no viewer of an ekphrasis can actually time the duration of the movement he observes; it simply goes on, “still,” forever.<sup>44</sup>

Second, we are never provided with a description of the map itself. Just as with the naked body of Candaules’ wife, we as readers only watch other people looking at an object to which we are denied visual access or even concrete description. Candaules may have been right to believe that men’s ears are more untrustworthy than their eyes (1.7.2) especially in a narrative that reiterates the power of the visual, but Herodotus never offers us the direct, simultaneous, and all-encompassing view that a single glance at a map fulfills.<sup>45</sup> As if to reinforce the point, the text’s (invisible) display of the map’s total visibility is narrated indirectly, as a second-remove *logos* first told by the Lacedaemonians (5.49.1).

The story of Aristagoras’s expedition to Sparta, therefore, points to Herodotus’s divergence from the Hecataean tradition and his rejection of cartography from the *Histories*, despite the inclusion of a character who does physically transport a map into the body of the work and attempt to utilize its potential for expanded visualization. At the same time, Aristagoras’s map also hints at bringing a divine, unlimited vision of the earth into the narrative structure of the work, of the same kind as the Muses bring to epic. Herodotus thus appears to be rejecting two models of visual description at once – both the prose form, by choosing to omit Hecataeus’s map, and the poetic, by passing over a version of the

<sup>43</sup> *Il.* 18.544–6. Note the use of the frequentative tense. Cf. Buchan (forthcoming).

<sup>44</sup> Krieger [1967] 2003; see my discussion in Ch. 1.

<sup>45</sup> For Herodotus’s complex presentation of the visual, Dewald 1993; Murnaghan 2001.

immortal vision and by causing ekphrasis to “fail” in his work. But we should reflect on the tension between cartography’s failure in the *Histories* and the possibilities for spatial representation which that failure suggests. For Herodotus, who must negotiate a similar tension in his work between sequential historical narrative and ethnographic descriptions of place, the analogy that we have drawn between map and ekphrasis helps to illustrate an attempt, in narrative terms, to grasp the world in its entirety.

*Seen and Unseen Space: The Thesaurus*

The map’s role in the larger pattern of Herodotus’s narrative cannot be as easily dismissed as the Aristagoras passage would imply. For one thing, it illuminates the strong dialectic between seen and unseen, or open and closed space, in the *Histories*.<sup>46</sup> As Aristagoras’s description showed, cartographic representation purports to make all space visible and accessible, even minimizing obstacles such as geographic borders as it effortlessly opens up space to the viewer, allowing him to enter not only foreign territory but even, finally, the royal palace at Susa. The *telos* of Aristagoras’s route on the map lays bare a distinctly Herodotean interest in kings and their treasure-houses (5.49.7):

ἔχεται δὲ τούτων γῆ ἡδε Κισσίη, ἐν τῇ δὴ παρὰ ποταμὸν τόνδε  
Χοάσπην κείμενά ἐστι τὰ Σοῦσα ταῦτα, ἔνθα βασιλεὺς τε μέγας δίαι-  
ταν ποιέεται, καὶ τῶν χρημάτων οἱ θησαυροὶ ἐνθαῦτά εἰσι· ἐλόντες  
δὲ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν θαρσέοντες ἤδη τῷ Διὶ πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε.

Bordering on these places is this land of Cissia, where Susa is situated, here, beside the Choaspes river. The Great King has his home here, and this here is also where his treasure-houses (thesauri) of gold are. If you capture this city, you may dare to challenge Zeus for wealth.

The king’s thesaurus, like his bedroom, should be one of the most closely guarded spaces within the *Histories*.<sup>47</sup> It is no surprise, therefore, to find that the map’s illusory uncovering of space ends with the fantasy of a view of the innermost chambers of Darius’s palace. The map’s transparent depiction of space stands in marked contrast to an alternative Herodotean template for imagining the world: Deioces’ extraordinary palace (1.98). The seven variously colored concentric walls of this structure mirror

<sup>46</sup> Bachelard 1994, 211–31.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Hdt. 2.121; Lloyd 1976, II, ad loc.



ancient representations of the cosmos in the manner of early Greek maps, and the palace also contains thesauri at its center (1.98.5):<sup>48</sup>

κύκλων <δ'> ἑόντων τῶν συωπαπάντων ἑπτὰ, ἐν δὴ τῷ τελευταίῳ  
τὰ βασιλῆα ἔνεστι καὶ οἱ θησαυροί. . . τοῦ μὲν δὴ πρώτου κύκ-  
λου οἱ προμαχεῶνες εἰσι λευκοί, τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου μέλανες, τρίτου δὲ  
κύκλου φοινίκεοι, τετάρτου δὲ κυάνεοι, πέμπτου δὲ σανδαράκινοι.

There are seven circles in all, and in the innermost one is the king's palace and treasure-houses. . . The battlements of the first circle are white, the second black, the third purple, the fourth blue, and the fifth orange.

Deioces' design for his palace is based on an architecture of blocked sight lines and hidden spaces, ensuring that no one from the outside is able to lay eyes upon the king (1.99). In this way, he ensures that although his palace presents a striking visual impression (the successively colored battlement walls are positioned on a hill, so each can be seen by the approaching visitor), he nevertheless keeps his own innermost space of the thesaurus private.

No discussion of the Herodotean thesaurus can fail to take into account Solon's visit to Croesus in Book 1 (1.30ff.), where the great king's display of his treasure-house, presented as if a static symbol of his fortune, was intersected by the wise Athenian's insistent emphasis on the passage of time. It is abundantly clear that Croesus prefigures his downfall by opening the doors to his treasure-house and making its contents visible. In a similar way, Candaules, by giving Gyges visual access to the most private room in his palace and allowing him to look upon the naked body of his wife, seals his own fate in the *Histories*. Both characters fail because they confuse the categories of inside and outside, seen and unseen space, while Deioces maintains the structure of his power precisely via the careful control of visual access.<sup>49</sup>

Each of the three kings (Candaules, Croesus, and Deioces) engages in the politics of space, attempting to enforce the power relations between himself and his subjects through visual revelation or retraction. Aristagoras aims to draw on this same manipulation of spatial power

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 616b–617d; Arist. [*Mund.*] 398a10–25.

<sup>49</sup> Murnaghan 2001, 65–8. Bakker 2002, 21–2 observes that Candaules' wife and Croesus's treasure are "shown" using a form of *epi-deik*, which he argues denotes gratuitous or unnecessary display, in contrast to Herodotus's project of showing in response and thereby performing or changing the object displayed, using the form *apo-deik*.

by suggesting to Cleomenes via the map that a whole host of political, economic, and military histories are all within his grasp. Such a promise is as false as the mythic statement about tyranny proposed by Herodotus about Deioces (that a king could ever inhabit and be hidden by a private space). The military and political desires embedded in the concept of mapping are also revealed in Xerxes' expedition, as we will see later in the chapter, and in the politics of history writing itself.<sup>50</sup>

As the terms of space move from the political to the domestic and the exterior to the interior, Aristagoras increasingly loses sway over his audience (significantly, in Athens, he is able to persuade because he presents his map within the open, public space of the *pnux*, 5.97). When Aristagoras follows his failure with his map with an attempt at bribery, Gorgo tells her father to go into another room in order to resist Aristagoras's gifts. Cleomenes counteracts the expansive space of the map by retreating inside his house, into a space marked as both interior and private by the presence of his daughter. The closing of Cleomenes' door on the view of the map gives a certain symmetry to the *Histories*, by reversing Candaules' fateful act of opening the door to his private room and hiding Gyges behind it. As the door swings shut, it destroys the capacity for illusion; no secret ways of gaining knowledge by seeing what it is not right or not possible to see remain, nor do any deceptive principles of scale or distance.

## EKPHRASIS AND ETHNOGRAPHY

By placing a closed door between himself and Aristagoras, Cleomenes reestablishes the spatial boundaries that maps so easily dissolve. Further, by making himself unseen, he corrects cartography's illusory power as a window into any and every space. But if Aristagoras's map fails as an encyclopedic view of the world, where does this leave the role of vision in Herodotus's literary project, which was famously labeled by him *historiês apodexis hêde*?<sup>51</sup> How does Herodotus put the many things he sees in his travels into the words of his text? I want to return to the notion of ekphrasis and argue that it can be methodologically helpful here, because it offers us an ancient way of thinking about the confluence of the verbal and the visual. I have suggested that the map's failure as an instrument

<sup>50</sup> Munn 2006, 178–220.

<sup>51</sup> Darbo-Peschanski 1987; Dewald 1987; Nagy 1987; Nagy 1990a, 259–62; Thomas 2000; and especially Bakker 2002.

of persuasion and illusion occurs through a reversal of the normal effects of ekphrasis, but the role of ekphrasis and visual description in the *Histories* deserves more interrogation, especially in relation to the broader consequences of drawing a parallel between Aristagoras's map in Book 5 and the Shield of Achilles in *Iliad* 18.<sup>52</sup>

Ekphrasis, as we have seen, has a special bearing on ancient cartography, because the shields that some of our earliest ekphrases describe were themselves, like maps, fashioned as representations of the world.<sup>53</sup> The space on the ancient map, as on the Shield, is engraved with a version of the entire world in miniature, complete with fields, cities, and landscapes. Achilles' Shield opens up a space in the text where the viewer, through the juxtaposition of widely divergent places and events, is able to see more than is humanly possible, just as the map erases the distances between countries with its concentration of multiple landscapes into a single space. But it is also helpful to move beyond the map, and to draw parallels between the epic figure of ekphrasis, a "still" digression in a text in which a visual representation is narrated verbally, and descriptions of place in the *Histories*. I want to consider this idea briefly through the category of Homeric and Herodotean wonder (*thauma/thôma*).<sup>54</sup>

Attached to the trope of ekphrasis is the explicit notion of amazement. Homer twice uses a form of the word for wonder (*thauma*) to describe the spectator's reaction to the Shield. Similarly, the *Shield of Heracles* punctuates its own ekphrasis of a shield that is also surrounded by Ocean and composed of layers of metal with the phrases *thauma idesthai* and *thauma idein* ("wondrous to look upon").<sup>55</sup> As the poet attempts to portray the object verbally, he simultaneously reassures his reader of the image's impact as a spectacle by his recurrent use of *thauma* or *thaumazô*. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the arresting affect that amazement has on the spectator's body, described by Greenblatt as a kind of paralysis, is reenacted on a textual level by a temporary paralysis within the narrative

<sup>52</sup> I should stress that I am not arguing for a deliberate allusion to ekphrasis or even to the Shield of Achilles within the *Histories*, but rather that the mechanics of ekphrasis can provide us with an important theoretical lens by which to access the visual within a literary work.

<sup>53</sup> Hardie 1985.

<sup>54</sup> The difference in spelling denotes a dialectical variation. On *thôma* in Herodotus, see Barth 1968; Hartog 1988, 230–7; Payen 1997, 117–28; Munson 2001, 232–65; Goldhill 2002, 21–6; on *thauma* in Homer, Prier 1989.

<sup>55</sup> *Il.* 18.496, 549; [Sc.] 140; 224; 318. Cf. also [Sc.] 218 θαῦμα μέγα φράσσασθ' and Lamberton 1988, 141–4.

itself, as its flow is halted by a narrative pause.<sup>56</sup> Ekphrasis may thereby prove to be a particularly useful model for approaching the Herodotean “ethnographic” sections (such as the description of Egypt, notable for the frequency of its *thômata*), which have received considerable scholarly attention for their ability to still the movement of the plot.<sup>57</sup>

Herodotus’s interest in the marvelous and its place in the writing of history is given significant emphasis in his prologue, where he promises to focus on preserving the *erga megala te kai thômasta* (“great and wondrous deeds”) of Greeks and Barbarians alike, so that they not become *akleâ* (“unrenowned”). Herodotus, like the poetic authors, uses *thôma* relatively often and in almost half of its occurrences the marvelous is directly or indirectly related to the *histor*’s role as eyewitness, just as it is most often connected with verbs of seeing in Homer and Hesiod.<sup>58</sup> A. S. Becker’s study of Homeric ekphrasis has emphasized how *thauma* brings the viewer into the picture, serving as “an index of the interpreter” since “there can be no amazement or wonder without a viewer,” while Hartog has classified Herodotus’s *thôma* as an indicator of “the eye of the traveling beholder.”<sup>59</sup> In preserving those deeds that are *thômasta*, and by exhibiting a steady stream of *thômata* in his *Histories*, Herodotus participates in a display of awe-inspiring works of art that we might then label poetic, with special reference to the theme of ekphrasis.

The relationship between map and ekphrasis that I have outlined can thereby be connected with the *erga thômasta* that Herodotus encounters as he travels through the geography of the *Histories*. Aristagoras’s audacious attempt to set a map of the world before Cleomenes’ eyes shifts the terms of the dialogue between verbal and visual from Hecataeus’s correction of the map “with the result that it became an object to be marveled at (*thamasthênai*)” (Ch. 3) to the “marvelous (*thômasta*) deeds” that Herodotus first set out to write. Although Herodotus displaces the map from his narrative, he may also be said to replace one facet of it – namely, its ability to still time – by his recurrent emphasis on visual

<sup>56</sup> Greenblatt 1991, 20, drawing evidence from Spinoza. For description as a narrative pause, see Genette 1976; Dewald 1987, 148–9; D. P. Fowler 1991; K. Clarke 1999, 37.

<sup>57</sup> Jacoby 1913, 331–2; Barth 1968; Dewald 1987, 155, note 21, 158–68; Hartog 1988, 230–7. Cf. Hdt. 2.35.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Nightingale 2002. θαῦμα is connected with ἰδεῖσθαι or ἰδεῖν in 8 of 17 occurrences in Homer, and 5 of 8 in Hesiod.

<sup>59</sup> A. S. Becker 1985, 129; Hartog 1988, 236. The role of the viewing eye (whether the author’s or his internal or external audience’s) in ekphrastic description is well-documented. Gombrich 1974, 190ff.; D. P. Fowler 1990, 1991, esp. 28–31.

marvels. As Hartog has argued, *thôma* has the ability to compress vast distances of space into a single, legible narrative.<sup>60</sup> In this respect, it shares certain obvious correspondences with the visual impression offered up by cartography.<sup>61</sup>

*Still and Moving Time: Gyges, Croesus, and Herodotus*

Herodotean wonders (*thômata*) typically appear in the ethnographical sections of the *Histories*, which have been described as “pauses” in the flow of his narrative, rather like snapshots that freeze time, as the author shifts narratological modes and turns his attention to describing a visual scene. Scholars have documented how description slows down the tempo of the narrative, as the author describes ethnographies and events that take place in a continuous or “atemporal” present. Nevertheless, in certain key passages, we can see that the idea of scenes being either “still” or animate in place, like the scenes on an ekphrasis, is troubled by Herodotus’s authorial practice of moving. At the same time, the *Histories*’ visual descriptions are often animated by a narrative impulse to move through either place or time.

Herodotus uses the figure of the barbarian king to meditate on the implications of some of these questions to do with vision, verbal description, and what I am calling here the effect of ekphrasis.<sup>62</sup> To take our two programmatic passages from Book 1 as examples: it was through sheer frustration at his own inability to compose a convincing *verbal description* of the beauty of his wife that Candaules insists Gyges see her in the flesh, while Croesus is disappointed in Solon’s failure to put into words the story that he feels sufficiently matches up to the visual display of all his gold. When Croesus displays his treasure-house to Solon, he expects a one-word answer (“you”) embedded in the concept of a temporality that remains present and still (“are the most blessed man now and you will remain so forever”). Yet Solon’s identity as a traveler associates him with linearity, and in his answer he insists on counting forward through time. On the other hand, Croesus, secure in his treasure-house of gold,

<sup>60</sup> Hartog 1988, 232: “*thôma* can be regarded as translating difference: one of the possible transcriptions of the difference between what is here and what is there, far away.”

<sup>61</sup> On the difference between *thôma*, which collapses distance, and *theôria*, which enhances it, placing the observer in the position of an outsider, Nightingale 2002.

<sup>62</sup> On tyrannical observation and its relation to Herodotus’s project as an historian, see Konstan 1987; Christ 1994.

a mythically atemporal substance, forgets that time is ticking on toward the fifth generation.<sup>63</sup>

When Candaules presents the visual display of his naked wife to Gyges, he simply expects confirmation as to the value of his possession. Everything goes according to plan for as long as Gyges remains still behind the door and the wife is undressing, according to her routine, in the same particular places in her bedroom that she undresses in every night. But when Gyges moves (ἐξιώντο, 1.10.2) to leave the room, he is seen. By that act of moving – which, not incidentally, imitates the activity of the *histôr*, Herodotus, who moves from place to place (ἐπεξιών, 1.5.3) – he unwittingly falls into a narrative dictated by the temporal succession of events. What Candaules thinks is the “still life” of his wife’s naked body, redisplaying itself in the same way every time (like the scenes on the Shield), is actually a story moving along a timeline that leads to the one *telos* – his own death – that he forgets to look forward to.<sup>64</sup> As much can be said, of course, for the “still life” of Croesus’s gold, which can offer a picture but not, in itself, a story.<sup>65</sup> So too, when Aristagoras is forced to tell how long the route to Susa will take, his answer unravels the simultaneous time of a single glance at the map into an inherently sequential register.

## HODOLOGICAL VERSUS CARTOGRAPHIC SPACE

Herodotus makes it clear that he has not fallen into the same ekphrastic mistake as Candaules, Croesus, or Aristagoras by setting his own description of the route from Ionia to Susa in pedestrian terms (5.52). Unlike Aristagoras’s mapped version, Herodotus’s territory is marked by regular borders – such as gates, rivers, and boundaries – that slow the narrative down, and highly specific, neutral distances from place to place. He offers his traveler practical information while avoiding Aristagoras’s deceptive, decorative emphasis. Instead, Herodotus grounds his account by relying on numbers to mark out the distances of the journey. These figures, which are based on a series of measurements and mathematical

<sup>63</sup> Hdt. 1.13, on the passing of Lydian kingship out of Croesus’s family in the fifth generation. On the timelessness of gold, cf. Hesiod’s myth of the ages and Kurke 1999, 53, 61–87.

<sup>64</sup> The irony of Candaules’ circular fate is that he dies in the same place where his plot began – the bedroom (1.11.5).

<sup>65</sup> Beyond granting Croesus a three-year reprieve, not even Apollo could hold back the inevitable overthrow of Lydian power in time (1.91).

equations, in parasangs, furlongs, and days (5.53.1), undo the synchronic impression of Aristagoras's description. In fact, Herodotus tells us, the journey would strictly take not three months but 93 days, if we take into account the distance from Ephesus to Sardis.

The only other place where the *Histories* becomes this mathematical is during Solon's calculation of the number of days in a man's life, even down to the "additional days" that Herodotus and Solon each scrupulously add into their calculations (1.32.2–4; 5.54). In both passages, measurement through time acts as the key with which to unlock the dazzling, instantaneous effect of Croesus's and Aristagoras's marvelous displays, and the counting up of days or parasangs acts as an accurate way of measuring time that corrects the false one presented by maps or pictures. The *telos*, for both Herodotus and Solon, is countable numbers, not uncountable gold, whether at the end of a journey on a map or at the end of a life.<sup>66</sup> In this way, the effect of space evolving through time replaces the "snapshot" model of the map or the display of treasure with the model of a moving picture; a visual medium that – whether in the form of biography (Solon's vision of human life) or travelogue (Herodotus's description of the route to Susa) – can only be understood as a progressively unfolding sequence.

As a corrective to the perspective offered by the map, Herodotus describes the road to Susa in terms of what Janni has labeled *spazio odologico*.<sup>67</sup> That is, his understanding of space follows a trajectory from A to B, following the traveler's experience and perspective rather than that of an abstract, overseeing eye. Narratives based on a model of hodological space tend to proceed in one direction (forward) and usually present the space they traverse as a series of places and landmarks en route. In contrast to Aristagoras's journey through cartographical space, Herodotus's hodological narrative does not necessarily proceed as the crow flies. Rather, he structures his route according to both the topography and architecture of the terrain that the King's Road passes through. As Janni observes, it is only in the hodological model of space that the time taken to traverse a route can be measured, since a cartographical layout does not necessarily indicate delaying factors such as mountains, fortresses, and rivers. As we have already seen, the map, by contrast, virtually erases

<sup>66</sup> Gold in barbarian thesauri is frequently described as overabundant and uncountable in the *Histories*.

<sup>67</sup> Janni 1984, part II. See also De Certeau's distinction between "tours" and "maps" (1984, 119–120). Cf. Meyer 2001.

the passage of time by the unbroken contiguity of its regions, as well as by the single instant within which the surveyor's glance crosses from one given place to another.

What is perhaps best illustrated by Janni's model is the difference in visual range between cartographical and hodological space. The layout of hodological space, because it can only look forward and because its vision is limited to what can be seen by the naked eye from a particular point along the route, is disorienting and fragmented. Janni compares it to inhabiting a large house and never knowing how close the armchair is to the bed until the wall between the living room and the bedroom is knocked down or a new door is opened. Following on from this, he suggests that a hodological conception of space allows for the possibility of a "secret room" in a way that cartographic space does not (86). The secret chamber in the gothic novel, for example, which is only accessible by a journey through long, dark passageways, and which is hidden away as a surprise for both reader and protagonist, cannot be represented on a map precisely because it takes time and intrigue to find.

The unexpected discovery of the concealed chamber by means of indirect pathways within the gothic novel corresponds, in narrative terms, to Brooks's discussion of plot as a secret plan or scheme and Aristotle's hidden finishing line.<sup>68</sup> In this case, the uncovering of the secret room completes the structure of the narrative, by revealing only at the very end the full layout of the castle, including the secret passages between walls and the chambers beneath floorboards that signal the hidden connections of the plot.<sup>69</sup> The experience of reading this kind of plot, therefore, is something like following a series of corridors or paths until the architecture of the text as a whole finally appears as a complete cognitive map in the mind of the reader. It is helpful to think of the plot of Herodotus's *Histories* along these lines, if we replace the idea of the architecture of the house with the geography of the world, whose many paths gradually cohere into a whole as Herodotus traces them. The cartographic design of Aristagoras's narrative, in contrast, could not be more different. Before he has even begun his journey, the reader/protagonist is provided with an explicit plan of the entire space he is about to traverse, including the premature revelation of the secret chamber where the king hides his gold. What Aristagoras presents to Cleomenes, in other words, is a text

<sup>68</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 3.9; Brooks 1984, 12.

<sup>69</sup> See also Foucault's analysis of the gothic novel in relation to Bentham's project of total exposure in designing the Panopticon (Gordon 1980, 146–65, esp. 153–4).



of exact and instant legibility. Because it has no hidden dénouement, it fails to unfold as a proper plot should.

Janni's scheme allows us to construct a "topography" for narrative, therefore, that ranges from the fantastic architecture of the laborious gothic novel, on one end of the spectrum, to the immediate clarity (and therefore plotless quality) of Aristagoras's map, on the other. For an extreme example of "hodological space" in the *Histories*, we can turn to Herodotus's description of the labyrinth at Moeris. This is a structure that severely restricts the orientation and view of its traveler and that, although consisting of an elaborate overall pattern in the architect's or mapmaker's eye (2.148.4), can be experienced only as a paratactic, meandering path by the one who moves through it (2.148.6):<sup>70</sup>

αἱ τε γὰρ ἑξοδοὶ διὰ τῶν στεγέων καὶ οἱ εἰλιγμοὶ διὰ τῶν αὐλέων  
ἔόντες ποικιλώτατοι θῶμα μυρίον παρείχοντο ἐξ αὐλῆς τε ἐς τὰ  
οἰκήματα διεξιούσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν οἰκημάτων ἐς παστάδας, ἐς στέγας τε  
ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν παστάδων καὶ ἐς αὐλὰς ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν οἰκημάτων.

The exits through the rooms and the twisting turns through the halls are most varied (superl., *poikilos*), furnishing a thousandfold marvel (*thōma*), and they go out from the hall into the living quarters and from the living quarters into the porches, and into other rooms from the porches and into other halls from the living quarters.

The maze has such an endless variation of routes that it exhausts all the possibilities of narrative. Herodotus does not orient his reader through the maze, but instead dwells on the many "thousands" of different directions that he could take within its overall structure. The paratactic nature of Herodotus's prose mimics the progress of a journey through space (like his description of Asia at 4.37–41 and like Aristotle's analysis of the *lexis eiromenē*), but here we see it moving in a *plural* order, from rooms to rooms, encompassing the possibility of many different routes at once. Herodotus calls the routes through the labyrinth "most varied" using a visual adjective, *poikilos*, that often occurs in descriptions of intricately designed and colorful works of art (such as robes, shields, and, in our

<sup>70</sup> Doob 1990, 1: "[The maze] may be perceived as a path (a linear but circuitous passage to a goal) or as a pattern (a complete symmetrical design)." The mythical character who best captures both these forms of viewing is perhaps Daedalus, architect both of the interior, hodological space of the labyrinth and of the wings that (if all too briefly) offer Icarus and himself an aerial view of the world (cf. De Certeau 1984, 91–110; Jacob 1984; Morris 1992; Jaeger 1997, 1999). On Herodotus's labyrinth mirroring his own narrative style, Munson 2001, 241–2.

case, maps).<sup>71</sup> As we discussed earlier, Aristotle used it when describing Homer's *eusynoptic* plot in chapter 23 of the *Poetics*, claiming that if Homer had shortened the length of his poem, it would have become too complicated due to the variety of incident (*poikilia*) in it (Arist. *Poet.* 23.1459a33–4, see Ch. 1).

The amount of color and detail in an object that is *poikilos* distracts the eye, calling attention to several different possible viewing directions at once. This can lead to the object itself becoming indescribable, as here with the labyrinth that Herodotus labels “beyond words” (λόγου μέζω, 1.148.1). Similarly, when Hecataeus describes the Egyptian labyrinth, it is the prelude to “many other things that would take too long to write.”<sup>72</sup> In this sense, the traveler's journey through the space of the labyrinth – for as long as he is lost – is paradigmatic of an unselected or plotless narrative. It is no surprise, either, to find it here in conjunction with the idea of a “thousandfold marvel (*thōma*).” The labyrinth, like the epic shields, paralyzes the viewer, confronting him with an endless variety of places to look at or turn toward, to the extent that it threatens never to let him out. Herodotus presents both the labyrinth and the map as complete, closed systems upon which space can be marked out, but neither of which give the traveler any indication of a specific route to follow. His own prose, on the other hand, moves beyond these static, self-enclosed models to offer a hodological narrative whose sequence through both time and space is presented as a more accurate alternative to the overview of all-paths-at-once that is either impossible to take in at one time (like the many paths of the labyrinth) or overly simplified (as in Aristagoras's display).

Rather than dealing with the minutiae of individual places and the differences between them, Aristagoras's map presents the world as a whole, as a kind of fantastic vision that collapses boundaries and makes for instantaneous “travel” across its surface. Cleomenes is surprised to find that the journey to Susa would take three months for much the same reason that Strepsiades complained that Sparta was too close to Athens (Ch. 3). The political implications of this kind of cartographic representation are clear. The map has the ability to homogenize space into a single whole that

<sup>71</sup> The verb *poikillō* is used to describe Zas's act of weaving the robe for Chthonië (Schibli fr. 68, col. 1, 16, see Ch. 3), and Aristagoras uses it to denote the finery of clothing in Asia (Hdt. 5.49).

<sup>72</sup> *FGrH.* 3A, 264, F25, 89.4; See also Hecataeus's comments on the labyrinth at *FGrH.* 264, F25, 61.2ff and 97.5.

is controlled by the cartographer's personal point of view. This perhaps also accounts for why Herodotus tries so hard to distance himself from cartography in the *Histories*. His rejection of the map betrays a certain anxiety about his own project as a historian, given that cartography is related not only to the emergence of geographical writing in prose but also to the implied power relations within the project of history writing itself, which cannot help but plot a version of events from one particular point of view. Herodotus attempts to defer this impression by referring to a plurality of sources, sidetracks and by-lines, as if to account for a number of different perspectives.

In the last books of the *Histories*, Xerxes' invasion of Greece works in a similar way to Aristagoras's map, by attempting to break all space down into a single entity. Xerxes' project, as he sees it, is to redraw the world by eliminating its borders and transforming Persia into a space that is so all-encompassing that it even verges upon a representation of the entire cosmos (7.8γ.1–2):

εἰ τούτους τε καὶ τοὺς τούτοισι πλησιοχώρους καταστρεψόμεθα, οἱ Πέλοπος τοῦ Φρυγὸς νέμονται χώραν, γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῷ Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμουρέουσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ χώραν γε οὐδεμίαν κατόψεται ἥλιος ὁμουρέουσιν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ, ἀλλὰ σφεας πάσας ἐγὼ ἅμα ὑμῖν μίαν χώραν θήσω, διὰ πάσης διεξελθὼν τῆς Εὐρώπης.

If we overthrow [the Athenians] and those who live near them, the men who inhabit the land of Phrygian Pelops, we will create a Persian empire that shares a border only with the aether of Zeus. For the sun will look upon no land sharing a border with ours, but I, with you, will make all of them one land, proceeding through all of Europe.

As Steiner has pointed out, Xerxes “reshapes” the landscape that he moves through during his expedition (1994, 146). Not only does Xerxes' army (which, by its size, itself represents a giant nation on the move) dig through mountains and redirect rivers, but it actually drinks several rivers dry (7.21, 43, 127, 196), erasing and redrawing the landscape's topographical markers. The map thus serves both as a catalyst of the original invasion for which Darius unremittingly planned revenge, and as a *tabula rasa* of the world that Xerxes intends to reinscribe. Notice how part of Xerxes' cartographical project is the translation of the “all” into a single land (*chôra*): “I will make all (πάσας) of them one land (μίαν χώραν), proceeding onward through all (πάσης) of Europe.”

This section of the *Histories* is notable for its focus on the single theme of Persian invasion, with shorter digressions and distractions.<sup>73</sup> The articulation of Xerxes' ambition to fold the world neatly into a single space coincides with a newly obtained geographical and narrative cohesion in a work that has meandered repeatedly and confusingly from place to place. But there is a small reminder of Herodotus's presence as narrator (and of the infeasibility of Xerxes' model) in the king's claim to make all lands into one by "going through" Europe from beginning to end (διεξέρχομαι). As we discussed earlier in relation to Gyges' movement (ἐξέρχομαι) into the events of history, it recalls Herodotus's own promise to "go through" cities one by one (ἐπεξέρχομαι, 1.5.3) in his introduction.

### MAPS, ROUTES, AND DELPHI

If Herodotus's model of the map is problematic for all of the reasons we have discussed, what it does suggest is the value of a system. Cartography allows for larger, overall patterns and multiple routes. The map's ability to bind space and to cohere a number of routes into an organizational system relates to Herodotus's larger project in the *Histories*, a text that is *both* restricted in its vision *and* hard for the reader to follow ("paratactic and poikolic"), but that also allows its readers to see it as a pattern, to "step outside of our limited perceptions" and recognize the work as a composite whole.<sup>74</sup> In the concluding section to this chapter, we will consider how the oracle at Delphi enables the idea of a cognitive map of the whole to appear in the mind of the reader, working as a structuring force for the narrative that draws many of its "routes" together. Read in this context, the vast number of roads in the *Histories* emerge as a series of detours and deviations from the single journey to Delphi and back. Characters in the work frequently consult the oracle at Delphi, providing an impetus and direction for the plot's many narrative turns.

The site of Delphi appears repeatedly in the *Histories*, and gradually takes on the role of a hub or crossroads for the different roads of the argument.<sup>75</sup> It is both the place where a great deal of objects end up (in the form of monuments, dedications, and war spoils), and the place to

<sup>73</sup> Payen 1997, 46–7; T. Harrison 2002, 560–71.

<sup>74</sup> Both of the quotations are from Dewald 1987 (152, 169). Ancient critics also noted the *Histories'* *poikilia* (Riemann 1967, 73ff.).

<sup>75</sup> Delphi is programmatically placed to appear at the end of the first "story" in the work (1.13) and reappears at least once in every book of the *Histories*. See further Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 73–84; Dougherty 1993; Maurizio 1997; T. Harrison 2000;

which people travel if their narratives reach some kind of personal or political crisis point. Delphi is associated with travel in several different and often obvious ways. In the classical period, it was the destination of a journey that any character might reasonably take, especially in the context of *theôria* (state-sponsored or individual pilgrimage and sight-seeing) or in order to consult the oracle. Delphi was, according to Herodotus, the first scheduled stop on the route of the first ever voyage, undertaken by Jason on the Argo and the first port of call for a good number of colonizing expeditions.<sup>76</sup> In addition to marking these “first” journeys, the path to Delphi was frequently trodden by emissaries, festival-goers, oracle seekers, and sightseers. Herodotus mentions the established route, the Sacred Way,<sup>77</sup> that runs to Delphi from Athens, as well as the sacred delegates that the Spartan kings elect to send there on official missions.<sup>78</sup> The city’s position as an important center within the Panhellenic network of classical Greek culture, as a kind of router (to continue the network analogy) that helped to fuse a sense of Greek identity, has been well documented by social and literary historians.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, the concept of approaching Delphi as a *theôros*, or spectator of sights or festivals, places the ancient Greek visitor in a position that is not unlike Herodotus’s own as *histôr*. Both adopt positions as culturally displaced outsiders, rather like tourists, who often travel with the explicit purpose of obtaining information to report back to a third party.<sup>80</sup>

Finally, it is not only the roads that lead into Delphi that set it up as a network for other places in the *Histories* but also the roads that lead out of it. In Book 2, Herodotus explains how the citizens of Delphi wandered extensively (*πλανώμενοι*) through various cities in order to collect donations for the rebuilding of their temple (2.180). We have evidence of *theôdorokoi*, or receivers of sacred envoys, who set out from Delphi and traveled from city to city in order to record names of envoys through whom they communicated information about truces and delegations.<sup>81</sup> The paths that these *theôroi* and *theôrodokoi* traced and the activities that they engaged in created a crisscrossing of Greek states in a network that

Maurizio 2001; T. Harrison 2003; Mikalson 2003, esp. 117–21; Barker 2006. On the oracle itself: Crahay 1956; Parke and Wormell 1956; Fontenrose 1978.

<sup>76</sup> Hdt. 4.179; cf. Hdt. 4.150–63 on the foundation of Cyrene. See also Dougherty 1993.

<sup>77</sup> 6.34.2. McInerney 1999, 107–8.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Hdt. 6.27; Rutherford 2004, 70.

<sup>79</sup> Rutherford 2000; Malkin 2005.

<sup>80</sup> Redfield 1985; Nightingale 2002, 29–33; Friedman 2006. On pilgrimage in Greece, see Dillon 1997.

<sup>81</sup> Giovannini 1969, 53ff.; Dillon 1997, 11–18.

not only bound cities to one another geographically (through the listing of certain routes or the building of roads from place to place) but also established a system of Panhellenic religious and cultural connections.

In Herodotus's work this concept expands to encompass Europe and Asia as a whole, in a "plot" of the earth whose narrative roads intersect and correlate through Delphi. It is an important site for the work (and different from, say, the site at Susa) because it can be accessed through multiple routes and directions rather than a single path from A to B. At the same time, because it is a place of pilgrimage, to and from which people are always coming and going, it allows for a dynamic model of geography shaped by the practice and performance of travel. It was understood by the Greeks as the *omphalos* or navel of the world because of a tradition that Zeus released two eagles on either side of the world and this is where they *crossed*. Delphi acquires its centrality on account not so much of its fixed position in the geography of the world but of its role as a median or nodal point through which the paths between so many other places intersect.<sup>82</sup>

We can also consider Delphi's role in Herodotus's narrative frame from a nongeographical point of view, as a truth system emanating from the oracle through which various narrative paths in the *Histories* circulate. The all-seeing knowledge of the Delphic oracle validates Herodotus's text in a way that is similar to the way in which the visual range of the Muses lends credibility to the voice of the epic poet. When Croesus decides to test all of the many oracles and truth systems available to him in the world, he does so by sending messengers out to all of them at once, instructing the messengers to count a hundred days from leaving Sardis and then ask the oracles what he was doing on that particular hundredth day (his secret is to cook a tortoise and a lamb together in a bronze pot). The answer of the oracle at Delphi pleased Croesus best (1.47.3):

οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ ψάμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης,  
καὶ κωφοῦ συνίημι καὶ οὐ φωνεῦντος ἀκούω.  
ὁδμή μ' ἐς φρένας ἦλθε κραταιρίνοιο χελώνης  
ἐπομένης ἐν χαλκῷ ἄμ' ἀρνείοισι κρέεσσι,  
ἦ χαλκὸς μὲν ὑπέσπρωται, χαλκὸν δ' ἐπίεσται.

I know (have seen) the number of the sand's grains and the  
measures of the sea,  
I understand the dumb man and can hear the mute.

<sup>82</sup> On Delphi as the central point of early Greek maps of the earth, cf. Dilke 1985, 24.

A smell has reached my senses of a hard-shelled tortoise,  
boiling in a bronze pan together with the lamb's meat,  
with bronze laid under and bronze on top.

The Pythia's vision (along with her other senses) gives her direct access to the truth, no matter how far away Croesus is from Delphi or how carefully he hides his culinary machinations. It is clear that number (*arithmos*) and distance (*metra*), the mechanisms by which humans measure and record their world, are no obstacles to her supernatural way of seeing. Instead, like the map reader, the Pythia is able not only to perceive the world in a single instant, but also to travel from one part of it to another in the blink of an eye. The hexameter verses of the Pythian oracle at Delphi accentuate the connection between the map and the epic Muse in Herodotus's work.<sup>83</sup> Yet Herodotus is quick to remind us that, as soon as the Pythia puts her vision into verse, the clarity of what she sees is often lost in the gap between human and divine understanding. It is impossible to forget that no sooner has Croesus successfully tested the oracles than he famously misinterprets the answer of the Pythia upon putting his first real question to her.<sup>84</sup>

The Pythia's ability to see at a microscopic level of detail (all the grains of sand) on such a macroscopic scale (in the world) reminds us of the divine way of looking found in Book 18 of the *Iliad*, where the shield presents a similar confluence of the miniature and the gigantic. To human eyes this confluence is not only incompatible but also incommensurate – we cannot “count up” or “measure” the size of such an immortal point of view.<sup>85</sup> A passage from Theognis makes clear that it would be foolish for a Delphic *theōros* to attempt to match the Pythia in his ability to calculate, for there is something about her vision that cannot be summed up in human units, even if the cartographer's instruments are brought into play (Thgn. 805–10):<sup>86</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Nagy 1990a, 164–7, on both the *theōros* and the supreme vantage point of the god of the oracle at Delphi.

<sup>84</sup> Just as he did with Solon, Croesus erroneously inserts himself into the implied subject position in this question and answer exchange, thinking that the Pythia is referring to him in exactly the way that she is not when she says that “a great empire will be destroyed” if he should attack Persia (1.53).

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *Il.* 2.800, where the disguised Iris compares the number of approaching Achaeans to an uncountable quantity of sand or leaves.

<sup>86</sup> Nagy 1990a, 166. Cf. Maurizio 1997, 315. On the use of the *tornos* or carpenter's lathe in map drawing, cf. Hdt. 4.36.2. On Anaximander's invention of the *gnomon*, see Ch. 3; DK 12A2.

Τόρνου καὶ στάθμης καὶ γνώμονος ἄνδρα θεωρὸν  
 εὐθύτερον χρή <ξ>μεν, Κύρνε, φυλασσόμενον,  
 ᾧτινί κεν Πυθῶνι θεοῦ χρήσασ' ἰέρεια  
 ὁμφὴν σημήνην πίονος ἐξ ἁδύτου·  
 οὔτε τι γὰρ προσθεῖς οὐδέν κ' ἔτι φάρμακον εὖροις,  
 οὐδ' ἀφελὼν πρὸς θεῶν ἀμπλακίην προφύγοις.

The man who is a *theōros*, Cynrus, must take care  
 to be straighter than the carpenter's lathe, line, or rule,  
 to whomever the prophesying priestess of the god at Delphi  
 declares a prophecy from the rich adyton.  
 For if you should add something (to her words) you would not  
 find a cure,  
 and if you subtracted anything you would not escape error in  
 the eyes of the god.

The Pythia's ability to travel across all space, in all directions at once, in a simultaneous moment trivializes Croesus's ambitious attempt to synchronize time through the simultaneous network of routes and the counting up of days (1.47.1, 48.2). It is notable that both the oracle's response to Croesus's test and the invocation to the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships offer ways of seeing that are juxtaposed with slow, human journeys.<sup>87</sup> In Homer, the Muse is invoked in order to tell of the number of Achaeans who sailed on the voyage from Aulis to Troy; in Herodotus, the Pythia is prompted to speak after the dispatching of Croesus's messengers in a number of different directions, over a hundred-day period, to the various oracles of Greece and Asia. Herodotus contrasts an ideal way of visualizing space with his own human project of following roads. Instead of aiming for Croesus's "simultaneous" effect, Herodotus follows one road of his argument at a time, circling back when necessary to rejoin earlier paths but always moving, paratactically, from one path or crossroads to another.

As we discussed earlier, Herodotus rejects the simultaneous "Croesus" model of history – the failed attempt to see as the Pythia sees – in favor of the sequential, Solonian one.<sup>88</sup> But the location of Delphi as a midway point for so many of the byways of his argument is significant, for it

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *Il.* 15.80–3, for a similar contrast between human movement and the divine ability to traverse space instantaneously.

<sup>88</sup> Barker 2006.



allows his narrative periodically to interface with a divine way of seeing. In Homer's invocation to the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships, the poet laments his own inability to see simultaneously across time. Like Croesus who fanned out several messengers to ask a single question in different places on the same day, perhaps Homer means that he would have to speak with ten mouths and ten tongues *at the same time* in order to express accurately the full extent of what the Muses see. Only by means of a single, linear catalogue is he able to count up, even partially, those who sailed to Troy.

Elsewhere in the *Iliad*, we hear that the journey from Aulis to Troy was navigated by the seer Calchas (*Il.* 1.70–2):

ὅς ῥ' ἤδη τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα,  
καὶ νήεσσ' ἡγήσατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἴλιον εἴσω  
ῥ' ἦν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τήν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

(Calchas) who knew the things that are and the things that  
will be and the things that were before,  
and he guided the ships of the Achaeans to Ilion  
by means of the prophetic art bestowed on him by Apollo.

The conflation of past, present, and future in Calchas's viewpoint must relate in some way to his ability to guide the ships toward Troy, and the juxtaposition of the two concepts lends a timeless quality to the journey. Apollo's gift of prophecy has removed the limitations of seeing through time; so too, we might infer, does the prophetic art remove any sense of the journey being slow.

The long recounting of the ships that sailed to Troy in *Iliad* 2 works in a different way, by borrowing from the sequential aspect of travel in order to pace out the Catalogue and put the ships in order. It appears to have been recounted through a mnemonic technique based on the tracing of an imaginary route through Greece in the mind of the speaker. The list moves in a clockwise direction around Greece, from the Boeotians to the Magnetes in the east of Thessaly, with occasional diversions to include Crete, Rhodes, and the surrounding islands (*Il.* 2.645–80). As Giovannini was the first to observe, three "routes" can be isolated in this movement through Greece, which match the itineraries of Delphic *theorodokoi* (the receivers of the sacred envoys) from a third-century inscription (1969, 53–62). If the Catalogue is based on this concept of a set of itineraries, then Homer is quite methodically walking himself through a memory

route, using the topographical structure of a set path through Greece as his guide.<sup>89</sup>

In both Homer and Herodotus, then, the reference to an encyclopedic, immortal vantage point that collapses time and space is juxtaposed with the model of human travel that traces a path through Delphi. Homer, like Herodotus, has taken three separate routes that different *theorodokoi* would set out on concurrently, and used them to help him remember a Catalogue of Ships that sailed from Aulis to Troy. Herodotus also uses sequence to achieve the effect of a simultaneous system of routes in his work, but at the same time he avoids restricting his narrative to the model of a single journey from A to B. Through his own tracing of a long series of paratactic routes Herodotus aims to imitate something of the system of comprehensive space that maps might aspire to.

Finally, if one aspect of Delphi's place in the *Histories* is as the intersection of a number of different routes and journeys, then its other dominant aspect is as a kind of storage space for the various objects that work their way through the narrative. Herodotus uses Delphi as a repository for a great number of *things* – gold and silver objects, war spoils, even the chains that held Croesus. Once these objects arrive in Delphi, they remain firmly in place, stored in a kind of mental holding bay that allows the author to locate things in his narrative and, at the same time, to preserve them as a visible display of the various deeds or monuments (ἔργα) he recounts. The thesauri located at Delphi contain an amount of gold and goods that can be observed, weighed, and counted by Herodotus. In terms of the overall pattern or “map” of Herodotus's narrative, Delphi offers a different kind of thesaurus to those owned by barbarian kings. The personal treasure-houses of Croesus and Darius contain an amount of gold that is beyond human abilities to count or accurately describe. The story of Alcmeon attempting to grasp as much as he can from Croesus's treasure-house illustrates the point, for even when he fills his boots and hair with it, Croesus is still able to give him more gold than he can possibly carry (6.125).

The amount of barbarian gold is excessive enough to work in parallel with the vast number of things that only gods can count (such as sand or the full number of men who sailed to Troy). Whether it is the countries “of the whole (*hapasês*) earth” represented on Aristagoras's map, “all

<sup>89</sup> As Minchin (2001) has argued in her study of the uses of memory in Homer, this kind of “cognitive mapping” was an important tool for memorizing large quantities of information in sequence, particularly in oral cultures (84–7).

(*panta*) the *daidala*” that the Myrmidons turn away from on the Shield of Achilles (*Il.* 19.13–15), or “all the things” (*panta*) that the Muses see (*Il.* 2.486), there are some presentations of place and things that cannot be taken in by the human eye, especially in one glance. At Delphi, however, a controlled, human version of this divine way of seeing is possible to a certain extent. Herodotus’s careful itemization of the gold there opposes the barbarian king’s incommensurate vision of space and number. In much the same way, Croesus’s counting out of a hundred days before questioning the oracles contrasts with Herodotus’s counting out of the number of days that it would take to walk from Ionia to Susa. On the one hand, we have the kind of counting that can be accurately gauged by the historian; on the other, a kind of magic counting up to simultaneity, which attempts to outperform the reckoning powers of divine sight and speech. But Croesus’s trick only confirms that there are two kinds of seeing, counting, and measuring in the work. First, there is the Delphic Pythia’s way of instantly knowing every grain of sand, that so many barbarian kings try but always fail to approximate through gold and treasure-houses, and that it is difficult for mortals to grasp even after it has been put into speech. Second, there is Herodotus’s way, which is organized and limited by the bounds of experience and the tracing of a path by the human eye.

Instead of having some unattainable vision (such as gold or the supremely beautiful naked body of a woman) stand as the *telos* to his narrative, Herodotus focuses on points of intersection and deviation,<sup>90</sup> using Delphi as a midway point for his various narrative paths that also help to bind them together into a cohesive or maplike system. In the opening of his *Histories*, he used his prologue to trace a series of relays and returns between Europe and Asia. As the *Histories* continues, however, it becomes clear that his many intersections through Delphi allow his model to come closer to the idea of a coherent system of the world offered by maps. His use of Delphi as a central site in his work gives him access, through oracle and prophecy, to “a kind of omniscient view of history,” but it also ensures that his history writing avoids the pitfalls offered by cartography and the human attempt to grasp the world, in its entirety, in the blink of an eye.<sup>91</sup>

What the Pythia is able to find (*heuriskô*) by looking in a single glance, Herodotus finds step by step, by following the path of wandering, which

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Hdt. 4.30.2; Payen 1997, 95–6.

<sup>91</sup> T. Harrison 2003, 254.

has epic precedents but which, as Montiglio observes, is no longer baneful and no longer even about being lost.<sup>92</sup> When Aristagoras attempts to replicate that art of orientation, he does so with an object that, I have argued here, is the by-product of both the epic and prose traditions. Herodotus, on the other hand, uses boundaries, turns, and measurements to give shape and form to his narrative. Cartography may remain important as a visual system, but – for Herodotus, at least – it does not engage with the fundamental question of what happens when space, movement, and time intersect.

<sup>92</sup> Montiglio 2005, 126.

## FIVE

# LOSING THE WAY HOME: XENOPHON'S ANABASIS

ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μὴ . . . ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε  
ὁδοῦ.

But I'm afraid that . . . like the Lotus Eaters, we might forget the way home.  
Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.2.25

Few words spring more readily to the mind of any reader of the *Anabasis* than  
parasang.

Tim Rood, *The Sea! The Sea!*

IN THE LAST CHAPTER, WE SAW HOW HERODOTUS'S HISTORIES integrates what we have been calling the countercartographic tendencies of his style within a relatively seamless and encyclopedic whole, in part through the successful alliance of geography and narrative form. I showed how Herodotus's prose compensates for some of the failings of cartography, by expanding instead of miniaturizing and by following a model that is diachronic and dynamic instead of synchronic and "still." In Xenophon's *Anabasis*, however, all of these aspects of the countercartographic plot are pushed to an extreme in the long, sequential journey of the Ten Thousand through the unknown landscape of Asia Minor, resulting in a certain amount of interference between the form of the narrative and the landscape it is describing. This creates a text that expresses a sense of being lost in its own environment, from which the notion of home and homeland is repeatedly evoked and deferred, and which fails to orient the plot and the reader in a number of suggestive ways.

The narrative details of the *Anabasis* are well known. As Xenophon tells it, approximately ten thousand Greek mercenaries were hired by Cyrus in 401 BCE to march from the Ionian coastal town of Sardis toward Susa in Mesopotamia. There they engaged in battle with the king and

ended up with all of their leaders killed. They thus found themselves stranded in Asia Minor, without provisions or guides, and surrounded by a hostile Persian army. Due to their own perseverance, however, the Ten Thousand marched northward through alien territory until they eventually reached the sea at Trapezus. From there they turned toward Greece and marched along the coast, until the group was eventually subsumed into another mercenary contract, this time fighting for the Spartans. At that point, Xenophon's narrative comes to a close.<sup>1</sup>

In this chapter, I will look in particular at how the historical and autobiographical aspects of Xenophon's description of being lost in the *Anabasis* overlap with the literary *topos* of narrating as a form of walking, especially within the context of a culturally unfamiliar geography. Xenophon explicitly documents the experience of being lost in a manner that is quite different to Homer's in the *Odyssey* (ch. 2). From that discussion and our previous readings of Herodotus and Aristotle, we are already familiar with the metaliterary concept of the road in both poetry and prose, following the principle that in order for a narrative to proceed, it needs a clear "road" or passageway – whether by sea or on land – by which it can progress. What happens, then, when circumstances force Xenophon to turn off the well-marked "Royal Road" running from Sardis to Susa, and to cut his own rough path through a largely unclassified landscape?<sup>2</sup>

Until the famous sighting of the sea, the plot of the *Anabasis* does not follow the logic of a prescribed path or route, as the *Odyssey* and the *Histories* do. Instead, it veers uncertainly through inland space, always heading in the general direction of the sea, yet with only a limited sense of its whereabouts. Indeed, it is not so much the road that guides us in reading the *Anabasis*, but the *parasang* – a Persian unit of measurement that Xenophon uses to structure his account through the interior. By means of the *parasang* and the *stathmos*, Xenophon tracks the progress of the march through Asia Minor, quantifying the distance that he has

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon probably wrote the *Anabasis* sometime in the 360s. He was a well-known figure in his time, not only for his *Anabasis* but also his other wide-ranging writings, his eventual exile from Athens (probably due to his support of the short-lived "Thirty Tyrants" oligarchy), and his friendship with Socrates. See further Dillery 1995.

<sup>2</sup> We last saw the Royal Road in Ch. 4, as described by Herodotus as a corrective to Aristagoras's map (Hdt. 5.52–4). This road is well established, enabling Herodotus to count up its distance with mathematical precision. Herodotus's source was probably Hecataeus's *Periegesis* (Cawksell 2004, 57). On the accuracy of Herodotus's description of the Royal Road, see Graf 1994.

covered in the course of a day.<sup>3</sup> The capacity of these units to quantify and survey would appear to help Xenophon to give an accurate and organized record of events.<sup>4</sup> At first glance, therefore, his recounting of distances and measurements, as if he had originally recorded them in a series of journal entries and later written them up into a historical narrative, suggests an author who is following a straightforward outline for his plot.<sup>5</sup> What clearer model for the line of his text could an author set out for his reader, after all, than a single route through space that is not only reiterated and retrodden by ten thousand pairs of feet but whose actual distances are also carefully recorded step by step?<sup>6</sup>

Yet, in stark contrast to the blazoned route that recedes in the Ten Thousand's wake, neither Xenophon's *parasangs* nor his *Anabasis* give the reader a strong indication of where his narrative is going. Xenophon uses the *parasang* only to look behind him, with the result that the path that the Ten Thousand forge begins to look disconcertingly long in the absence of an endpoint in the other direction. This serves to undermine the sense of an overview that Xenophon's careful measurement of the topography originally created. Indeed, the story of the *Anabasis*, although ostensibly a simple one, increasingly meanders and wavers as it progresses through alien territory.

Our attempt to find coherence within Xenophon's account of his experience is complicated by the hostile nature of the landscape he traverses and by the difficulty of ordering that landscape into a coherent plot. Tellingly, the use of measurement to record the progress of the Ten Thousand decreases the further into the interior they march. As Xenophon's practice of measuring by the *parasang* breaks down, so the coordinates of his narrative become harder to grasp. Questions of genre, narrative form, and historical experience interweave here, for the complicated relationship between the orientation of the *Anabasis's* plot and the landscape Xenophon attempts to describe impedes our attempt to

<sup>3</sup> The *parasang* is a Persian unit of measurement that roughly corresponds to the distance that an army can march in an hour. Williams 1996; Tuplin 1997. The *stathmos* was a "stage," perhaps symbolized by stopping places en route, but also used by the Greeks as a measurement of distance.

<sup>4</sup> Note Herodotus's use of measurement in the *Histories*, which enabled him to master space without the use of the Muse's perspective. Hartog 1988, 342, and my Ch. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Tuplin 1999, 341: "The only thing in *Anabasis* one might call a real «framework» is the (nearly) systematic record of *stathmoi* and *parasangs* in I–IV. . . ." Cawkwell 2004 discusses the journal-entry theory.

<sup>6</sup> The plodding, repetitive nature of this narrative style has often been observed (Rood 2007, 149).

make sense of Xenophon's experience as a straightforward account. The practice and performance of autobiography, the difficulty of ordering a long and chaotic journey into a narrative frame, and the impossibility of translating all space and experience into quantifiable amounts together disrupt Xenophon's daily monitoring of *parasangs*.

Thus the reader of the *Anabasis* may find herself unexpectedly lost, since Xenophon's use of the *parasang* (as well as his "easy Greek," [Rood 2004]) sets up an expectation of a straightforward account with a transparent and uncomplicated narrator. As far as the pleasures of storytelling go, however, this is no cause for regret. Instead, as I will show, some of the more fascinating aspects of the *Anabasis* are to be found in those places where the ordered enumeration of experience breaks down.

In the countercartographical aspects of Herodotus's *Histories* that we examined in Chapter 4, we came across this same spirit of the plot's apparent meandering. Xenophon and Herodotus are alike in deferring spatial knowledge, in a manner that separates them from the all-encompassing cartographic vision that we first encountered in the circumscribed edges of Achilles' Shield (Ch. 1). But, even as Herodotus derides mapmaking, he smuggles enough cartographic and surveying techniques into his narrative to ensure that the form of his plot is ordered and coherent. By means of the carefully organized network of routes by which he traces his *historia*, and by the plot's imperative to look to the end, Herodotus guides his reader through a bewildering array of landscapes and events whilst retaining a firm grasp on his authorial overview of the whole.

Xenophon's position is more complicated because of the personal role he plays in his own story and the practical, physical inability of his authorial persona "to traverse boundaries freely" in the way that a writer such as Herodotus can.<sup>7</sup> For as long as he is narrating his experiences as one of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon is also unable to relate his account from the uncomplicated or uncompromised viewpoint of the historian who surveys the events of history and organizes them into a selective frame, viewed from a distance.<sup>8</sup>

In Chapter 4, we looked at how the line or path of the prose sentence allowed Herodotus to organize the shape of his plot in a way that complemented his project as a historian. Yet in Xenophon's *Anabasis* we

<sup>7</sup> Friedman 2006, 166, describing Herodotus. Cf. Munson 2001; Dewald 2002, esp. 267–8.

<sup>8</sup> This is not to suggest that we can ever fully retrieve Xenophon's experience as a participant within the march, nor that questions of autobiography can ever be satisfactorily disentangled from conventions of genre and narrative (see Ch. 4, note 6).



are at times confronted with the sense that the order and line of prose is unraveling before our eyes. Whilst Herodotus and Odysseus adopt the formal authorial standpoint of the narrator who views “from the ground,” lending a countercartographic or hodological perspective to their narratives, Xenophon folds into his authorial stance the curtailed viewpoint that comes from the grueling experience of walking through every step of the *Anabasis*’s plot. The fact that for most of that journey the Ten Thousand were lost only reinforces the extent to which his text pushes the countercartographic form of narrative to an extreme.

Herodotus’s programmatic injunction to look to the end taught us to set his work into a visual perspective, in a way that incorporated time into the narrative frame and made up for the shortcomings of cartography. Like the narrative model of the path, however, the concept of looking to the end presents certain challenges for the *Anabasis*. To begin with, Xenophon’s formulation of an endpoint in his work incompletely incorporates two different categories. First, the end appears to be represented by the sea, which the Ten Thousand reach at the close of Book 4. Xenophon builds up to the view of the sea as if it were the end of the journey, although it is not. Although this view is eagerly anticipated throughout the march up-country, I will discuss how its realization is eventually anticlimactic and how its presence in the text serves to highlight a series of problems to do with seeing at long and short range. This vacillation between the near and the far in the attempt to see the end will also inform our discussion of the countercartographic qualities of the work.

The second sense of an ending that the *Anabasis* continually looks toward (but never satisfactorily attains) is the notion of home. The most frequent form of *oikos* to be found in the text is *oikade*, “toward home.”<sup>9</sup> The prevalence of home and homeland in Xenophon’s plot raises questions about the work’s genre and overall cohesion. Why does the *Anabasis* stop before the Ten Thousand do, in fact, return home? How is the narrative complicated by its author’s status as an exile? What does it mean to try to reinvent home by setting it up in a foreign environment? How is one’s sense of home affected by the experience of becoming lost?<sup>10</sup> Since it has long been noted that the *Anabasis* contains allusions and parallels to the *Odyssey*, how then does Xenophon reconceptualize the

<sup>9</sup> *An.* 2.3.23; 3.1.2; 3.2.24; 3.2.26; 3.3.3. Montiglio 2005 shows how the idea of home, or reaching home, shapes the concept of wandering in texts such as the *Anabasis* (227–46). Cf. Ma 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Wigley 1996.

epic *nostos* plot within the context of an autobiographical history written from exile?<sup>11</sup>

When Xenophon worries, deep in the interior, that “like the Lotus Eaters, we might forget the way home” (3.2.25), the reader is reminded that several of the Ten Thousand’s experiences inland before they reach the sea correspond to Odysseus’s experiences at sea in Books 5 and 9–12. In both cases, the hero wanders through unknown and barbarian territory, and his attempt to escape from an alien and frequently hostile environment provides the core adventure element of the two plots. In one sense, therefore, the “fantastic journey” of *Anabasis* 1–4 across the landlocked territory of Asia Minor mirrors the fantastic journey of *Odyssey* 9–12 across the uncharted regions of the sea. But in another, it resembles Odysseus’s final journey with the oar, which we examined in Chapter 2, since in both, the protagonist wanders a long, long way inland before returning to the sea.<sup>12</sup>

Any consideration of Xenophon’s *Anabasis* as a fourth-century *Odyssey*, moreover, should take into account the role that Odysseus’s *nostos* played in shaping the patterns of Greek colonization between the Homeric age and the fourth century. Malkin has argued that Odysseus should be understood as a “protocolonial hero,” whose “returns,” somewhat paradoxically, provided the model for the departure of the *oikistês* in colonizing expeditions (1998). The experiences of Odysseus on his return home, like the “returns” of the heroes that followed him, provided the early Greeks who were setting out for the coasts to the west with a model by which to frame their encounters with alien cultures. The overlaying of the model of a return journey onto one of archaic narratives of colonization finds its counterpart, to some extent, in Xenophon’s combining of *nostos* and colonization motifs in the *Anabasis*.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Lossau 1990 notes the parallels between Odysseus’s *nostos* and the Ten Thousand’s journey home. The Greeks’ arrival at the coastal town of Trapezus (4.7), for instance, shares several points of contact with Odysseus’s experience in Scheria in Books 6–8 of the *Odyssey*. Both Scheria and Trapezus mark the end of their protagonists’ wanderings through fantastic topographies; at both festivities occur; and from both, a swift, safe return home by ship is proposed. Note that one soldier dreams of completing the final leg of the journey, “stretched out like Odysseus on his Phaeacian ship” (5.1.2). See also Higgins 1972, 291; Tuplin 2003; Marincola 2007, 31–3. On Iliadic associations, see Dalby 1992. On the Homeric overtones of Xenophon’s first dream, Rinner 1978.

<sup>12</sup> Tuplin 2003. Xenophon arrives back at Cyrus’s starting point on the west coast of Asia Minor at the very end of the text.

<sup>13</sup> Dalby 1992 argues that the Ten Thousand act like a colonizing expedition. Cf. Ma 2004, 341–5.

The *Anabasis* thereby echoes the story of the *Odyssey* on a number of different levels. In Xenophon's refiguring of the epic *nostos* plot, the inland space of Asia Minor registers ambivalence in terms of what it represents, fluctuating between the fantastic sea regions of *Odyssey* 9–12, the boundaryless landlocked terrain prophesied in *Odyssey* 11, and the new lands of the colonizing narratives that might take the *Odyssey* as their antecedent. Xenophon moves in an ambivalent direction in treading the route of what appears to be both a *nostos* and a mission to found a colony.<sup>14</sup> In fact, it would be more accurate to say that as the *Anabasis* treks further into the interior, it retraces the combined narrative model of the *Odyssey* and the archetypal Greek foundation story – that is, a journey home and a journey away from home – by moving in both directions at once.<sup>15</sup>

The generic markers of home and homeland are not confined exclusively to the epic *nostos* narrative, however. Home plays a central role in the writing of history, geography, and ethnography, and especially the genre of travel writing. With its emphasis on traveling so far away from the norm that one might forget not “home” exactly but “the way home” (ἡ οἴκαδε ὁδός), the *Anabasis* touches on the question of prose's ability to steer a clear and coherent narrative line all the way to the end. Forgetting in the context of a fourth-century text no longer carries with it connotations of *kleos* and epic memory but rather the identity and nationality crises that can ensue from walking too far from home, especially when the landscape you move through is too vast and unfamiliar to be sufficiently stored or surveyed in the mind. Xenophon's exploration of disorientation, space, home, and forgetfulness in the *Anabasis* thus works as both prologue and antithesis to his description of the perfectly ordered and remembered space of the home in his *Oeconomicus* (Ch. 6).

I want to stress, however, that there is something innovative and positive in the disorientation that results from the *Anabasis*'s extremely countercartographical plot, even (and especially) in those places where the narrative appears in danger of falling apart. By decoding the scrambled

<sup>14</sup> On the latter point, see esp. Dalby 1992; Malkin 1998, 102–4. Xenophon twice proposes settling a colony in the *Anabasis*, first in a dismissive or joking tone at 3.2.24–5, but then with more seriousness as they reach the Black Sea (whose coast has already been settled with several Greek colonies, 5.6.11). Eventually, this creates tension in the narrative (Dillery 1995, 86–94).

<sup>15</sup> On the ability of the *nostos* narrative to move in many directions at once, Bonifazi (forthcoming).

messages that lie behind the experience of becoming lost, new logics and landscape patterns emerge, even when the ground appears to be in its most incoherent and unreadable state.<sup>16</sup> This has long been recognized. In Paris in the 1960s, for example, the Situationists attempted to break the patterns formed by habit that dominated their experience of familiar spaces, not so much by deliberately trying to get lost, but by forcing themselves to “drift” (*dérive*) in new directions in order to bring unnoticed aspects of the city’s topography to life.<sup>17</sup> One of the best-known examples of this form of wandering took place in the Harz region of Germany, which a man once walked around while closely following a map of London.<sup>18</sup> Although the practice of the *dérive* is a simple experiment, it effectively illustrates the ways in which we are informed by our own cultural models of space. In addition – although this differs from the stated aims of the Situationists – the Harz experiment tells us something about how Xenophon might have wandered through Asia Minor (if he carried any map in his head, it had to be associated in some way with a map of Greece), and the ways in which, unconsciously or not, we transpose familiar models of space onto unfamiliar landscapes.

At issue here is the convergence of inland space – an environment deeply unfamiliar to the Greeks – with the style of the narrative that describes it. Certain topographies of the Greek world are by now familiar for their ability to resonate with or shape certain types of plots. In our analysis of Aristagoras’s map in Herodotus’s *Histories*, we saw how the Ionian visitor attempted to use cartography to familiarize the Spartan

<sup>16</sup> The association between finding one’s way through space and putting a narrative into an ordered sequence of words is further illuminated by Lévi-Strauss 1973, in which his own account of becoming lost in the bush follows on from an attempt to take a census of an illiterate tribe, who imitate his bookkeeping by drawing squiggly lines on pieces of paper and passing them off as writing. In this case, Lévi-Strauss’s own inability to read the topography through which he passes is sharply contrasted with the way in which the locals rapidly trace his steps and find him. Cf. Derrida [1974] 1997, 101–40.

<sup>17</sup> The Situationists on the *dérive* sought a condition of *dépaysement*, that is “of being ‘taken out of one’s element’ or ‘misled’” (McDonough 2002, 264, note 39). Cf. McDonough 2002 on the Situationists’ experiments with new forms of cartography.

<sup>18</sup> Knabb 1981, 7, 50–4; G. Debord 1989; Sadler 1998; McDonough 2002; Ross 2002; McDonough 2005. The activities of the nineteenth-century Parisian *flâneur* also seek to uncover hidden or secret paths in the city. Benjamin 1979, 298: “Not to find one’s way in a city may well be uninteresting and banal. It requires ignorance – nothing more. But to lose oneself in a city – as one loses oneself in a forest – that calls for quite a different schooling.”

king with the space of the Persian Empire.<sup>19</sup> Cleomenes' reaction to that attempt is familiar (Hdt. 5.50.3):

ὦ ξεῖνε Μιλήσιε, ἀπαλλάσσεο ἐκ Σπάρτης πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου·  
οὐδένα γὰρ λόγον εὐεπέα λέγεις Λακεδαιμονίοισι, ἐθέλων σφέας ἀπὸ  
θαλάσσης τριῶν μηνῶν ὁδὸν ἀγαγεῖν.

Milesian stranger, be gone from Sparta before the sun sets. What you say is in no way an acceptable proposal to the Lacedaemonians, wishing to lead them on a three-month journey (*hodos*) away from the sea.

Less noted, however, is that Cleomenes' response contains an important clue to the way that the Greeks organized the known and unknown topographies of their world. For it is specifically the prospect of following a path that leads such a great distance *away from the sea* that Cleomenes finds antithetical to Spartan notions of travel and geography. To journey for three months into the interior is to enter into a universe as boundless and alien as the desert between Egypt and Ethiopia, a site from which Cambyses' troops eventually tread a dejected retreat and where a distant tribe of pygmies are "discovered" by an expedition who wander far into unexplored territory (Hdt. 2.32, 3.25). Similarly, in Book 4, Herodotus describes the inland topography of Scythia as a trackless landscape lacking boundaries or markers such as graves or civic architecture; an infinite and structureless terrain that Darius futilely attempts to "plot" with his surveyor's measuring cord.<sup>20</sup> As Shaw observes, Herodotus's Scythia is itself divided into a series of ethnic groups whose savagery escalates the further into the north (and away from the sea) they are located (1982, 11).

This also brings us back to the problem of inland space that we first encountered in Chapter 2. If narrative follows certain routes (the tracks of an earlier explorer or author) through an already-inscribed terrain, then we can better understand the breakdown of linguistic and generic markers in the story of Odysseus and the inland journey. For Odysseus turns off the well-marked path of epic into an unwritten and unnamed landscape.<sup>21</sup> It also permits us to go some way toward classifying the sea as an intertextual site, full of literary referents through which both protagonist and reader can establish their coordinates.<sup>22</sup> It makes sense

<sup>19</sup> Ch. 4; Hdt. 5.49ff.

<sup>20</sup> Hartog 1988; Purves 2006a.

<sup>21</sup> For the practice of naming and its role in the appropriation of territory, see Carter 1987, 1–33; De Certeau 1986, 142–4.

<sup>22</sup> On the intertextuality of place, see Barnes and Duncan 1992, 7–8.

that the Ten Thousand should lose their bearings when they march hundreds of miles inland, further from the sea than it is ever possible to march in Greece. No wonder, also, that their cry of “The sea! The sea!” resonates so strongly with the theme of homeland when they do finally set eyes upon the coast again. For with the reappearance of the long-absent sea, we imagine that the narrative is at last back on track, on familiar literary ground.<sup>23</sup> In Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, just as in the *Histories* and so many other Greek texts, the coastline marks the familiar and secure territory of home, while the movement away from the boundary of the sea indicates a terrain that is alien, uncharted, and often hard to limit or categorize.

Xenophon’s project in the *Anabasis* is not only to escape from this hostile environment but also to find a language and style with which to describe it. He has to somehow reconcile his experience in a foreign landscape with his attempt to put that novel experience into a new form of writing. In large part, the question is one of authorial vantage point. The reader is faced with the apparent contradiction of the name Xenophon encompassing both the historian who writes the *Anabasis*, with all the authorial control that position implies, and a character within the story who – although he plays a significant role in ordering and commanding the troops – never knows what lies behind the next turn in the road. Beyond the much-idealized view to the sea, which significantly comes into focus at the very last moment, the only aspect of surveying that Xenophon offers his reader is the measurement of distances, and when that fails, so too does the reader’s ability to keep track of the narrative.

## KEEPING TRACK

It will be easiest to track the Ten Thousand’s journey by following the customary practice of dividing the *Anabasis* into three phases.<sup>24</sup> Phase one covers the narrative up to the death of Cyrus (1.1–1.8), phase two up to the sight of the sea (1.9–4.7), and phase three up to the end of the work (4.8–7.8). In phase one, Xenophon begins with a straightforward account of the attempt by Cyrus the Younger to wrest power from his older brother, Artaxerxes II, after the death of their father Darius. Amassing

<sup>23</sup> Here, I disagree with those scholars who claim that the sea alone marks the territory of disorientation (e.g., Montiglio 2005, 8). The Ten Thousand wander not despite but because of the fact they are so far from the sea. Cf. Ch. 2.

<sup>24</sup> Nussbaum 1967, 147–93; Dillery 1995, 64ff.; Stronk 1995.

a vast army made up of both Persian soldiers and Greek mercenaries, Cyrus marches from Sardis to Babylon. The journey, which is narrated through the course of the first book, moves through Asia Minor along the left bank of the Euphrates.<sup>25</sup> At Cunaxa, just shy of Babylon, Cyrus meets the king in battle and dies (1.8). In the ensuing chaos that marks the beginning of phase two, most of the Greek generals are executed, and the Ten Thousand (led now by Xenophon and Cheirisophus) are chased north on a long march through the interior. At Trapezus, the first point of arrival at the Black Sea, the narrative moves into phase three. From here, the Ten Thousand make their way down to the Bosphorus by following the coastline, finally entering into the service of the Spartans in their war against Persia. In this chapter, I focus on the first and second phases of the work, for the breakdown of order and topography to be found there pushes the Greeks into a state of *aporia* and disorientation that repeatedly jeopardizes their chances of reaching home.

### *Counting by Parasangs: Number and Measure*

In my discussion of Odysseus's inland journey, I looked at Homer's use of measurement, or *metra*, to document not only movement through space but also the movement of the narrative itself, which – since it is divided into metrical units – is “counted out” through the singing of a poem. In Herodotus, the Pythia speaks in epic hexameters of knowing all the “measures” (*metra*) of the seas, yet her articulation of a divine way of seeing is offset by Herodotus's own empirical prose measures in the *Histories*, as when he gives the measurements of the Black Sea.<sup>26</sup> In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon continues this use of measurement and attempts to divide his narrative into an ordered system of units by which the reader can follow its progress. As Cyrus's army marches east in Book 1, Xenophon methodically takes note of the distances traveled each day according to the Persian units of *parasangs* and *stathmoi*.<sup>27</sup> As I mentioned earlier, in this first phase of the work, the “plot” of the *Anabasis* is made

<sup>25</sup> On Cyrus's route, see W. J. Farrell 1961; Joannès 1995.

<sup>26</sup> Chs. 2, 4; Hdt. 1.47.3, 4.85.2–86.4. Cf. Hartog 1988, 342.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. note 3. The *parasang* (like the modern *farsakh*) was a Persian unit of time that was converted into a spatial unit by the Greeks. Herodotus tells us at 2.6 that 1 *parasang* = 60 stades. According to W. J. Farrell 1961, 153, the speed of the *parasang* can be compared to the march of the British infantry (approx. 3 mph). The *stade* (from the Greek length of the stadium) was measured at 400 Grk cubits, or 600 feet. *OCD*, “Measurement, Greek”; Barnett 1963, 2–3; Bauslaugh 1979; Dilke 1987; Lewis 2001, xviii–xix, 19ff.

up of comprehensively recounting the steps of the road along which the Ten Thousand travel.

By breaking the journey up into a series of discrete and measurable units, the *parasang* creates an ordered narrative road.<sup>28</sup> As periods divide words into quantifiable sections of text, so do *parasangs* divide topography into a linear, sequential path. We need only examine the Greek system of measurement, which begins with the dactyl and multiplies on from there, to understand that there is an inherent connection between the original unit of sound by which verse was counted out (the dactyl of epic poetry), and the base factor of the dactyl (one finger's breadth) by which distances across space were measured.<sup>29</sup> For the Greeks, who counted by a system of letters, the analogy between language and measurement is close and correspondent.<sup>30</sup> Aristotle's *Rhetoric* describes the ideal period as the one that "has number – the easiest of all things to remember" (3.9.1409b5–6), and Kahn (1983) has demonstrated a link between the beginnings of geometry and prose in his analysis of architectural and civic plans in the archaic and classical periods. These examples help to show how number can be such an important ordering device for the spatial trajectory of Xenophon's narrative.

Scholars have invested considerable energy in trying to make sense of Xenophon's measurements. Why does he record *parasangs* in some parts of the journey and not others?<sup>31</sup> How did he count up his *parasangs* (did soldiers count numbers of steps; were there *parasang*-markers en route; was Xenophon working from an earlier periegetic source)? Why is he

<sup>28</sup> Tuplin 1997, 409 (on the *parasang*): "to measure and number things is to increase one's control over them." Cf. Carter 1987, in his discussion of nineteenth-century explorations into the Australian interior, who writes "[The explorer-writer] transformed his disconnected notes into a connected narrative of the road" (74). Alexander recognized the importance of ordering his journey by measuring its distances, and employed *bematistae*, or "pacers," to count the number of steps taken by his army each day (Graf 1994, 169).

<sup>29</sup> 2 dactyls (finger-breadths) = 1 half-finger; 4 dactyls = 1 palm; 16 dactyls = 1 foot; 100 feet = 1 acre; and so on.

<sup>30</sup> The Milesian or alphabetic numeration of the Greeks was possibly invented by Thales or Anaximander. See Dilke 1987, 13.

<sup>31</sup> "Xenophon uses *parasangs* to measure army-marches in five sections of the trip: (a) Sardis to Cunaxa; (b) Median Wall to R. Zab, (c) just after R. Zab to Villages N of Mespila, (d) R. Centrites to a little south of Armenian Village, and (e) R. Phasis to Trapezus. The biggest gap is between (c) and (d) and corresponds to the land of the Carduchi, an area not subject to the King and only intermittently in friendly relations with Achaemenid authority" (Tuplin 1997, 404).



accurate in some places with his measurements and vastly inaccurate in others?<sup>32</sup> I will not try to solve the historical and geographical puzzles that Xenophon's use of distance markers poses, but will instead discuss their role as a barometer of the fluctuating levels of disorientation that occur over the course of the Ten Thousand's journey. As landscape in the *Anabasis* becomes increasingly difficult to measure, the breakdown of numerical categories works hand in hand with a corresponding breakdown in the structure of the account.

At the start of Xenophon's description of the expedition from Sardis, he begins by establishing five numerical categories that he will employ to "measure out" his narrative into objective and rational prose: (i) number of troops; (ii) distances marched; (iii) lengths, breadths, and widths; (iv) time passed in days and/or nights; and (v) amounts of money. In the beginning, it is fairly clear how the first four of these categories function in the organization of Xenophon's prose (1.2.5–7):

Κῦρος δὲ ἔχων οὓς εἴρηκα ὠρμάτο ἀπὸ Σάρδεων· καὶ ἐξελαύνει διὰ τῆς Λυδίας σταθμούς τρεῖς παρασάγγας εἴκοσι καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τὸν Μαίανδρον ποταμόν. τούτου τὸ εὖρος δύο πλέθρα· γέφυρα δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξευγμένην πλοίοις. τοῦτον διαβὰς ἐξελαύνει διὰ Φρυγίας σταθμὸν ἕνα παρασάγγας ὀκτώ εἰς Κολοσσάς, πόλιν οἰκουμένην καὶ εὐδαίμονα καὶ μεγάλην. ἐνταῦθα ἔμεινεν ἡμέρας ἑπτὰ· καὶ ἦκε Μένων ὁ Θετταλὸς ὀπλίτας ἔχων χιλίους καὶ πελταστὰς πεντακοσίους, Δόλοπας καὶ Αἰνιᾶνας καὶ Ὀλυνθίους. ἐντεῦθεν ἐξελαύνει σταθμούς τρεῖς παρασάγγας εἴκοσιν εἰς Κελαινάς,

Having obtained the aforementioned troops, Cyrus set out from Sardis. He marched three stathmoi, a distance of twenty-two parasangs, through Lydia to the Maeander river. The width of this river is two plethra,<sup>33</sup> and there was a bridge formed from boats upon it. Having crossed this river he marched one stathmos, a distance of eight parasangs, through Phrygia to Colossae, an inhabited, prosperous, and large city. He stayed there for seven days. Then Menon the Thessalian joined him, bringing a thousand hoplites and five hundred peltasts, made up of Dolopians, Aenianians, and Olynthians. From there he marched three stathmoi, a distance of twenty parasangs, to Celaenae.

<sup>32</sup> Cawkwell 2004. Cf. Hornblower 1994, 26–8; Rubincam 2001 on Thucydidean numerical inaccuracies.

<sup>33</sup> 1 *plethrum* = approx. 100 Grk feet.

Even though these units of measurement are not always fixed (the *stathmos* can denote anything from five to ten *parasangs*), by setting them in relation to one another, Xenophon orders the space he is walking through. Similarly, the money that the Greek mercenaries are to be paid will, according to the terms of their employment, be counted out in direct relation to the amount of time they spend on the journey.<sup>34</sup> But these measuring systems work better in theory than in practice, especially after Cyrus deviates from the main route of the Royal Road, first by veering southeast through hostile territory (1.2.19) and then by marching along the left bank of the Euphrates instead of the right.<sup>35</sup> This takes the Ten Thousand into a difficult and inhospitable terrain where they are forced to march quickly and where food is scarce (1.5.1–6).

In the first phase of the *Anabasis* (1.1–8), the word *parasang* occurs fairly frequently, but its use drops rapidly in the second (“lost”) phase.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, *stathmos* occurs more frequently in the first phase than in the second.<sup>37</sup> As we move into the third phase of the work (after reaching the Black Sea), the Greek system of measurement, the *stade*, comes to replace the use of *parasang* and *stathmos*. In fact, these two terms all but disappear from Xenophon’s vocabulary once he reaches the sea.<sup>38</sup> As Xenophon progresses through the first two phases of the work, the *parasang* and *stathmos* also become increasingly unstable. Most notably, the *stathmos* begins to expand in length as Cyrus requires his army to

<sup>34</sup> It is not clear how the pay system in the *Anabasis* worked, especially as it broke down so rapidly. But see G. T. Griffith 1935, 265–6, who believes that the soldiers’ pay was intended to be distributed at the end of each month, citing later occasions when Cyrus raises the rate of pay per month (1.3.21; 5.6.23).

<sup>35</sup> We are unsure of the exact route of the main Royal Road, but Joannès’s assessment of the evidence from cuneiform and neo-Assyrian texts indicates that the conventional route was located on the right of the Euphrates, rather than the left (1995, 182–5); P. Debord 1995, 95; Tuplin 1999.

<sup>36</sup> First phase: 27 times in 32 OCT pages (1–1.8), or approximately 0.84 times per page. Second phase: 25 times in 99 OCT pages (1.9–4.7), or approximately 0.25 times per page.

<sup>37</sup> First phase: 31 times in 32 OCT pages (approx. 0.97 times per page); Second phase: 30 times in 99 OCT pages (approx. 0.30 times per page).

<sup>38</sup> *Parasang* occurs a mere four times in phase three (120 OCT pages), or approximately 0.033 times per page; *stathmos* occurs six times in the same 120 pages, or approximately 0.05 times per page. The word *stade*, on the other hand, remains fairly consistent between the three phases, with a slight increase in frequency (it occurs approx. 0.125 times per page in phase one, 0.18 times per page in phase two; 0.158 per page in phase three).

cover greater distances in shorter amounts of time. An example occurs midway through Book I (I.5.6.I–7.3):<sup>39</sup>

τὸ δὲ στράτευμα ὁ σῖτος ἐπέλιπε, καὶ πρίασθαι οὐκ ἦν εἰ μὴ ἐν τῇ Λυδίᾳ ἀγορᾷ, ἐν τῷ Κύρου βαρβαρικῷ, τὴν καπίθην ἀλεύρων ἢ ἀλφίτων τεττάρων σίγλων. ὁ δὲ σίγλος δύναται ἕπτ' ὀβολοῦς καὶ ἡμιωβέλιον Ἀττικούς· ἡ δὲ καπίθη δύο χοίνικας Ἀττικὰς ἐχώρει. κρέα οὖν ἐσθιόντες οἱ στρατιῶται διεγίγνοντο. ἦν δὲ τούτων τῶν σταθμῶν οὓς πάνυ μακροὺς ἤλανεν, ὁππότε ἢ πρὸς ὕδωρ βούλοιτο διατελέσαι ἢ πρὸς χιλόν.

The army's grain supply ran out, and it was not possible to buy any except in the Lydian market in Cyrus's barbarian army, at the price of four *sigli* for a *capithê* of wheat flour or barley meal. The *siglus* is worth seven-and-a-half Attic obols, the *capithê* yields two Attic *choenices*. So the soldiers survived by eating meat. Some of the stages (*stathmoi*) Cyrus marched were very long, on those occasions when he wished to reach water or fodder.

The rapid shift in monetary value that takes place at the same time as the *stathmoi* are increased is also a result of the difficult terrain: it provides the Greeks with nothing to eat, leaving them at the mercy of inflated prices (here fifty times those at Athens). It also means that their payment is repeatedly deferred (I.2.II; I.3.2I; I.4.I3).

The gradual collapse of measuring systems and numerical values comes to a head in the second phase of the work, when the Ten Thousand are forced to turn toward the north without leaders or guides. This prompts Xenophon to suggest abandoning the old system of relative weights and values (3.2.2I):

τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια πότερον ὠνεῖσθαι κρεῖττον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἢς οὗτοι παρεῖχον μικρὰ μέτρα πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου, μηδὲ τοῦτο ἔτι ἔχοντας, ἢ αὐτοὺς λαμβάνειν ἥνπερ κρατῶμεν, μέτρῳ χρωμένους ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται;

which is better – to buy our provisions from their market, where they were offering small measures for a great deal of money, even though we don't have money, or for us to take provisions for ourselves if we are strong enough, and to set our own standards of measurement according to each of our desires?

<sup>39</sup> Cf. 2.2.I2.I–3, where Ariaeus advises the Ten to “make our first *stathmoi* as long as possible in order to separate ourselves as far as possible from the army of the King.”

As the story of the journey begins to lose its markers of distance and number, so do its protagonists come to abandon the relative standards of measure by which they had regulated the exchange of provisions. The phrase *ὅπόσῳ ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται* that Xenophon uses in his call for setting new prices in the marketplace speaks to a temporary setting aside of number and limit. This suggests that, as the Ten Thousand move further inland, the practice of counting as a means of conferring order and meaning becomes increasingly difficult to carry out. As they progress on their march, the Greeks are faced with unquantifiable entities, whether in the form of the “immeasurable number” of the enemy (3.2.16: *τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἄμετρον*), or an incommensurate landscape (3.5.7):

καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλὴ ἀπορία ἦν. ἔνθεν μὲν γὰρ ὄρη ἦν ὑπερύψηλα, ἔνθεν δὲ ὁ ποταμὸς τοσοῦτος βάθος ὥς μηδὲ τὰ δόρατα ὑπερέχουν πειρωμένοις τοῦ βάθους.

There was no easy way to make it out from there. For the mountains were exceedingly high, and the river so deep that not even their spears reached above it when they tested its depth.

The phenomenon of incommensurability results in part from the vastness of the Persian Empire, which often appears to stretch endlessly toward an undefined horizon. When, in Book 1, the Greek mercenaries complain to Cyrus about not receiving their pay, he reassures them by alluding to the limitless resources of his father's land (1.7.6–7):

Ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν ἡμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ πατρώα πρὸς μὲν μεσημβρίαν μέχρι οὗ διὰ καῦμα οὐ δύνανται οἰκεῖν ἄνθρωποι, πρὸς δὲ ἄρκτον μέχρι οὗ διὰ χειμῶνα· τὰ δ' ἐν μέσῳ τούτων πάντα σατραπεύουσιν οἱ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀδελφοῦ φίλοι. ἦν δ' ἡμεῖς νικήσωμεν, ἡμᾶς δεῖ τοὺς ἡμετέρους φίλους τούτων ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῆσαι. ὥστε οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα, μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν φίλων, ἂν εὖ γένηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ.

Men, my father's rule reaches as far to the south as it is possible to live in the heat and as far to the north as it is possible to live in the cold. All the land in between the friends of my brother oversee. If we are victorious, I guarantee that I will make *my* friends in charge of these places. So I am not afraid on this account – that I will not have anything to give to each of my friends, should things go well – rather that I will not have enough friends to give my land to.

Even the vast number of friends in Cyrus's retinue is insignificant in the face of the size of the Persian Empire. Human beings will always

be small in relation to this kind of topography, and this is something that the Persian royal household has long understood and prepared for, not only in their careful network of satraps, but also by devices like the King's Eye and the monarch's seasonal tours and changes of residence.<sup>40</sup> A legendarily fast messenger service made up of horse-riders working in relay serviced the network of royal roads.<sup>41</sup> The monarchy thereby found ways of minimizing the difficulty of the extraordinary distances in their landscape. Even faster communication could be achieved by a system of fire beacons posted at stages along the king's highway. By means of these beacons, it was said that the king could learn of all the news in his empire within a single day, making movement across space – even space as vast as this – virtually instantaneous.<sup>42</sup> Contrast the Lydian monarch Croesus's testing of the oracles in Herodotus, in which he allowed a hundred days for his different messengers to radiate out to different oracle sites, or Cleomenes' shock at the idea of a land-march that could take three months.<sup>43</sup> As for the Ten Thousand, it takes them two years to walk through the king's territory.

The Persian king uses these devices in order to make his extensive empire visible, legible, and to scale. The Greeks, in contrast, are in every sense dominated by the territory they move through, and much of their subjection comes from the fact that their forward progress is slow, often hindered by obstacles such as rivers, mountains, or hostile forces, and that the distances they traverse are sometimes difficult to calculate. Unlike the officials who monitor the fire beacons and who rely on a system of seeing at a distance, neither the Ten Thousand nor Xenophon, from his position as "internal" narrator, can transcend their environment or see it from the outside. Although they begin by attempting to measure and track its roads by following the Persian example, they end up so immersed in the topography that they abandon the idea of regular intervals and measuring systems altogether.

Xenophon's call to the mercenaries to set their own standards of measurement "according to each of our desires" that we considered earlier makes use of a phrase (ὅπόσῳ ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται, literally: "as far as

<sup>40</sup> On the size of Cyrus the Great's empire, see further *Cyr.* 1.1.5; 8.8.1. Cf. Graf 1994; Briant 1988, 67–8.

<sup>41</sup> At *Cyr.* 8.6.17, Xenophon claims that the messenger service was reputed to be faster than the flight of a bird, calling it "the fastest overland travel among men." Cf. *Xen. Cyr.* 8.6.16, 17, 21.

<sup>42</sup> Arist. [*Mund.*] 398a30; Hdt. 8.53–4, 98; 9.31; Tracy 1986; Graf 1994, 168.

<sup>43</sup> As discussed in Ch. 4.

each of us pleases”) that is later echoed in his description of one of two key dreams in the text: (4.3.8):

Ξενοφῶν δὲ ὄναρ εἶδεν· ἔδοξεν ἐν πέδαις δεδέσθαι, αὐταὶ δὲ αὐτῷ  
αὐτόματα περιρρυῖναι, ὥστε λυθῆναι καὶ διαβαίνειν ὅπῃσιν  
ἐβούλετο.

Xenophon had a dream. He dreamed that he was bound in chains but that they fell off him spontaneously, leaving him free and able to stride (or cross over, *diabainō*) as far as he pleased.

The dream appears to Xenophon as a good omen: it occurs on a night when the Ten Thousand have come up against an apparently unfordable river, and the next morning Xenophon is shown a way to cross over (*diabainō*) to the other side. The chains that bind Xenophon in the dream imply not only that he is in danger of losing his freedom as a Greek but also that he is a captive of the terrain, despite the fact that it is so expansive. This second reading makes even the sense of release he experiences in the dream ambivalent, for the idea of being able to walk “as far as he pleased” hints at the disturbing nature of a landscape that stretches on and on, seemingly without end. It registers, if only obliquely, that Xenophon’s triumph in finding a way to move forward through this inland space is muted by the danger that he could go on walking forever, or that – in this landscape – distances themselves might be meaningless and infinite.

As an objective stance becomes harder to apply to both the topography and the narrative, Xenophon stops repetitively recording *stathmoi* and *parasangs*. As noted earlier, mention of both drops dramatically as we move through the first three books. Cawkwell notes that when the Ten Thousand march out of valleys and into territories off the beaten path, Xenophon recounts the number of days passed rather than parasangs (4.3.2), although he does briefly return to *stathmoi* and *parasangs* in the more stable terrain of Armenia (4.5.2–3).<sup>44</sup> As Breitenbach’s recording of the times and distances marched in the *Anabasis* shows (1967, cols. 1579ff.), there is a great discrepancy in Xenophon’s methods and in the amount of ground covered each day. Once the Ten Thousand reach the sea on the other side of Asia Minor, measurement is reintroduced as the army regains its bearings, but this time within the shorter dimensions of

<sup>44</sup> Cawkwell 2004, 57–8: “after Armenia the record is somewhat fitful, and after Trapezus there is no further mention of *stathmoi* and *parasangs* (save 5.5.1).” For a detailed analysis of *parasangs* in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, see Tuplin 1997, 404–17.

the Greek stade. It is at the interstice of these two measuring systems, topographically positioned between the Royal Road and the sea, that the Ten Thousand wander far from the perimeters of measurable space.

*Wandering Off-Track*

Without the familiar topographical signposts of boundaries, measurements, or sea, the Greeks are frequently described as lost in their movement through the interior. They anticipate this before they start the journey north, telling Tissaphernes: “Without you, every road is clouded over by the darkness of our ignorance . . . every river is hard to cross (*dusporos*)” (2.5.9). Although it is in Tissaphernes’ own interests to paint as negative a picture of the landscape as possible, his description of the Ten’s route out of Asia Minor is similarly bleak (2.5.18):

οὐ τοσαῦτα μὲν πεδιάς ἃ ὑμεῖς φίλια ὄντα σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ διαπορεύεσθε, τοσαῦτα δὲ ὄρη ὁρᾶτε ὑμῖν ὄντα πορευτέα, ἃ ἡμῖν ἔξεστι προκαταλαβοῦσιν ἄπορα ὑμῖν παρέχειν, τοσοῦτοι δ’ εἰσὶ ποταμοὶ ἐφ’ ὧν ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ὅποσους ἂν ὑμῶν βουλώμεθα μάχεσθαι; εἰσὶ δ’ αὐτῶν οὓς οὐδ’ ἂν παντάπασι διαβῶιητε, εἰ μὴ ἡμεῖς ὑμᾶς διαπορεύοιμεν.

Don’t you see how great the plains are which, even in good conditions, you journey across so arduously? Don’t you see how large the mountains are that you will need to travel over, which it is possible for us to take ahead of you, making them impassable? Don’t you see how large the rivers are, around which it is possible for us to marshal as many of you as we wished to fight? In fact, some of these rivers you would not be able to cross at all, if we weren’t there to ferry you across them.

Later, after Tissaphernes betrays them, the Ten Thousand are left with a great sense of helplessness: ἐν πολλῇ δὴ ἀπορίᾳ (3.1.2):

ἀπείχον δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ μείον ἢ μύρια στάδια, ἡγεμῶν δ’ οὐδείς τῆς ὁδοῦ ἦν, ποταμοὶ δὲ διείργον ἀδιάβατοι ἐν μέσῳ τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ . . .

They were no less than 10,000 stades from Greece with no guide for the road, and there were unpassable rivers lying between them and the road home . . .

The lack of guides and the difficulty of crossing rivers are repeatedly invoked as the greatest challenges of the topography. It is not as if the Ten Thousand wander completely aimlessly; Xenophon calls for their carts

to be set on fire in order that the pack-animals not determine their route (3.2.27), and they often capture villagers to use as guides. Nevertheless, the word *aporia* is repeatedly employed in the second phase of the work to describe the Greeks' sense of hopelessness in the face of the interior's unfathomable geography.<sup>45</sup>

In the *Anabasis*, *aporia* is often applied to the difficulty of crossing rivers (3.2.22; 4.1.2; 4.3.6; 6.6.23) and mountains (2.5.18).<sup>46</sup> The Greeks are periodically "at a loss" because they can find no "way" (*poros*) or passage through the landscape of Asia Minor. As Detienne and Vernant have shown, the word *poros* means a route or path but also a stratagem, "the expedient which the cunning of an intelligent being can devise in order to escape from an *aporia*" (1991, 150, cf. 144–54; 289–92). The convergence of spatial order, cunning, and plot embedded in *poros* is also reflected in the problem that Xenophon faces in the *Anabasis* – his authorial crux is first and foremost a topographical one. In order to make it to the end of his story, he needs to find his way through and out of the landscape that he is trapped in. *Aporia*, a condition of lack, impassability, or confusion, is thus diametrically opposed to the route-marker of the *parasang*. *Apor*-words occur most frequently in the second and third books, where there is also a corresponding dip in the number of times the measuring terms *parasang* or *stathmos* are used. This is especially noticeable in Book 3, where *parasang* and *stathmos* measurements are used only four times respectively (compared to 28 and 32 times in Book 1) but instances of *apor*-words rises to ten times (compared to three times in Book 1).

Commentators have puzzled over why the several rivers that the Greeks encounter on their route north were so difficult to cross.<sup>47</sup> At that time of year, they should have been not only fordable but even helpful to the army as a navigational tool. Instead, in keeping with their Hellenocentric view of the interior as *aporia*, the Ten Thousand do not see the rivers as "roads" or routes to travel along (*poroi*) but as obstacles that hinder their movement through the landscape (*aporoi*).<sup>48</sup> Guides help the Greeks on

<sup>45</sup> *An.* 2.2.12; 2.4.1; 2.5.9; 2.5.10; 2.5.17; 2.5.18; 2.5.21; 3.1.2; 3.1.11; 3.1.13; 3.1.21; 3.1.26; 3.2.22 (x2); 3.3.4; 3.5.7; 3.5.8.

<sup>46</sup> See Hartog 1988, 57–60 on *poros* and *aporia* in Herodotus's narrative of Scythia.

<sup>47</sup> Xenophon often describes the rivers in the interior as uncrossable (*a-diabatos*, *a-poros*) – *An.* 2.1.11; 3.1.2; 3.2.22; 4.3.6. Baslez 1995, 84; Brulé 1995, 7; Tuplin 1999, 340–3.

<sup>48</sup> In the first phase of the expedition, rivers do "help" the Ten Thousand. Great significance is attached to the act of crossing the Euphrates from the right bank to the left, while the river itself miraculously only reaches to the men's chests, becoming crossable (*diabatos*) in what is perceived by the Cyreans to be a favorable convergence of body, geography, and fate (1.4.18).



the occasions when they are available (3.1.1; 3.5.14; 4.5.25) but often not for long (4.6.3). Instead, the Greeks haphazardly make their way across rivers and navigate a route toward the sea in an environment largely lacking the kinds of reference points or markers necessary to plot the distance home.

*The Route through Asia Minor and the Narrative Path*

The Ten Thousand experience a basic difficulty in moving *forward* through the narrative, either because they are held back by a great sense of despondency (*aporia*, *athumia*) or because of the layout of the terrain and its hostile inhabitants (4.3.7). Often, they either do not know which way they are going or are forced to take detours, sometimes even in reverse (3.5.13, 17; 4.2.2). This has an effect on the narrative itself, placing it in danger of losing its way.

Carter identifies a similar effect on the narratives of the first government-sponsored explorations into the nineteenth-century Australian interior. He describes the difficulties these explorers had in writing up their journeys because of the novelty of the landscape. In their descriptions of journeys into a terrain where no road yet exists: “their task is to draw the line for the first time, to give space a narrative form, and hence the possibility of a future history . . .” (1990, 102–3). Carter also analyzes how the accounts of these journeys become increasingly discontinuous and plotless the further they move toward the idea of an unmarked center. He uses Miller’s reading of narrative, or *diêgesis*, as “the redrawing of a line already drawn,” to show how, in the absence of an inscribed pathway in the landscape, “the narrative itself cannot proceed confidently forward.”<sup>49</sup>

Yet if a plot, as Brooks has claimed, is always a deviance from the straight line between beginning and end, always a vacillating “detour,” then the lost interior of Books 3 and 4, as it is mapped onto the round-about progress of the Ten Thousand, may be said to provide the *Anabasis* with its “deviant middle” (1984, 104). This formulation only works if there is a tension between the deviance of the middle and the drive of the plot to eventually reach its goal, operating as a kind of sequence of desires and frustrations that recharge each other. In the *Anabasis* the draining of “textual energy” that occurs when the men, at a number of points in the

<sup>49</sup> Carter 1990, 92; Miller 1981, 25; also quoted in Brooks 1984, 338, note 9. See further Purves 2006a, 16–17.

story, refuse to go any further, leads to a narrative impasse that mirrors the impasse of the Ten Thousand in an indomitable topography (4.5.15). Although the reader knows, in other words, that the Greeks *will* eventually reach the sea (just as every reader knows that a sentence or text will eventually come to an end), he is as blind as the characters in the *Anabasis* are as to his location on the narrative “road” and his distance away from its end.<sup>50</sup>

The experience of the Ten Thousand on their inland journey, many of whom simply “turned aside and sat down, refusing to go any further,” may be compared with Aristotle’s description of the reader who flags and gives up before reaching the end of a sentence (*Rh.* 3.9.1409a30–4):<sup>51</sup>

I mean by the *lexis eiromenē* that style which has no end (*telos*) in itself, and does not complete the event being narrated. It is displeasing because of its endlessness (*to apeiron*), for everyone likes to have the end (*telos*) in view. Otherwise they run out of breath and give up at the turning posts. But those who are able to look ahead to the end (*peras*) do not tire ahead of time.

There is no indication of how far the Ten Thousand are from the sea throughout their time inland, until the mention of a guide who promises to lead them there in five days, just a few paragraphs before they reach the coast. But even then, both the reader and army believe that the guide is deceiving them, and Xenophon holds back from mentioning the sea until the last possible moment. When the end does come in sight, the army approaches it, like Aristotle’s reader, through a series of “blind turns,” only fully realizing its position as the shout is passed down the line of men, and as they come closer to their eagerly anticipated view (4.7.21–4).

### *Losing the Way Home*

The waning of markers that indicate distance and direction translates, at the most heightened points of *aporia*, into a disordered and improper use of space. At the beginning of Book 3, the Greeks are so despondent (ἐν πολλῇ δὴ ἀπορίᾳ) that they no longer even sleep in their quarters, but

<sup>50</sup> Even Jane Austen’s “tell-tale compression of pages” (*Northanger Abbey*, ch. 31) is of no help here. Not only does a fourth-century text lack “pages” to count, but the “telos” of reaching the sea is hidden within the middle of the narrative as a whole.

<sup>51</sup> *An.* 4.5.15: ἐνταῦθα ἑκτραπρόμενοι ἐκάθηντο καὶ οὐκ ἔφασσαν πορεύεσθαι. The Greek text of the Aristotle is provided in Chs. 1 and 4.

simply lie at random wherever they happen to be on the ground (3.3.1). The disintegration of home operates on two levels in the text, both as a loss (sometimes classed as a forgetting) of orientation toward Greece, and as a gradual dissolution in the ordering of the camp, as the Ten Thousand are forced to give up their property, women, and slaves at various stages in the march (4.1.12–14). Cut off from home, both spatially and symbolically, the Ten Thousand find themselves in a state of (o)utopia, or nonplace, in the topography between Cunaxa and Trapezus.<sup>52</sup> In a reversal of the norms of home, they encounter a vast, abandoned citadel whose deep-set walls stand empty of inhabitants (3.4.7), and a topsy-turvy village whose underground dwellings are inhabited by animals (4.5.25–34). Where the Ten Thousand do find a domestic norm, they quickly destabilize it by ransacking homes in search of food.

This heightened sense of despondency is evident in Xenophon's other major dream in the text, in which he sees a thunderbolt fall on his father's house and set it on fire (3.1.11–12). Upon waking, Xenophon worries that the dream was sent by Zeus and means that he will never be able to escape (ἐξελθεῖν) the king's land but will always be "shut in from all sides" by various *aporia* (εἰργοιτο πάντοθεν ὑπὸ τινων ἀποριῶν).<sup>53</sup>

The dream suggests both the dissolution of the idea of the fatherland in this new, protean landscape and the breakdown of social structures associated with home.<sup>54</sup> Its significance is underscored by Xenophon's own future status as an exile from Athens. Sometime after Cyrus's expedition, Xenophon was sent into exile, probably for his role in the Athenian oligarchy of the "Thirty Tyrants" (404–403 BCE). It is believed that he may have also been exiled from his adopted home of Scillus, outside Olympia.<sup>55</sup> The account of his departure from Athens in the *Anabasis* is notably equivocal (3.1.5–7), while his description of his estate near

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Dillery's reading of utopia (with an "e") in the last stage of the *Anabasis* (1995, 59–98, esp. 63–95). His use of the word to mean an "ideal community" is different from my meaning of it as "placelessness" with an "o." For more on utopic space, see Marin 1984; Grosz 2001, 131–50. We could also broaden our description of "home" to include Heidegger's sense of the uncanny or *unheimlich* ("unhomeliness") – an apt description of the experience of being lost.

<sup>53</sup> Note the use of moving verbs by Herodotus (such as compounds of *bainō* and *eimi*) in order to express his role as a narrator progressing through the text, as discussed in Ch. 4. Here too, Xenophon effectively sets up his narrative, and the progress of "marching" through or being stuck in it as a reader, as a mimesis of the disordered landscape.

<sup>54</sup> Ma 2004, 336; Parker 2004, 148.

<sup>55</sup> Dillery 1995, 94.

Olympia (5.3) is utopian both in terms of its location (a liminal space sacred to Artemis) and its abundance (fish, crops, games, and festivals abound). Xenophon's complicated relationship to homeland is thus displaced onto the non-Greek landscape through which the Ten Thousand travel, which itself acts out the absence of a clearly marked homeland within the story of the *Anabasis*.<sup>56</sup>

### *Disappearing Acts*

The inland geography of the *Anabasis*, whether it is described as nomadic, utopian, or uncanny and *oikos*-less, in each case amounts to the same thing: a vast, uncharted region that it is largely impossible for the Greeks to grasp visually or cognitively. From the indeterminate position of being somewhere "inside" the landscape (ἐν μέσῳ τῇ χώρᾳ) and surrounded by uncrossable rivers (ποταμῶν ἐντὸς ἀδιαβάτων) (2.1.11; cf. 3.1.12, 3.5.7), the Ten Thousand lack a sense of overview by which they might cognitively map their position. Rather, as if traveling through a labyrinth, they wander through a geography composed of obstacles and unclear entrances and exits.<sup>57</sup>

As we have already observed in the *Histories* and the *Odyssey*, bodies become so lost in this kind of inland landscape that they sometimes disappear without trace. In Herodotus, Aristean and Salmoxis vanish within the interior space of the North, and the Scythians confidently predict that Darius will never find the graves of their ancestors, no matter how hard he looks for them (Hdt. 4.14–15, 95, 127). In a similar fashion, Odysseus "disappears" within the interior by leaving behind only an equivocal trace of his journey, in the form of a *séma*, which remains anonymous and which stands as an ambiguous marker in an unknown location (Ch. 2). Within the inland regions of the *Anabasis*, the corpse of Orontas vanishes (1.6.11) and two companies of the army disappear crossing some mountains into a plain (1.2.25). Some of the Ten Thousand attribute the latter disappearance to the savagery of the Cilicians, but others believe they simply lost their way. This passage

<sup>56</sup> My reading of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (Ch. 6) serves as the counternarrative to this story of being "lost in space." In that work, Xenophon uses the architecture and management of the house to ensure that space remains ordered, commensurate, and stable.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. E. Jameson's famous description of losing his way in the Bonaventura Hotel (1984, 83.)

articulates more strongly than any other the danger of getting lost in the *Anabasis* (I.2.25):

οἱ μὲν ἔφασαν ἀρπάζοντάς τι κατακοπῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν Κιλικίων, οἱ δὲ ὑπολειφθέντας καὶ οὐ δυναμένους εὑρεῖν τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα οὐδὲ τὰς ὁδοὺς εἴτα πλανωμένους ἀπολέσθαι·

Some said that somehow they had been cut to pieces by the Cilicians when they were plundering; others that they had been left behind and were unable to find the rest of the army or the roads. Then, wandering about (*planaomai*), they perished.

In Book 3, 120,000 men are reported to have disappeared within the inland territory of the Carduchians (3.5.16):

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμβαλεῖν ποτε εἰς αὐτοὺς βασιλικὴν στρατιὰν δώδεκα μυριάδας· τούτων δ' οὐδέν' ἀπονοστήσαι διὰ τὴν δυσχωρίαν.

In fact, once a king's army of one hundred and twenty thousand men invaded them. But because of the inhospitable landscape (*duschôria*), not a single one of them returned.

The territory of the interior, then, as it displays an uncanny ability to erase the bodies that move through it, acts as a strange double to the sea; the trackless medium *par excellence* into which sailors often vanished without trace. The landscape is large enough to absorb not only the body of Orontas but also those of a thousand Greek hoplites and 120,000 royal soldiers. Perhaps Xenophon has this in mind when he talks of forgetting the way home, for when they disappear into the mountains, the king's soldiers fail to "return home" in the epic sense (*aponostêd*). The threat of losing one's way forever is a constant source of unease within the *Anabasis*, a text that Ma has argued is "structured around the difficulty or impossibility of return" (2004, 333).

The mainland is thus transformed into a landscape that human beings can symbolically drown in, whose lack of boundaries reflects eerily upon the unfathomable depth of the sea.<sup>58</sup> The comparison of inland space, especially the desert, with the sea has a rich literary heritage.<sup>59</sup> In the

<sup>58</sup> This applies also to the inland space being characterized by *aporia*. Cf. Detienne and Vernant 1991, 151–2 on the sea (Pontos) as a primordial, undifferentiated mass until it is spatially differentiated by path, Poros.

<sup>59</sup> Rood (2004, 24–6) comments on parallels between the sighting of the sea and the motif of escape from shipwreck, comparing the Ten Thousand's viewpoint from Mount Thekes with the sight of land by sailors from the open sea. See also my points about Odysseus's inland "shipwreck" in the conclusion to Ch. 2.

*Anabasis*, one of the first indications that the Ten Thousand are entering an alien and incommensurate territory is their discovery of the “Arabian desert,” which figures in the text as a kind of landlocked ocean complete with briny absinthe (1.5.1):

ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τόπῳ ἦν μὲν ἡ γῆ πεδῖον ἅπαν ὁμαλὲς ὥσπερ  
θάλαττα, ἀψινθίου δὲ πλήρεις

In this place the land was completely flat and level, just like the sea,  
and it was full of absinthe.

and within which even the ostrich performs a strange kind of “sailing” when it is chased by men on horseback (1.5.3):

πολὺ γὰρ ἀπέσπα φεύγουσα, τοῖς μὲν ποσὶ δρόμῳ, ταῖς δὲ πτέρυξιν  
αἴρουσα, ὥσπερ ἰστίῳ χρωμένῃ.

[The ostrich], fleeing, would pull far ahead of them, running with its  
feet and lifting itself up with its wings just as if it were using a sail.

The interior landscape of the *Anabasis* has a sluggish, retarding power that threatens to impede the drive of the plot, and that is more commonly associated with the outer edges of the sea.<sup>60</sup> Throughout Books 3 and 4, Xenophon enforces his role as both leader and author in willing his men to keep moving forward through a landscape that repeatedly entices them to lie down in despair (3.1.14; 4.5.15–16; 4.5.19; 5.8.14–15; cf. 4.8.21). Although it is primarily hunger, cold, and physical exhaustion that stop the men from proceeding, the larger context of *aporia* that is played out within the structure of the narrative calls the feasibility of ever making it home into question.

## REACHING THE SEA... REACHING THE END?

The impulse toward disorientation and despair brought on by the interior leads the reader to believe that measurement, markers, and order will reassert themselves when the Greeks do eventually reach the coast at the end of Book 4. Certainly, the first thing that the Ten Thousand do upon viewing the sea is set up a monument (*kolonos megas*, 4.7.26) topped with enemy shields, ox hides, and walking sticks, which can be viewed as a

<sup>60</sup> Herodotus, in his account of the attempts to circumnavigate Africa (4.43.6), tells how Sataspes turned back because “his ship was unable to go any further forward, but simply stuck fast in the water.” Cf. Romm 1992, 20–6. On the drive of the plot, see Brooks 1984, 90–142.

version of a boundary stone, signaling a return to the kind of territory that is open to the practices of marking and surveying.<sup>61</sup> Tuplin calls it “not a trophy but a monument of a psychological state” and thinks that it results “from a spontaneous need to «mark» the place/moment” (1999, 361). He draws a parallel with the milestone markers set up for Hermes, the god of boundaries.

Immediately after the setting up of the monument, the verb *horizô* occurs in the text, to describe how a river forms a border between the Macronians and the Scythinians (4.8.1). This expression for boundary (as either verb or noun: *horizô/horion*) has been used only once before in the *Anabasis*, just a few sections earlier (4.3.1), but its occurrences sharply increase (to nine more in the ensuing books) after the Greeks reach the sea.<sup>62</sup> In Book 7, for example, it is employed to describe a line of boundary stones along the Thracian coast (7.5.13). Nowhere inland do we find any indications of boundary-drawing. Given the significance of *horoï* or boundary-markers in the Greek polis, this stone might then refer to a return to a demarcated landscape that is manageable and potentially political.<sup>63</sup>

Beyond the implications of this “boundary,” the reordering of the topography of Books 5–7 can be discerned in Xenophon’s return to an ordered sense of scale in his work, and the most explicit indication of this is the way that *parasang* and *stathmos* are largely displaced by the stade, a Greek unit of measurement, in Books 5 and 6.<sup>64</sup> The landscape of the coast, which Xenophon describes as populated with Greek towns set at a distance of eighty stades from one another (5.4.31), is ordered and regulated. In fact, the stade is symbolically reintegrated into the topography through the running of the stadion in the games held upon arrival at Trapezus. In running this race and the longer *dolichos* (a distance of between 6 and 24 stades), the Ten Thousand get back into the practice of performing their Greek identity, as it were, by recovering the physical memory of traversing a Greek unit of space.<sup>65</sup> For the spectators too,

<sup>61</sup> Scholars have questioned the purpose of this monument, since there have been no recent victories to celebrate (cf. Dillery 1995, 77).

<sup>62</sup> 4.3.1; 4.8.2; 4.8.9; 5.4.2; 6.2.19; 7.5.13.2; 7.5.13.3; 7.7.36.

<sup>63</sup> On the *horos* demarcating the space of the polis, see Cole 2004, 20.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. 5.3.4; 5.5.4; 5.6.23; 5.6.26; 6.2; 7.1.3; 7.5.13.

<sup>65</sup> Or perhaps we should say engaging in the *idea* of the performance, since most of the runners of the stadion were the boys of captives. The stadion was a running race that took its name from the Greek stade, modeled on the length of the stadion at Olympia. On the improvisation of a community around the stadion, see Ma 2004, 338.

the effect is similar – in observing members of their company run the length of a stade, they are given the opportunity to reframe their idea of the landscape according to familiar models and lengths, even when the piece of ground that the stadion is run on is chosen at random (4.8.26). This stade, like Aristotle's animal, is easy to look at, being neither too big nor small to be taken in by one view.<sup>66</sup> In this sense, it indicates that landscape and space are coming back into a coherent perspective.

There are some specific ways, however, in which the return to the sea does not mark a return to order and normality in the *Anabasis*. The alien nature of the interior held the Ten Thousand together as a remarkably cooperative entity, yet when they reach the sea the fabric of their Panhellenic unity begins to disintegrate.<sup>67</sup> The topography in the final stage of their journey is relatively stable, but the Ten Thousand as a political and social unit become more disordered, with various tensions and factions flaring up between troops and leaders, as they leave the interior behind.<sup>68</sup> For the most part, it is the lack of ships and morale that contributes to the disorder, not the physical environment. The general decline in cohesiveness after Book 4 is associated with the anticlimax of continuing beyond the landscape's (and so, we would have thought, the plot's) "natural" ending. Once the Ten Thousand cross beyond the *telos* of the sight of the sea, the concept of what they now look forward to becomes increasingly hazy. The presence of an intervening space, which always seems to lie ahead and separate the Greeks from their goal, troubles the cohesion of the *Anabasis*'s plot and deserves some further consideration.

### *Looking into the Distance*

We have discussed Xenophon's practice of recording the distances that the Ten Thousand traverse on their journey. I now want to consider the way that the distances that lie *ahead* in the narrative have an impact on the rhetoric of space in the text. For the traveler, who is constantly making a complex series of visual adjustments to allow for the relationship between his moving body and the scenery that shifts in and out of several different views, the coordination of his perspective on the near and far is not always easily managed. Landscape is ideally viewed from a set distance, in the

<sup>66</sup> Arist. *Poet.* Ch. 7, discussed in Ch. 1.

<sup>67</sup> On the Panhellenism of the Greeks before they reach the sea, see Dillery 1995, 59–77. The more familiar Greek territories on the coast, coupled with the ability to make a profit, now drive the Ten Thousand into unruly and often barbaric behavior.

<sup>68</sup> This point has been well documented by others. See, e.g., Dillery 1995, 77–92.



position of standing still. It “folds uneasily with movement,” as Rose and Wylie have put it (2006, 467). Yet, as we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Xenophon’s role as author is complicated by the circumstances of his also being a character who moves through the space of his plot. As a moving entity, the narrator of the *Anabasis* is constantly required to adjust his perspective, particularly in response to the fluctuations of distance and proximity.

There are two instances of looking at long and close range that occur while the army are on the march that illustrate this point. The first, the approach of the king’s army at Cunaxa, helps to contextualize the second, the famous sighting of the sea from Mount Thekes.

### *Looking for the King*

In the first section of the *Anabasis*, Cyrus is constantly on the lookout for the appearance of the king’s army, an event that he foresees as clamorous, entailing a great number of men (*plēthos polu*, 1.7.4). When his brother finally approaches, however, he does so silently, appearing in a gradual process that starts as a dust cloud on the horizon, transforms into the glinting of spears, and then gradually takes shape with the outline of human and animal figures in the foreground (1.8.8).

καὶ ἤδη τε ἦν μέσον ἡμέρας καὶ οὐπω καταφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πολέμιοι·  
 ἡνίκα δὲ δεῖλη ἐγίγνετο, ἐφάνη κονιορτὸς ὥσπερ νεφέλη λευκή,  
 χρόνῳ δὲ συχνῶ ὕστερον ὥσπερ μελανία τις ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ἐπὶ πολὺ.  
 ὅτε δὲ ἐγγύτερον ἐγίγνοντο, τάχα δὴ καὶ χαλκὸς τις ἤστραπτε καὶ  
 λόγχοι καὶ αἱ τάξεις καταφανεῖς ἐγίγνοντο. καὶ ἦσαν ἵππεῖς μὲν  
 λευκοθώρακες ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τῶν πολεμίων·

It was now the middle of the day and the enemy had still not appeared. But in the afternoon a whirl of dust appeared, just like a white cloud, and some time later looking like some black cloud far out into the plain. But when they were closer, then there was a frequent flashing of bronze as spears and the units of the army became visible. And there were horsemen with white breastplates on the left wing of the enemy.

It is notable how long it takes for the army to come into focus in this wide open territory. First they were “not yet visible” (οὐπω καταφανεῖς) although it was already midday, then (ἡνίκα) a dust cloud appeared (ἐφάνη), some time later (χρόνῳ δὲ συχνῶ ὕστερον) a black smudge. Then, when they were closer (ὅτε δὲ ἐγγύτερον ἐγίγνοντο), the metal of their spears started to become visible (τάχα . . . καταφανεῖς ἐγίγνοντο),

before the horsemen and the divisions themselves became apparent (ἦσαν). The concentration of temporal adverbs (οὕτω, ἡνίκα, χρόνῳ δὲ συχυνῶ ὕστερον, ὅτε, τότε) and words meaning “to be,” “to appear,” or “to be visible” (καταφανής; φαίνομαι, γίγνομαι; εἰμί) draw the image out into a long stretch of time and space. With the approach of the king’s army, in other words, it becomes clear just how far into this landscape it is possible to see.

Xenophon’s description of the event continues, becoming increasingly microscopic, as he recounts the divisions of the army section by section. A little later, he zooms in further to the actual body of the king, which Cyrus catches sight of and lunges toward with the words τὸν ἄνδρα ὁρῶ (“I see the man!”), aiming at his brother’s chest. The vast, panoramic visual description ends here, in hand-to-hand combat, as Cyrus, unable to endure (οὐκ ἠνέσχετο) the sight of the king, dies from the strike of a javelin at close range.<sup>69</sup> Or more precisely, for Cyrus at least, it ends with the visual zeroing in of the javelin thrust, which hits him just beneath the eye.

The manner of Cyrus’s death provides a fitting close to the impressive visual technique by which Xenophon brings the king’s army – for so long invisible in the landscape – into sight, without ever setting them at a distance that is median, ideal, or manageable. The slow approach of the king’s army out of the distant haze up until the too-sharp and too-closely focused thrust of the javelin thematizes not only the subject’s sense of being out of scale in his landscape but also the psychological difficulty of conceptualizing the approach of such a vast number of men from the standpoint of a soldier in the field. Xenophon claims the king’s army numbered 1,200,000; historians have put the estimate at 60,000.<sup>70</sup> Indeed, Cyrus’s use of the term *plēthos polu* to describe their number recalls the problem that Homer was first faced with in his attempt to describe the multitude (*plēthun*) who sailed to Troy.<sup>71</sup>

### *Looking for the Sea*

This is not the only time that the *Anabasis* experiments with the idea of space that alternates between being too close and too far away. When the

<sup>69</sup> 1.8.26. S. R. Bassett 1999, 478. Ctesias claims that the javelin was thrust by the king; Xenophon simply says “someone” killed Cyrus.

<sup>70</sup> *An.* 1.7.12; Ctesias put the number at 400,000 (*FGrH* 688 F 22). Both are judged to be wild exaggerations (Rood and Waterfield 2005, 202).

<sup>71</sup> *Il.* 2.488. See my discussion in the Introduction.

Ten Thousand approach the sea, Xenophon's narrative alternates between the extremes of close and distant visual range. The event happens as they are in the process of climbing a hill. In the past, the emphasis on ascending to the tops of mountains was always military; certainly no one among the Ten Thousand ever climbed a hill in order to enjoy a view.<sup>72</sup> The men's focus on this occasion must have been the same: like most people who are in the process of ascending mountains, they probably looked at the ground or their feet and knees.<sup>73</sup> The relentlessly diachronic nature of the march makes this just one more *parasang* traveled on the marathon trudge toward the end. Nor are the men suddenly inspired to look up and glimpse the sea by accident. Initially, they do not see the sea but only hear about it, first as an inarticulate shout, then a murmuring from person to person, then as the word itself: *thalatta* (4.7.21–4):

ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους,<sup>74</sup> κραυγὴ πολλὴ ἐγένετο. ἀκούσας δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν καὶ οἱ ὀπισθοφύλακες ᾤηθησαν ἔμροσθεν ἄλλους ἐπιτίθεσθαι πολεμίους. . . . [a long sentence concerning the position of the enemy behind, and the spoils captured from them]. . . . ἐπειδὴ δὲ βοὴ πλείων τε ἐγίνετο καὶ ἐγγύτερον καὶ οἱ αἰεὶ ἐπιόντες ἔθεον δρόμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ βοῶντας καὶ πολλῶν μείζων ἐγίνετο ἢ βοὴ ὅσῳ δὴ πλείους ἐγίνοντο, ἐδόκει δὴ μείζον τι εἶναι τῷ Ξενοφῶντι, καὶ ἀναβὰς ἐφ' ἵππον καὶ Λύκιον καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας ἀναλαβὼν παρεβόηθει· καὶ τάχα δὴ ἀκούουσι βοῶντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν Θάλαττα θάλαττα καὶ παρεγγυώντων. ἔνθα δὴ ἔθεον πάντες καὶ οἱ ὀπισθοφύλακες, καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια ἡλάνετο καὶ οἱ ἵπποι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκοντο πάντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον, ἔνταῦθα δὴ περιέβαλλον ἀλλήλους καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ λοχαγούς δακρύνοντες.

When the vanguard reached the mountain, a great shout went up, which, having heard, Xenophon and the rearguard thought was an indication that another enemy had attacked them from up ahead. . . . [a long sentence concerning the position of the enemy behind, and the spoils captured from them]. . . . But when the shout kept getting louder and closer, and those who were following kept breaking into a run toward those who were shouting and making the din even greater, and the shout was

<sup>72</sup> For the strategic hill climbing of generals to survey the topography for battle in Herodotus and Thucydides, see Greenwood 2006, 19–41.

<sup>73</sup> See here Wylie's analysis of his repeated ascension of Glastonbury Tor (2002), 449, and esp. 451 ("Head bowed one reaches the summit").

<sup>74</sup> Along with other editors after Marchant, I follow the first hand of the C manuscript in omitting the phrase καὶ κατεῖδον τὴν θάλατταν here (cf. Masqueray 1931; Rood and Waterfield 2005, 213, note 101).

increasing as more people joined in, it seemed to Xenophon that it must be something significant. So, mounting his horse and taking with him Lycius and the cavalry, he went to help. Very soon they heard the soldiers shouting “The sea, the sea!” and passing the word along. Then the entire rearguard ran forward, and the pack animals and the horses were driven forward too. When they all reached the top, they embraced one another and the generals and captains, weeping.

The rhythmic sound of the syllables in the word *thalatta* break and reform like waves over the approaching mass of soldiers as they reach the top of the hill and come within the long-desired sight of the sea.<sup>75</sup> Xenophon uses his role as the leader of the rearguard, at the very back of the line, as a stylistic device that allows him to delay the climax for as long as possible. The repetition of certain key words within the passage (γίγνομαι, θέω, βοάω/βοή, πλείων, μείζων, ἄει) serves to impede the narrative further, causing it to double back on itself and frustrate the reader’s desire to “see” all the way to the end.<sup>76</sup> The breakthrough that occurs when the Ten Thousand do finally catch sight of the sea is a monumental one, signaling a procession out of a narrative space whose routes and viewpoints had been profoundly obscured into one that is marked by seeing at long range, where borders and edges are visible.

The Ten Thousand, for whom landscape so far has been all about practical distances and topological obstacles such as mountains and rivers, suddenly have a view. After months immersed within an environment they had little understanding of, they are at last confronted with a horizon, with depth, and with the ability to stand outside and look from a distance. When Homer describes the Shield of Achilles as a single, complete version of the world, he gives structure to the whole by depicting the river Ocean running around its edges. The same is true of the early Greek maps: the sea makes the space cohere into a comprehensive overview. When the Ten Thousand catch sight of the sea, they are finally able to look into the distance, not just to the foreground, and to see something on the horizon that represents an edge, an ending. The display of the sea allows the Ten Thousand for the first time to look beyond their immediate surroundings toward a new landscape – a view – an image of

<sup>75</sup> In the popular tradition, the Ten Thousand’s shout is often rendered in Ionic Greek (*Thalassa! Thalassa!*), because its sibilant sound evokes the liquid sound of the sea (Rood 2004).

<sup>76</sup> On repetition as a delaying device in narrative, Brooks 1984, 90–112; Quint 1993, 50–96. On the *Anabasis* as a text stuck in a structure of repetition and déjà-vu, Ma 2004, esp. 335.

the future gleaming on the horizon. It is a triumphant moment because it finally allows the wanderer to look up and see where he is going; to mark an endpoint in an interminable journey.

But there is a similar sense of disjunction between seeing at long and close range in the scene leading to the view of the sea as there was in the scene detailing the approach of the king's army. In this case, the sea glimmers in the distance as a vision of the end; the *telos* that the runner will have to cross one final stretch of space to reach. Yet, as an ending, the sea is an illusion, a mirage arising out of the blankness of the landscape. The Ten Thousand weep and embrace one another on top of Mount Thekes; they erect a monument commemorating their journey; they press on with all swiftness to Trapezus, where they mingle with other Greeks and carry out sacrifices and games. However, their journey does not end at the close of Book 4, as is all too well known but just as often forgotten. The march continues for another three books, and the *Anabasis* ends with its story – and especially the theme of reaching home – largely unresolved.<sup>77</sup>

When they look out at the sea from Mount Thekes, the soldiers *believe* that they are looking forward toward the end, and the reader believes with them. As Rood observes, “the Greeks’ shout [of *Thalatta! Thalatta!*] has gripped the imagination of readers of the *Anabasis* because it is the climax to a long narrative of toil and suffering. Its appeal is a reflection of our desire for the satisfaction of closure” (2004, 2). Even Xenophon himself apparently once forgot where the *telos* of his own story lay, for in his description of the Ten Thousand in the *Hellenica* he summarized the expedition in the following way: “How Cyrus gathered an army and marched up country against his brother, and how the battle happened, and how he died, and how afterward the Greeks safely reached the sea.”<sup>78</sup> Why would Xenophon foreshorten his own narrative by suggesting it ends when the Greeks reach the sea? Or, to put it another way, why could he *not* end his narrative there?

<sup>77</sup> The ending of the *Anabasis* is unsatisfying: “Meanwhile Thubron arrived and, having taken on the army and joined it with the rest of the Greek forces, he waged war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.” Bradley 2001, 64, discusses the strange nature of Xenophon’s decision to end the narrative where he does, showing that while Diodorus and Diogenes found definite endpoints for the story of the expedition (Diodorus even ends with the word *telos*), “Xenophon saw just one more turning point.” (2001, 64–5, 81).

<sup>78</sup> *Hell.* 3.1.2. Xenophon attributes the narrative to Themistogenes of Syracuse, probably, as Plutarch believed, to make his own role in the story more believable (Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 345e; Rood and Waterfield 2005, xix; Gray 2004, 130).

According to Ma, the answer lies in the fact that the Ten Thousand create their identity through movement. The only constants in the *Anabasis* are deferral and displacement, the unceasing movement forward toward an unattainable goal (“identity is not founded on ‘being there,’ but precisely on an ‘elsewhere’: coming from elsewhere, going elsewhere” (2004, 340). There has always been an implicit and impossible choice in the *Anabasis* between “setting out for home” (οἶκαδε ὁρμάομαι) and “settling a home” (αὐτοῦ οἰκέω, 3.2.24). The pretext of Books 2–4, therefore, which states that there is an equivalence between sea, Greece, and home, can only be sustained from a distance. When the Ten Thousand finally reach the sea, this set of equations collapses.

There is a world of difference, in narrative terms, between looking at the sea and reaching it, and between what is visible at long range and what confronts the eye close up. That difference can be observed in the middle space between Mount Thekes and the sea town of Trapezus. First, a strange incident takes place during an encounter with the initially hostile Macronians that illuminates the ways in which one’s sense of homeland can be both tangible and elusive. As the two sides are drawing up for battle, one of the Ten Thousand abruptly realizes that he has, in fact, reached home (4.8.4):

Ἐνθα δὴ προσέρχεται Ξενοφῶντι τῶν πελταστῶν ἀνὴρ Ἀθήνησι φάσκων δεδουλευκέναι, λέγων ὅτι γινώσκοι τὴν φωνὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐμὴν ταύτην πατρίδα εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μὴ τι κωλύει, ἐθέλω αὐτοῖς διαλεχθῆναι.

Then a man from the peltasts approached Xenophon, saying that he had been a slave in Athens and that he understood the language of the people. “I think,” he said, “that this is my fatherland. And, if nothing prevents it, I wish to speak with them.”

For the peltast, home is not a place that is seen but one that is remembered, if vaguely, through language, and that he himself remains unsure of. The scene, although brief, speaks to the complicated relationship between place, homeland, and identity in the *Anabasis*.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Rood puts it well (2004, 204–5): “If the sight of the sea meant the promise of home for the Greek mercenaries, what did home mean for this peltast when he suddenly found himself back in his fatherland? What did it mean for him to see the sea? Did he shout *Thalatta! Thalatta!* in another language?” Ma also singles out this passage for its thematic resonance, commenting on the sense of displacement in the peltast’s homecoming: “on the move, he finds no identity, even when he returns home” (2004, 332).

Earlier in their march, Xenophon worried aloud that the Greeks might, like the Lotus Eaters, “forget the way home,” yet this incident suggests that the way home will always be partly forgotten, even when its cultural aspects (such as language) can be recognized. No wonder, then, that the last incident before reaching the sea, when the Ten Thousand fall under the spell of a sickening honey, is reminiscent of the time in the *Odyssey* when the crew eat the lotus plant and lose the will to return home. The honey makes some men resemble drunks, others to rave like madmen, and some to appear to have died, and in all cases it takes away their ability to stand up: the troops lie strewn on the ground in great numbers, as if they had suffered a military defeat (4.8.20–1). Here, in the very last stage of their march to the sea, the Ten Thousand are briefly paralyzed; their bodies simply refuse to keep on moving forward through space. With the “end” now just seven *parasangs* away, the supine Greeks both have and have not “forgotten their way home.” They are (or would be, if they were able to walk) heading in the right direction, but their inertia testifies to the difficulty of closing the gap between “here” and “home.”

Although the reader of the *Anabasis*, too, yearns to close the gap between seeing the sea and reaching the end of the journey, the space that separates the Greeks from home remains. Xenophon hints at that space in the problematic interval between Mount Thekes and Trapezus, which opens ever wider the interval between what they thought they saw on the horizon and the stage in their journey that they actually reach when they get there.<sup>80</sup> There is an episode after the arrival in Trapezus when a number of the Ten Thousand chase a group of market officials into the sea, causing some of them to drown (5.7.25). Their behavior is problematic, but, if framed within the context of their long journey through the interior, it also makes sense thematically. For confronting a border that does not mark the end, a sea that does not represent the fatherland after all, and Greeks who do not resemble themselves is unsettling enough to prompt the Ten Thousand to keep pushing outward until they literally run out of land. What they saw on the horizon – the boundary line of the sea – turns out not to be the end of their journey,

<sup>80</sup> Again, the image of the Persian Royal Road serves as a foil to the Greeks’ route, for its relay postal service works through an efficient series of gap closings (*diastantes, diadexomenoi*). The Ten Thousand rehearse that same inability to close the gap as they attempt to hunt the ass (“if anyone tried to chase it, it would run ahead and stop . . . until the horse caught up, and then it would do the same thing again”) and the elusive ostrich (1.4.2).

and by running into and beyond that line, they express their frustration over an end that is not an end. Like the enigma in Odysseus's story of the journey inland that hinges on a death that will come either straight from the sea or far from the sea (ἐξ ἁλός), the Ten Thousand are in a quandary about their proximity to the sea: they are either too far away to ever reach it or so close as to be subsumed by it.

*Narrative Indeterminacies*

Wigley has written that the experience of being lost arises from an "indeterminate sense of immersion, in which the body cannot separate itself from the space it inhabits" (1996, 34). In the case of the *Anabasis*, this sense of immersion arises from the vastness of the topography, which upsets the subject's sense of depth and his ability to distinguish between the near and the far. There is no concept in this landscape of an ideal Aristotelian *megethos*, or of "a subject who, through *and* by depth, is able to stand aloof."<sup>81</sup> At the same time, because the *Anabasis* offers us no clearly definable, satisfactory *telos* (even the sea fails in this respect), its landscape simply goes on for too long, extending into an ever-remote horizon. This continual deferral of an ending means that, for the characters in the text, it is just as Wilson has suggested for characters in tragedy who live beyond their allotted time: neither they nor we can gain a firm grasp of their place in the narrative (2004, 12).

The breakdown in boundaries that I have outlined in Xenophon's description of the interior is replayed on the authorial level in the increasingly blurred boundaries between Xenophon the author and Xenophon the protagonist. We might say that, in Xenophon's case, the body of the author and the body of the protagonist converge in a landscape within which distances are difficult to judge and objective measurement is no longer possible. Xenophon confounds the boundaries of external detachment normally upheld by the ancient historian by twice taking us into his inner dreamworld in Books 3 and 4. This is unusual because the narrative is not ostensibly about him. Until Cyrus's death, he has only a minimal role (1.8.15). As the Ten Thousand recede further into the interior, however, Xenophon's authorial stance changes with the new position he adopts in the group. And that authorial stance is itself put on trial when Xenophon is forced to defend his actions of the third

<sup>81</sup> Wylie 2006, 522 (*italics original*).



and fourth books, a task that he never performs to the army's complete satisfaction.

It becomes unclear, the further we read, what genre Xenophon is writing in and how we are supposed to separate his two roles as narrator and protagonist.<sup>82</sup> Like Odysseus, then, we might say that Xenophon's journey away from the sea has the effect of undermining the perceived limits of the genre from which he sets out, and in the process of losing those edges, he also, somewhat paradoxically, renders more invisible his identity as an author and protagonist within the story that he is telling.

The *Anabasis* combines an autobiographical history along a single line toward home with the effects of meandering, forgetting, and losing control over space. These effects are both practical in that they threaten the Ten Thousand's survival, and literary in that they reflect on the shape of Xenophon's narrative. As I have argued here, the relationship between forgetting the way home and losing one's coordinates in space is mutually reinforcing, especially given that the inland landscape of the *Anabasis* is so antithetical to Greek topography. In the following chapter, we will consider how Xenophon addresses the issue of losing, forgetting, and home from the opposite perspective, by providing his reader with an idealized model of space from which all sense of disorder, the alien, and uncertainty is emphatically precluded.

<sup>82</sup> On Greek autobiography and its roots in Persian narrative, see Momigliano 1993, 23–64. For various attempts to discern Xenophon's role in the text, see recently Tuplin 2003. On the “generic uniqueness” (60) of the *Anabasis*, see Bradley 2001.

## SIX

# FINDING (THINGS AT) HOME: XENOPHON'S OECONOMICUS

Nothing about the “spatiality” of space can be theorized without using objects as its indices.

Elizabeth Grosz, *Space, Time, and Perversion*

It ought to be obvious that the objects that occupy our daily lives are in fact the objects of a passion.

Jean Baudrillard, “The System of Collecting”

ὥς δὲ καλὸν φαίνεται, ἔπειδ' ἂν ὑποδήματα ἐφεξῆς κέηται

How beautiful it looks, when shoes are arranged in rows . . .

Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 8.19

HOW COULD IT BE WORTHWHILE TO SPEND THE LAST CHAPTER OF this book focusing on a Socratic dialogue that espouses the beautiful appearance of shoes arranged in rows within the ordinary setting of a house? For one thing, by looking at the small intermediary gap that occurs between objects, we gain access to a slightly different way of thinking about space. And since we opened this book by thinking about magnitude (*megethos*) and scale in terms of the maximum amount of space that can be seen in one view, it is appropriate in closing to rethink the notion of space from a more miniaturist vantage point. If the long, pedestrian text of Xenophon's *Anabasis* was characterized by an overwhelming sense of space that never opened up into a real view of home, then the perfectly ordered text of the *Oeconomicus* focuses on the delights of having arrived there. The divergence in perspectives between Xenophon's two works is obvious. The *Oeconomicus* treats a very different area of space as its subject matter by means of a different genre. Here, Xenophon uses the form of the Socratic dialogue to suggest a shape for his text that is not one of the written, traveling road. Instead, the

*Oeconomicus* is imagistically as well as topically grounded in a small subset of contained places, and by interlocutors who converse from stationary positions while in those places.<sup>1</sup> In addition, as I will go on to show, the arrangement of the speeches within the dialogue is mimetically arranged according to the structure of a house.

With the entry into Ischomachus's house, the scale of this work will diminish, drawing us toward a sense of space that is small enough to be measured by the human eye. After ranging through the various epic, imaginary, and geographical spaces of either the world as a whole or the world outside in the course of this book, we will conclude with the more familiar space of Classical Athens. For Ischomachus's house and the small domestic drama of the training of his wife reflect in miniature upon the question of how space can be ordered, sequenced, and catalogued that we have been investigating through different genres in the preceding chapters.

This last chapter uses Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* as an opportunity to reflect upon some of the questions raised by earlier chapters. First, as I have already suggested, the *Oeconomicus* picks up where the *Anabasis* left off, by completing the journey toward that one space that is most familiar and most cognitively mappable: home. In the *Oeconomicus*, the concepts of "home," "the interior," and "room" speak to comfort, containment, and a proportionate relationship between the self and its environment. Here, space is quantifiable and perfectly viewable, with all notions of the foreign, the other, and the supernatural left aside.<sup>2</sup> The *Oeconomicus* is so specific in the way that it organizes and locates space that it can be understood as a response to the *Anabasis*, where the incommensurate topography of Asia Minor leads to a breakdown in the narrator's ability to keep track of the regions that he travels through (Ch. 5). Instead, Xenophon's presentation of the interior space of Ischomachus's house and the "inside-out" space of Cyrus's *paradeisos* focuses on the aesthetics of the room and the deferral of the kind of limitlessness and disorder that are associated with wide open spaces and uncountable numbers of people and things.

Second, Ischomachus's house can be understood as a kind of idealized correction of what went wrong in the imperial bedrooms and thesauri of Herodotus's *Histories*, where attempts to engineer small plots within the

<sup>1</sup> The entire conversation between Socrates and Ischomachus takes place in the Stoa Poikilê, while Ischomachus is waiting for some friends to arrive.

<sup>2</sup> Even the notion of woman as "other" is set aside, as Murnaghan 1988 argues.

secret confines of rooms ended up spilling over into the outside world (Ch. 4). Ischomachus is at pains in the *Oeconomicus* to make everything about the interior of his house completely visible; to reveal a structure that harbors no secret store of wealth nor operates through a system of hidden politics. The transparency of the objects stored in each of Ischomachus's rooms and even – as we will see – the openness to view of the body of his wife strips away the kind of plotting-through-architecture that took place in the stories Herodotus told about Candaules' bedroom, Deioeces' palace, or Rhampsinitus's thesaurus (1.8–12, 1.98, 2.121). Instead of a Herodotean Lydian monarch, Croesus, showing off vast amounts of gold in his treasure-house and mistakenly expecting it to add up to the sum of his good fortune, Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* presents us with the Persian monarch, Cyrus, showing off an ordered and countable display of trees in a garden that is like a room but that does “naturally” reflect, this time, on his good fortune. Xenophon's interiors, in other words, are productive rather than deceptive. Instead of sharing an association with the secret or illusory interior spaces of the *Histories*, they look forward to the thesauri of imaginary memory houses where objects could be stored, and later retrieved, in the mind.

Third, in the early chapters of this book, we spent some time thinking about how the earth (γῆ) could be viewed from a distance, through the examples of cartography, the Shield of Achilles, and geography (Chs. 1–4). Specifically, we considered how Pherecydes' cosmogony articulated the conceptual shift between earth as dirt and earth as the world (Ch. 3). Now Xenophon trains our attention back to the earth, in close-up, through his focus on the activities of digging and planting. The association that he draws in the *Oeconomicus* between planting, remembering, and family trees will also prompt us to revisit the ending of the *Odyssey*, and to consider the way that space and memory is represented in the scene between Laertes and Odysseus in the father's orchard.<sup>3</sup> Through his cumulative analysis of a perfect architectural order (Ischomachus's house) and a perfect agricultural one (the planting of trees and farming), Xenophon lays out a ground plan for a comprehensive system of space. The key to that system, in terms of both the house and the planting of trees, is memory. The role of memory in the text reflects on the human ability to order space in a way that brings the narrator close

<sup>3</sup> Hom. *Od.* 24.336–44. In Ch. 2, we considered the ending of the *Odyssey* through a reading of *Od.* 23.267–84.

to a supreme, encyclopedic vision that is so natural as to be very close to the divine. Just as I suggested early on in this book that the map made a gesture toward replacing the Muse during the early days of prose, so here I will suggest that the intricate memory system that Ischomachus reads into the architecture of his house substitutes not just for the need for a map but the need for a muse as well.

The education that Ischomachus's wife receives concerning the allotment of particular things to particular places relates, then, to a concern with memory that runs through the text. There are three explicit uses of memory in the *Oeconomicus*: the dialogue is structured as a series of remembered conversations; it is invested with ensuring the good memory of Ischomachus's wife; it closes with an example of Socratic "recollection" (*anamnêsis*). These three examples will underpin my argument that Xenophon's *oikos*, as a spatial structure built for the storage of material goods, also provides for a vast categorization of disparate items in the way that ancient memory techniques were supposed to do.

Given the amount of attention we have paid to the way that the Greeks articulated a sense of "lostness" or dislocation in the *Odyssey* and *Anabasis* (Chs. 2 and 5), it is also relevant to point out that Ischomachus's idealized spatial system centers around the question of *how to find things*. The space of his house opens up into an area within which a seemingly infinite number of objects can be stored and easily located. Xenophon suggests that, through the process of visualization, we can hold a vast amount of information in our minds, and that certain spaces, if correctly supervised, naturally conform to such an ordered and articulate system.

## SPACE AND ORDER

The *Oeconomicus* is organized as a series of five different conversations, all of which are successively nested in an elaborate sequence of indirect discourse, beginning with Xenophon's recounting of a conversation that he once heard taking place between Socrates and Critoboulus (1.1), and subsequently unfolding into Socrates' description (to Critoboulus) of other conversations that he himself has either had, or had recounted to him, in the past.<sup>4</sup> Within the widest, external frame of Xenophon's address to the reader at 1.1 ("I once heard [Socrates] discussing estate management

<sup>4</sup> Murnaghan 1988, 10; Pomeroy 1994, 17–18.

in the following way . . . ”), these principally comprise exchanges between: (a) Socrates and Critoboulus (1.1 – never completed within the narrative frame); (b) Cyrus and Lysander (as told to Socrates, 4.20–5); (c) Ischomachus and Socrates (7.1–21.12); (d) Ischomachus and his wife (7.1–10.13). Given that the entire dialogue apart from Xenophon’s opening line is in reported speech, each conversation exists within a cross-sectional plan, one inside the other. Socrates’ investigation into what an *oikos* is can therefore be imagined, like a house, as a series of interior scenes that are partitioned by walls or frames.<sup>5</sup>

The structure of the dialogue both expands beyond and recedes into the successive narrative layers I have outlined, by beginning in the open air with a definition of the *oikos* that expands well beyond the city walls (a), and concluding in the fields of Attica (c). Between these two outdoor frames at the beginning and end of the work, we are gradually drawn inward – first within the walls of a Persian royal garden (b); then within the city walls, to the Stoa Poikilê where Socrates and Ischomachus converse (c); next within the walls of Ischomachus’s house, which reaches within the innermost walls of their private quarters, as the narrator leads his wife on a tour through his home (d), before the shift back to the outside at the end of the poem (c). Thus, the position of the story of Ischomachus’s wife within the narrative of the *Oeconomicus* replicates the interior position of the woman’s quarters within his house.<sup>6</sup> Her voice, set in the middle portion of the work, is distanced from the reader by its mediation through three separate male voices or frames. The direct, external conversation between Socrates and Critoboulus, on the other hand, takes place in the open air. The two middle conversations, between Lysander and Cyrus and Socrates and Ischomachus, take place in structures that are part inside and part outside (the walled garden and the Stoa Poikilê).

### *What Is an Oikos? (Oec. 1–6)*

The careful spatial framing of the narrative around the idea of the *oikos* affords the author considerable flexibility, since Socrates and Critoboulus establish early on in the dialogue that one’s *oikos* extends beyond the

<sup>5</sup> On the relationship between architecture and the space of narrative, F. Jameson 1984; Rakatansky 1992. On architecture and the *Oeconomicus*, Wigley 1992.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Bourdieu’s discussion of the Kabyle house (1992, 271–83), which examines how the interior contents of the house are organized along structural oppositions so that the interior reproduces the world outside exactly but inversely.

walls of one's house. Having ascertained that ἡ οἰκία amounts to the full extent of one's personal property that is beneficial to the self, the interlocutors proceed to draw a three-part comparison between the *sōma*, the *psyche*, and the *oikos*.<sup>7</sup> Socrates convinces Critoboulus that one's house, as a metaphorical and physical extension of the self, reflects upon the composition of one's mind and the appearance of one's body. The value of one's property should thereby not be calculated on its sale price, but on whether it offers what is "sufficient" (ἱκανόν) to its owner (2.2–9). This includes not only the beneficial properties of things but also the way that those things are arranged, the treatment of the slaves, and the training of the wife within the house (3.1–16). All these factors revolve around the principle of good estate management (*oikonomia*), which cannot be achieved unless the house is well built and well arranged, the body is kept active and in-check from vices such as gluttony and drunkenness, and the soul resists soft pleasures, ambition, and other moral weaknesses (3.1–3; 1.20–2).

As the dialogue continues, moreover, the connection between the master of a well-run *oikos* and a good citizen in the *polis* becomes increasingly apparent.<sup>8</sup> By focusing on the importance of farmland within the concept of the *oikos*, Socrates accentuates the benefits that a good farmer can bring to his body, his house, and his city. He is able to remain active by working the land and performing the important task of bringing into the household the goods that his wife will then administer and distribute (3.15). At the same time, the movement of the husband between his house and land keeps him engaged in the affairs of the city. A man who has property outside the city gates is more likely to defend his *polis* in times of war, both because he will be more physically able to do so and because he will have a vested interest in the land that is being attacked (6.4–10). Good *oikonomia* is thus connected not only with good farming but also with good military tactics and good warfare, extending the concept of the *oikos* still further into the sphere of political institutions and administrations.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the symbolic range of the *oikos* is without

<sup>7</sup> On the *oikos* comprising what is beneficial to the self, Foxhall 1989, 26–7. On the triangulation of *oikos*, *sōma*, and *psychē*, see, e.g., 1.13: κάκιον μὲν τό σῶμα ἔχοι, κάκιον δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, κακίον δὲ τὸν οἶκον; 1.23; 4.2; 6.6–10. Cf. Cyrus's body at 4.16ff., and the natural pairing of the *oikos* and the *sōma* (καὶ οἴκου αὖξησης καὶ σωμάτων ἄσκησις) at 5.1.

<sup>8</sup> 21.2; cf. *Mem.* 3.4; 3.6; 3.9; Stevens 1994, 209.

<sup>9</sup> Pomeroy 1984; Murnaghan 1988, 15; Brock 2004. By the time of the Classical period, it is most often associated with property or the family (MacDowell 1989).

limits, as is evidenced by Socrates' praise of Cyrus I, the Persian king who excelled in the arts of both farming and war, and who conducted careful surveys of his vast empire to ensure that all of his land was both well protected and well cultivated.<sup>10</sup> It is Cyrus whom Socrates praises first in setting out the skills of good *oikonomia* (4.4).

The well-run Persian Empire under Cyrus becomes, in Socrates' hands, a macrocosmic paradigm for the well-run *oikos*. Yet at the same time Socrates is able to show through another example how Cyrus and Cyrus the Younger crafted perfect microcosmic ideals of the *oikos* as well, in their cultivation of the oriental park or *paradeisos* that the kings would spend time in, both at home and on campaign, in the pursuits of planting, walking, and hunting. These Persian "walled gardens" can be thought of as "inside-out" versions of the *oikos*, for they bring those outside elements that Xenophon considers to be important to the household inside, within a walled enclosure.<sup>11</sup> By bringing the outside inside, the *paradeisos* neatly folds the extended landscape and ideals of the *oikos* into a single physical space.

#### *Cyrus's Paradeisos (Oec. 4.20–5)*

In the first six chapters of the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon sets the stage for the description of the interior of Ischomachus's house by commenting on different kinds of spaces that can serve as extensions or doubles of the *oikos*. One of the initial examples he offers as a paradigm for good *oikonomia* is the perfect ordering of trees in a Persian *paradeisos*. The trees belong to Cyrus the Younger, who is visited in his royal palace at Sardis by the Spartan general Lysander.<sup>12</sup> In relating the story once

<sup>10</sup> 4.4–12. Cf. 4.17, of Cyrus the Younger, about whom Socrates notes that his soldiers failed to desert him even at the moment of defeat. In this way, they resemble the loyal slaves of an ideal *oikos* (2.4; 4.18).

<sup>11</sup> *Paradeisos* comes from the Avestan word *pairidaēza* (*pairi*, around; *daēza*, wall). Meiggs 1982, 271–3; Pomeroy 1994, ad loc.; L'Allier 1998. On the *oikos* as both an "inside" and an "outside" construction, cf. *Oec.* 1.5–6. For comparison, note the Roman garden as an "inside-out" construction (Kuttner 1999). Pomeroy (1984) discusses the correspondence between the *paradeisos*, the Persian Empire, and Ischomachus's house.

<sup>12</sup> The Elder and Younger Cyrus are deliberately confused here by Xenophon, in order to make the point of his story more effective (Pomeroy 1984, 98–9 and 1994, ad loc.).



told to him by Lysander, Socrates dwells on the description of Cyrus's garden (4.21):

ἐπεὶ δὲ θαύμαζεν αὐτὸν ὁ Λύσανδρος ὡς καλὰ μὲν τὰ δένδρα εἶη, δι' ἴσου δὲ πεφυτευμένα, ὀρθοὶ δὲ οἱ στίχοι τῶν δένδρων, εὐγώνια δὲ πάντα καλῶς εἶη, ὁσμά δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδεῖαι συμπαρομαρτοῖεν αὐτοῖς περιπατοῦσι, καὶ ταῦτα θαυμάζων εἶπεν· Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ Κῦρε, πάντα μὲν <ταῦτα> θαυμάζω ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἄγαμαι τοῦ καταμετρήσαντός σοι καὶ διατάξαντος ἕκαστα τούτων·

When Lysander had marveled at how beautiful the trees were, and how they had all been planted at equal distances, at how straight the rows of trees were, and how beautifully everything was spaced at regular angles, and at the many sweet smells that wafted about as they walked the grounds, and, utterly amazed at these things, he said: "Cyrus, I'm amazed at the beauty of all these things, and I admire even more the one who measured out and regulated each of these trees into order for you."

Upon learning that the orchard is the work of Cyrus's own hands, Lysander goes on to congratulate the king on his good fortune, associating the order and simplicity of his horticulture with his moral worth (4.22):

ἀκούσαντα δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Κῦρον ἡσθῆναί τε καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ὦ Λύσανδρε, ἐγὼ πάντα καὶ διεμέτρησα καὶ διέταξα, ἔστι δ' αὐτῶν, φάναι, ἃ καὶ ἐφύτευσα αὐτός.

When Cyrus heard this he was pleased and replied, "These ones, Lysander, I measured and apportioned all of them myself," he said, "and some of them I even planted myself."

Prompting Lysander to draw a direct connection between Cyrus's choice of farming, an activity cherished by the gods, and his status as a happy man (4.25):<sup>13</sup>

Δικαίως μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Κῦρε, εὐδαίμων εἶναι· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖς.

"You seem to me to be justly fortunate, Cyrus, and your fortune comes from your being a good man."

<sup>13</sup> Socrates calls farming the *technê* "closest to nature" 5.1; cf. 19.17.

The divinely sanctioned association between farming and happiness is naturalized within the text through an unexpected grafting of agricultural imagery and geometry. For Cyrus not only “measured out” and “apportioned” everything himself (ἐγὼ πάντα καὶ διεμέτρησα καὶ διέταξα) using strikingly technical and orthogonal vocabulary (note also the use of the words καταμετρέω; ὀρθοί; εὐγώνια), but he also “planted” the trees with his own hands (ἐφύτευσα αὐτός), thereby creating a garden that grows within exact mathematical proportions, rows, and angles. What is beautiful or good (καλός) in nature is here expressed through the beautiful lines and angles of geometry.

There is also a political dimension to Cyrus’s planting. The plants that grow in his garden are, like the Athenian gentleman-class to which Ischomachus belongs, *kala k’agatha* (4.13). For Cyrus “sees to it that there be gardens – called *paradeisoi* – full of all the fine and beautiful things (πάντων καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν μεστοί), as many as the earth naturally produces (ὅσα ἡ γῆ φύειν θέλει).” The insertion of the concept of the *kalos k’agathos* into plant life is coupled with the “furnishing” (κατασκευάζω) of the garden with plants and trees as if it were a house (4.14):

Νῆ Δί’, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνθα γε διατρίβει αὐτός, καὶ ὅπως ὡς κάλλιστα κατεσκευασμένοι ἔσονται οἱ παράδεισοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δένδρεσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι καλοῖς ὅσα ἡ γῆ φύει.

“By Zeus,” said Critoboulus, “then it is necessary, Socrates, that those *paradeisoi* where he spends his time must be furnished as beautifully as possible with trees and all other beautiful things, as many as the earth produces.”

κατασκευάζω and κατασκευή are used elsewhere in the *Oeconomicus* to refer to military and domestic equipment, just as κατασκευάζω is frequently employed in this section of the work to describe the cultivation of land and to draw a comparison between planting and military defense.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, it is through his intertwining of a series of idealized concepts from nature, the city, and warfare that Socrates uses the

<sup>14</sup> κατασκευάζω is employed in reference to the cultivation of the land (4.15; 4.16; 4.17); the equipping of soldiers (4.7); the training or equipping of individuals for certain kinds of work (3.10; 7.23; 10.13); and the provision of necessities or furniture (2.8). κατασκευή is used of equipment on board ship (8.17) and in the home (8.18). See 4.16–17 for the comparison of land that is cultivated (κατασκευάζομαι) to land that is defended.

paradigm of the orderly garden to illustrate a final point about the body and nature of its owner (4.23–5):

καὶ ὁ Λύσανδρος ἔφη, ἀποβλέψας εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἰδὼν τῶν τε ἱματίων τὸ κάλλος ὧν εἶχε καὶ τῆς ὁσμῆς αἰσθόμενος καὶ τῶν στρεπτῶν καὶ τῶν ψελίων τὸ κάλλος καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου κόσμου οὐ εἶχεν, εἰπεῖν· Τί λέγεις, φάναι, ὦ Κύρε; ἢ γὰρ σὺ ταῖς σαῖς χερσὶ τούτων τι ἐφύτευσας; καὶ τὸν Κύρον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· Θαυμάζεις τοῦτο, [ἔφη,] ὦ Λύσανδρε; ὁμνυμί σοι τὸν Μίθρην, ὅτανπερ ὑγιαίνω, μηπώποτε δειπνήσαι πρὶν ἰδρῶσαι ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν τι ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν ἔργων μελετῶν ἢ ἀεὶ ἔν γέ τι φιλοτιμούμενος. καὶ αὐτὸς μέντοι ἔφη ὁ Λύσανδρος ἀκούσας ταῦτα δεξιώσασθαι τε αὐτὸν καὶ εἰπεῖν· Δικαίως μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Κύρε, εὐδαίμων εἶναι· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖς.

And Lysander said, looking at him and seeing the beauty of the clothes that he wore and perceiving his perfume, and the beauty of his necklaces and anklets and the other finery that he had on, “What do you mean, Cyrus? Did you really plant each of these with your own hands?” And Cyrus answered, “Are you amazed at this, Lysander? I swear to you by Mithras that whenever I’m in good health, I never eat before working up a sweat either through military practice or farming tasks or being constantly engaged in some contest.” Lysander himself said that when he heard these things, he honored him and said “You seem to me to be justly fortunate, Cyrus, and your fortune comes from your being a good man.”

The eastern monarch’s display of his prosperity and good fortune to a wise Greek abroad has an established literary heritage, and here, most obviously, Lysander’s encounter with Cyrus reflects on Solon’s with Croesus (Hdt. 1.30.2–3). In both encounters, we are asked to consider the ways in which individual character can be revealed through a display of one’s property. In Herodotus, Croesus’s display of his riches (πάντα ἔοντα μέγала τε καὶ ὀλβία) to Solon is engineered as a means of revealing, in a single, synoptic view, his status as the happiest man of all (πάντων ὀλβιώτατος), as if there were a direct, even innate, connection between the objects in the room and the owner of the room. Yet his attempt famously fails. This is because, as I argued in Chapter 4, such an instantaneous visual command over past, present, and future was only available to the epic Muses or Herodotean Pythia. In the world of the *Oeconomicus*, however, it *is* possible to place one’s innate, unchanging self on display, through the correct ordering (τάξις) of one’s property. Unlike the Herodotean episode, which is marked by a desire to overwhelm the spectator with excess by showing him things that were supposed to be either

uncountable or indescribable, the sites on display in the *Oeconomicus* – although they may represent *everything* (*panta*), as much as the earth naturally produces – are nevertheless regulated by a strict adherence to order and number.<sup>15</sup> The naturalness of that order is underscored, moreover, through its contact with the “divine geometry” of the earth.

*Ischomachus’s House (Oec. 7–10)*

Instead of imitating Herodotus and placing the barbarian king within the thesaurus, a sometimes secret room used for the storage of surplus goods, Xenophon places him within the equally oriental architecture of the walled garden (*paradeisos*).<sup>16</sup> We discussed earlier how, as an open space that is walled on all sides, the *paradeisos* incorporates the idea of containing the outside space of one’s *oikos* within the interior space of a room. But we have not yet fully explored the ways in which what the king does in his *paradeisos* is analogous to what the good housekeeper does in her *oikos*. Xenophon is at pains to show how the themes of planting and geometry-in-nature are put to use *inside* the house. Ischomachus first told his wife that she should remain inside because the god has “planted,” “apportioned,” and “divided out” in her sex a greater share of qualities best suited to the indoor life (7.24):

εἰδὼς δὲ ὅτι τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ ἐνέφυσε καὶ προσέταξε τὴν τῶν νεογνῶν  
τέκνων τροφήν, καὶ τοῦ στέργειν τὰ νεογνὰ βρέφη πλέον αὐτῇ  
ἐδόσατο ἢ τῷ ἀνδρί

the god, knowing that he had planted in the woman and apportioned to her the nurture of newborn children, had divided out more care for newborn babies to her than to the man.

The language of this passage echoes Cyrus’s description of how he planted the trees in his *paradeisos*, in a trend that continues to move the language of planting further and further inside (4.22):

ταῦτα τοίνυν, ὦ Λύσανδρε, ἐγὼ πάντα καὶ διεμέτρησα καὶ διέταξα,  
ἔστι δ’ αὐτῶν, φάναι, ἃ καὶ ἐφύτευσα αὐτός

“These ones, Lysander, I measured and apportioned them all myself,” he said, “and some of them I even planted myself.”

<sup>15</sup> In Herodotus’s story, *Croesus* is amazed (*apothōmazō*, 1.30.4) at Solon’s *lack* of amazement. In Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, Lysander marvels openly (*thaumazō*).

<sup>16</sup> On the associations between secrecy and the thesaurus in Herodotus, see my discussion in Ch. 4.

In this perfectly measured-out universe, the woman's role fits neatly within the ordered spatial system of the house. Her own task of dividing up the household items and apportioning them to different regions within the *oikos* according to different categories (9.6) is mirrored in the god's allotment of *her*, according to the category of her sex, to a particular place within a larger cosmic order.<sup>17</sup>

If the trees are "planted" and arranged by a divinely ordered logic to appear at perfect intervals in the ground, just as the woman is planted with the right kind of nature to make her best suit a particular kind of space, then all that remains to complete the image of the well-run *oikos* is the correct placing (or apportioning, τάσσω) of things within the house. When she first arrived at his house as a girl, Ischomachus's wife had been trained in the art of correctly taking things in, since she had been taught to control her appetite (7.6). Ischomachus will complete that education by teaching her to control the entrance of goods into the home. Otherwise, just as a farmer who throws different kinds of grain randomly together into a bin will have trouble differentiating them in the future, so the wife who lets all sorts of random things into her house will lose the chance of putting them to good use (8.9):

ἡ δ' ἀταξία ὁμοίον τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι οἷόν περ εἰ γεωργὸς ὁμοῦ ἐμβάλοι  
κριθὰς καὶ πυροὺς καὶ ὄσπρια, κᾶπειτα, ὅποτε δέοι ἢ μάζης ἢ ἄρτου  
ἢ ὄψου, διαλέγειν δέοι αὐτῷ ἀντὶ τοῦ λαβόντα διηυκρινημένοις  
χρῆσθαι.

A good example of disorder seems to me to be if a farmer threw together in one place barley, grains and beans, and then, when he needed barley-cake or bread or something to go with his bread, he would have to pick through the grains, instead of taking and using what had already been carefully separated.

Ischomachus mentions only in passing that his wife has been trained in respect to her appetite, or "the ways of the belly" (τά γε ἀμφὶ γαστέρα, 7.6), but this passage about the efficient sorting of grain makes it clear that much of her training in *oikonomia* rests on the careful regulation of her body. His comment about appetites certainly hints at the typical Greek anxiety about women's hungry bellies or wombs causing them to open doors (to lovers, store cupboards, etc.) that they should not. Xenophon's example of the farmer who does not keep the different kinds of seeds

<sup>17</sup> On Xenophon's naturalization of gender roles, see Foucault 1990, 158–9; Scaife 1995, 227–9; Murnaghan 1988; Thalmann 1998, 124–33.

separate probably has just such a subtext, given that the *oikos* is set up to produce legitimate heirs as well as income. By keeping her house in order, Ischomachus's wife also learns how to order that other interior space, her belly, by regulating what comes into and out of both. In this way, she is most unlike the bad wife, Pandora, who did not keep all her goods securely within but caused them to scatter haphazardly into the world.<sup>18</sup>

### *The Gendered Interior*

The divine planting metaphor and the concern with taking in things in the right way and depositing them in the right place suggests that Xenophon displaces the woman's troubling interiority onto the interior of the *oikos*, two spaces in one that a wife can be trained to regulate. But this coequivalence between the woman's body and the house needs to be articulated with care. At the beginning of her training, the wife's alienation from the *oikos* is manifested by a blush when she realizes that she is unable to find an object that Ischomachus has asked for (8.1). This blush appears on the surface of her face as an external expression of her inner turmoil, while at the same time marking her as an outsider within the interior of the home. The blush is a symbol of the wife's shame, but, more pertinently, it registers her sense of dislocation from her surroundings – what Grosz has called a “homelessness within the home itself” (1995, 122). The message is clear: Ischomachus's wife can learn her own place in the house only after she has learned the place of the things within it.<sup>19</sup>

The blush reveals those parts of the wife's interiority that the house, in keeping parts of its own interior hidden from her, is able to conceal. Unlike the lost object, her body can be easily read and “found out.” But when, later in her training, the wife's face is covered not by a real blush but a cosmetic one, Ischomachus is displeased in a different way. For now it appears that wife and *oikos* have swapped places. After the couple have

<sup>18</sup> The jar is associated with gynecology (it gives its shape to the womb), household economics (as a receptacle for the storage of goods), and, in both of these capacities, Pandora. Sissa 1990, 147–56; Zeitlin 1996, 64–5. On Ischomachus's replacement of the idea of the wife as an empty vessel with the image of a clean slate, Too 2001, 70.

<sup>19</sup> Wigley 1992, 340; cf. Grosz 1995, 92: “It is our positioning within space, both as the point of perspectival access to space, and also as an object for others in space, that gives the subject a coherent identity and an ability to manipulate things, including its own body parts, in space.”

together managed to set up their house in such a manner that it is openly known to its inhabitants, Ischomachus sees his wife take on the capacity for a hidden interior (10.2):

Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἰδὼν ποτε αὐτήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐντετριμμένην πολλῶ μὲν ψιμυθίῳ, ὅπως λευκοτέρα ἔτι δοκοίη εἶναι ἢ ἦν, πολλῇ δ' ἐγγούσῃ, ὅπως ἐρυθροτέρα φαίνοιτο τῆς ἀληθείας, ὑποδήματα δ' ἔχουσαν ὑψηλά, ὅπως μείζων δοκοίη εἶναι ἢ ἐπεφύκει

“Once, Socrates,” he said, “seeing her painted with a good deal of white lead, in order that she might appear paler than she was, and with a good deal of rouge, in order that she might appear redder than she was in truth, and wearing high shoes, in order that she might appear taller than she naturally was . . .”

The wife’s second mistake is, like her first one, visualized as a redness on the surface of her face. In the second case, though, her complexion masks an interior that attempts to deceive (ἐξαπατάω, 10.3, 5, 8), while in the first it had naturally exposed her inner sense of shame.<sup>20</sup> Notice how this differs, for example, from the description of Cyrus’s ornament and body – for his *matched* the beauty of his *paradeisos*, even down to the fact that both are wondrous to gaze upon and both emit a pleasant smell – while the wife’s appearance diverges from the dictates of the “natural” space that contains her.

Yet we need to stop here and think a little more carefully about the image of Ischomachus’s “artificial” wife. Even inasmuch as he explicitly rejects her painted face, Ischomachus’s disregard for his wife’s made-up appearance is troubled by Socrates’ comparison of her, just a few lines earlier, to the painted picture of a beautiful woman (10.1–2), and perhaps also by the fact that the two men talk about her within the setting of the Painted Stoa. Ischomachus has endeavored to ensure that his wife has a plain face and the undecorated walls of his house a plain coloring (οὐ γὰρ ποικίλμασι κεκόσμηται, 9.2), yet her blush and makeup nevertheless converge with both the painted walls of the Stoa Poikilē and the painted surface upon which the artist’s beautiful woman is depicted.<sup>21</sup>

On the one hand, in Ischomachus’s idealized household, both walls and skin must be kept natural and unadorned in order that the viewer

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Lys. 1.14 and 17, where the wife’s makeup is also a sign of deceit taking place within the house.

<sup>21</sup> Even the painted wall of the theatrical *skênê* is hinted at as a backdrop, before which the actor is placed in his high shoes and artificial, colored mask.

might not be deceived as to what truly lies within.<sup>22</sup> In reasoning with his wife about the dangers of makeup, Ischomachus makes clear that her relationship to her body should be equivalent to his relationship to his goods. Both must achieve a transparent visibility that neither hides nor deceives if they are to manage the *oikos* successfully together (10.3):

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην, ὦ γύναι, ποτέρως ἂν με κρίναις ἄξιοφίλητον μᾶλλον εἶναι χρημάτων κοινωνόν, εἴ σοι αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀποδεικνύοιμι, καὶ μήτε κομπάζοιμι ὥς πλείω τῶν ὄντων ἔστι μοι, μήτε ἀποκρυπτοίμην τι τῶν ὄντων μηδέν, ἢ εἰ πειρώμην σε ἑξαπατᾶν λέγων τε ὥς πλείω ἔστι μοι τῶν ὄντων, ἐπιδεικνύς τε ἄργύριον κίβδηλον [δηλοῖν σε] καὶ ὄρμους ὑποξύλους καὶ πορφυρίδας ἐξιτήλους φαίην ἀληθινὰς εἶναι;

“Tell me, wife,” I said, “would you judge me to be more deserving of love as a partner in our affairs if I revealed everything I had to you, and I did not boast that I had more than I really did, nor tried to conceal any of my things in any way, *or* if I tried to deceive you by saying that I had more than I did, showing you counterfeit silver and necklaces of gilded wood and purple garments that would fade and pretending they were genuine?”

On the other hand, by attaining color, the wife becomes so visible as to come to life, stepping out from the plain camouflage of the house’s interior in order to meet the narrative requirements of the text. If the walls of the house cannot be *poikilos* (9.2), surely the wife at least can? For we have to be able to picture the wife, to see her in some way, for the men’s discussion to make sense. Yet in order to preserve her exemplary status within the dialogue, she must also remain invisible, honorably “unseen.” When Socrates favorably contrasts the activity of learning about the virtue of Ischomachus’s wife as a living woman (ζώσης γυναικός) to seeing the likeness of a beautiful woman in a painting by a fashionable artist like Zeuxis (εἰ Ζεῦξις . . . καλὴν εἰκάσας γραφῇ γυναικίκα), the text needs to work hard to keep the categories of the living, moving body (ζώσης), separate from the still body represented in a picture (ζῶον).<sup>23</sup> For the living body turns and moves in a way that might potentially have the will to move beyond the house, starting a narrative that goes somewhere, just as the living body of Candaules’ wife was mobile enough

<sup>22</sup> On the association in architectural discourse between wall and face/skin/clothing, see Wigley 1992, 352–89.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Goldhill’s reading of Socrates’ viewing of both the live and the painted Theodote (1998; *Mem.* 3.10–11). I discuss the *zōon* and narrative movement in Ch. 1.



to catch sight of Gyges exiting from behind the door, or the beautiful decorated body of Hesiod's Pandora proved excessively dangerous when it moved its limbs (and who, in opening the jar, symbolically opened up the *oikos*).<sup>24</sup> There are certain advantages, therefore, to framing a woman in a pictured space, so that she might remain static and easily viewed. This device is also particularly effective in the context of a series of nested conversations about a house, set within the form of the Socratic dialogue.

Since women move between houses in marriage while men stay fixed to one for their entire lives, the wife cannot help but have a mobile relationship in respect to the *oikos*.<sup>25</sup> To counter the dangerous nature of her moving body, the dialogue attempts to make the wife one with the house and the objects that occupy it, so that "the virtuous woman becomes woman-plus-house, or rather woman-as-housed, such that her virtue cannot be separated from the physical space."<sup>26</sup> It is for this reason, too, that Ischomachus objects to the wife's attempts to make herself beautiful. For what is *kalos* about her body is the same as what is *kalos* about the planted trees and the rows of shoes: not the thing or her body itself, but the relationship of the body to the space that surrounds it. Just as it is the interval between shoes and trees that make them beautiful, so is the woman made beautiful only by the ordered space that her body occupies in relation to the house. The interval that creates the requisite unit of separation necessary for *taxis* also inseparably joins the woman's body to the space. Again, the analogy with Candaules' wife is suggestive. Candaules revered what was beautiful (*kalos*) about the body of his wife, but he was unable to slip Gyges unseen through the space between her body and the inside of the house (Hdt. 1.10.2).

### *Making the Interior Visible*

In desiring that the interior of his house be as like its plain surface as possible, Xenophon endeavors to ensure that the difference between outside and inside is a natural one (as marked by the "natural" difference between the sexes), in contrast to the deceitful exteriority set in place by adornment, makeup, and counterfeit goods. When he takes his wife on a tour of the house to show her its "possibilities" (9.2–6), Ischomachus reveals

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Mulvey 1992, 55, who describes the home as a point of stasis in a narrative, a place that must be left in order for the story to achieve momentum. Candaules' wife turns the male gaze back on itself, by looking out as well as being looked at.

<sup>25</sup> Carson 1990, 136; Bergren 2008, 242–303.

<sup>26</sup> Wigley 1992, 37.

no more than a series of simply decorated rooms as a prelude to sorting out the contents that might be housed in each of them. But in laying bare the inside of his house to his reader, he does more than simply refute the perceived dangers of female interiority. He also confronts the secrets that citizen men keep about their *oikoi*, especially those men who are *kaloi k'agathoi*. Ischomachus begins his conversation with Socrates with a direct reference to the difference between what men show about themselves and who they really are, when he recounts how he is often summoned into an *antidosis* procedure on the grounds that he is *kalos k'agathos* (7.3).

The principle of *antidosis* or “property exchange” in Athenian law speaks to a general suspicion about the contents of one’s neighbor’s house. The procedure consisted in the right of any of the wealthy men of Athens, upon being called to provide a service for the city at his own expense, to deny that call on the grounds that another citizen was still wealthier and thus better equipped for the job. In such cases, Citizen A will formally request an *antidosis* with Citizen B, the man whom he believes to be wealthier than himself. Citizen B, upon being challenged, has two options. He can either agree to take on the civic expenses of the liturgy formerly demanded of Citizen A, or he can refuse, in which case, he must agree to an exchange of all of his property with Citizen A. Two elements that are particularly important to Ischomachus in the *Oeconomicus* – that is, revealing the interior of his house and making an inventory of his goods – were major steps in the *antidosis* procedure.

In the *Oeconomicus*, Ischomachus’s house not only shuns the pretence toward goods that are greater than reality, but, by following in kind the preliminary stages of an *antidosis* procedure, it also proves that it has no secret store of wealth within an unseen interior.<sup>27</sup> The inventory that takes place during an *antidosis* is termed an *apophasis*, or “revelation,” in an effort to make one’s “invisible” (*aphanês*) property visible.<sup>28</sup> The choice of language betrays an anxiety about whether all of a citizen’s property can ever be fully seen at one time, and whether, as a consequence, one’s

<sup>27</sup> See Gabrielson 1986 on the other ways in which individual wealth or property was itemized in Athens. As he points out “it was virtually impossible to gain an accurate picture of one’s wealth” in Classical Athens (110). See further; Ar. *Ran.* 1065–67; Foxhall 1989, 40–1; Christ 1990.

<sup>28</sup> Gabrielson 1986, 1987, 18–20; Johnstone 2003. Murnaghan 1998, 17, notes that Ischomachus fosters a connection “between farming and *ta phanera*, visible, real property, as opposed to more suspect, hidden wealth, that was an important element in defenses of the life of the aristocratic landowner” (see also her note 34, p. 21 and Murnaghan 2006).

*oikos* can be fully opened to surveillance or inventoried from inside to out.<sup>29</sup> This attitude is at first unexpected, if only because Greek houses were relatively simple and small in their layout.<sup>30</sup> But, as sites for the production and storage of a large amount of goods, including oil, wine, food, clothing, bedding, shoes, grain, and cooking implements, they needed to adapt to hold a considerable number of things. Because many of the goods that need to be stored within the house are produced outside on the farm, the accumulation of property within the *oikos* is much greater than we might at first expect.

Even more than its function as a living space, then, the *oikos* is defined by its capacity for storage, and Xenophon's visual ideal is that every room reveal its possessions in as open a manner as possible. (9.2):<sup>31</sup>

οὐ γὰρ ποικίλμασι κεκόσμηται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τὰ οἰκήματα  
ῥυκοδόμηται πρὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐσκεμμένα, ὅπως ἀγγεῖα ὡς συμ-  
φορώτατα ἢ τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐσέσθαι

The house is not finely decorated, Socrates, but the rooms are furnished to this end, that they be as convenient as possible as storage places for the things that will go in them.

We have seen Lysander marveling at the display of trees in Cyrus's orchard, each planted in its proper place in the ground, but what about small household objects – how can they each have their own special place in the space of the house? Ischomachus uses the example of a Phoenician merchant ship that he once saw, in order to demonstrate that with the due amount of order, the spatial capacities of the house (no matter how small they are) can be increased almost *ad infinitum*. Upon boarding the ship, Ischomachus tells how he “saw the greatest number of things divided up into the smallest receptacles” (8.11), in a space that, again, bears comparison to a room (its total surface area is not much bigger than a dining room built for eleven couches, 8.13). Through the application of a meticulous system of order (τάξις), Xenophon implies that the numerous

<sup>29</sup> Note here the attempt to turn the houses of the city “inside out” in the radical new reforms of the women in Ar. *Ecl.*, beginning with the call for citizens to donate their property to the state. As one man brings his cooking implements out of his house, he files them into a verbal inventory (Ar. *Ecl.* 730–45), but his neighbor refuses to expose all of his property to the public eye (746ff.). On surveillance, gender, and power in relation to questions of property, see Johnstone 2003.

<sup>30</sup> Wycherley 1969, 185–208; M. Jameson 1990; Nevett 1999.

<sup>31</sup> Note also the premium that Hesiod places on the house as a place of storage at *Op.* 361–77 (cf. Purves 2004).

contents of a house or ship (which include, in the latter's case, wooden equipment, anchors, ropes, rigging, weapons, eating utensils, and cargo) can be collected into a limited space that is able to be surveyed in an instant, whether in the mind's eye or in reality. Thus the ship's lookout is able to procure any item immediately, without having to search for it, because he has a perfect plan of the ship's order in his mind.<sup>32</sup> The ship's declaration of its goods works as a kind of visual inventory at the same time as it does away with those secret spaces where "invisible" property might hide. By transposing such a system onto the *oikos*, Ischomachus places his house above suspicion of artifice or duplicity.

As if they were planting a *paradeisos* or preparing a merchant ship of their own, Ischomachus and his wife arrange their possessions within the home in a most pleasing and beautiful order, using the rooms as storage vessels (ἀγγεία, 9.2). This leads to a description of shoes, clothes, bedding, and cooking utensils that appear *kalos* when separated into rows (ἐφεξῆς, 8.19):

ὥς δὲ καλὸν φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴν ὑποδήματα ἐφεξῆς κέηται, καὶ ὅποια ἦ, καλὸν δὲ ἱμάτια κεχωρισμένα ἰδεῖν, καὶ ὅποια ἦ, καλὸν δὲ στρώματα, καλὸν δὲ χαλκία, καλὸν δὲ τὰ ἀμφὶ τραπέζας, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ πάντων καταγελάσειεν ἂν μάλιστα οὐχ ὁ σεμνὸς ἀλλ' ὁ κομψός, [ὅτι] καὶ χύτρας [φησὶν] εὐρυθμον φαίνεσθαι εὐκρινῶς κειμένas – τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη πού τοῦτου ἅπαντα καλλίῳ φαίνεται κατὰ κόσμον κείμενα.

How beautiful it looks, whenever shoes are laid out in rows, each according to their type, how beautiful it is to see clothes separated out in their proper places, how beautiful bedding looks, how beautiful bronze pots, how beautiful tableware! This is the kind of thing that a facetious man would laugh at but an august man would not, since he would say that even pots appear to be graceful when they are laid out in a discriminating manner – and so, following on from this, everything else too appears to be more beautiful when it is arranged in order.<sup>33</sup>

It emerges that it is not so much the things themselves that are beautiful, but the spatial order in which they are arranged. Ischomachus ends his eulogy of household equipment by focusing not upon the actual beauty of shoes, clothes, or tableware, but on the beauty of the spaces that separate one thing from the next. He tells Socrates that, just as with

<sup>32</sup> Cf. how the collector Robert Opie stores his vast collection of household products (Elsner and Cardinal 1994).

<sup>33</sup> Translation adapted from Pomeroy 1994.

the intervals that form between people dancing in a chorus, “the space between all these things appears beautiful,” (καὶ τὸ μέσον δὲ πάντων τούτων καλὸν φαίνεται, 8.20).

In my reading of the *Anabasis* (Ch. 5), I discussed how Xenophon became increasingly unable to keep measurements and distance relative, particularly in his regulation of the interval. In the *Oeconomicus*, however, no matter how small the area within the house is, there will always be enough interstitial space to prevent one category from overlapping with the next. The presence of these intervals will prevent the order of the house from becoming muddled, just as in the process of differentiation embedded in the idea of the index or encyclopedia.

In any system of cataloguing, it is the process of dividing, of creating spaces between things, that establishes order and meaning. Thus, as Ischomachus and his wife sort their possessions into different categories, they establish a carefully delineated taxonomy based on a series of separations and divisions. Clothing, for example, is classified first by gender, then by occasion; household goods are divided into those that are used daily and those only for feasts; goods that will be consumed within a month are separated from what will be consumed within a year; bedding and shoes are separated out for men and women (9.6–10). The list goes on, and it could continue, bifurcating into an increasing number of categories.<sup>34</sup> In his much-noted preface to *The Order of Things*, Foucault had discussed the implications of such a state as it is reflected in Borges’ quotation from a certain Chinese Encyclopedia, which lists an anomalous index of animals, with categories that include “drawn with a very fine camelhair brush” and “that from a long way off look like flies” (1970, xv).

In his analysis of this list, Foucault focuses on the “interstitial blanks *separating* all these entities from one another,” arguing that it is the narrowness of the distances between the categories that contributes to the text’s strangeness (1970, xvi, *italics original*). The *Oeconomicus* is less far-reaching than Borges’ Chinese Encyclopedia, and yet it is still a remarkable fact, bordering on fantasy, that Ischomachus can claim a place for every interval (τὸ μέσον) that separates one category from another. But this is exactly what happens in the text, where the cataloguing of Ischomachus and his wife is physically enacted by their sorting of groups of possessions into different receptacles. Each of these groups is then given its own specific site within the house, its “natural” space,

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Elsner and Cardinal 1994, 27–8, 32. Too 2001 believes that Ischomachus engages here in rhetorical overkill, resulting in a prose bursting with *ataxia*.

to which it inherently belongs.<sup>35</sup> No matter how small the area within the house is, there will always be enough interstitial space to prevent one category from overstepping (ἐμποδίζει) the next, and it is the presence of these intervals that will keep the collection of goods in order.<sup>36</sup> Ischomachus's house has that fantastic capacity of the miniature, like the beehive or doll's house, to reproduce its number of spaces seemingly indefinitely.<sup>37</sup>

Although Ischomachus and his wife make a written inventory of their possessions (9.10), it is the house itself that stands as the true inventory. In this way, the model of housing or placing items in a particular category resembles the structure of a library, for example, or any other number of index systems based on the idea of locale that became so popular in the fourth century, such as the *pinacotheca* (picture gallery) or *daclyiotheca* (gem cabinet). In the increasing trend toward the encyclopedic collecting of literary and artistic works, the Greeks of the Hellenistic period began to create imaginary physical structures within which entries could be "placed" (as the suffix *-theca* denotes).<sup>38</sup> In each case, we find a system of designated, ordered storage for a broad range of things, much in the same way that Ischomachus's house is constructed as a series of specific storage spaces (ἀγγεῖα) and places (χώροι). In the case of the *Oeconomicus*, moreover, as with the case of the library or gem cabinet, the taxonomy works not only to house a large number of objects but also to situate them in such a way that any individual item can immediately be accessed for retrieval.<sup>39</sup> This brings us to the last aspect of Ischomachus's training of his wife, for she may be shown all the rooms in the house and taught to catalogue every conceivable item, but this will all come to nothing unless her memory is also trained.

<sup>35</sup> "After we had separated all the utensils into different categories, we carried each thing to its proper place" (9.8); "Each (room) calls out for that which is most fitting to it" (9.2).

<sup>36</sup> In Ischomachus's description of the Phoenician merchant ship, everything is snug but laid out "in order that nothing get in anything else's way (ἐμποδίζει)" (8.13). Later, he states that τὸ μέσον is beautiful only when each thing is out of the way (ἐκποδῶν) of the other (8.20).

<sup>37</sup> 7.33; S. Stewart 1993, 37–69.

<sup>38</sup> On the organization of "collections of words" in the Greek art of memory, with reference to Callimachus's catalogue, see Small 1997, 41–52, esp. 44–5. On the totalizing effect of encyclopedism in Pliny the Elder, Carey 2003.

<sup>39</sup> Small 1997, 44–5, on Callimachus's catalogue; Casson 2001, 38–41. Carruthers 1992, 33, "memory without conscious design is like an uncatalogued library."

## MEMORY

In order for Ischomachus's tabulation to work, he must train his wife's mind so that she will remember where in the house each particular object belongs. Memory is emphasized in the text as an essential prerequisite to the system's efficiency: both the wife and the housekeeper must possess capable memories if they are to remember where the various things are kept (7.26; 9.10; 9.11). Otherwise the usefulness of objects and systems cannot be taken advantage of, just as would be the case if a slave forgot where in the marketplace a particular item was sold (8.22). On the Phoenician ship, the lookout regularly spends time inspecting and memorizing the order of his equipment. In fact, he knows it so well that (8.14):

οὕτως ἡῦρον ἐπιστάμενον ἐκάστων τὴν χώραν ὡς καὶ ἀπὼν ἂν εἴποι ὅπου ἕκαστα κεῖται καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ὁ γράμματα ἐπιστάμενος εἴποι ἂν Σωκράτους καὶ ὁπόσα γράμματα καὶ ὅπου ἕκαστον τέτακται.

Even when he wasn't on the ship, he could say where each thing was positioned and how many of them there were, as easily as one who knows letters could say how many letters there are in the word "Socrates" and the order in which they are arranged.

The ability to remember by visualizing how objects are physically arranged in a particular place is compared to the ordering of letters in early treatises on memory as well. Carruthers discusses the importance of being able to read both backward and forward in ancient mnemonics,<sup>40</sup> and Arist. *Mem.* 452a uses the sequence of opening letters in the alphabet as a key to being able to remember accurately. Although Aristotle's explanation of how memory works is at times unclear, he combines *topoi* and visualization in his explanation of mnemonic technique.<sup>41</sup> At other points in the treatise, he likens memory to a painting or the impression

<sup>40</sup> Carruthers 1992, 29: "The ancients . . . thought that each 'bit' of knowledge was remembered in a particular place in the memory, which it occupied as a letter occupies space on a written surface."

<sup>41</sup> Aristotle mentions the "place" system of memorizing four times (*Top.* 163b; *De an.* 427b; *Mem.* 452a; *Div. somn.* 458b). Yates 1966, 31–6; Blum 1969, 70–80; Sorabji 1972; Schofield 1977; Everson 1997, 193–5. Small 1997, 87, says of Aristotle that he "recommends memorizing sequentially so that by remembering the flanked items, you will be able to remember what comes in-between," going on to argue that "all the ancient accounts of memory present only a sequential system and memorizing is a serial process."

left in wax by a signet ring (*Mem.* 450a), and claims that it is impossible to think without imagination, or *phantasia*, which “takes place as an impression in the mind like the composition of a picture” (449b). Here, and in *On the Soul*, Aristotle insists that the *phantasmata* (the images created by imagination) appear “before our eyes” (πρὸ ὀμμάτων), and that we cannot learn or think without the faculty of mental images.<sup>42</sup> He also states that the art of memory is predicated on this visualizing of mental images (*De an.* 427b18–20) and on arranging things into position within the mind (*Insomn.* 458b17–25).

The system of positioning particular objects within certain places in a house is familiar from the Roman rhetorical treatises that deal with the cultivation of the *ars memoriae*. Both the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (c. 82 BCE) and Quintilian (late first century CE) explain how, in cultivating a trained memory, one should construct a spatial structure in the mind wherein a sequence of thoughts – represented by a number of different objects – could be housed.<sup>43</sup> Thus, as the orator walked through his own memory house or street in his mind, he was supposedly able to remember the order of his speech simply by looking at an imaginary object located in an appropriate place. The placing of *imagines* (memory pictures) in sequence in different *loci* (architectural structures) or thesauri (storehouses) is thus somewhat like Ischomachus and his wife’s construction of a storehouse of their own possessions in order that they might find them again in the future.<sup>44</sup>

According to our Roman sources, the technique of remembering through spatial structures was invented by Simonides after an accident involving the collapse of a building.<sup>45</sup> As Cicero has Antonius tell it in *On the Orator*, the poet devised his technique after having been called out

<sup>42</sup> Arist. *Mem.* 450a; *De an.* 427b, 431b, 432a. At *Mem.* 450b20ff. Aristotle draws an analogy between a memory and a picture (ζῶν) painted on a panel.

<sup>43</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 3.16.28–3.24.40; Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.1–17.

<sup>44</sup> The thesaurus was a popular conceit for the structure in which one placed the object images to be remembered in the Latin authors. Cf. *Rhet. Her.* 3.16.28; Quint. *Inst.* 11.1; August. *Conf.* 10.8 with O’Donnell 1992, ad loc.; Carruthers 1992, 33–45. Her discussion in this section on the metaphor of the beehive as a storage site for memory in medieval texts, with the bee serving as the “collector” and “distributor” of knowledge (37–9), has interesting implications for Ischomachus’s comparison of his house to a hive and his wife to the queen bee within it (*Oec.* 7.17, 32–4, 38). Cf. Thalmann 1998, 124–5. It would be inappropriate for Ischomachus to refer to a thesaurus in his own house, since it was a room generally used for the storing-up of treasure (*L.S.J.* s.v.).

<sup>45</sup> Cic. *De or.* 2.86.353–4; Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.14–16 (cf. Yates 1966, 27; Blum 1969, 41–6). J. Farrell 1997 critiques the Simonides “foundation myth” in Roman thought.



of a banquet hall at which he was performing (*De or.* 2.86.351–5). While Simonides was outside, the roof of the hall collapsed, causing everyone within to be crushed beyond recognition. Simonides, however, was able to identify the different bodies for burial because he remembered the order in which each guest had been positioned within the room (*De or.* 2.86.353–4):

Simonides dicitur ex eo quod meminisset quo eorum loco quisque cubuisset demonstrator uniuscuiusque sepeliendi fuisse; hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxime qui memoriae lumen afferret. Itaque eis qui hanc partem ingeni exercerent locos esse capiendos et ea quae memoria tenere vellent effingenda animo atque in eis locis collocanda: sic fore ut ordinem rerum locorum ordo conservaret, res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret, atque ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris uteremur.

Simonides, because he remembered in which place (*locus*) each of them had been reclining, is said to have been able to point out each individual for burial. Then, inspired by this incident, he is reported to have discovered that order is by far the most important factor in bringing clarity to memory. And those who would train this part of their mind must take up places (*loci*) and create images in their mind of those things that they wish to remember and place the images in the places. Thus it would turn out that the order of places would preserve the order of the things, that the images of the things would denote the things themselves, and that the places would work like wax, and the images like letters (in the wax).<sup>46</sup>

The idea of an actual “memory house,” as a rhetorical extension of the theory that “the order of places preserves the order of things” can only be found in Roman texts. Our Greek sources do not tell us much about Simonides’ invention of mnemonics, beyond the references found in Callimachus and the third-century *Parian Chronicle*.<sup>47</sup> They do, however, tell us that some kinds of memory techniques existed in Classical Greece, and that, in principle, the concept that memory stores, sorts, and retrieves

<sup>46</sup> Cicero, like Quintilian, appears to be applying a causal relationship to two facts about Simonides mentioned in Call. *Aet.* fr. 64.3–14: that he was the inventor of memory technique, and that he was saved by being called out of Scopas’s dinner party before the roof collapsed (Blum 1969, 41–6; Marchesi 2005, 394–5).

<sup>47</sup> The *Parian Chronicle* records Simonides as the “inventor of the system of memory-aids” (Yates 1966, 29). According to Quintilian, Simonides wrote about his invention in a lost work (Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.16; Small 1997, 83).

material is common to both cultures.<sup>48</sup> In the *Theaetetus*, Plato compares the mind within which different thoughts are collected to an aviary full of birds, in order to show that there are two stages to the induction of knowledge (Pl. *Tht.* 197d):

νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.

Now let us construct in each soul a kind of aviary of different species of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, some in small groups, and some on their own flying about through them all whichever way they please.

Each individual fills his aviary with different pieces of knowledge as he progresses through life, but he soon learns that these random facts are almost useless unless he is able to find a method of successfully retrieving them whenever he needs them.<sup>49</sup> Hence, the blush of Ischomachus's wife, which revealed to her husband that he had only trained her in the first stage of learning, or the precautions of the Phoenician lookout, who warns that it is not enough to simply arrange things neatly – one must know the exact order in which things are placed so as to be able to retrieve them again in the shortest amount of time.

We also have some evidence for Greek mnemotechnics that have survived in the fragments of the sophists.<sup>50</sup> The anonymous author of the *Dissoi Logoi* has a section on artificial memory, mostly involving a system of verbal association, perhaps visualized through pictures.<sup>51</sup> In addition,

<sup>48</sup> The most comprehensive account of Greek memory practices can be found in Blum 1969, 38–104. The relationship between recollection and “finding” is worth stressing in this context. “Hunting,” “tracking-down,” and “finding” are all common terms used in the description of retrieving a piece of knowledge from one's memory in the ancient world. Cf. Carruthers 1992, 16–45, and Small 1995, 159: “Issues of storage and retrieval loom large for any consideration of memory.”

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Pl. *Tht.* 197d, on the hunting of pigeons and the famous wax tablet analogy at *Tht.* 194c–d. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates refers to the tradition of comparing the souls of forgetful and foolish men to sieves because they are unable to retain anything (*Grg.* 493c1). Ischomachus's wife is unlike a sieve in both mind and body precisely because she is able to keep her memory/house in order (cf. Ischomachus's reference to those “who draw water in a leaky jar” [i.e., manage their households inefficiently] at 7.40). The myth of the Danaids, who were condemned to the Underworld to draw water in sieves as a marker of the murderous and boundary-destroying capacities of their bodies, expresses the same idea (Carson 1990, 155ff.).

<sup>50</sup> See Blum (1969, 40) on the role of memory in the daily life of Pythagoras (*Iambl. VP* 164–6).

<sup>51</sup> *Dissoi Logoi* IX, Sprague 1972.

both Plato and Xenophon refer to the rhapsode Hippias's technique for memorization.<sup>52</sup> Although Socrates mocks Hippias in both of the eponymous dialogues, suggesting that the technique was not taken very seriously, the rhapsode claims to have acquired the ability to recite fifty names after hearing them only once (*Hip. mai.* 285e). This ability to catalogue is of course important for epic poets, whose oral mnemonic techniques provided them with the startling ability to recite the Catalogue of Ships or the fifty daughters of Nereus in the *Theogony*.<sup>53</sup> Hippias's mnemonic ability can thus be seen as part of a general trend wherein what was described as "inspirational" memory among the first epic poets is now linked to the more technical skill of the rhapsode. Both epic catalogues and the idea of the prose index or memory system bear a connection with the concept of plotting a sequence in space, especially if memory was understood to work as a well-organized spatial structure onto which mental images were mapped.<sup>54</sup> The role of the Younger Cyrus in cultivating a *paradeisos* of perfect geometric proportions thus also reflects, again, on the Elder Cyrus, who was said to have possessed a remarkable ability to remember the name of every soldier in his army (Plin. *HN* 7.24.88).

Pliny the Elder also records the story of the Greek Charmades (*HN* 7.24.89), who was renowned for his ability to recite the names of all the books in a library. It is tempting to believe that Charmades' technique was based on the idea of memorizing a place (*topos*) for each book within the spatial layout of the building. Presumably, this would also lead one to be able instantly to retrieve the name of a book by rapidly scanning the ground plan of the library in one's mind, in much the same way as Ischomachus's wife might instantly remember where one of her husband's numerous possessions was kept within the house.<sup>55</sup> In his treatise on architecture, Vitruvius tells the story of Aristophanes of Byzantium, who "with utmost enthusiasm and the utmost diligence had been making daily readings through every one of the books [in the library at Alexandria] *in sequence*."<sup>56</sup> It is not Aristophanes' ability to read at such a voluminous rate that is astounding, however, but the fact that he remembers *where* each book is located in the library (presumably because he reads in

<sup>52</sup> Pl. *Hip. mai.* 285e9; *Hip. mi.* 368d6–7; Xen. *Symp.* 4.62.

<sup>53</sup> On the memorization of epic catalogues using visual techniques, see Minchin 2001, 73–99.

<sup>54</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 3.23.38 states that Greeks were particularly interested in the idea of memorizing words. Yates 1966, 15.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Arist. *Mem.* 452a.

<sup>56</sup> Vitr. *De arch.* 7. pref. 5.

order).<sup>57</sup> This reading-in-sequence allowed Aristophanes to expose the plagiarism of certain poets in a literature contest in an “amazing” way, by immediately locating and retrieving every volume that he required in the library’s vast collection (*De arch.* 7. pref. 7).

## EPILOGUE: TREES AND MEMORY IN THE ODYSSEY

In order to make more sense of the spaces between things and memory in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, I want to end by looking back to Homeric epic. Rather than entering into a general discussion on memory and oral poetics, I will focus on one example of early mnemonic technique in the *Odyssey*.<sup>58</sup> Mueller has recently written about Penelope’s control of the memory of Odysseus’s house, comparing it to the mnemonic skill of Ischomachus’s wife-as-housekeeper (2007). As she observes, Penelope’s remembrance of Odysseus and her assurance that she will remember his house even after she should remarry shares some associations with the memory that the epic poet must cultivate, who not only sings through a process of memorization but also memorializes through song.<sup>59</sup> We have also discussed how Hippias’s technical ability to recite a list of fifty names can be seen as a kind of technical grafting of the inspirational memory bestowed by the Muses on Homer onto the later singer, enabling him to recount long catalogues in verse.

Yet something of the self-conscious practice of mnemonics as *technê* rather than inspiration is reflected at the very end of the *Odyssey*, where we see Odysseus reclaim his place in the *oikos* through a series of recollections and, eventually, by recollecting a series of things.<sup>60</sup> Odysseus is only able to reestablish the marriage bond with his wife after he has correctly remembered the secret of the space of their bedroom, and he cannot claim his rightful place as Laertes’ son until he has recounted from memory the order of the trees in his father’s orchard. These two *sêmata*, like the earlier *sêma* of the scar, are revealed through a process

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Small 1997, 44–5, on Callimachus’s catalogue of the library at Alexandria. On the importance of the interval in memorizing, note that Cic. *De or.* 2.87.357–8 claims that “one must use many places (*loci*) which must be clear, defined, and at moderate intervals” (Small 1997, 96).

<sup>58</sup> On memory and oral poetics, cf. Minchin 2001, with further bibliography. On the archaic conception of *mnêmosunê*, see Vernant [1983] 2006, 115–53.

<sup>59</sup> *Od.* 19.1577–81=21.75–9.

<sup>60</sup> Pedrick (1988) analyzes how Penelope maintains control of the space of the *oikos*, and how Odysseus, in order to fully return, must find a way to reclaim that space as his own as well.

of memorization. In both cases, moreover, memorization depends on the *sēmata* keeping their place in or on the ground. If either the bed or any of these trees had been moved out of place (ἄλλοθε), the effect of Odysseus's memory would have unraveled (cf. Ch. 2).

Odysseus's uncovering of the last memory sign by correctly recounting the trees in Laertes' orchard looks forward to the ordered and preserved house of the *Oeconomicus*. The trees in the orchard of *Odyssey* 24 are like the ones in Cyrus's *paradeisos* inasmuch as they are arranged and tended with great care by the gardener.<sup>61</sup> By precisely remembering the numbers and names of those trees, in the correct order, Odysseus convinces Laertes of his true identity and reclaims his place in the Ithacan "plot" (*Od.* 24.336–44):<sup>62</sup>

εἰ δ' ἄγε τοι καὶ δένδρε' ἐϋκτιμένην κατ' ἀλωήν  
εἵπω, ἃ μοί ποτ' ἔδωκας, ἐγὼ δ' ἤτεόν σε ἕκαστα  
παιδνὸς ἐών, κατὰ κῆπον ἐπισπόμενος· διὰ δ' αὐτῶν  
ἱκνεύμεσθα, σὺ δ' ὠνόμασας καὶ ἔειπες ἕκαστα.  
ὄγχνας μοι δῶκας τρισκαίδεκα καὶ δέκα μηλέας,  
συκέας τεσσαράκοντ'· ὄρχους δέ μοι ὦδ' ὀνόμηνας  
δῶσειν πεντήκοντα, διατρύγιος δὲ ἕκαστος  
ἦην· ἔνθα δ' ἀνὰ σταφυλαὶ παντοῖαι ἔασιν,  
ὅππότε δὴ Διὸς ὦραι ἐπιβρίσειαν ὑπερθεῖν.

Come then what if I recount to you the trees in your well laid  
out orchard,  
those that you once granted to me, and I asked you about  
each one,  
when I was a boy, following you through the plot.  
We walked through the trees, and you named and recounted  
each one.  
You gave me thirteen pear trees, ten apple trees,  
and forty fig trees. You named the fifty rows of vines you  
would give me,  
each one never failing. And there were grapes  
of all kinds upon them, whenever the seasons of Zeus pressed  
down from above.

Odysseus's act of remembering here has a visual and spatial emphasis, both in his manner of imaginatively retracing the steps he first took with his father in order to remember the position and order of the trees, and

<sup>61</sup> L'Allier (1998) argues that Laertes' orchard is a greater influence on Xenophon's portrayal of Cyrus's garden than genuine Eastern *paradeisoi*.

<sup>62</sup> On "plot," see further Henderson 1997.

in his ability to conjure up a vivid mental picture of the grapes weighing heavily upon the vines. In this way, the well-preserved order of Laertes' garden provides a visual structure in Odysseus's mind for remembering the different species of trees contained within it. This association between order and memorization in Homer, then, works through the principle of claiming one's place in the *oikos* by recounting exactly how that place is arranged.

Laertes and the now-grown Odysseus use the orchard as a space through which to navigate and articulate their reunion, just as they once expressed a familial bond by the act of naming and walking through the trees in earlier times. It is through the act of *recounting* that the two imaginatively retrace the spatial dimensions of the family plot to which the son has finally returned. We can think again here of Jameson's "narrative promenade" (or Eco's "inferential walk," which Henderson refers to in his reading of this passage).<sup>63</sup> Although the list of trees, spoken first by Laertes and now repeated, many years later, by Odysseus, is a simple and repetitive one, it enables the two figures to mark out a narrative trajectory. The list of trees announces itself as a catalogue by its association with counting and setting things in order, as well as by the verbs to do with speaking and naming (*eipein* and *onomazein/onamainein*).<sup>64</sup> On the one hand, then, like the Catalogue of Ships, it is purely, or even merely, the remembering of a number of facts or things (Pucci 1996, 21):

The catalogue, as speech act, manifests a prowess of memory, and points to poetry as its privileged means. Cataloguing constitutes the supreme distillation of poetry's capabilities for truth, rigor, order, history, sequentiality: mere names, mere numbers, and no *mētis*; or, as we would say no connotations, no rhetoric, no fiction. Almost no poem.

On the other hand, the retracing of steps already taken (using the verbs *follow* ἐπισπόμενος and *walk* ἰκνεύμεσθα) connects to the idea of the path of narrative. Storytelling is tied to movement through space inasmuch as it is the "retracing of the line already drawn," or – in this case – retracing a path followed long ago.<sup>65</sup> What is striking about this last imaginary journey to be narrated in the poem is that Odysseus knows exactly where he is going. Rather than forging a path through unfamiliar space, he walks over old and familiar ground.

<sup>63</sup> Henderson 1997, 87, note 2; F. Jameson 1984, 82.

<sup>64</sup> The same verbs introduce the *Iliad's* Catalogue of Ships (*Il.* 2. [484], 488, 493).

<sup>65</sup> Miller 1981, 25.

The orchard, one's "father's land," acts as another version of home because it is a double of the fatherland (πατρὶς γαῖα). Orchards in Homer are frequently connected with fathers. In addition to the orchards belonging to the fathers of Bellerophon, Glaucus, Diomedes, and Lycaon in the *Iliad*, there is the orchard of Nausicaa's father in the *Odyssey*, which Alcinous unwittingly offers as a kind of fantastic and magical substitute for Laertes' orchard when he proposes that Odysseus might marry his daughter.<sup>66</sup> The poem signals its final arrival home by having Odysseus return to and recount the properties of this small yet complete piece of his fatherland.

The fact that Odysseus counts *trees* must also be significant. First, Homeric trees are well-known for their leaves, a prime example of uncountable things. As Glaucus comments in *Iliad* 6, the leaves that fall from trees multiply and fade away, signifying the innumerable cycles of human generation and the seasons, rather than creating a quantifiable list with a beginning and end. Yet these leaves are set in a paradoxical relationship to the trees on which they grow. For trees repeatedly symbolize an individual human life in Homer, and – presumably because of the order and organization with which they are laid out – are always (re)countable.

Trees and their leaves, therefore, can be said to engender both epic impulses: the countable (as expressed through the catalogue; or the individual moment of death on the battlefield) and the uncountable (the unquantifiable number of leaves that take us beyond the limits of human vision and knowledge in Homer). At the beginning of the *Iliad*, after Homer has failed to recount *all* the men who sailed to Troy but has nevertheless produced a remarkable catalogue of the leaders and their ships, Polites tells the Trojans that he cannot calculate the mass of Achaeans on the plain, comparing their number to those of leaves or sand (2.800).<sup>67</sup> Odysseus's arrival home at the end of the *Odyssey*, on the other hand, underscores the movement from grand catalogue (one that covered the geography of Greece and Asia Minor) to one of a more manageable size (contained within a walled garden and nurtured by the relationship between father and son). In Laertes' garden, there are no more epic uncountable things, leaving Odysseus in full control of his path through space and his memory. This style of remembering looks forward, I suggest, to

<sup>66</sup> *Il.* 6.194–5, 12.314, 14.123, 21.34–8, *Od.* 6.293, 7.112.

<sup>67</sup> Remember Herodotus's Pythia, who distinguished her immortal vision by knowing the number of every grain of sand (Ch. 4).

post-epic mnemonic systems where every item *can* be accounted for, just as it can in Ischomachus's house. In both texts, the accountability of *each thing* to its proper place is underscored by the use of the word ἕκαστος (*each, every*), which appears twice in our *Odyssey* passage and with great frequency in the relevant passages of the *Oeconomicus*.<sup>68</sup>

In another way, too, the catalogue of trees with which the story of the *Odyssey* "fades out," as Pucci puts it, is significantly different to the Catalogue of Ships from which Homeric epic began (1996, 14). The number of trees in Laertes' orchard *does not change* over the length of the epic timeline of sailing to Troy and returning, while the number of ships and leaders in the Catalogue of Ships must, in the passage of time, decrease as the poems go on. Not only does the action of the *Iliad* record death after death on the battlefield, but the entire *Odyssey* can also be read as a reduction of the sheer mass of numbers (*plêthus*) expressed in the invocation before the Catalogue of Ships.<sup>69</sup> The many ships and men that Odysseus leaves Troy with are gradually whittled down, over the course of Odysseus's journey, to one (*Od.* 1.1–10).

Odysseus's catalogue of trees, in contrast, not only remains the same from beginning to end, it also overwrites the narrative action of the *Iliad*, where the symbolic fall of a tree marks the death of a warrior.<sup>70</sup> The ships in the Catalogue foreshadow the inevitability of those deaths, for the vessels are themselves made from trees that have been cut down.<sup>71</sup> Thus, every death in the *Iliad* that evokes the fall of a tree also evokes, in a highly subtle and suggestive way, the planks of the ship that first carried that hero to Troy. Read along this grain, it becomes all the more urgent for Laertes to keep all of his trees upright, recountable, and alive.

When trees are cut down and transformed into ships, they are changed into an object that, although it might carry within it the memory of a

<sup>68</sup> *Od.* 24. 339, 342; *Oec.* 4.22.1 (Cyrus's orchard); 7.33.3 (the beehive); 8.2.8; 8.3.4; 8.7.2; 8.10.5; 8.12.6; 8.13.3; 8.14.2–3; 8.15.1; 8.17.6–8; 8.18.2; 8.19.1; 8.20.2–4; 8.22.1–5; 8.23.4; 9.3.1; 9.9.1; 9.10.4–6. 9.14.4. 9.15.4. 9.17.1 (Ischomachus's house); etc. See further Henderson 1997.

<sup>69</sup> See the Introduction.

<sup>70</sup> Pucci 1996, 17–18: "The son/*phyton* must not die as an *anêr*, but as a tree on his own soil, and taken care by the attention of the gardeners. The *Iliad*, in its most stern spirit, dislikes this agricultural image, since it is inconsistent with heroic death, and directly and indirectly debunks it by the elaborated equation of the heroic life with the corruptible life of nature and by the repeated similes that compare the fallen hero with the cut-down tree, or flower." See also his note 13; Murnaghan 2006; Telò (forthcoming).

<sup>71</sup> I thank Melissa Mueller for her suggestions on these pages.



secure and rooted version of space (like the bed in Odysseus's bedroom or the trees in an orchard), is essentially a moving, floating platform.<sup>72</sup> The falling of men like trees at Troy expresses their uprootedness in place and alienation from their homelands. This highlights the significance of the fact that the trees in Laertes' orchard and Odysseus's bedroom remain uncut and vertical – for as such they represent a return to home. Ships are important because they chart lateral space, defining a community that reaches beyond a single *oikos*, such as the community of Achaeans at Troy. This is one of the reasons why Telemachus must set sail at the beginning of the *Odyssey*. But for ship-worn Odysseus, the series of upright, immobile trees is just as important for the fact that it denotes a return to the individual family unit; a movement within the personal and exclusive borders of the household.

The fact that Odysseus makes it back to his father's orchard, his piece of homeland, is in itself an anti-*Iliadic* move: only Lycaon returns to his father's orchard in the *Iliad*, for a brief period, before being recaptured and killed by Achilles. As a son who is taken from his father's garden, Lycaon is the opposite of Odysseus; he is the tree that will always be missing.<sup>73</sup> At the same time, the discovery in *Odyssey* 24 that the number of a catalogue first compiled long before the Trojan War began has not changed suggests a movement out of the time of action and even the action of time itself. The path from the Catalogue of Ships to the catalogue of trees moves in the direction of the miniature, where things are small enough to be counted, catalogued, and also frozen in strange, artificial tableaux. In other words, if the hard reality of death in the *Iliad* made the catalogue of ships steadily less complete, then, from another point of view, the return of Odysseus to complete his father's catalogue speaks to its own kind of death, especially in terms of narrative action. Laertes faints when he realizes that Odysseus has at last returned, for his son is the last shoot, *phuton*, who was needed not only to recount but also to complete the sequence of trees in the orchard.<sup>74</sup> He is the last piece in the collection.<sup>75</sup> The space of Laertes' garden was animated by

<sup>72</sup> Dougherty 2001.

<sup>73</sup> Lycaon was caught by Achilles when cutting branches from his father's fig tree to make rails for a chariot (*Il.* 21.34–8).

<sup>74</sup> Pucci 1996, 11: "the son is one of the trees, all of them, the orchard itself."

<sup>75</sup> Baudrillard 1994, 13: "Might it not be that the missing item in the collection is in fact an indispensable and positive part of the whole, in so far as this lack is the basis of the subject's ability to grasp himself in objective terms? Whereas the acquisition of the final item would in effect denote the death of the subject, the absence of this item

Odysseus's absence; for as long as his son was away, Laertes would have gone on tending the trees and, during the warmer months, sleeping on their leaves (11.193). With Odysseus's return, however, Laertes' interest in the trees disappears, and the two walk away from the orchard.

According to the same pattern of objects that Xenophon laid out in the *Oeconomicus*, then, Odysseus can only reenter his *oikos* after he has made clear that he knows exactly where the things belonging to the *oikos* are. The articulation of the trees is the last in a sequence of remembrances – we have mentioned the bed he shares with Penelope and the importance of it having remained “in place” (*empedos*) while he was away. Let us not forget, as well, the storeroom around which Odysseus first hatched his plan to kill the suitors, the careful management of which was nearly derailed by the immaturity of Telemachus when he forgot to shut its door. In recounting the catalogue of trees, Odysseus remembers through his “mental body,” by taking an imaginary walk through the orchard in his mind, just as Minchin has suggested that Homer takes a cognitive walk through the Peloponnese in order to recount the Catalogue of Ships (2001, 84–7). The list of trees in Laertes' orchard, as if “planted” in Odysseus's mind when he was just a boy before the frame of the *Iliad* had begun, makes that second model for remembering explicit, and looks forward to Xenophon's spatial-mnemonic system in the *Oeconomicus*.<sup>76</sup> The progression of steps from Laertes' orchard to Cyrus's *paradeisos* and on to the training of Ischomachus's wife within the space of the house brings us to an understanding of how one claims or displays one's relationship to place by means of an accurate recounting of how that place is arranged. In each case, the careful ordering of elements within a catalogue-like structure leads to a spatial system that is reflected in the *psychê* or mind of its guardian. The capacity to hold that spatial system in the mind, as a visual picture that can be both indexed and navigated, anticipates what the Romans would come to classify as an artificial system in their construction of imaginary memory houses.

### *Digging*

There is more to be said about the use of trees in this story of memory and space, for it is not just that they are eminently countable or that they counteract the endless multiplication of epic leaves. There is also their

still allows him the possibility of simulating his death by envisaging it in an object, thereby warding off its menace.”

<sup>76</sup> Phemius says that the Muse “planted” the gift of song in him (*Od.* 22.347–8).

deep and rooted connection to the earth. Without wishing to put too fine a point on the connection between storing things in the earth (in underground jars) and planting trees in the soil, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the importance of digging. When Odysseus comes upon his father, he is digging around a shoot, λιστρεύοντα φυτόν (*Od.* 24.227), laboring in his orchard. As several scholars have observed, it is striking how much Laertes and his garden are associated with the activity of work.<sup>77</sup> De Romilly (1993) has pointed out that Laertes' orchard is just as plentiful as Alcinous's, yet she argues that it is completely human, with no recourse to the supernatural. Laertes digs the trees that provide a man-made model for remembering, and through manual work and *technê* the poem finds a way of escaping the need to fall back on divine inspiration in order to sustain an epic landscape.

In the *Oeconomicus*, too, Xenophon closes the work by illustrating a process of remembering through digging, by having Ischomachus teach Socrates how to plant a tree through the practice of recollection. The process works in a similar way to Plato's description of *anamnêsis* in the *Meno*.<sup>78</sup> Although Socrates believes that he does not know how to farm, he discovers – with the prodding of Ischomachus – that he actually does know but had somehow “forgotten” that he knew. Ischomachus describes his education of Socrates as a “refreshing of his memory” (ὑπομνήσκειν, 16.8), and, finally, his pupil is forced to agree that “I had forgotten that I knew this” (ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐλελήθη ἔμαυτὸν ἐπιστάμενος, 18.9), although he cannot specifically remember having learned it. Ischomachus helps Socrates to “remember” by having him first create a picture in his mind and then draw a series of associations from there. By visualizing a hole he has seen dug for planting, for instance, Socrates is able to work out how deep it should be (19.2–5). In this way, Ischomachus trains Socrates in the “natural” art of farming (and hence in the principles of *taxis*), much in the way he trains his wife, by demonstrating to them both how memory works as a series of pictures or experiences stored in the mind.<sup>79</sup> When arranged appropriately and put to the proper use, these pictures can lead the individual to act according to

<sup>77</sup> Cf. μόγησεν at *Od.* 24. 207, and Odysseus's description of Laertes at 24. 244–50.

<sup>78</sup> Pl. *Meno* 80eff., where the “natural” order of geometry helps to trigger the slave's recollection. Cf. Guthrie 1971, 17.

<sup>79</sup> Some have considered it improbable that Ischomachus could really be teaching Socrates anything, in the same way that he taught his wife. I disagree in this respect with Too 2001, who argues that Xenophon's portrayal of Ischomachus is ironic, and that we should read the character as a fool.

an ability he or she never knew they had.<sup>80</sup> This brings us back to Cyrus and his model garden, the good order of which stands as an outward manifestation of its owner's mind and body. Through the actions of Ischomachus and Socrates at the end of the *Oeconomicus*, the parallel between placing things in the house and planting trees in the ground now extends beyond the example of Cyrus's *paradeisos*.

As the *Oeconomicus* draws to a close, therefore, it focuses on the question of how memory works and how natural or innate it is. When questioned by Socrates as to whether he must know-but-have-forgotten several other skills besides that of farming, Ischomachus replies in the negative, claiming that farming naturally teaches or reminds men because it is a benevolent and gentle skill (19.17).<sup>81</sup> Likewise, because of the house's strong connection with a divinely imposed order of the sexes, it too fosters a memory system that is – here unlike the artificial *ars memoriae* of the Roman orators – founded upon the “natural” state of *taxis* that can be found in kinesiology (the movement of an army, or rowers in a trireme), agriculture, and aesthetics. Once that natural system is in place, moreover (which can only happen with the requisite amount of discipline and training), the human mind is equipped with a means of scaling down a vast amount of information into a manageable form. This might even reach the point where the scaled-down version is able to be glanced at, and comprehended, in a single visual instant. In this way, it comes close to achieving what the human narrator was supposedly able to do only with the help of the Muses in earlier forms of narrative. Ischomachus's wife emerges as an aid to the male narrator – a Muse of sorts – who manages a system for him by which he might create narratological order. Situated somewhere at the midpoint between housekeeper and muse, *oikos* and *mouseion*, she is also a prototype of the Hellenistic librarian.

Whereas the epic Muse, as we discussed in Chapter 1, is present everywhere as a kind of all-pervasive, unplaced eyewitness, the wife (like the librarian) is located in a specific space that she tracks through memory and sight. The number of countable things in her household corresponds, in human terms, to the number of grains of sand in the world, which the epic Muse could index down to the finest grain. The figure who stands in Laertes' orchard, too, is able to recount a “complete” and muselike view of space. The size of both the house and the garden make them the most

<sup>80</sup> Sorabji 1972, 5, note 1, discusses the concept that memory and imagination involve the seeing of internal pictures in Plato (and explicitly in Aristotle).

<sup>81</sup> See further Murnaghan 2006.

ordinary of spaces, but their smallness also draws them, in the same way as the miniature, toward an association with the magical and the supernatural. Thus Laertes' garden overlaps with Alcinous's, a space that is abundant in its plenitude and that Odysseus looks upon with delight. In Laertes' orchard, as in Scheria, numbers do not go up or down; they always stay the same.<sup>82</sup> Because time has no real effect on the place, it ends up as a kind of dead narrative space. All Laertes can do there is dig and wait, just as all Odysseus could do, in the immortal sequestered space of Calypso's island, was weep for his sense of being trapped in a place outside time.

We discussed earlier in this chapter how Socrates and Critoboulus opened the *Oeconomicus* by drawing a number of equations between the *oikos* and the self. They begin by establishing that ἡ οἰκία comprises one's personal property and whatever is beneficial to the self. They also draw a three-part comparison between the *sôma*, the *psyche*, and the *oikos*. This suggests that one's house, as a metaphorical and physical extension of the self, reflects upon the composition of one's mind. I have already discussed how Ischomachus's wife's "interiority" is associated with the interior of the *oikos*. Now I wish to reiterate that the ordering of both wife and house cannot be dissociated in the text – they both have a potential (*dunamis*) that Ischomachus, in training his wife, also trains his house to reveal (7.3; 9.2). The *oikos*, because it represents the order of the wife's mind through its own neatness or disorder, thereby emerges as an externalized version of not only her body, but also her *psyche*. Her training in the filing away of particular objects in specific spaces within the house is thereby predicated upon the training of her memory, which – according to a somewhat circular logic – is itself predicated upon the spatial model of the *oikos*.

At the same time, it is important to keep in mind the fact that the *Oeconomicus* is structured around a series of remembered conversations. I have suggested that the structure of these conversations is based on the architecture of the house. We know from other Socratic dialogues that the task of the narrator, in remembering an account, could sometimes be a formidable one. Critias practiced his story by going over it again and again in the *Timaeus*, Phaedrus had Lysias's speech written down, and Euclides kept notes of his discussions with Socrates in order to remember them.<sup>83</sup> Not only would Socrates have the topographies of

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Buchan 2004, 36–49.

<sup>83</sup> Pl. *Ti.* 25–6; *Phdr.* 228; *Tht.* 143a.

house and city to guide him in his remembering of the conversations he recounts, but the increasing emphasis on the visual in the text also suggests that he is remembering it as a series of pictures, much in the way that Aristotle suggests that memory works through mental images, or *phantasmata*. While Xenophon opens his account with “I once heard him . . .” (ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ, 1.1), Socrates begins his description of his encounter with Ischomachus with “I once saw him . . .” (ἰδὼν οὖν ποτε αὐτὸν, 7.1), and their discussion takes place surrounded by the paintings of the Stoa Poikilê. Moreover, the weight that Ischomachus places on the visual in the training of his wife (how beautiful a chorus, army, house, shoes, etc. all look when they are in order) is reflected in Socrates’ comparison of listening to Ischomachus’s description of her to watching an athletic competition or horse race, or to looking at a painting.<sup>84</sup> Socrates and Ischomachus together fix the wife in their (and their readers’) memories by a technique based on the visual capacity of the imagination.

Inasmuch as the representation of space in the *Oeconomicus* centers on finding things, it offers a closed system, which is very different to the way that stories about being lost work. In a sense, Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* presents the idea of a perfect map, where everything can be seen, correctly identified, and accounted for. Objects that were uncountable in the storage rooms of Herodotean monarchs are now countable in Ischomachus’s *oikos*, Cyrus’s *paradeisos*, and, by association, Laertes’ orchard. These figures make place quantifiable through objects, circumscribing the limits of the plots that contain them. The spaces that separate one thing from another are no longer considered as units of measurement, conferring distance, but simply as absolutes, sorting the different categories and regions of the world into a topological system.

For all of Xenophon’s strong ideological bias toward the “natural,” the *Oeconomicus* remains an artificial description of space. In repeating obsessively the beauty of order, whether it be shoes or trees that stand in rows, the *Oeconomicus* does not take up the idea of a narrative path that veers in the direction of new forms of space or into the time of action.<sup>85</sup> Ischomachus and his wife do not essentially *do* anything in the dialogue except arrange their goods into categories, like modern-day

<sup>84</sup> *Oec.* 7.9; 10.1 (discussed earlier in the chapter). On the mnemonic/rhetorical practice of creating an “interior painting,” see Rouveret 1989, 323.

<sup>85</sup> Bachelard 1994, 5, explains that the house is a structure that is “not experienced from day to day only, on the thread of a narrative.” Xenophon’s separation of the male and female quarters in the house (9.5) also appears to be overly schematic (Nevett 1995).

collectors of postage stamps or bottle tops. Baudrillard has referred to a “problematic of temporality” inherent in collecting, arguing that it is a practice that is disconnected from time (1994, 15–18). The repetition inherent in the idea of collecting, in the doubling of pot after pot in sequence down the line, is mirrored in the repetition of conversations, one after another, in the text. Xenophon’s idealized description of the beautiful “space between things” stands outside time and, in a very real sense, outside narrative action. Instead, the idea of the *oikos* presents us with something like a still life, based on the coordination of painting, repetition, and keeping things safe.

The “literary landscape” that the *Oeconomicus* leaves us with is like the ideal, imaginary map: fully encyclopedic and comprehensive, with each object visible within a single gaze. The kind of paralysis it effects on time and action is in part connected to the paralysis of complete memory, which stops time and leads to abundant description.<sup>86</sup> But it lacks the dynamic paths of narrative, just as memory systems based on the idea of storage and retrieval neglect the dynamic that accompanies speech and performance.<sup>87</sup> For all of the brilliance of Xenophon’s system, especially in the way that it responds to the problems inherent in space, representation, and narrative, it does not, nor could it ever, solve those problems. In this sense, the *Oeconomicus* continues the tradition that began with catalogues and ekphrasis in Homeric epic and culminated in the map, by warding off disorder and disorientation. This deferral can be best understood as a defensive strategy against the insufficiency of human vision. What is remarkable about Xenophon’s use of the catalogue in the *Oeconomicus*, however, is his ability to create a new technology for the Greek narrator in his thinking about space, continuing the quest for a view of literary space that can be “plotted” by the human eye, beyond the aid or the range of the epic Muse.

<sup>86</sup> Mitchell 1994, 183–207.

<sup>87</sup> J. Farrell 1997; Mueller 2007, with further references.





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